CourtListener 10763270•People v. Vasquez CA2/1
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Filed 12/22/25 P. v. Vasquez CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
THE PEOPLE, B340021
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA132627)
v.
BENJAMIN GARCIA VASQUEZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Rogelio Delgado, Judge. Reversed and
remanded with directions.
Richard B. Lennon, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Nima Razfar, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
The trial court denied defendant Benjamin Garcia
Vasquez’s motion for mental health diversion pursuant to Penal
Code1 section 1001.36, and sentenced him to three years
imprisonment following his no contest plea to battery with injury
on a peace officer. Vasquez claims, the Attorney General agrees,
and we concur that the trial court misapplied section 1001.36’s
statutory criteria when denying him diversion. We conditionally
vacate Vasquez’s no contest plea and sentence, and remand for
the trial court to reconsider the motion for mental health
diversion under the applicable criteria.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
As Vasquez pleaded no contest, we summarize his offense
conduct from evidence presented at the preliminary hearing. On
March 27, 2023, a tenant observed Vasquez sitting next to trash
bins she kept on the side of her residence; the tenant’s relative
told her Vasquez had defecated next to the trash cans. Vasquez
refused to leave the property when asked and hurled a brick-
sized metal object at the landowner. When a deputy with the Los
Angeles County Sheriff’s Department responded, Vasquez struck
the deputy in the face with a ball of wire, and again on the top of
the head, before being subdued. Vasquez’s actions caused
abrasions to the deputy’s face and knuckles.
At the time he battered the deputy, Vasquez was on
probation for a 2021 conviction for assault with a deadly weapon
(§ 245, subd. (c)). The court held a probation revocation hearing
along with the preliminary hearing and revoked Vasquez’s
probation.
1 Unspecified statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
An information filed on June 27, 2023, charged Vasquez
with one count of battery with injury on a peace officer (§ 243,
subd. (c)(2)) and further alleged Vasquez’s 2021 assault with a
deadly weapon conviction qualified as a prior strike under the
Three Strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)).
On April 5, 2024, Vasquez filed a motion for pretrial mental
health diversion under section 1001.36. The motion included a
written evaluation from psychologist Dr. Efrain Beliz, Jr., and a
conditional letter of acceptance for a treatment program at the
Los Angeles Restoration Church. Dr. Beliz’s evaluation stated
that Vasquez met the recognized diagnostic criteria for stimulant
use disorder, alcohol use disorder, cannabis use disorder, and
delusional disorder. Dr. Beliz observed that Vasquez attended
two substance abuse rehabilitation programs in the past;
Vasquez said he left the first one without completing it “because I
felt they were torturing me.” Dr. Beliz opined that Vasquez’s
disorders remained active, that they were the primary cause of
his behavior, and that Vasquez was amenable to treatment. Dr.
Beliz concluded that Vasquez posed minimal risk of future violent
behavior provided Vasquez did not resume abusing substances
and adhered to substance abuse treatment, random toxicology
screening, anti-craving medication, and housing assistance.
At a hearing on August 6, 2024, the court denied the
request for diversion. The court explained it was “cognizant of
the fact that the defendant is on probation and the strike case is
the probation case,” and recognized that Vasquez was “suffering
from some type of abuse/mental illness issue. Looking at the
prior record of the probation violation, he was sent to a
program . . . . He was given a couple of chances, [but] couldn’t
complete it for whatever reason. So the court is cognizant of that.
3
And counsel did file a motion for mental health diversion. So
that should be noted on the record. But this court has decided to
deny that motion due to the fact . . . he is not suitable due to his
prior history and the fact he was due for sentencing on the
probation violation itself.”
Vasquez pleaded no contest to the sole charge against him.
The court struck the prior strike allegation and sentenced
Vasquez to the upper term of three years for the battery charge,
along with a concurrent low term sentence of three years for the
probation violation.
Vasquez filed a timely notice of appeal, and the trial court
granted Vasquez’s request for a certificate of probable cause to
appeal the denial of his motion for mental health diversion.
DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
We review a ruling on a motion for mental health diversion
for abuse of discretion and the facts underlying that ruling for
substantial evidence. (People v. Whitmill (2022) 86 Cal.App.5th
1138, 1147.) “ ‘A court abuses its discretion when it makes an
arbitrary or capricious decision by applying the wrong legal
standard [citations], or bases its decision on express or implied
factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ”
(Ibid.)
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B. The Trial Court Erred When Analyzing Vasquez’s
Suitability for Diversion
Section 1001.362 contemplates a two-step analysis in which
the trial court first determines whether Vasquez is eligible for
diversion, and if he is eligible then whether he is suitable for such
relief. Vasquez’s eligibility for diversion was not disputed. As his
offense did not render him categorically ineligible (§ 1001.36,
subd. (d)), his eligibility was governed by section 1001.36,
subdivision (b). The trial court found, and substantial evidence
supports, that Vasquez was eligible for diversion. He suffered
from mental health issues, and the court did not find by clear and
convincing evidence (as section 1001.36, subdivision (b)(2)
requires to find a defendant ineligible) that Vasquez’s mental
health conditions were not a motivating, causal, or contributing
factor to his offense.
Because Vasquez “satisfie[d] the eligibility requirements in
subdivision (b),” the court was next to “consider whether
[Vasquez] is suitable for pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.36,
subd. (c).) The court found that Vasquez was not suitable, but
when reaching that conclusion it misapplied the appropriate
statutory criteria.
Section 1001.36, subdivision (c) sets forth four criteria, all
of which must be met, for a court to find a defendant suitable for
diversion. The first two are not at issue here: Dr. Beliz opined
the symptoms that contributed to Vasquez’s criminal behavior
2 While this appeal was pending, the Legislature amended
section 1001.36, with the changes effective as of January 1, 2025.
(Stats. 2024, ch. 646, § 1, ch. 647, § 1.5.) We cite to the current
version of the statute as those amendments do not impact
Vasquez’s appeal.
5
would respond to mental health treatment (id., subd. (c)(1)), and
Vasquez consented to diversion and waived his right to a speedy
trial (id., subd. (c)(2)).
The remaining two criteria are whether Vasquez would
“pose an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety,” meaning
that he was likely to commit a so-called super-strike offense,3 “if
treated in the community” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)), and whether
Vasquez “agree[d] to comply with treatment as a condition of
diversion” (id., subd. (c)(3)). The court’s order denying diversion,
however, was untethered to either of these criteria, and said only
that Vasquez was not suitable “due to his prior history” without
further elaboration as what that meant, “the fact [Vasquez] was
due for sentencing on the probation violation itself,” and that
Vasquez was previously “sent to a program, the [Los Angeles]
Restoration Church” where “[h]e was given a couple of chances[
but] couldn’t complete it for whatever reason.”
With regard to an unreasonable risk of danger to public
safety (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4)), the court’s reference to Vasquez’s
“prior history” and that he “was due for sentencing on the
probation violation itself” indicate only that Vasquez had a prior
strike for assault with a deadly weapon, and had battered a
police officer while on probation for the strike offense. Neither of
Vasquez’s two prior offenses are super strikes or indicative that
Vasquez is likely to commit a future super-strike offense.
(Sarmiento v. Superior Court (2024) 98 Cal.App.5th 882, 897;
People v. Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1151.) The court
accordingly did not adhere to the statutory criteria governing
dangerousness because it did not determine whether Vasquez
3 See People v. Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at p. 1149.
6
was likely to commit a super-strike offense if treated in the
community.
To the extent the court’s comments were meant to assess
the bona fides of Vasquez’s agreement “to comply with treatment
as a condition of diversion” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(3)), it appears to
have confused the facts. Vasquez did previously seek drug abuse
treatment, but nothing in the record indicates that prior
treatment was at the Los Angeles Restoration Church. Instead,
that church was the provider willing to treat him as part of this
case, which did not occur because the court denied diversion.
Further, if the court’s statements about “prior history” and
Vasquez’s inability to complete a prior treatment program
referred to the prior efforts at treatment referenced in Dr. Beliz’s
report, the court stated it did not know anything about why
Vasquez could not complete that previous treatment. These
limited facts were therefore not substantial evidence that
Vasquez would not follow through with his current agreement to
treatment. If the court lacked necessary information, section
1001.36, subdivision (e) permitted it to require an additional
showing from Vasquez, but the court made no such inquiry.
We finally note that the court had residual discretion to
deny the motion for diversion even if Vasquez met all the express
criteria for suitability. (Sarmiento v. Superior Court, supra, 98
Cal.App.5th at p. 892.) “But this ‘residual’ discretion must be
exercised ‘ “consistent with the principles and purpose of the
governing law.” ’ [Citations.] That purpose includes a strong
legislative preference for treatment of mental health disorders
because of the benefits of such treatment to both the offending
individual and the community. Where the court chooses to
exercise this residual discretion to deny diversion, its statement
7
of reasons should reflect consideration of the underlying purposes
of the statute and explain why diversion would not meet those
goals.” (Id. at pp. 892-892.) The court’s statement of reasons
does not reflect that it was exercising its residual discretion, as
its reasoning does not reflect considerations such as the
underlying purposes of the statute or an explanation of why
diversion would not meet those goals.
Vasquez requests that in light of the error in applying
section 1001.36 we reverse the trial court’s ruling and remand
with directions for the court to grant diversion. We agree,
however, with the Attorney General that the better course is to
conditionally vacate Vasquez’s no contest plea and sentence, and
remand the matter with directions to the trial court to hold a new
hearing to determine Vasquez’s motion for mental health
diversion using the criteria set forth in section 1001.36. (See,
e.g., People v. Qualkinbush (2022) 79 Cal.App.5th 879, 892;
People v. Moine (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 440, 452.)
8
DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is conditionally reversed. The
matter is remanded for the trial court to consider whether
Vasquez is eligible and suitable for mental health diversion. If
the court determines mental health diversion is appropriate, it
shall so order. If the court denies the motion for mental health
diversion, it shall reinstate the no contest plea, conviction, and
sentence.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
WEINGART, J.
We concur:
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
M. KIM, J.
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