CourtListener 10761011•People v. Motsenbocker CA4/1
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Filed 12/18/25 P. v. Motsenbocker CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D084913
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD241912)
MATTHEW MOTSENBOCKER,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Jeffrey F. Fraser, Judge. Affirmed.
Daniel J. Kessler, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and Charles C.
Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Robin Urbanski and Brendon
Marshall, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
In 2013, Matthew Motsenbocker was found guilty of multiple crimes
related to his attempt to evade a federal marshal who was seeking to arrest
him. Motsenbocker was originally sentenced to 29 years four months in
prison but was later resentenced to a term of 19 years four months.
In 2024, the Secretary of the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation (“CDCR”) recommended additional resentencing pursuant to
Penal Code1 section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) based on Motsenbocker’s
“exceptional conduct” while incarcerated, which included his demonstrated
commitment to rehabilitation. After the People filed an opposition to the
recommendation and Motsenbocker filed a brief in support, the trial court
held a hearing and declined to recall Motsenbocker’s sentence. On appeal,
Motsenbocker claims the trial court abused its discretion in refusing to recall
his sentence and resentence him.
We affirm the order.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND2
On July 6, 2012, Nicholas Wayman, a bail enforcement agent,
requested the assistance of Deputy U.S. Marshal Don Allie to apprehend
Motsenbocker, a fugitive with an outstanding felony warrant for his arrest.
Allie and Deputy U.S. Marshal Kristopher Stephens met Wayman at an
1 Unless otherwise specified, all subsequent statutory references are to
the Penal Code.
2 We, sua sponte, take judicial notice of our prior opinion in
Motsenbocker’s direct appeal (People v. Motsenbocker (Nov. 4, 2015, D064877)
[nonpub. opn.], review granted Jan. 20, 2016, S231177, review dismissed
February 22, 2017). (See Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459.) As do the
parties in their briefing, we rely on that prior opinion in providing a factual
background.
2
apartment complex where Lindsey Hagberg, Motsenbocker’s girlfriend,
resided. They saw Hagberg drive away in a white Volvo.
Marshal Allie, driving an undercover black Dodge Durango; Marshal
Stephens, driving an undercover black Dodge Charger; and Wayman, driving
a white Kia Optima, followed Hagberg to a shopping center on Balboa
Avenue. Hagberg stopped and spoke with Motsenbocker, who was standing
next to a stolen Toyota FJ Cruiser. He got in the stolen vehicle, drove to a
nearby cul-de-sac, and parked it there. Hagberg, who followed Motsenbocker
to the cul-de-sac, then picked him up in her Volvo.
While Motsenbocker and Hagberg were in the cul-de-sac, Allie and
Stephens put on their body armor vests, which identified them as “U.S.
Marshals.” Both Allie and Stephens also displayed U.S. Marshal badges on
their apparel. Allie, Stephens, and Wayman followed Hagberg as her Volvo
left the cul-de-sac. Wayman could not identify the vehicle’s passenger
because the passenger seat was tilted back low. Allie saw movement in the
passenger’s seat.
Based on his observations, Marshal Allie decided to initiate a traffic
stop of the Volvo and activated his vehicle’s emergency lights and siren.
Marshal Stephens also activated his vehicle’s emergency lights, but not his
siren because he was attempting to communicate on his radio. Both vehicles’
emergency lights were red and blue lights located at the top of the front
windshield. Their vehicles also had “wigwag” lights in their front headlights
that flash in a strobe-like fashion. Wayman heard the siren and saw the
flashing lights.
Despite the flashing lights and siren, Hagberg did not stop her vehicle.
She knew Motsenbocker had outstanding arrest warrants and thought law
enforcement agents were following her in the Dodge Durango. She continued
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driving from southbound Interstate 805 onto Balboa Avenue, pulled behind a
flatbed semi-truck, and maneuvered between that truck and Marshal Allie’s
Durango to the front of the lighted intersection. With his vehicle’s lights and
siren still activated, Allie drove his vehicle forward to see the driver’s side of
the Volvo.
Hagberg told Motsenbocker she wanted to get out of her vehicle. She
jumped out, walked toward Marshal Allie with her hands up in the air, and
complied with Allie’s command to lie on the ground.
Marshal Allie approached the Volvo and saw Motsenbocker move from
the front passenger’s seat to the driver’s seat. Allie ordered Motsenbocker to
get out of the vehicle, but he did not comply. Allie reached through the
Volvo’s open driver’s window with his left hand (without his gun drawn) in an
attempt to grab the keys and disable it, but Motsenbocker sped off with Allie
hanging onto the driver’s side of the vehicle.
As Motsenbocker accelerated through the traffic light, traveling about
25 miles per hour, Marshal Stephens heard a pop and saw Marshal Allie “go
flying across the road.” Allie fell onto the street and rolled into the center
median.
Motsenbocker continued driving, crossing the center median, heading
into oncoming traffic and then crossing back over into westbound traffic,
where he then stopped the Volvo. He got out of the Volvo and yelled, “Help
me, I’ve been shot.” Marshal Stephens arrested Motsenbocker.
Wayman came to Marshal Allie’s aid, saw Allie’s firearm on the road,
and secured it. Allie appeared unresponsive, had a gash on his head, and
was bleeding. Allie was taken to a hospital, where he was diagnosed with an
acute intracranial hemorrhage with subdural hematomas, a subarachnoid
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hemorrhage, a neck strain, scalp lacerations, facial abrasions, bilateral upper
extremity abrasions, and a potential loss of consciousness.
Toxicology tests showed Motsenbocker had ingested methamphetamine
within 24 hours of his arrest. He also had morphine and codeine in his
system, which was indicative of heroin use. After the incident, Motsenbocker
told paramedics he had used heroin two hours earlier.
Marshal Stephens found a stolen Glock handgun, apparently loaded, on
the passenger’s seat of the Volvo. Officers found the case for that handgun in
the stolen FJ Cruiser Motsenbocker had been driving. His DNA profile
matched that found on the handgun. Officers also found two knives on the
floorboard of the driver’s seat of the Volvo.
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In 2013, a jury found Motsenbocker guilty of the following 13 offenses:
assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); two counts of felon in
possession of a firearm (§ 29800, subd. (a)(1)); auto theft (Veh. Code, § 10851,
subd. (a)); two counts of receiving stolen property (§ 496, subd. (a)); two
counts of burglary (§ 459); felon in possession of ammunition (§ 30305, subd.
(a)(1)); possession of a forged document (§ 475, subd. (a)); possession of a
completed check with intent to defraud (§ 475, subd. (c)); unlawful possession
of an access card (§ 484e, subd. (c)); and petty theft with priors (§§ 484, 666).
With respect to the assault with a deadly weapon count, the jury found true
the allegation that Motsenbocker had inflicted great bodily injury on the
victim (§ 12022.7). The jury further found that Motsenbocker was on bail
when the offenses took place (§ 12022.1, subd. (b)). Motsenbocker admitted
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having suffered both a prior strike conviction and a serious felony conviction,
as well as having served a term in prison.
The trial court originally sentenced Motsenbocker to 29 years four
months in prison. We modified the judgment by striking a stayed prison
prior enhancement, and otherwise affirmed the judgment. (People v.
Motsenbocker, supra, D064877.)
In 2016, Motsenbocker filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus.
During an evidentiary hearing on that petition, pursuant to the parties’
stipulation, the trial court resentenced Motsenbocker to a term of 19 years
four months. The sentence was comprised of 11 years on the assault with
a deadly weapon count and related great bodily injury enhancement, a
consecutive term of three years four months on one of the felon in possession
counts and the related bail enhancement, and a consecutive term of five
years for the serious felony enhancement finding. On the People’s motion,
the court dismissed the remaining counts and special allegations.
In 2024, the Secretary of the CDCR sent a letter to the trial court
recommending that Motsenbocker’s sentence be recalled and that he be
resentenced pursuant to section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) based on his
exceptional conduct in prison. As detailed below, after briefing and
argument, the trial court declined to recall Motsenbocker’s sentence.
Motsenbocker appeals from the court’s order denying the Secretary’s
recommendation to recall.
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DISCUSSION
Motsenbocker claims the trial court erred in refusing to recall his
sentence and resentence him pursuant to section 1172.1.
1. Governing law and standard of review
“Section 1172.1 provides a recall and resentencing procedure that
may be invoked when, for example, the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation recommends resentencing.” (People v.
Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 248.) “The Department makes such
recommendations ‘not only to bring to the trial court’s attention sentences
in need of correction (e.g., unauthorized sentences) but also to invite the
court to recall sentences based upon equitable considerations . . . .’
[Citation.] The ‘recommendation furnishes the court with jurisdiction it
would not otherwise have to recall and resentence and is “an invitation
to the court to exercise its equitable jurisdiction.” ’ ” (People v. Codinha
(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 976, 986–987.)
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1) provides in relevant part: “When
a defendant, upon conviction for a felony offense, has been committed to
the custody of the Secretary of the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation . . ., the court may, . . . at any time upon the recommendation
of the secretary . . ., recall the sentence and commitment previously ordered
and resentence the defendant in the same manner as if they had not
previously been sentenced, whether or not the defendant is still in custody,
and provided the new sentence, if any, is no greater than the initial
sentence.”
Section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(5) specifies a series of factors that a
court shall consider in recalling and resentencing a defendant and provides
in relevant part: “In recalling and resentencing pursuant to this provision,
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the court shall consider postconviction factors, including, but not limited to,
the disciplinary record and record of rehabilitation of the defendant while
incarcerated, evidence that reflects whether age, time served, and diminished
physical condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have changed since
the original sentencing so that continued incarceration is no longer in the
interest of justice. Evidence that the defendant’s incarceration is no longer
in the interest of justice includes, but is not limited to, evidence that the
defendant’s constitutional rights were violated in the proceedings related to
the conviction or sentence at issue, and any other evidence that undermines
the integrity of the underlying conviction or sentence. The court shall
consider if the defendant has experienced psychological, physical, or
childhood trauma, including, but not limited to, abuse, neglect, exploitation,
or sexual violence, . . . and whether those circumstances were a contributing
factor in the commission of the offense.”
Section 1172.1., subdivision (b) provides that if the Secretary of the
CDCR makes a request for resentencing under the statute, “There shall be
a presumption favoring recall and resentencing of the defendant, which
may only be overcome if a court finds the defendant currently poses an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, as defined in subdivision (c)
of Section 1170.18.” (§ 1172.1, subd. (b)(2).)
Section 1170.18, subdivision (c) in turn defines an “unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety” to mean “an unreasonable risk that the
petitioner will commit a new violent felony within the meaning of clause
(iv) of subparagraph (C) of paragraph (2) of subdivision (e) of Section 667.”
Violent felonies that fall within this meaning are “commonly referred to as
super strikes.” (People v. Valencia (2017) 3 Cal.5th 347, 351, fn. 3.) Included
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within this list is “[a]ny homicide offense, including any attempted homicide
offense.” (§ 667, subd. (e)(2)(C)(iv).)
The parties agree that this court reviews a trial court’s decision
whether to recall and resentence a defendant under section 1172.1 for an
abuse of discretion. Accordingly, we apply the abuse of discretion standard.
(See People v. Frazier (2020) 55 Cal.App.5th 858, 863 [applying section
1172.1’s predecessor statute and stating, “We review the court’s order
declining to follow the Secretary’s recommendation for abuse of discretion.”].)
“Under this standard, a trial court’s exercise of discretion will not be
disturbed unless the trial court exercised it in an arbitrary, capricious, or
patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.”
(People v. Gibson (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th 315, 325 (Gibson).)
2. Additional background
In June 2024, the Secretary filed a letter to “provide the court with
the authority to resentence [Motsenbocker] pursuant to . . . [s]ection 1172.1,
[s]ubdivision (a)(l) based on exceptional conduct while incarcerated.” The
Secretary explained, “Motsenbocker has not only exhibited exceptional
conduct through their ability to obey rules and regulations but has also
demonstrated a commitment to their rehabilitation through voluntary
participation in various self-help programs, and vocational and educational
programs,” and had “displayed dedicated participation in their
rehabilitation.”
The People filed an opposition to the Secretary’s recommendation.
The People discussed Motsenbocker’s “violent actions in this case,” as well as
his serious prior criminal history involving firearms, drugs, and residential
burglary. The People also referred to Motsenbocker’s initial behavior while
in prison, which included his use of weapons and drugs. In particular, the
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People noted that Motsenbocker’s prison disciplinary record involved a rules
violation for his use of a “manufactured weapon to stab [another inmate]
several times in abdomen.”3 The People also noted that Motsenbocker had a
“long history of struggling when released into the community, as seen in his
many failures on probation . . . .”4 Along with their opposition, the People
lodged a letter from Marshal Allie’s wife and son opposing the resentencing
and describing the negative impact that “Motsenbocker’s actions had on
[their] family.”
Motsenbocker filed a brief in support of the Secretary’s
recommendation that emphasized his exemplary postconviction conduct in
prison since 2015. Along with his brief, Motsenbocker lodged the Secretary’s
letter recommending resentencing, along with an accompanying report
outlining relevant information pertaining to the commitment offenses,
3 The People’s opposition contains references to several attachments
that are not included in the clerk’s transcript, including one that appears
to describe the circumstances of Motsenbocker’s disciplinary history while
incarcerated, including the prison stabbing. The clerk’s transcript does
contain a photocopy of a compact disc entitled “People’s Opposition to
Resentencing,” but the disc has not been transmitted to this court. In
addition, at the hearing on the Secretary’s recommendation, the court
received in evidence an exhibit that the prosecutor stated, “contains the
attachments that I submitted to the court attached to my motion in
opposition.” However, that exhibit is not in the clerk’s transcript and has
not been transmitted to this court.
Since Motsenbocker has not explained these omissions or challenged
the correctness of the People’s description of his prison disciplinary history in
their trial brief, we rely on the People’s characterization of Motsenbocker’s
prison disciplinary history offered in the People’s trial brief.
4 The record contains the probation report from the commitment
offenses. The report states that Motsenbocker had been granted probation
three times and that he had not successfully completed probation on any of
the grants.
10
Motsenbocker’s criminal history, and his behavior while incarcerated. The
report includes a list of numerous commendations that Motsenbocker had
received for positive behavior in prison as well as a lengthy list detailing
Motsenbocker’s rehabilitative activities while incarcerated. Motsenbocker
also included a letter from a doctor and a nurse indicating that he was
participating in a tattoo removal program. He also lodged many letters of
support, copies of the numerous detailed commendations from prison staff,
and copies of several certificates obtained for various rehabilitative programs.
Motsenbocker also lodged letters that he had written to the trial judge,
Marshal Allie and the City of San Diego expressing his remorse for his prior
actions, as well as both a “Journey Letter” and a “Reentry Plan.”
Upon completion of the briefing, the trial court held a hearing on the
Secretary’s recommendation at which the court heard from both defense
counsel and the prosecutor as well as Motsenbocker5 and his wife.
Defense counsel argued that there was “not enough evidence to support
a finding that Mr. Motsenbocker currently poses an unreasonable risk [to]
public safety,” and that the presumption in favor of resentencing applied.
Defense counsel stressed that Motsenbocker had no custodial rule violations
over the past ten years, and that he had participated in extensive
rehabilitative programming. Counsel noted that the defense had provided
ten letters from CDCR staff who had exhaustively described the “immense
change that [Motsenbocker] has made in his life.” Counsel also noted that
Motsenbocker was deeply remorseful and that he had written a statement of
remorse to the affected parties. In addition, counsel noted that the record
contained letters of support from other inmates, as well as from family and
friends. Further, counsel observed that Motsenbocker had provided the court
5 Motsenbocker appeared via video feed from prison.
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with a detailed reentry plan addressing future plans for obtaining housing,
employment and transitional support, which counsel summarized at the
hearing.
Motsenbocker personally expressed his remorse for his commission
of the charged offenses against Marshal Allie and for having “assaulted
and stabbed” an inmate. With respect to the prison stabbing, Motsenbocker
explained that he “was still in [his] addiction and fully immersed in [his]
gang and criminal mentality and prison politics.” Motsenbocker also stated
that he was “no longer addicted to drugs or a gang member,” and he worked
“very hard to earn the reputation” that he now had with the staff and other
inmates. Motsenbocker also noted that he was a certified mentor and drug
counselor, and that these programs had changed his life and given him
purpose. Motsenbocker’s wife recounted Motsenbocker’s transformation and
explained that she would be able to financially support him upon his release
from prison until he was able to gain employment.
In response, the People argued that there was sufficient evidence to
believe Motsenbocker was at risk of committing a super strike. The People
discussed the circumstances of the commitment offenses and the prison
stabbing incident, as well as Motsenbocker’s criminal history and previous
poor performance on probation and parole. The People also referred to
Motsenbocker’s gang affiliation6 and his drug usage.
After hearing the foregoing, the trial court issued its ruling. The
court began by acknowledging the section 1172.1 presumption in favor of
6 The prosecutor argued that “even though it sounds like he has
taken some of the gang tattoos off, it doesn’t appear that there has been
an official debrief and dropout.” The Secretary’s report lodged along within
his recommendation states, “Motsenbocker has Security Threat Group
information, specifically with the STG II, San Diego Skinheads.”
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resentencing, which it noted could be overcome only if the court were to find
that there was an unreasonable risk that Motsenbocker would commit a
super strike. The court also indicated that it had been “stewing on this for
quite some time.”
The court noted that it remembered the trial of the underlying
offenses,7 which the court stated involved “a very serious crime.” The
court also noted that Motsenbocker had a prior strike and had previously
committed “other crimes.” Turning to Motsenbocker’s conduct in prison,
the court stated that it “applaud[ed] [Motsenbocker] for all of the things
that he has done over the last several years to rehabilitate himself,” but
that it was hard to “overlook the fact that [he] stabbed another inmate.”
The court observed that the stabbing was an “act of violence” that amounted
to a “serious red flag.” The court also noted that it was positive that
Motsenbocker had “denounced his gang,” and that he was “recovering from
drugs,” but observed that “we have no assurances at all that that is going to
be done on the outside.” The court added, “He is certainly headed in the right
direction, but the [L]egislature[] ha[s] basically trusted this court to do an
analysis and make a call as to whether or not he is going to be someone who
commits serious felony crimes in the future. And based on what I have just
talked about, I can’t say that.”
Ultimately, the court stated, “I think the defendant at 43 years old
remains a threat to the public. And I don’t say this lightly, because I applaud
all that he has done over the past ten years, but I have to look at what he did
before, did in this crime, and what he did afterwards. So based on that, I find
7 The record reflects that the trial judge was the same judge who
presided over Motsenbocker’s original trial, had imposed the initial sentence
after the jury trial in 2013, and had resentenced him in 2016 pursuant to the
parties’ stipulation during habeas proceedings.
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that the [P]eople have, in fact, overcome the presumption, and I will deny it
on that.” The trial court added that even if it were “to go back and resentence
him,” it would not impose a lesser sentence.
Immediately thereafter, noting the trial court’s reference to “serious
felony crimes,” defense counsel asked the court to clarify whether it was
“talking specifically about super strikes.”
The trial court responded affirmatively and stated, “I should probably
have clarified this.” Thereafter, the court referred to Motsenbocker’s criminal
history, the circumstances of the commitment offenses, including that “he
nearly killed a U.S. Marshall,” and the fact that he had “nearly killed another
inmate.” The court concluded by stating: “I am specifically making a finding
that he is a public safety threat based on his ability and desire at one point
to kill a federal marshal and his desire at another point to kill an inmate.
Again, you tried to kill two people. It’s not hard to predict you may try to kill
again in the future. So based on that, the defense motion is denied.”
3. Application
We note at the outset that the trial court properly considered the
presumption in favor of recall and resentencing under section 1172.1,
subdivision (b)(2), and that the court complied with the statutory
requirement specified in section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(7) that it state on
the record its reasons for denying recall and resentencing. The record
also reflects that the trial court carefully considered the Secretary’s
recommendation. The parties provided extensive briefing and argument
and the court provided a detailed statement of its reasons for its decision.
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The trial court also expressly noted that it had been “stewing” over the
proper result and stated that it did not make its ruling “lightly.”
Further, while the trial court acknowledged Motsenbocker’s laudable
efforts to rehabilitate himself, the court also reasonably considered numerous
factors that weighed in favor of a finding that the presumption in favor of
recall and resentencing had been rebutted in denying the Secretary’s
recommendation. Specifically, the court noted the seriousness and violent
nature of one of the commitment offenses, Motsenbocker’s prior commission
of a strike and other criminal offenses, and his commission of a stabbing
while in prison. The court also reasonably observed that Motsenbocker’s
efforts to recover from his drug addiction and end his involvement with gangs
had not been tested outside of a custodial setting. These observations were
particularly rational given that the record also reflects that Motsenbocker
had previously failed to complete probation successfully on several occasions.
We are not persuaded by Motsenbocker’s argument that reversal is
required because “[c]ontrary to the trial court’s statement, in the underlying
case [he] was not charged with or accused of intending or desiring to kill the
federal marshal,” and that with respect to the prison stabbing incident that
he “was not accused of attempted murder.” Motsenbocker cites no authority,
and we are not aware of any, holding that a court is not entitled to consider
the record and make its own assessment of the nature of a defendant’s prior
criminal conduct in considering whether to recall his sentence under section
1172.1.
Further, even assuming strictly for the sake of this opinion that it
was improper for the trial court to make these statements, the court did so
only after explaining that it found that the presumption in favor of recalling
Motsenbocker’s sentence rebutted and having denied the Secretary’s
15
recommendation and after having offered a lengthy explanation in support of
this ruling. The court also stated that it would resentence Motsenbocker to
the same sentence even if it were to recall the sentence. In short, even
assuming the court erred in referring to its assessment of Motsenbocker’s
state of mind in committing the assault on Marshall Allie and the prison
stabbing, it is clear beyond any reasonable doubt that the court would have
found the presumption of recall and resentencing rebutted and denied the
Secretary’s recommendation even without such an assessment.
In sum, the record reflects both Motsenbocker’s remarkable
rehabilitative efforts while in prison and his prior serious and violent
conduct involving firearms, other weapons, drugs, and gangs. After
carefully considering the totality of the record, we agree that Motsenbocker
appears to have made, as one CDCR officer aptly put it, a “remarkable
transformation.” We cannot, however, say that the trial court erred in
finding that the presumption in favor of recall and resentencing had been
overcome based on the ground that Motsenbocker continued to pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety under section 1172.1, subdivision
(b)(2). We further conclude that the trial court did not act in an “arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest
miscarriage of justice.” (Gibson, supra, 2 Cal.App.5th at p. 325.) Thus, even
if other reasonable judges might have ruled differently, we conclude the trial
court did not abuse its discretion in declining to recall Motsenbocker’s
sentence.
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DISPOSITION
The order denying recall of Motsenbocker’s sentence is affirmed.
BUCHANAN, J.
WE CONCUR:
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
DO, J.
17
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