People v. Webb CA2/5

CourtListener 10760149CalctappDec 17, 2025

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Filed 12/17/25 P. v. Webb CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

THE PEOPLE, B340786

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. BA434377-02)

CALVIN FURNESS WEBB,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Mildred Escobedo, Judge. Dismissed.

Antonio M. Zaldana, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Deputy
Attorney General, and Nikhil D. Cooper, Deputy Attorney
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

******
Calvin Furness Webb (defendant) appeals from the trial
court’s order declining to exercise its discretion to resentence him
under Penal Code section 1172.1.1 Because the order from which
defendant appeals is not appealable, we dismiss the appeal.
BACKGROUND
On February 11, 2016, defendant pled no contest to assault
with a firearm likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd.
(a)(2)), and second-degree robbery (§ 211). As to the robbery, he
admitted allegations that the crime benefitted a gang (§ 186.22,
subd. (b)(1)(C)) and that he had personally used a firearm (§
12022.53, subd. (b)). As to both crimes, he admitted that his 2007
conviction for robbery was a serious felony conviction (§ 667,
subd. (d)) and that is also constituted a “strike” within the
meaning of our “Three Strikes” law (§§ 1170.12, subds. (a)–
(d), 667, subds. (b)–(j)).
The trial court sentenced defendant to an aggregate term of
22 years in state prison. Specifically, the court imposed a
sentence of 20 years on the robbery count, comprised of a base
term of 10 years for the robbery (an upper term of five years,
doubled due to the prior strike), plus 10 years for the firearm

1 All further statutory references are to the Penal Code
unless otherwise indicated.

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enhancement. The court imposed a consecutive two-year term for
the assault with a firearm offense (one-third the midterm
sentence of three years, doubled due to the prior strike).
On June 26, 2024, defendant in pro per., filed a
“Petition/Invitation To Resentence Defendant” asking the trial
court to resentence him pursuant to Assembly Bill No. 600 (2023-
2024 Reg. Sess.) and section 1172.1. He argued that he was
eligible for resentencing because he had “fully accepted
responsibility for his criminal conduct” and had “rehabilitated
himself.” As exhibits to his petition, he attached written
testimonials conveying his remorse, support letters from several
family members and friends, and prison documentation showing
his efforts at rehabilitation and self-improvement.
On July 17, 2024, the trial court denied the petition. In its
order, the court stated that it had “read and considered” the
petition, that defendant was “not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief” under section 1172.1, subdivision (c), and that,
“based upon” a “review[ of] the circumstances of defendant’s
case,” the court “decline[d] to recall and resentence defendant
absent a recommendation from the District Attorney or [prison
authorities].”
Defendant timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Defendant is seeking to appeal the trial court’s order
denying his petition for relief under section 1172.1.
This is not an appealable order. (See People v. Brinson
(2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040, 1046-1047; People v.
Faustinos (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 687, 693 (Faustinos); People v.
Hodge (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 985, 997, 999 (Hodge); People v.
Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 998-999; People v. Wilson (2025)

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109 Cal.App.5th 198, 202.) A post-judgment order in a criminal
case is appealable only if it affects a party’s substantial rights. (§
1237, subd. (b).) In the post-judgment context, a trial court lacks
jurisdiction absent express legislative authorization. (People v.
Picklesimer (2010) 48 Cal.4th 330, 337 & fn. 2.) Our Legislature
has not granted that authorization here: Section 1172.1
explicitly indicates that “[a] defendant is not entitled to file a
petition seeking relief from the court under this section” (§
1172.1, subd. (c)), and obligates a court to advise a defendant of
the right to appeal only when relief is sought under this section
by prosecutorial authorities and not when a defendant seeks that
relief (id. at subd. (d)). Because a defendant has no right to
demand that the trial court rule on a petition he files, the trial
court’s decision not to make a ruling does not deprive that
defendant of any right, let alone a substantial one necessary to
support an appeal. (Brinson, at p. 1046; Hodge, at p. 996.)
Defendant resists this analysis with what boil down to
three arguments.
First, defendant seeks to analogize this situation to the
situations in People v. Carmony (2004) 33 Cal.4th 367, 375-376
and People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155, 1158-1161. We reject
these analogies. Carmony held that a defendant who was
directly appealing his sentence could appeal a trial court’s
discretionary decision not to dismiss one of the “Three Strikes”
allegations; Loper held that a defendant could appeal a trial
court’s discretionary decision not to grant compassionate release
from custody requested by prison authorities. In each situation,
however, the party seeking that relief—the defendant in
Carmony and the prison authorities in Loper—had a right to
have the court issue a ruling in the first place. A defendant has

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no such right under section 1172.1. (Accord, Hodge, supra, 107
Cal.App.5th at p. 997 [rejecting analogy to Loper and Carmony].)
Second, defendant argues that his case is distinguishable
because the trial court only “decline[d] to recall and resentence
defendant” after a “review” of “the circumstances of defendant’s
case,” which in defendant’s view shows that the trial court—while
not obligated to entertain his petition—nevertheless did
entertain his petition, thereby creating an appealable order. We
reject this characterization of the court’s order. Where, as here, a
trial court is not obligated to issue a ruling, its failure to do so
“does not affect the defendant’s substantial rights”—regardless of
whether the order is “couched as a denial, dismissal, or any other
statement that the court is not acting.” (Faustinos, supra, 109
Cal.App.5th at p. 696.) This case is unlike People v. Olea (Oct.
30, 2025, H051988) ___Cal.App.5th___ [2025 Cal.App.LEXIS
704], where the court held that a trial court’s order denying a
defendant’s petition for relief under section 1172.1 affected the
defendant’s substantial rights (and hence was appealable)
because the trial court had appointed counsel for defendant,
authorized the release of records, held a hearing on the merits of
the petition, and issued an order unequivocally indicating its
rejection of the petition on the merits. (Id. at *20–*23.)
Third and lastly, defendant argues the trial court abused
its discretion in denying his request for resentencing,
maintaining that he was a suitable candidate for relief and that
granting his motion would have furthered the spirit and purposes
of Assembly Bill No. 600 and other recent resentencing
initiatives, as well as the interests of justice. This argument
presupposes the court was obligated to issue a decision, which, as
discussed above, it was not.

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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P. J.
HOFFSTADT

I concur:

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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The People v. Calvin Webb
B340786

BAKER, J., Concurring

I join only the disposition dismissing the appeal. (Pen.
Code, § 1172.1, subd. (c).)

BAKER, J.

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