Rodriguez v. Gutierrez CA1/4

CourtListener 10760253CalctappDec 17, 2025

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Filed 12/17/25 Rodriguez v. Gutierrez CA1/4

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not
certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not
been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

ROBERT RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
A171274
v.
OLIVER GUTIERREZ et al., (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. 21CV002661)
Defendants and
Respondents.

Attorney Robert Rodriguez briefly represented Yesenia
Cruz in her divorce action until the state bar suspended his
license to practice law.1 Cruz then retained Oliver Gutierrez,
who negotiated a settlement. Rodriguez sued Cruz, Gutierrez,
Gutierrez’s law firm, and others for allegedly outstanding
attorney fees and other relief.
Gutierrez moved to dismiss the action against himself and
his firm (jointly, “Gutierrez”) as strategic litigation against public

1 His license to practice law was later revoked.
We take
judicial notice of the relevant state bar records. (Evid. Code,
§ 452, subd. (h).)
participation. (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.162 (the anti-SLAPP
statute).) The trial court granted the motion, finding the action
arose from protected speech and that Rodriguez failed to
establish a probability of prevailing. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Cruz retained Rodriguez to represent her in her marital
dissolution in late 2020, but was forced to find new counsel some
five months later after the state bar suspended his license for
misconduct. In May 2021 Cruz engaged family law specialist
Gutierrez to replace him. In June Rodriguez notified her he had
placed an attorney fees lien on the proceeds of any recovery from
the divorce action. Cruz forwarded the notice to Gutierrez.
Upon review, Gutierrez concluded the purported lien was
invalid for multiple reasons. First, Rodriguez had not brought a
required separate action to establish the lien’s existence,
determine its amount, and enforce it against Cruz. Second,
Rodriguez’s retainer agreement neither explicitly nor implicitly
authorized him to seek payment for his services through an
attorney’s lien.) Finally, the fees he claimed were largely dated
after the bar suspended him.
Rodriguez filed notice of his lien in the trial court and sued
Cruz and her husband, J.C., for unpaid attorney fees and other
relief. Gutierrez subsequently negotiated a settlement of the
divorce action. The settlement agreement required that Cortez
pay Cruz monthly child and spousal support and cover

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.
2
Gutierrez’s attorney fees, but otherwise provided no monetary
relief. On June 6, 2022, the trial court entered judgment on the
settlement.
Eighteen months later, Rodriguez filed an amended
complaint naming five new defendants, including Gutierrez,3 and
adding causes of action for “conversion/embezzlement”;
intentional and negligent interference with prospective economic
advantage; “inducing breach of contract/intentional interference
with contractual relations”; intentional and negligent infliction
of emotional distress; aiding and abetting multiple intentional
torts; trespass to personal property; constructive trust; breach
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing; breach of
fiduciary duty; constructive fraud; civil conspiracy; and
“implementation of lien.”
As factual support, Rodriguez alleged that, acting with
culpable intent, the defendants appropriated at least $10,132.46
in fees to which he was entitled; concealed their
misappropriation from Rodriguez; disregarded and repudiated
his attorney fees lien; gave Cruz the money secured by the lien
and took it for themselves; advised her she possessed no funds
subject to the lien; advised her not to cooperate with him, honor
his retainer agreement, or pay his fees; and refused his request
to account for any settlement proceeds in her possession or
control.

3 The complaint refers jointly to all of the new defendants

as “ ‘LAW OFFICE’ Defendants” without distinguishing between
them.
3
Gutierrez moved to strike the action under the anti-SLAPP
statute, asserting it arose from his protected activity and that
Rodriguez could not demonstrate a reasonable probability of
succeeding on the merits. The trial court agreed on both points.
First, it concluded the claims against Gutierrez arose from his
protected role in the marital dissolution case. Second, it found
his evidentiary showing defeated Rodriguez’s claims as a matter
of law.
Rodriguez timely appealed the ensuing order of dismissal.
(See Code Civ. Proc. §904.1, subd. (a)(13) [order dismissing case
under section 425.16 is immediately appealable].)
II. DISCUSSION
A. The Anti-SLAPP Statute
The Legislature enacted the anti-SLAPP statute to combat
harassing lawsuits designed to chill the exercise of constitutional
free speech and petition rights by weeding out, at an early stage,
meritless claims arising from such protected activity. (Sweetwater
Union High School Dist. v. Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th
931, 940 (Sweetwater); Park v. Board of Trustees of California
State University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1060 (Park).) The statute
is construed broadly to encourage participation in matters of
public significance and ensure such participation is not chilled
through abuse of the judicial process. (§425.16, subd. (a).)
Resolution of an anti-SLAPP motion involves two steps.
First, the moving defendant must show the alleged acts
supporting the plaintiff’s claims arose from activity protected by
section 425.16. (Sweetwater, supra, at p. 940; Park, supra, at

4
p. 1061.) Protected activities are those undertaken “in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech . . . in
connection with a public issue.” (§425.16, subds. (b)1), (e).) As
relevant here, they include “any written or oral statement or
writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a . . . judicial body.” (§425.16, subd. (e)(2).)
At this first stage the defendant bears the burden of
identifying the allegations of protected activity and the claims for
relief premised on them. (Michael K. v. Cho (2025)
113 Cal.App.5th 1, 8 (Michael K.).) If the court determines the
complaint seeks relief based on allegations arising from protected
activity, it proceeds to the second step and the burden shifts to
the plaintiff to show, for each claim arising from protected
activity, that the complaint is both legally sufficient and
supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the plaintiff’s evidence is credited.
(Sweetwater, supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 940; Michael K., supra, at
pp. 7–8.) The court considers the pleadings and supporting and
opposing evidence “ ‘in a summary-judgment-like procedure’ ” to
assess the parties’ respective claims and defenses. (Sweetwater,
supra, at pp. 940–941.)
We exercise our independent judgment to determine
whether the motion to strike should have been granted. (Park,
supra, 2 Cal.5th at p. 1067.)

5
B. Analysis
1. Protected Activity
The trial court here found Rodriguez’s claims against
Gutierrez were intrinsically premised on his protected activities
in the course of representing Cruz, and, accordingly, fell squarely
within the “ ‘fairly expansive’ ” (Seltzer v. Barnes (2010)
182 Cal.App.4th 953, 962 (Seltzer)) definition of protected
activity. We agree.
“On the ‘arising from’ requirement [citation], the defendant
must show ‘the defendant’s act underlying the plaintiff’s cause of
action [was] itself’ a protected act.’ ” (Michael K., supra,
113 Cal.App.5th at p. 8.) “[L]itigation that takes place outside of
court may be protected under the anti-SLAPP statute. In the
anti-SLAPP context, ‘ “[a]ny act” includes communicative conduct
such as the filing, funding, and prosecution of a civil action.’
[Citation.] This includes conduct ranging from filing an
insurance claim as a prerequisite to litigation [citation], to
counseling a tenant in anticipation of litigation [citation], to
soliciting litigation by others [citation], to communications in the
course of settlement negotiations.) (Timothy W. v. Julie W. (2022)
85 Cal.App.5th 648, 658; see also Neville v. Chudacoff (2008)
160 Cal.App.4th 1255, 1259, 1267–1268 [attorney’s statement
warning client’s customers not to do business with potential
defendant was protected activity].) Even “funding an attorney’s
services to prosecute a lawsuit, as well as soliciting litigation
funding, are themselves protected acts in furtherance of

6
petitioning activity.” (Michael K., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at
p. 12.)
Rodriguez appropriately does not dispute that the anti-
SLAPP statute extends to an attorney’s activities undertaken in
furtherance of and in effectuation of a settlement. (See, e.g.,
Michael K., supra, at pp. 10–11; O&C Creditors Group, LLC v.
Stephens & Stephens XII, LLC (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 546, 566
(O&C Creditors); Seltzer, supra, 182 Cal.App.4th at p. 963.) To
determine whether his claims against Gutierrez arise from such
protected activity we “ ‘consider the elements of [each] challenged
claim and what actions by the defendant supply those elements
and consequently form the basis for liability.’ ” (Bonni v.
St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009;
Michael K., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 8–9.)
The underlying actions here, as alleged, are that Gutierrez
disregarded the lien; appropriated funds subject to it or gave
them to Cruz; concealed those acts from Rodriguez; advised
Cruz to breach Rodriguez’s retainer agreement; advised her to
not cooperate with him or pay his fees; and conspired with Cruz
to conceal the settlement. Contrary to Rodriguez’s contention
that they “ ‘merely provide context’ ” for his legal claims (see
Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1012),
these factual allegations are inseparable from Gutierrez’s role in
the marital dissolution case.
O&C Creditors, supra, 42 Cal.App.5th 546, involving the
settlement of a coverage dispute, is instructive here. A
settlement agreement between attorneys and their insurer

7
allocated the settlement proceeds. (Id. at p. 555.) In ensuing
litigation over fees and a fee lien, the trial court granted an anti-
SLAPP motion that targeted two causes of action: one for breach
of trust against the insurer for improperly disbursing settlement
proceeds and another, based on the same conduct, for interfering
with prospective business relations. (Id. at p. 559.)
The appellate court affirmed. (O&C Creditors, supra, at
p. 576.) “Far from providing mere evidentiary support for or
being incidental to the challenged claims, the settlement
agreement is the crux of the cross-defendants’ allegedly wrongful
conduct. O&C Creditors cannot allege its claims without the
settlement agreement—both because the allegedly wrongful
‘disbursement’ of ‘proceeds’ occurred only because of the
settlement agreement and because the alleged attorney lien could
not arise without the settlement. O&C Creditors’ claims are thus
based on and arise from a purportedly wrongful settlement
agreement” subject to section 415.16. (42 Cal.App.5th at p. 571.)
So too here.
The authorities on which Rodriguez relies do not suggest
otherwise. In Drell v. Cohen (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 24 (Drell), a
personal injury plaintiff hired new counsel after his first attorney
withdrew from the representation. (Id. at p. 27.) The first
attorney asserted a lien on any recovery in the litigation, but,
after new counsel settled the case, the insurer paid the proceeds
jointly to the new attorney and plaintiff. (Ibid.)
New counsel sued for declaratory relief as to the attorneys’
respective entitlement to fees and the first attorney moved to

8
strike under section 425.16. (Drell, supra, 232 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 27–28.) In this context, the court held the complaint did not
arise from protected activity. It explained: “a complaint is not a
SLAPP suit unless the gravamen of the complaint is that
defendants acted wrongfully by engaging in the protected
activity. The complaint here did not allege defendants engaged
in wrongdoing by asserting their lien. Rather, the complaint
asked the court to declare the parties’ respective rights to
attorney fees.” (Id. at p. 30.) Here, in contrast, Rodriguez’s legal
claims are expressly premised on allegedly wrongful actions
Gutierrez undertook in litigating and settling his client’s case.
Rodriguez’s reliance on California Back Specialists Medical
Group v. Rand (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 1032 is also unpersuasive.
Rand, an attorney, disbursed proceeds from his clients’ personal
injury actions without notifying treating doctors who had
asserted medical liens on the recovery. (Id. at p. 1035.) He then
moved to strike the doctors’ ensuing suit to enforce those liens,
asserting that he questioned the reasonableness and necessity of
their medical care and that the treating physician was under
investigation and had been reprimanded by the state medical
board. (Id. at pp. 1035–1036.)
The court rejected his contention that his activities were
protected because he had disbursed the funds as an attorney and
was representing his clients in the underlying actions.
(California Back Specialists Medical Group v. Rand, supra, 160
Cal.App.4th at p. 1037.) Those factors, it reasoned, were “only
collateral or incidental to the purpose of the transaction or

9
occurrence underlying the complaint.” (Ibid.) The complaint,
rather, was based on the doctors’ dispute with Rand about the
validity and satisfaction of their lien—"issues that were never
under consideration in any court or official proceeding” before the
doctors filed suit. (Ibid., italics added.) Here, in contrast,
Rodriguez’s complaint plainly targets Gutierrez’s litigation
activities on behalf of Cruz in her divorce action—unquestionably
a court proceeding—including his legal assessment that the lien
was invalid.
Rodriguez further contends, without citation to the record,
that Gutierrez engaged in “criminal conduct that alleviated his
privileges.” (See Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 305
[anti-SLAPP does not apply to illegal acts].) Not so. As the trial
court noted, unconceded allegations of illegal conduct that are
unsupported by conclusive evidence, as is the case here, do not
preclude application of the anti-SLAPP statute. (See Laker v.
Board of Trustees of California State University (2019)
32 Cal.App.5th 745, 761–762.)
2. Probability of Prevailing
The second anti-SLAPP step utilizes a “summary-
judgment-like” procedure to determine whether the plaintiff has
shown a probability of prevailing on the merits. (Sweetwater,
supra, 6 Cal.5th at p. 940.) The plaintiff need only show the
complaint is legally sufficient and supported by a sufficient prima
facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment. (Ibid.)
Minimal merit is enough to defeat the motion. (Ibid.)

10
We review the trial court’s finding on this question
independently, assuming the truth of the plaintiff’s evidence and
assessing the defendant’s only to determine whether it defeats
the plaintiff’s showing as a matter of law. (Sweetwater, supra,
6 Cal.5th at p. 940.) We limit our review to those specific issues
as to which Rodriguez has provided reasoned legal argument
supported by pertinent citation to authority and the record (see
Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C);4 Benach v. County
of Los Angeles (2007) 149 Cal.App.4th 836, 852 (Benach)). In so
doing, we agree with the trial court that the claims against
Gutierrez fail as a matter of law.
While the trial court’s detailed ruling identifies multiple
failings in Rodriguez’s various claims, we are satisfied that they
are, at least in large part, barred by the litigation privilege.
Codified at Civil Code section 47, subdivision (b), “ ‘ “the privilege
applies to any communication (1) made in judicial or quasi-
judicial proceedings; (2) by litigants or other participants
authorized by law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and
(4) that [has] some connection or logical relation to the action.” ’ ”
(Timothy W. v. Julie W., supra, 85 Cal.App.5th 648, 661–662.)
Like the anti-SLAPP statute, the privilege is broadly construed to
protect a litigant’s right to access the courts without fearing
subsequent derivative tort actions. (Rohde v. Wolf (2007)
154 Cal.App.4th 28, 37.)

4 Subsequent references to rules are to the California Rules

of Court.
11
Here, the trial court found the litigation privilege barred
all counts based on Gutierrez “ ‘advising’ Cruz, ‘causing’ Cruz [to]
do things,’ and aiding and abetting Cruz.” 5 It explained: “Any
communications to Cruz regarding either her marriage
settlement or her obligations to plaintiff based on his prior work
on the case would bear a ‘connection or logical relation’ to the
case in the family law court” and, accordingly, were privileged.
We agree. All causes of action arising from Gutierrez’s alleged
communications with Cruz are barred.
Rodriguez asserts the privilege is inapplicable because
some part of the alleged wrongdoing fell within exceptions for
criminal conduct and proceedings where application of the
privilege would abrogate a specific statute. He has not supported
these assertions with reasoned legal argument supported by
pertinent authority and citation to the record, so we need not
address their merits. (See rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C); Benach,
supra, 149 Cal.App.4th at p. 852; see also People v. Baniqued
(2000) 85 Cal.App.4th 13, 29 [argument developed only in reply
brief is forfeited].) “It is not our place to construct theories or
arguments to undermine the judgment and defeat the
presumption of correctness. When an appellant fails to raise a
point, or asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument
and citations to authority, we treat the point as waived.”
(Benach, supra, at p. 852.)

5 E.g., intentional and negligent interference with

prospective economic advantage, inducing breach of
contract/intentional interference with contract, aiding and
abetting, and conspiracy.
12
We are also satisfied that any other claims based on
Gutierrez’s alleged impairment of lien, assuming they are not
based on communications having some logical relation to the
litigation, are barred for a different reason. Various causes of
action—e.g., conversion, embezzlement, trespass to personal
property, constructive trust, breach of fiduciary duty and
implementation of lien—sought to recover the fees allegedly
secured by the lien. But, as the trial court correctly observed, a
discharged attorney cannot sue to enforce a fee lien against a
successor attorney without first establishing the validity and
value of the lien in a separate, independent action against the
client. (Mojtahedi v. Vargas (20l4) 228 Cal.App.4th 974, 977–
978.) Rodriguez did not do so, and he provides no authority
allowing him to bypass this requirement by pursuing a single,
simultaneous action against his former client and her successor
counsel.
Finally, woven throughout Rodriguez’s brief are his
refrains that he and Gutierrez were neither parties nor witnesses
in the divorce action and that the “phantom” marital settlement
agreement was not proffered as evidence. He fails to explain why
these points matter or provide relevant legal authority and
reasoning. Nor, similarly, does he provide pertinent record
citations for his repeated claim that the trial court “failed to
consider” his legal arguments and evidence—a refrain refuted by
the court’s thoughtful and thorough written order. No error is
evident. See Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564

13
[where record is silent, all presumptions favor trial court’s
ruling].)

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III. DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Gutierrez is entitled to his costs on
appeal. (Rule 8.278(a) &(b).)
MOORMAN, J. *

WE CONCUR:

STREETER, Acting P. J.
GOLDMAN, J.

*Judge of the Mendocino Superior Court, assigned by the Chief

Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
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