People v. Hornsby CA2/7

CourtListener 10761186CalctappDec 18, 2025

Full text

Filed 12/18/25 P. v. Hornsby CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B336873

Plaintiff and (Los Angeles County
Respondent, Super. Ct. No. SA108978)

v.

COREY ALLEN HORNSBY,

Defendant and
Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Lana S. Kim, Judge. Affirmed.
Debbie Yen, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Heidi Salerno, Deputy Attorney General,
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_____________________

Corey Allen Hornsby appeals from a judgment of conviction
entered after a jury found him guilty of second degree robbery,
possession of a stun gun, and resisting a peace officer. Hornsby
contends the trial court made several errors in instructing the
jury, including failing to instruct on theft as a lesser included
offense of robbery and incorrectly instructing on the elements of
possession of a stun gun and resisting a peace officer. We affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. The Evidence at Trial
On the afternoon of October 11, 2023 Kyaw Thein was
working in a sunglasses store in Santa Monica. He was alone in
the store when Hornsby entered and took “three to four
sunglasses in a row” and “put them in the pocket of his
backpack.” Thein thought this was unusual because most
customers picked up one pair of sunglasses, tried them on, and
then put them down to pick up another. Because Hornsby was
acting suspiciously, Thein moved from his position at the register
toward the door. Hornsby tried on a pair of sunglasses and then,
rather than going to the cash register, Hornsby “slowly walked to
the exit.” Hornsby tried to leave the store, but Thein locked the
door. Hornsby pushed Thein, and they struggled while Thein
tried to prevent Hornsby from leaving. At some point Hornsby
“maybe” hit Thein in the face. After about a minute Thein let
Hornsby unlock the door and leave. Thein was in “total shock”
and afraid that Hornsby might have a weapon and harm him.

2
Hornsby left the store with four pairs of designer sunglasses, two
of which were worth approximately $300 each.
Sean Morris was walking on the sidewalk outside the
sunglasses store on the afternoon of October 11 when he heard “a
loud thud against the glass” of the store. Morris saw Hornsby
“actively trying to get past what looked to be the store worker,
who was trying to block him from leaving. And it very quickly
became a physical kind of brawl.” Thein tried to hold Hornsby
from behind, and Hornsby “pushed [Thein] back and choked him
a little bit to try and leave.” Morris heard Thein yell for someone
to call the police. At one point it appeared Thein was able to lock
the door because Morris saw the gate coming down, but Hornsby
“threw off” Thein and unlocked the door. Hornsby “slipped
through and casually walked away.” Morris watched the
altercation for approximately 20 to 30 seconds, at which point he
began filming the incident on his phone. The 11-second video
was played for the jury. After Hornsby walked away, Morris
called the police to report the incident.
Santa Monica Police Officers Justin Buonarati and
Christian Goretti were on patrol on October 11 when they
received a radio call regarding a robbery that had taken place a
block from their location. Both officers were in uniform and were
traveling in a marked police vehicle. As they approached the
area of the sunglasses store, Officer Buonarati saw Hornsby, who
matched the description of the robbery suspect. Officer
Buonarati got out of the car and told Hornsby to “stop and get on
the ground.” Officer Buonarati testified that Hornsby did not
stop, and Officer Buonarati repeated the command at least one

3
more time.1 Hornsby continued walking and said, “Fuck you.” As
Hornsby passed him, Officer Buonarati “grabbed [Hornsby’s]
right arm with [his] right arm and grabbed the back of
[Hornsby’s] neck with [his left arm].” Officer Buonarati “did a
light sweep to get [Hornsby] to the ground.” Hornsby tried to
push himself up while Officer Goretti grabbed Hornsby’s left arm.
Hornsby continued struggling and kicking while the officers
handcuffed him. The officers recovered the stolen sunglasses
from Hornsby’s backpack. Officer Goretti searched Hornsby and
found a stun gun in Hornsby’s front pants pocket.
Hornsby stipulated that he had suffered a conviction in
2002 for felony assault with a deadly weapon. Hornsby did not
present evidence in his defense.

B. The Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Hornsby guilty of second degree robbery
(Pen. Code, § 211),2 possessing a stun gun after a prior felony
conviction (§ 22610, subd. (a)), and resisting a peace officer
(§ 148, subd. (a)(1)).3 The trial court sentenced Hornsby to a
state prison term of six years for second degree robbery,
consisting of the middle term of three years, doubled under the
three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12). The court
imposed concurrent terms of 180 days for possession of a stun

1 Officer Goretti testified he heard Buonarati tell Hornsby to
stop “approximately one time.”
2 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 The jury found Hornsby not guilty of carrying a dirk or
dagger in violation of section 21310.

4
gun and 364 days for resisting a peace officer. Hornsby timely
appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Not Instructing the Jury on
Theft
1. Governing law and standard of review
A trial court in a criminal case has a duty to instruct on
general principles of law applicable to the case that are “‘“‘closely
and openly connected with the facts before the court, and which
are necessary for the jury’s understanding of the case.’”’” (People
v. Valdez (2004) 32 Cal.4th 73, 115; accord, People v. Young
(2005) 34 Cal.4th 1149, 1200.) This includes a duty to instruct
the jury sua sponte on all lesser included offenses if there is
substantial evidence from which a jury can reasonably conclude
the defendant committed the lesser, uncharged offense, but not
the greater offense. (People v. Smith (2018) 4 Cal.5th 1134, 1163;
People v. Whalen (2013) 56 Cal.4th 1, 68.) This instructional
requirement “‘prevents either party, whether by design or
inadvertence, from forcing an all-or-nothing choice between
conviction of the stated offense on the one hand, or complete
acquittal on the other. Hence, the rule encourages a verdict,
within the charge chosen by the prosecution, that is neither
“harsher [n]or more lenient than the evidence merits.”’” (People
v. Smith (2013) 57 Cal.4th 232, 239-240; accord, People v. Banks
(2014) 59 Cal.4th 1113, 1159-1160.)
Substantial evidence in this context is evidence “‘“sufficient
‘to deserve consideration by the jury,’ not ‘whenever any evidence
is presented, no matter how weak.’”’” (People v. Wilson (2005)

5
36 Cal.4th 309, 331.) An instruction is not required where only
“[s]peculative, minimal, or insubstantial evidence” supports the
instruction. (People v. Simon (2016) 1 Cal.5th 98, 132, 134.) In
deciding whether to give a defense instruction, the court must
“view the evidence in the light most favorable to the defendant.”
(People v. Millbrook (2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1137.)
We review a defendant’s claims of instructional error de
novo. (People v. Simon, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 133 [failure to
instruct on lesser included offense]; People v. Posey (2004)
32 Cal.4th 193, 218.)

2. Theft as a lesser included offense of robbery
Robbery is “the felonious taking of personal property in the
possession of another, from his person or immediate presence,
and against his will, accomplished by means of force or fear.”
(§ 211; see People v. Williams (2013) 57 Cal.4th 776, 781, 786.) A
taking for purposes of robbery is “either the gaining possession or
the carrying away” of property. (People v. Cooper (1991)
53 Cal.3d 1158, 1165, fn. 8.) “‘[T]he crime of robbery is a
continuing offense that begins from the time of the original
taking until the robber reaches a place of relative safety.’”
(People v. Anderson (2011) 51 Cal.4th 989, 994 (Anderson).)
“‘The terms “force” and “fear” as used in the definition of
the crime of robbery have no technical meaning peculiar to the
law and must be presumed to be within the understanding of
jurors.’” (People v. Griffin (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1015, 1025-1026.)
Something more is required than the quantum of force necessary
to accomplish the mere seizing of the property (Anderson, supra,
51 Cal.4th at p. 995; People v. Burns (2009) 172 Cal.App.4th
1251, 1259), but only such force as is necessary to overcome the

6
victim’s resistance. (See Burns, at p. 1259; People v. Mungia
(1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 1703, 1708 [proper inquiry is whether
“defendant engage[d] in a measure of force at the time of taking
to overcome the victim’s resistance”]; see also Griffin, at p. 1025
[the degree of force used, if not merely incidental, is immaterial].)
Theft, defined in section 484 as the felonious stealing,
taking, carrying, leading or driving away the personal property of
another, is a lesser included offense of robbery. (People v.
Whalen, supra, 56 Cal.4th at p. 69; People v. DePriest (2007)
42 Cal.4th 1, 50.) “The crime [of robbery] is essentially a theft
with two aggravating factors, that is, a taking (1) from [the]
victim’s person or immediate presence, and (2) accomplished by
the use of force or fear.” (Miller v. Superior Court (2004)
115 Cal.App.4th 216, 221; accord, DePriest, at p. 50.)

3. Substantial evidence did not support an instruction
on theft
The evidence at trial established that Thein and Hornsby
engaged in a physical struggle when Hornsby tried to leave the
sunglasses shop with the sunglasses in his backpack. Both Thein
and Morris testified that Hornsby pushed Thein, and Morris saw
Hornsby choke Thein. Morris said the physical altercation lasted
approximately 30 seconds. In addition, the jury viewed the 11-
second video depicting the confrontation. Based on this evidence,
there was no basis upon which a jury could conclude Hornsby
took the sunglasses without the use of force unless the jury
rejected the uncontradicted evidence presented by the
prosecution. The possibility that a jury might reject the
prosecution’s evidence does not establish substantial evidence to
support an instruction on a lesser included offense. (See People v.

7
Friend (2009) 47 Cal.4th 1, 51 [lesser included offense instruction
not warranted where “there was no reason why the jury would
have rejected the prosecution’s evidence that defendant
committed a robbery”]; People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 514
[“‘if there is no proof, other than an unexplainable rejection of the
prosecution’s evidence, that the offense was less than that
charged, such instructions [on lesser included offenses] shall not
be given’”].)
Hornsby argues that despite the physical altercation at the
door of the store, there was substantial evidence he “intended to
shoplift, but did not intend to use force or fear such that he would
commit a robbery and only used ‘force’ in response to Thein’s
unexplained actions in locking the door on him.”4 This argument
misapprehends the applicable law. As discussed, robbery is an
ongoing crime that continues until the robber reaches a place of
safety. (Anderson, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 994.) A defendant may
“conceive[] the intent to steal either before or during the
commission of the act of force against the victim.” (People v.
Jackson (2016) 1 Cal.5th 269, 343.) Accordingly, a robbery occurs
“where the perpetrator peacefully acquires the victim’s property,
but then uses force to retain or escape with it.” (Miller v.
Superior Court, supra, 115 Cal.App.4th at p. 222; see People v.

4 Hornsby also argues the jury could have found he had no
intent to steal the sunglasses and merely placed them in his bag
“as a way of holding them while he continued shopping and [had]
not realized that his actions could be construed as a prelude to
shoplifting.” This inference is not only unreasonable, but was
rejected by the jury; had the jury believed Hornsby had no intent
to steal the sunglasses, it could not have found him guilty of
robbery.

8
Phillips (1962) 201 Cal.App.2d 383, 385 [“escape of the robber
with the loot is a part of the robbery itself”].)
Here, even if Hornsby initially intended to commit only
theft, once he used force to flee and to physically resist Thein’s
attempts to retain the sunglasses, the theft was converted into a
robbery. (See People v. Gomez (2008) 43 Cal.4th 249, 253, 265
[sufficient evidence of robbery where defendant peacefully stole
property but shot at victim while driving away]; People v.
Mendez-Torres (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1016 [use of force in
response to a “‘a victim’s physical resistance will convert a theft
into a robbery’”].) In order to have convicted Hornsby of theft
(and not robbery), the jury would need to have concluded Hornsby
used no force in taking the sunglasses and no force in getting
away. The evidence is to the contrary.5

B. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury on
Possession of a Stun Gun
1. Governing law and standard of review
When instructions are alleged to be ambiguous or
conflicting, we “‘review[ ] the wording of a jury instruction de
novo and assesses whether the instruction accurately states the
law.’” (People v. Lewis (2023) 14 Cal.5th 876, 900 (Lewis).) “‘The
challenged instruction is viewed “in the context of the

5 Hornsby’s argument that the jury was “troubled as to
whether [he] even used force” is unavailing. During deliberations
the jury submitted a question asking for “the definition of ‘force’
and what the threshold is to consider an action ‘forceful.’” The
jury’s request for clarification on the use of force does not show
the jury was “troubled” about that issue or believed that no force
was used.

9
instructions as a whole and the trial record to determine whether
there is a reasonable likelihood the jury applied the instruction in
an impermissible manner.”’” (Ibid.; accord, People v. Mitchell
(2019) 7 Cal.5th 561, 579.) “[W]e must . . . not judge a single jury
instruction in artificial isolation out of the context of the charge
and the entire trial record. [Citations.] When a claim is made
that instructions are deficient, we must determine whether their
meaning was objectionable as communicated to the jury. If the
meaning of instructions as communicated to the jury was
unobjectionable, the instructions cannot be deemed erroneous.”
(People v. Dieguez (2001) 89 Cal.App.4th 266, 276; accord, Lewis
at p. 900.)
“When instructions are claimed to be conflicting or
ambiguous, ‘we inquire whether the jury was “reasonably likely”
to have construed them in a manner that violates the defendant’s
rights.’ [Citation.] . . . We assume that the jurors are
‘“‘intelligent persons and capable of understanding and
correlating all jury instructions . . . given.’”’” (People v. Franco
(2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 713, 720; accord, People v. Covarrubias
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 838, 906 (Covarrubias) [“we inquire whether
there is a reasonable likelihood that the jury misunderstood or
misapplied the instruction”]; People v. Rogers (2006) 39 Cal.4th
826, 873.)

2. There is no reasonable likelihood the jury
misunderstood the law based on the modified
CALCRIM No. 252 instruction
Hornsby contends the trial court’s instruction with
CALCRIM No. 252 allowed the jury to improperly convict him of
possession of a stun gun without a finding he had knowledge the

10
object was a weapon, which was a required element to prove
unlawful possession of a stun gun under section 22610,
subdivision (a). This contention lacks merit.
Section 22610, subdivision (a), states: “No person convicted
of a felony or any crime involving an assault . . . shall purchase,
possess, or use any stun gun.” Because the statute does not
specify an intent requirement, it is considered a general intent
crime. (People v. Rubalcava (2000) 23 Cal.4th 322, 328 [“‘When
the definition of a crime consists of only the description of a
particular act, without reference to intent to do a further act or
achieve a future consequence, we ask whether the defendant
intended to do the proscribed act. This intention is deemed to be
a general criminal intent.’”].) However, the Supreme Court has
clarified that crimes for unlawful possession of a weapon have a
knowledge requirement where the law criminalizes otherwise
lawful conduct. (Id. at p. 332.) In Rubalcava, for example, the
court stated that to find a defendant guilty of the unlawful
carrying of a concealed dirk or dagger under former
section 12020, subdivision (a), “the defendant must knowingly
and intentionally carry concealed upon his or her person an
instrument ‘that is capable of ready use as a stabbing weapon.’
[Citation.] A defendant who does not know that he is carrying
the weapon or that the concealed instrument may be used as
a . . . weapon is therefore not guilty of violating” the unlawful
possession statute. (Rubalcava, at p. 332.)
The trial court properly instructed the jury on the elements
of unlawful possession of a stun gun with a modified version of
CALCRIM No. 2500 as follows: “The defendant is charged in
Count 3 with unlawfully possessing a weapon, specifically a stun
gun in violation of Penal Code section 22610(a). [¶] To prove

11
that the defendant is guilty of this crime, the People must prove
that: [¶] 1. The defendant possessed a stun gun; [¶] 2. The
defendant knew that he possessed the stun gun; [¶] 3. The
defendant was previously convicted of a felony; [¶] AND [¶]
4. The defendant knew that the object was a weapon. [¶] The
People do not have to prove that the defendant intended to use
the object as a weapon.”
Because Hornsby was charged both with specific intent
offenses (robbery and resisting arrest) and general intent offenses
(possession of a stun gun and possession of a dirk or dagger), the
trial court properly instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 252,
which explains the union of act and intent for both specific and
general intent crimes. The modified version of CALCRIM
No. 252 given to the jury stated in the first paragraph: “The
crimes charged in Counts 1-4 require[] proof of the union, or joint
operation, of act and wrongful intent.” The instruction continued
in the second paragraph: “The following crimes require general
criminal intent: PC 21310, as charged in Count 2 and
PC 22610(a), as charged in Count 3. For you to find a person
guilty of these crimes, that person must not only commit the
prohibited act, but must do so with wrongful intent. A person
acts with wrongful intent when he or she intentionally does a
prohibited act; however, it is not required that he or she intend to
break the law. The act required is explained in the instruction
for that crime.”
The court then instructed the jury with the third paragraph
of CALCRIM No. 252: “The following crimes require[] a specific
intent or mental state: PC 211, as charged in Count 1 and
PC 148(a)(l) as charged in Count 4. For you to find a person
guilty of these crimes, that person must not only intentionally

12
commit the prohibited act, but must do so with a specific intent.
The act and the specific intent required are explained in the
instruction for that crime.”
Hornsby argues the trial court’s inclusion of possession of a
stun gun in the second paragraph of CALCRIM No. 252
regarding general intent crimes was error because the jurors
would have believed they could convict him of possession of a
stun gun based solely on a finding he acted with wrongful intent,
without finding he had the required knowledge that the stun gun
was a weapon. In support of this argument Hornsby relies on the
bench notes for CALCRIM No. 252, which state “[i]f the crime
requires a specific mental state, such as knowledge or malice, the
court must insert the name of the offense in the third paragraph
[regarding specific intent], explaining the mental state
requirement, even if the crime is classified as a general intent
offense.” (Bench notes to CALCRIM No. 252.) The third
paragraph of the CALCRIM No. 252 pattern instruction provides
additional language “as needed”: “The specific [mental state]
required for the crime of _____ is ______.”
Hornsby is correct that the trial court did not instruct the
jury in strict compliance with the bench notes to
CALCRIM No. 252 because the court listed possession of a stun
gun as a general intent crime without instructing with the
additional language that conviction of the crime required a
specific mental state (knowledge the stun gun was a weapon). It
would have been a better practice for the trial court to have
included this language in the third paragraph. However, the
bench notes are not binding authority. (See People v. Morales
(2001) 25 Cal.4th 34, 48, fn. 7 [“we caution that jury instructions,
whether published or not, are not themselves the law, and are

13
not authority to establish legal propositions or precedent”]; People
v. Garcia (2020) 46 Cal.App.5th 123, 155, fn. 32 [“bench notes are
not authority for legal principles”].)
Moreover, in the context of the instructions as a whole,
there is no reasonable likelihood the jury was misled by the
court’s inclusion of possession of a stun gun in the second
paragraph of CALCRIM No. 252 regarding general intent rather
than in the third paragraph on mental state. (See Lewis, supra,
14 Cal.5th at p. 900.) The jury was instructed in the second
paragraph with respect to the general intent crimes that the “act
required is explained in the instruction for that crime.” The
court’s instruction on CALCRIM No. 2500 made clear that to find
Hornsby guilty of possession of a stun gun, the jury had to find
Hornsby “knew that the object was a weapon.” In order to find
Hornsby guilty of possession based on general intent alone, the
jury would have needed to ignore the court’s instruction on the
knowledge requirement. “‘[W]e of course presume “that jurors
understand and follow the court’s instructions.”’” (People v.
Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th 658, 746; accord, People v. Anderson
(2018) 5 Cal.5th 372, 419 [“‘[a]bsent a contrary indication in the
record, it must be assumed the jury followed [the court’s
instruction]’”].) Nothing in the record supports a finding the jury
did not follow understand and follow the court’s instructions.
People v. Castillo (1997) 16 Cal.4th 1009 is directly on
point. In Castillo, the trial court instructed the jury with
CALJIC No. 4.21 that voluntary intoxication could negate specific
intent to kill with respect to the murder and attempted murder
counts but failed to state voluntary intoxication could negate the
mental states of premeditation and deliberation. (Id. at p. 1016.)
The Supreme Court held the instruction “was correct although,

14
by itself, it would not have been complete. . . . Although the trial
court might have adapted the first paragraph of CALJIC No. 4.21
to refer to both the specific intent necessary for murder and the
additional mental state necessary for first degree murder, its
failure to do so did not mislead the jury in light of the rest of the
instructions.” (Id. at p. 1017.)
Hornsby urges us to follow People v. Southard (2021)
62 Cal.App.5th 424, in which the Court of Appeal concluded the
failure to include in CALCRIM No. 250 (on general intent crimes)
the required mental state was error because it instructed the jury
that it “could convict defendant on all counts solely if it found ‘he
intentionally [did] a prohibited act; however it is not required
that [he] intended to breach the law.’” (Id. at pp. 666-667, italics
added.) Southard is distinguishable. In Southard, the defendant
was charged with resisting a police officer and possession of
methamphetamine, both general intent crimes that contain a
knowledge requirement. (Id. at p. 437.) The Court of Appeal
concluded the general intent instruction and instructions on the
specific offenses were “contradictory,” noting the trial court had
disregarded the “express boldface warning in the Bench Notes.”
(Ibid.) It is not clear from the opinion why the court read
CALCRIM No. 250 to mean the jury could convict the defendant
of the offenses “solely” if he intentionally committed the acts, i.e.,
without having the necessary knowledge. As discussed, in this
case nothing in the court’s instruction with CACLRIM No. 252
contradicts the court’s instruction with CALCRIM No. 2500 on
the elements of the offense. And, as discussed, the failure to
instruct a jury in conformance with the bench notes is not error
in the absence of conflicting or confusing instructions.

15
C. The Trial Court Did Not Err in Instructing the Jury on
Resisting a Peace Officer
1. Substantial evidence did not support an instruction
on excessive force
Hornsby argues the trial court erred by not instructing the
jury with portions of CALCRIM Nos. 2656 and 2670 on the use of
excessive force. The court instructed the jury with a modified
version of CALCRIM No. 2656, stating: “The defendant is
charged in Count 4 with resisting a peace officer in the
performance or attempted performance of his duties in violation
of Penal Code section 148(a). [¶] To prove that the defendant is
guilty of this crime, the People must prove that: [¶] l. Officer
Buonarati was a peace officer lawfully performing or attempting
to perform his duties as a peace officer; [¶] 2. The defendant
willfully resisted Officer Buonarati in the performance or
attempted performance of those duties; [¶] AND [¶] 3. When the
defendant acted, he knew, or reasonably should have known, that
Officer Buonarati was a peace officer performing or attempting to
perform his duties.” (Italics omitted.)
Hornsby argues the trial court erred in failing to instruct
the jury with the bracketed portion of the CALCRIM No. 2656
pattern instruction (to be given when lawful performance is an
issue), which states, “A peace officer is not lawfully performing
his or her duties if he or she is (unlawfully arresting or detaining
someone/ [or] using unreasonable or excessive force in his or her
duties).” Hornsby likewise argues the court should have
instructed the jury with CALCRIM No. 2670 on the use of
excessive force, which states, “A peace officer is not lawfully
performing his or her duties if he or she is . . . using unreasonable

16
or excessive force when making or attempting to make an
otherwise lawful arrest or detention.”
As discussed, a trial court has a sua sponte duty to instruct
on general principles of law applicable to the case, which includes
a duty to instruct on a particular defense “if it appears that the
defendant was relying on the defense, or that there was
substantial evidence supportive of the defense, and the defense
was not inconsistent with the defendant’s theory of the case.”
(People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 581.) Use of
excessive force by a peace officer is a “defense[] available to a
charge of violating section 148 (resisting, delaying or obstructing
a police officer in the performance of his duty)” because “excessive
force by a police officer renders unlawful an otherwise lawful
arrest in that excessive force is not within the performance of the
officer’s duty.” (People v. Olguin (1981) 119 Cal.App.3d 39, 44.)
The evidence in this case did not support an instruction on
excessive use of force. Officer Buonarati testified he told Hornsby
to “stop and get on the ground,” but Hornsby kept walking.
Officer Buonarati then grabbed Hornsby and executed a leg
sweep to get Hornsby to the ground. Hornsby struggled while the
two officers handcuffed him. Hornsby did not argue at trial that
this use of force was excessive for apprehending a robbery
suspect. In his closing argument, Hornsby’s counsel did not claim
Hornsby was resisting an excessive use of force by the police
officers, and instead argued the encounter happened so quickly
that Hornsby’s behavior could not be construed as resistance.6

6 In his closing argument, Hornsby’s counsel stated, “The
cops say one time, ‘Get on the ground.’ . . . And then less than
10 seconds later he grabs Mr. Hornsby by the neck, by the arm
and leg sweep and takes him down to the ground in less than

17
On this record there was not substantial evidence to support a
finding by the jury of excessive force.

2. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
responding to the jury’s question
After it began deliberating, the jury sent a note to the trial
court stating, “Does the [officer] have to state the reason for
stopping or detaining a person at the time or prior to the time
they attempted to stop or detain the individual in order to make
it lawful?” The court read the note to counsel for the parties and
informed them it intended to refer the jury to the instruction for
resisting a peace officer (CALCRIM No. 2656). Neither the
prosecutor nor defense counsel objected. Accordingly, the trial
court responded to the jury’s note by writing, “Please refer to jury
instruction #2646 and look at the elements.”
Section 1138 provides, “After the jury have retired for
deliberation . . . if they desire to be informed on any point of law
arising in the case, they must require the officer to conduct them
into court. Upon being brought into court, the information
required must be given in the presence of, or after notice to, the
prosecuting attorney, and the defendant or his counsel, or after
they have been called.” The Supreme Court has explained, “The

10 seconds. ‘You have 10 seconds to listen to me or I’m taking
you to the ground.’ And that’s resisting? Mr. Hornsby is on the
ground having been tackled. He still doesn’t know why he’s being
arrested. The officers still haven’t told him. He is on his side on
his arm and trying to get his arm out, and that took that as
resisting and struggling. Is it? Or is it because: ‘Hey, I’m on my
arm and another 200 pounds is on top of me. Can I please get it
out?’”

18
court has a primary duty to help the jury understand the legal
principles it is asked to apply. [Citation.] This does not mean the
court must always elaborate on the standard instructions. Where
the original instructions are themselves full and complete, the
court has discretion under section 1138 to determine what
additional explanations are sufficient to satisfy the jury’s request
for information. [Citation.] Indeed, comments diverging from the
standard are often risky.” (People v. Beardslee (1991) 53 Cal.3d
68, 97; accord, People v. Cleveland (2004) 32 Cal.4th 704, 755; see
People v. Smithey (1999) 20 Cal.4th 936, 984-985 [a trial court
may satisfy its duty to respond to the jury’s question by referring
it to instructions already given if those instructions are full and
complete and adequately answer the jury’s question on the facts
of the case].)
We review the trial court’s responses to the deliberating
jury’s questions for abuse of discretion. (See People v. Waidla
(2000) 22 Cal.4th 690, 745-746 [“[a]n appellate court applies the
abuse of discretion standard of review to any decision by a trial
court to instruct, or not to instruct, in its exercise of its
supervision over a deliberating jury”]; People v. Fleming (2018)
27 Cal.App.5th 754, 765 [same].)
Hornsby argues that when the jury asked for further
guidance regarding a peace officer’s lawful performance of his
duties, the court prejudicially erred by not instructing on
excessive force with the omitted portions of CALCRIM No. 2656
and CALCRIM No. 2670. However, nothing about the jury’s
question, which focused on an officer’s duty to state the reason for
the detention, related to excessive force or suggested the jury was
confused as to how excessive force would impact the lawfulness of
the officer’s actions. And, as discussed, there was no evidence to

19
support instructions on excessive force. Accordingly, the trial
court did not abuse its discretion by referring the jury to the
instructions as given.

3. The trial court did not err in failing to give a
unanimity instruction
“[T]he Sixth Amendment’s right to a jury trial requires a
unanimous verdict to support a conviction” in federal or state
court. (Ramos v. Louisiana (2020) 590 U.S. 83, 93; accord,
Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 877 [“In a criminal case, ‘the
jury must agree unanimously the defendant is guilty of a specific
crime.’”].) “A unanimity instruction is required if there is
evidence that more than one crime occurred, each of which could
provide the basis for conviction under a single count.” (People v.
Grimes (2016) 1 Cal.5th 698, 727; accord, People v. Russo (2001)
25 Cal.4th 1124, 1132 [“when the evidence suggests more than
one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the
crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same
criminal act”].)
“This requirement of unanimity as to the criminal act ‘is
intended to eliminate the danger that the defendant will be
convicted even though there is no single offense which all the
jurors agree the defendant committed.’ [Citation.] . . . ‘The
[unanimity] instruction is designed in part to prevent the jury
from amalgamating evidence of multiple offenses, no one of which
has been proved beyond a reasonable doubt, in order to conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant must have done
something sufficient to convict on one count.’” (People v. Russo,
supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 1132.) “‘In deciding whether to give the
instruction, the trial court must ask whether (1) there is a risk

20
the jury may divide on two discrete crimes and not agree on any
particular crime, or (2) the evidence merely presents the
possibility the jury may divide, or be uncertain, as to the exact
way the defendant is guilty of a single discrete crime. In the first
situation, but not the second, it should give the unanimity
instruction.’” (Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 878; accord,
Russo, at p. 1135.)
The trial court must give a unanimity instruction even
absent a request “‘“where the circumstances of the case so
dictate.”’” (Covarrubias, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 877; accord, People
v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1199.) We review de novo whether
the trial court erred in failing to give a unanimity instruction.
(People v. Sorden (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 582, 616 [reviewing de
novo whether “trial court erred in failing, sua sponte, to give a
unanimity instruction”]; People v. Selivanov (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
726, 751 [same].)
“[N]o unanimity instruction is required if the case falls
within the continuous-course-of-conduct exception, which arises
‘when the acts are so closely connected in time as to form part of
one transaction’ [citation], or ‘when . . . the statute contemplates
a continuous course of conduct of a series of acts over a period of
time.’” (People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616, 679; accord,
People v. Sorden, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at p. 616; People v. Jo
(2017) 15 Cal.App.5th 1128, 1178.) In addition, “a unanimity
instruction is not required if ‘the defendant offered the same
defense to both acts constituting the charged crime, so no juror
could have believed defendant committed one act but disbelieved
that he committed the other, or because ‘“there was no evidence
from which the jury could have found defendant was guilty of”

21
the crime based on one act but not the other.’” (Covarrubias,
supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 879; accord, Jennings, at p. 679.)
Hornsby contends the trial court erred in not instructing
with a unanimity instruction because the jury could have found
he resisted the police officers either by refusing to stop when
ordered to do so or by struggling and kicking them once he was
on the ground. The evidence did not require a unanimity
instruction. Officer Goretti testified it was less than 10 seconds
between the time the officers saw Hornsby and when
Officer Buonarati brought Hornsby to the ground. Given that
Hornsby’s refusal to stop and the physical struggle occurred
within a matter of seconds, the entire encounter constituted a
continuous course of conduct. (See People v. Lopez (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 1508, 1533 [the defendant’s struggle with
several officers within a short period of time constituted a
continuous course of conduct not requiring unanimity
instruction]; People v. Haynes (1998) 61 Cal.App.4th 1282, 1296
[no unanimity instruction required for robbery charge where
“[t]he two encounters were just minutes and blocks apart and
involved the same property”].)7

7 Hornsby argues he was denied a fair trial due to the
cumulative errors with respect to the jury instructions for
resisting a peace officer. Because we reject the individual claims
of error, there is no cumulative error. (People v. Ramirez (2021)
10 Cal.5th 983, 1020 [“‘Because we have found no error, there is
no cumulative prejudice to evaluate.’”]; People v. Lopez (2018)
5 Cal.5th 339, 371 [same].)

22
DISPOSITION

The judgment of conviction is affirmed.

FEUER, J.
We concur:

MARTINEZ, P. J.

SEGAL, J.

23

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.