People v. Zepeda CA2/7

CourtListener 10761008CalctappDec 18, 2025

Full text

Filed 12/18/25 P. v. Zepeda CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B344188

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. SA077725)
v.

JOSE MAURICIO ZEPEDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, William L. Sadler, Judge. Affirmed and
remanded with directions.
California Appellate Project, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Charles S. Lee and Michael C. Keller, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Jose Mauricio Zepeda appeals from a postjudgment order
denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code
section 1172.6.1 The superior court concluded Zepeda failed to
make a prima facie showing of eligibility. Zepeda requests, and
the People do not oppose, remand with directions for the superior
court to consider an amended petition should Zepeda seek to file
one so that he and the superior court have the benefit of the
Supreme Court’s guidance in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th
549 (Patton). Accordingly, we affirm the order denying the
petition for resentencing but remand for the superior court to
consider Zepeda’s amended petition, should he seek to file one
within 30 days of remand.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In 2011, Zepeda was charged with one count of murder
(§ 187, subd. (a)) and one count of attempted murder (§§ 664, 187,
subd. (a)), with gang and firearm enhancements alleged. In 2012,
Zepeda pleaded no contest to one count of voluntary
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), and he admitted the gun
(§ 12022.5, subd. (a)) and gang (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C))
enhancement allegations. The trial court sentenced Zepeda to an
aggregate determinate term of 26 years.
On October 10, 2023, Zepeda filed a petition to vacate his
conviction under section 1172.6. The People filed a written
opposition arguing Zepeda was ineligible for resentencing as a

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2
matter of law because he was prosecuted solely under a
“provocative act” theory, and they attached the preliminary
hearing transcript. Zepeda, through counsel, filed a reply
disputing the People’s argument.
On February 3, 2025, the superior court denied the petition
without issuing an order to show cause. The court stated: “The
court denies the petition for failure to state a prima facie showing
he is eligible for relief under 1172.6. The record of conviction
clearly demonstrates that the defendant was prosecuted under a
‘provocative act’ theory of liability and that 1172.6 provides no
relief for such petitioners. There is no theory of liability for
which petitioner pleaded guilty to that 1172.6 offers relief.”
Zepeda timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Standard of Review and Governing Law
We review de novo an order denying a petition under
section 1172.6 at the prima facie stage without issuing an order
to show cause. (See People v. Hickman (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th
1262, 1268; People v. Bodely (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1193, 1200.)
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.), effective
January 1, 2019, changed the law of murder by eliminating the
natural and probable consequences doctrine (see People v. Gentile
(2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842, 847-848) and significantly narrowing
the scope of the felony-murder rule (see People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 707-708). Section 1172.6 provides a resentencing
procedure for certain persons who were convicted of murder,
attempted murder, or manslaughter under the pre-2019 murder
laws. (See Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 558; People v. Lewis

3
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 959-960 (Lewis); People v. Lezama (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 583, 590.)
A section 1172.6 petition must include “[a] declaration by
the petitioner that the petitioner is eligible for relief under this
section” and indicate “[w]hether the petitioner requests the
appointment of counsel.” (§ 1172.6, subds. (b)(1)(A), (C).) On
receiving such a petition, the court “shall appoint counsel” if
requested and assess “whether the petitioner has made a prima
facie case for relief.” (Id., subds. (b)(3), (c).)
“[A]fter the appointment of counsel, a court looks beyond
the face of the petition.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.)
The court may consider the record of conviction, which will
“necessarily inform the trial court’s prima facie inquiry under
section [1172.6], allowing the court to distinguish petitions with
potential merit from those that are clearly meritless.” (Lewis,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971; see People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th
433, 463-464.) “[T]he record of conviction the parties may consult
at the prima facie stage includes a preliminary hearing transcript
preceding a guilty plea.” (Patton, at p. 568.) “[P]etitioners
confronting a record of conviction that demonstrates relief is
unavailable have the burden of coming forward with
nonconclusory allegations to alert the prosecution and the court
to what issues an evidentiary hearing would entail. It follows . . .
that should a trial court encounter a material fact dispute, the
court may not resolve that dispute at the prima facie stage and
should instead grant petitioner an evidentiary hearing, assuming
relief is not otherwise foreclosed.” (Id. at p. 567; accord, Lewis, at
p. 972 [“In reviewing any part of the record of conviction at this
preliminary juncture, a trial court should not engage in

4
‘factfinding involving the weighing of evidence or the exercise of
discretion.’”].)
“[A] section 1172.6 petitioner who, despite having access to
counsel upon submission of a facially sufficient petition, offers
only conclusory allegations of entitlement to relief, in response to
a record of conviction that demonstrates the petitioner's
conviction was under a still-valid theory, has not, thereby, made
a prima facie showing. Where facts from the record of conviction
are undisputed, accepting them over contrary legal allegations
that are merely conclusory is not ‘“factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.”’” (Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 565-566, fn. omitted.) Under these
circumstances, a superior court may deny a section 1172.6
petition at the prima facie stage. (See ibid.)

B. The Superior Court Properly Denied Zepeda’s Petition for
Resentencing Under Section 1172.6
In his opening brief, Zepeda presents no argument for
reversal. Indeed, the preliminary hearing transcript establishes
that Zepeda was prosecuted solely on a provocative act murder
theory after the California Supreme Court’s decision in People v.
Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, which remains a valid theory of
murder after Senate Bill No. 1437. (See People v. Antonelli
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 730-731; People v. Venancio (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 593, 168.) Zepeda’s petition did not assert
allegations to rebut the facts in the preliminary hearing
transcript, and the superior court properly denied the petition
because the record of conviction established Zepeda was ineligible
for relief as a matter of law. (See Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
p. 569.)

5
Nevertheless, citing Patton, Zepeda requests leave to file an
amended petition in superior court. As stated, in Patton the
California Supreme Court resolved a conflict among the Courts of
Appeal regarding the use of a preliminary hearing transcript at
the section 1172.6 prima facie stage. Patton held a superior court
may “rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a
preliminary hearing transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox
allegations” in determining at the prima facie stage whether a
petitioner is eligible for relief under section 1172.6. The high
court concluded the petitioner in that case failed to make a prima
facie showing because his petition contained only a checkbox
declaration with legal conclusions, and he submitted no facts to
controvert the People’s showing from the preliminary hearing
transcript that he was the sole perpetrator of the attempted
murder. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 564.) The Court
affirmed the denial of the petition but, “out of an abundance of
caution,” directed the Court of Appeal to remand the matter to
the superior court with directions for the superior court to
consider an amended petition should the petitioner choose to file
one. (Id. at p. 569.)
Zepeda urges us to follow Patton and remand the case to
the superior court with directions to consider an amended
resentencing petition should Zepeda seek to file one within
30 days of remand. The People argue that Zepeda “is ineligible
for resentencing as a matter of law under section 1172.6 because
he was prosecuted solely under a provocative act theory,” but
further state that “respondent does not oppose appellant’s
request for a limited scope remand that would permit him to
amend his petition with ‘the benefit of Patton’s guidance’ on the
burden he must satisfy at the prima facie stage.”

6
Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s denial of
Zepeda’s petition, and we follow Patton’s disposition “out of an
abundance of caution” and remand the matter to the superior
court with directions to consider an amended petition should
Zepeda seek to file one. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.)

DISPOSITION

This matter is remanded to the superior court to consider
an amended petition should Zepeda, within 30 days of remand,
seek to file one. We otherwise affirm the order denying the
petition for resentencing.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

FEUER, J. STONE, J.

7

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.