CourtListener 10760154•People v. Bosch CA2/5
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Filed 12/17/25 P. v. Bosch CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FIVE
THE PEOPLE, B343252
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. SA107305)
EDWARD BOSCH,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, William L. Sadler, Judge. Reversed.
Owen P. Martikan, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews, Supervising
Deputy Attorney General, and Gary A. Lieberman, Deputy
Attorney General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
******
Edward Bosch (defendant) appeals from his criminal
conviction for first-degree burglary. On appeal, he argues that
the trial court erred in (1) terminating his right to represent
himself, and (2) striking a juror for cause. Because we conclude
that the trial court erred in terminating his right to self-
representation, we are obligated to reverse and have no occasion
to reach the second issue.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
In late November 2020, defendant and others broke into a
home and stole high-end equipment from a music studio in the
home. Surveillance video inside the home showed defendant to
be one of the burglars, and defendant left his fingerprints at the
scene.
II. Procedural History
A. Charges
The People charged defendant with first-degree burglary
(Pen. Code, § 459).1
1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.
2
B. Defendant’s fluctuating status as a self-
represented litigant
1. Initial order allowing self-representation
Although initially appointed counsel, defendant in October
2023 asked to represent himself. The trial court thereafter
advised defendant of the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, and after defendant maintained his desire to
represent himself, granted the request.
2. Abandonment of self-representation
In March 2024, defendant asked the trial court to appoint
advisory counsel for him (that is, counsel to assist him in
preparing for trial), explaining that his “pro per” privileges in
custody had been revoked because he had been involved in “an
incident” in the “pro per” unit of the jail. When the court
explained that it would not appoint advisory counsel and that
what defendant needed was a lawyer appointed to represent him,
defendant said he wanted to “think about” whether to have
counsel reappointed and, after a break, requested to “take back
counsel.” The court then reappointed the same attorney who had
previously represented him.
3. Second order allowing self-representation
After defendant and his counsel appeared at an April 2024
hearing at which they disagreed over whether to seek a
continuance of the trial and defendant left midway through the
hearing, defendant at a May 2024 hearing asked for a Marsden
hearing2 to discuss his grievances with counsel. At that hearing,
defendant indicated his desire to represent himself once again.
The trial court determined that defendant still had pro per
privileges in custody for a pending murder charge against him,
2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.
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and granted his request for self-representation after advising him
that representing himself in this case—while simultaneously
representing himself in the pending murder case—was a “really
bad decision.” The court also advised defendant that it would
“take away” his right to self-representation if defendant were to
have any “disciplinary issues that . . . would curtail hi[s pro per
privileges]” in custody. The court also advised defendant, who
had refused to come to court on two prior occasions, that trial
would proceed in his absence if he refused to be transported to
court again in the future.
4. Revocation of self-representation
On June 20, 2024, the trial court held a pre-trial hearing at
which it advised the parties that the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department had filed a formal notification that defendant’s pro
per privileges in custody had been terminated because defendant
had assaulted another prisoner in the library used by pro per
litigants, which evinced a “propensity for violence and jail rule
violations.” Defendant told the court that the assault had been a
“one-on-one fight”; that the assault had been “nothing serious”
because “nobody really got hurt”; and that defendant had been
“defend[ing] [him]self.” Defendant added that it would be
“[un]fair” for him to “lose [his] pro per status” in court based on
the altercation in the pro per library in jail because defendant
had “never been disruptive in th[e] courtroom.” The court
“agree[d]” that defendant had “never been disruptive in the
courtroom,” but nevertheless indicated its “inclin[ation]” to
revoke defendant’s right to represent himself because defendant
had violated the court’s “order” not to get into any “altercation[s] .
. . in the pro per module” and because, without “access to” the
“pro per library,” defendant would be unable to “conduct [his]
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defense.” Before the court could make a final ruling, defendant
repeatedly said, “I got to go,” refused to sit down, and was
escorted out of the courtroom. The court then revoked
defendant’s self-representation status and reappointed his prior
counsel to represent him.
C. Trial
The case proceeded to trial, with defendant represented by
counsel. A jury convicted defendant of first-degree burglary. The
trial court sentenced him to state prison for the middle term of
four years.
D. Appeal
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant’s chief argument on appeal is that the trial court
erred in revoking his right to self-representation. We review a
trial court’s decision to revoke a defendant’s self-represented
status for an abuse of discretion. (People v. Becerra (2016) 63
Cal.4th 511, 518 (Becerra).)
Criminal defendants have a federal constitutional right to
represent themselves at their criminal trial. (Faretta v.
California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, 817-818 (Faretta).) Yet this right
is “not absolute.” (People v. Butler (2009) 47 Cal.4th 814, 825
(Butler).) A trial court may revoke a defendant’s self-represented
status if the defendant has “‘deliberately engage[d] in serious and
obstructionist misconduct.”’ (People v. Carson (2005) 35 Cal.4th
1, 8 (Carson).) Revocation may be justified based on (1) a
defendant’s in-court misconduct or (2) a defendant’s out-of-court
misconduct, but only if that out-of-court misconduct “seriously
threatens the core integrity of the trial.” (Id. at pp. 8, 11; see also
id. at p. 10 [out-of-court efforts to intimidate witnesses;
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revocation appropriate]; cf. People v. Kirvin (2014) 231
Cal.App.4th 1507, 1516 [throwing excrement at jail officials
insufficient on its own].)
The trial court abused its discretion in revoking defendant’s
self-representation status in this case. The court’s stated reason
for doing so was defendant’s loss of pro per privileges while in
custody. This is an invalid reason as a matter of law, as the
People properly conceded at oral argument. Our Supreme Court
has noted that limitations or loss of pro per privileges while in
custody are not a “justification for depriving inmates of the right
to represent themselves.” (Butler, supra, 47 Cal.4th at p. 827;
Ferrel v. Superior Court (1978) 20 Cal.3d 888, 892, overruled in
part on other grounds by Butler.) The trial court also alluded to
the defendant’s failure to adhere to the condition the trial court
attached to reinstatement of his self-represented status—namely,
that defendant not engage in any more misconduct in the pro per
unit of the jail. This is also an invalid reason as a matter of law
because courts may not attach conditions to a defendant’s
exercise of their constitutional right to self-representation
(beyond the condition of not engaging in serious and
obstructionist misconduct). (Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at 834, fn.
46.) Because application of an incorrect legal standard
constitutes an abuse of discretion (People v. Knoller (2007) 41
Cal.4th 139, 156), the trial court erroneously denied defendant
his right to self-representation. This error is not subject to
harmless error analysis, so we are compelled by precedent to
vacate the conviction. (Becerra, supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 520.)
The People resist this outcome, urging that we may affirm
the revocation on any possible valid ground (People v. Chism
(2014) 58 Cal.4th 1266, 1295, fn. 12) and that there is such a
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valid ground here—namely, that defendant’s refusal to come to
court on two occasions and his insistence upon leaving the
courtroom as the trial court was announcing its ruling revoking
his self-representation status “serious[ly] threaten[ed] the core
integrity of the trial.” The facts and law are to the contrary. The
trial court found, point blank, that defendant had “never been
disruptive” in the courtroom. Contrary to what the People
asserted at oral argument, the court’s finding regarding the effect
of the defendant’s behavior on its proceedings is not one we may
casually brush aside; instead, it is owed deference. (Carson,
supra, 35 Cal.4th at p. 12 [“accord[ing] due deference to the trial
court’s assessment of . . . the nature and context of [a defendant’s]
misconduct and its impact on the integrity of the trial”]; People v.
Ng (2022) 13 Cal.5th 448, 494-495 [entrusting to “trial courts”
“considerable discretion in determining whether termination of
Faretta rights is necessary to maintain the integrity and fairness
of proceedings”].) When we factor out that one of defendant’s
refusals to be transported to court occurred while he was
represented by counsel and that his insistence upon leaving
occurred as the trial court was issuing its ruling (see Becerra,
supra, 63 Cal.4th at p. 520 [“subsequent misconduct, no matter
how serious, cannot shore up an unsupported ruling that had
already taken place”]), we are left with a single refusal to come to
court. This falls short of what is necessary to seriously threaten
the core integrity of the trial in light of the trial court’s express
finding that this had not been disruptive.
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.
______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:
_________________________, J.
MOOR
_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)
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