CourtListener 10760147•Varga v. Lomas Serenas Property Owners Assn. CA4/1
Varga v. Lomas Serenas Property Owners Assn. CA4/1
CourtListener 10760147CalctappDec 17, 2025
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Filed 12/17/25 Varga v. Lomas Serenas Property Owners Assn. CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
TIBOR VARGA et al., D082364, D083174
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
v. (Super. Ct. No. 37-2018-
00016786-CU-NP-NC)
LOMAS SERENAS PROPERTY
OWNERS ASSOCIATION et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
CONSOLIDATED APPEALS from a judgment and postjudgment order
of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Cynthia A. Freeland, Judge.
Affirmed.
Berding & Weil, Anne L. Rauch, Trinette Sachrison and Paul W.
Windust for Defendants and Appellants.
Palomar Law Group, Randolph W. Ortlieb and Andre Didier; Williams
Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiffs and Respondents.
Defendants Lomas Serenas Property Owners Association (Association),
a California nonprofit corporation, and board members Anthony Ditty and
Thomas Demere (sometimes collectively, Defendants) appeal from a
judgment and postjudgment order in favor of plaintiffs Tibor Varga and Ligia
Varga, husband and wife (sometimes collectively, the Vargas). In a
bifurcated trial, the jury found (1) the Association breached its fiduciary duty
to the Vargas when it failed to lift a cease and desist order (CDO or Order) its
board imposed during the Vargas’s construction of, and when it took
additional disciplinary action against them in connection with, their home
improvement project (Project), awarding Tibor and Ligia each $100,000 in
noneconomic damages; (2) Ditty and Demere individually liable for their own
breaches of fiduciary duty as board members, awarding Tibor and Ligia each
$2,500 against both Ditty and Demere; and (3) during a duly noticed Board
meeting, Ditty committed a civil assault against Tibor, awarding him
damages of $2,500.1
Following the jury trial, the trial court conducted a bench trial on the
parties’ equitable claims and defenses. In its 20-page final statement of
decision (SOD), the court (1) rejected the Association’s affirmative defense of
equitable estoppel and its claim that deference should be given to its decision
to keep the CDO in place through the time of trial; and (2) declared the CDO
was no longer in force or effect. It subsequently awarded the Vargas attorney
fees and costs and entered judgment accordingly.
In a postjudgment order,2 the court granted the Vargas’s motion
requiring the Association to levy a special emergency assessment on its
members to pay the money portion of the judgment, after finding the
Association did not have sufficient executable assets. The court, however,
1 The jury found Demere not liable to Tibor for civil assault and battery.
2 In February 2024, we construed the parties’ stipulation to consolidate
case Nos. D082364 (appeal from the judgment) and D083174 (appeal from the
postjudgment order) as a motion to consolidate and granted that request.
2
stayed enforcement of that order until the Association exhausts its appellate
rights.
On appeal, Defendants contend the trial court erred when it (1) ruled
they each owed a fiduciary duty to the Vargas; (2) refused to defer to the
decision of the Association and its Board to keep the CDO in place and, like
the jury in this case, found their doing so was unreasonable; and (3) rejected
Defendants’ posttrial arguments that Ligia’s breach of fiduciary cause of
action was time-barred under the applicable statute of limitations. Ditty
alone contends (4) there is insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding
he “threaten[ed] to touch Tibor . . . in a harmful or an offensive manner” for
purposes of civil assault. Finally, Defendants contend the court abused its
discretion when it (5) ordered the Association to levy a special assessment on
its members to pay the money judgment.
As we explain, we reject each of these contentions and affirm the
judgment and the postjudgment order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND3
A. The Lomas Serenas Property Owners Association
The Association is a nonprofit corporation operating a common interest
development located in the City of Escondido (City), County of San Diego,
consisting of the residential properties within the Association’s boundaries.
It is governed by a five-person Board who are members of the Association
elected by the community at large. All of the lots within the development are
subject to the recorded Restatement of Declaration of Restrictions (CC&Rs).
3 We summarize the facts in the light most favorable to the judgment
and postjudgment order, drawing all reasonable inferences and resolving all
conflicts in favor of the Vargas. (See Behr v. Redmond (2011) 193
Cal.App.4th 517, 522, fn. 1.)
3
As owners of a home located within the Association, the Vargas were subject
to the CC&Rs and the Board’s directives.
The CC&Rs require all owners within the development to submit plans
and specifications for home improvement projects to the Association’s three-
member architectural review committee (ARC) for review and final approval
before performing any of the proposed improvements. The ARC’s approval
does not relieve an owner “from complying with any requirements of any
public authority having jurisdiction and shall not constitute any
representation or guarantee by the ARC . . . that a building permit will be
issued therefor by the City.”
B. The Vargas’s Project
In 2002, the Vargas submitted plans to the ARC for a substantial
remodel of their home. The ARC approved the plans in early 2003. The
Vargas’s next-door neighbor, O.W., appealed the approval of the Project,
claiming it interfered with his view. Although the Board rejected O.W.’s
appeal, the Vargas postponed the Project for other reasons.
In 2009, the Vargas sought “reapproval” of their Project, modifying
their previous plans. In August 2009, the ARC approved the revised plans,
reiterated its approval did not supersede the City’s building codes, and
recommended the Vargas contact the City’s planning department to
determine whether any permits were required. The Vargas hired a
structural engineer and architect, and submitted modified plans to the City
for a proposed addition that included a new garage, pool, driveway, and deck.
In February/March 2011, various departments of the City approved the
revised plans and issued permits for the Project. The Vargas began
construction in early September that same year.
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On September 28, 2011, the Association sent the Vargas a notice to
cease and desist construction, pending verification it was complying with the
Project approved by the ARC in 2009. In response, Tibor met with the
Association’s property manager, Prescott Management, a day or two later
and resolved the issue.
C. Revision 1 Plans
In May 2012, the Vargas submitted a revised set of grading plans
(Revision 1 Plans) to the City and the ARC. The Revision 1 Plans differed
from the previously approved plans in that they added a retaining wall that
“could be filled” with water, creating a “pond” or “reflecting pond,” and a
seven-foot-wide paved trail that ran from the top to the bottom of their
property, where it abutted an easement road; eliminated the previously
contemplated pool, which would have required a separate permit; and
included a legend showing where they intended to pour hardscape.
The ARC approved the Revision 1 Plans in May 2012, noting they
reflected “changed field conditions due to rocks encountered on site.” In the
review and approval process, the ARC did not raise any concerns about the
proposed access trail shown on the plans, or the reduced scope of the
courtyard and retaining-wall system in lieu of a pool. The City approved the
Revision 1 Plans in July 2012.
The Vargas’s construction continued in 2013, despite ongoing
opposition by neighbor O.W. In October 2013, Prescott Management asked
the Vargas to update the status of their Project, which it then would pass on
to the Vargas’s neighbors. In March 2014, the Board asked the Vargas to
submit a notice of completion of construction items and provide a landscape
restoration plan with a timeline for completion. That same month, the
Vargas submitted an updated home improvement application, setting
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August 30, 2014, as the estimated completion date for construction. In the
updated application regarding tasks to be completed, the Vargas referenced
the “rain pond,” the “courtyard rain pond,” and retaining walls as part of that
pond, about 13 times; the backyard grading and hardscape; and landscape
restoration.
D. The CDO
In early June 2014, the Vargas were set to pour concrete for the access
trail in their backyard. Demere saw the concrete forms and alerted Board
president Dick Flanagan just prior to the pour. The Board in response
instructed Prescott Management to mail the CDO to the Vargas, believing
the Vargas were constructing an unapproved concrete “driveway” from the
front to the back of their property.
The Vargas began pouring concrete on the morning of June 11, in what
was scheduled to be a two-day pour. A City inspector was present and made
only one comment to Tibor regarding a fence for erosion control, which had
been inadvertently knocked down during construction. That evening, Ligia
told Tibor that someone, presumably from Prescott Management, had left a
voicemail message earlier in the day stating they were to stop all work on
their “driveway” and that they would receive written notice of the stoppage in
the mail. Tibor promptly returned the call and left a message that a City
inspector had been onsite and witnessed the pour; and that construction was
proceeding in accordance with the approved Revision 1 Plans.
In the afternoon of June 12, the Vargas received the CDO notice with
their regular mail delivery. Neither the Board nor Prescott Management
communicated with the Vargas on June 12, despite Tibor’s message. The
CDO instructed the Vargas to stop all work on the “driveway leading from
the back of [their] property to the easement road that was not included in
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[their] original Architectural Application”; and requested they either
personally appear at, or submit written documentation in advance of, the
upcoming July 9 Board meeting.
The Vargas were “very anxious” about having to wait until July 9 to
address the Board because their building permit was to expire on August 30,
2014. According to Tibor, if construction was not completed by that date,
they would have to restart the entire permitting and approval process. In
addition, the Vargas were concerned about stopping work without having
proper erosion control in place, and felt pressured by the Association to
“finish the job.” As a result, Tibor e-mailed the Association on June 13,
explaining they were not constructing a driveway but only a walkway, which
was in accordance with their approved Revision 1 Plans. He also attempted
to resolve the matter more expeditiously by contacting the Board members
directly, but was advised he needed to wait until the July 9 meeting.
On July 1, City inspector Hector Favela e-mailed Flanagan, stating the
“concrete pathway” in the Vargas’s backyard was “not considered a code
violation,” as it allowed the Vargas “to reach the lower portion of their
residence for maintenance and personal use.” Favela’s e-mail was in
response to Flanagan’s inquiry whether the City considered the “concrete
pathway” to be a “trail,” as indicated on the Revision 1 Plans.
E. The July 9 Meeting and Appointment of an Executive Committee
Tibor appeared at the meeting and asked the Board to prepare an
“attendance sheet” because he was unfamiliar with some of its newer
members. The Board refused; it also refused to give him the Board minutes,
identify its members by name, and allow him to photograph the Board.
According to Tibor, the meeting “started out on a bad foot.”
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During the meeting, the Board requested more detail about the
concrete “driveway,” including its width; and asked the Vargas to provide a
color-coded plan showing the improvements they already had built. Less
than a week later, the Vargas complied with that request.
On July 17, 2014, the Vargas received the Board’s response thanking
Tibor for attending the July 9 meeting and “submit[ing] much, if not all of the
requested documentation” it originally sought. The Board, however,
requested additional information from the Vargas, including a full-sized set
of “ ‘as built’ ” plans highlighting any changes they had made from their
previous plans, as well as digital photo files showing when they had poured
the concrete for the access trail.
The Board subsequently appointed President Flanagan and Vice
President Ditty to a two-board committee to further investigate the Vargas’s
construction. On July 27, they spent about an hour at the Vargas’s property.
In addition to the access trail, they questioned whether the Revised 1 Plans
included portions of the hardscape and the “pond.”
On July 29, Flanagan informed the Vargas he had spent about three
hours that day at the City reviewing the Vargas’s plans and “conducting
discussions with Building and Engineering” regarding their Project.
Flanagan indicated the City would be asking the Vargas to submit updated
plans, that the Board had no desire to “delay” the Vargas’s Project, and that
it wanted the Project “completed as soon as possible.”
F. The Revision 2 Plans
The Vargas submitted updated plans (Revision 2 Plans) to the City on
August 1, 2014, and to the Board on August 5. On August 6, the Board met
in an executive session, acknowledged receipt of the Revision 2 Plans, and
recommended the CDO remain in effect until it received more detail from the
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Vargas, “so that both the Association and the City . . . are clear on what is
being constructed.” The Board authorized Flanagan and Ditty to continue to
“correspond” with the Vargas and obtain “any further stipulations on
clarification of the plans” prior to lifting the CDO, and “grant[ed] the two
Directors the full authority to handle all issues related to this matter,
including the lifting of the [CDO,] once the appropriate level of construction[-]
plan detail ha[d] been received.”
On August 13, the Board wrote the Vargas identifying various concerns
about the Revision 2 Plans, including their intended use of the “pond”;
mitigation measures—including flow calculations—they had undertaken for
the additional hardscape, to reduce the chance of runoff; and the absence of
perimeter fencing. The Board cautioned that submission of incomplete and
“potentially misleading plans” would only further delay final approval of the
Project.
Tibor responded on August 21. He took issue with the Board’s
statement their plans were incomplete and potentially misleading, and
explained in detail what the Revision 2 Plans showed regarding the “pond” or
“water containment structure,” including its purpose, dimensions, and
functionality. He also addressed the Board’s concern about the seven-foot-
wide trail leading to the easement road behind their property. He claimed
the pathway was included in the plans previously approved by the ARC; and
that the City had viewed the hardscape changes to be in “substantial
conformance” with those plans.
In addition, Tibor pointed out that all the concrete had been poured
before they received the CDO in the mail; that a licensed civil engineer had
prepared the flow calculations, which he previously had submitted to the
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City; and that he was under no obligation to provide those calculations to the
Board.
G. The Board Agrees to Lift the CDO if the City Approves the Revision 2
Plans
Key to this appeal, the Board met in an executive session on
September 3, 2014. Flanagan, Ditty, and Demere were in attendance, as was
a representative from Prescott Management. The minutes from that session
state in part: “The Board . . . reviewed the last correspondence sent to this
owner [i.e. the Vargas] by management at the direction of the Board. The
owner has contacted Management at least twice stating that all the
clarification was provided to the Executive Committee and requesting the
Cease and Desist order be lifted. Dick [Flanagan] and Tony [Ditty] reported
that they are interfacing with the City building department to get their
position on the pool/catch basin, and whether a fence will be required. It was
determined that if the City reports that all safety requirements have been met
the Cease and Desist order will be lifted.” (Italics added.) The Board
subsequently approved the minutes at a later meeting.
A week later, Prescott Management e-mailed the Vargas, advising that
“once confirmation has been received from the City that all drainage and
hardscape construction, including the catch basin/pool area, are deemed safe
by the City[,] the Cease and Desist order will likely be lifted.”
H. Defendants Refuse to Lift the CDO Despite City Approval
On September 17, in response to questions posed by the Board, the City
sent an e-mail to Prescott Management, Board members Flanagan and Ditty,
and the Vargas stating the City’s engineering department had no further
comment on the Revision 2 Plans and was “not requesting a fence along the
City easement or [the Vargas’s] property line.” The following day, the City
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asked the Vargas to revise the Revision 2 Plans to change the designation of
“pool” to “retaining pond” as a condition of its final approval. That same day,
the City’s engineering department approved the Revision 2 Plans and
forwarded them to the City’s Building Department.
Anxious to complete their Project, on September 18 the Vargas e-
mailed the Board and Prescott Management describing the final changes to
the Revision 2 Plans required by the City and included a photograph showing
those changes had been made. With the City’s approval and those changes
detailed for the Board, the Vargas requested the Board lift the CDO without
further delay. The following day, Prescott Management responded that it
could not lift the CDO until the executive committee of the Board received a
“satisfactory response” from “all involved departments of the City.”
Five days later and after receiving no additional communication from
the Board or Prescott Management, the Vargas sent a follow-up e-mail
requesting that the CDO be lifted, noting the Order had been in place for
about 100 days.
About an hour later, Ditty e-mailed back. He blamed the Vargas for
the delay of their Project, stating the CDO was “a direct result of [their] lack
of candor and penchant for cutting corners and ignoring protocol”; they had
poured concrete for their seven-foot-wide path, despite receiving notice to
stop all construction; and they had provided “contradictory explanations
about the water containment structure.” Ditty also referenced the Board’s
“lack of trust” of the Vargas, which for him “continue[d] to grow”; and advised
that any future communication should be directed to Prescott Management
and not the Board, as that was “not advancing [their] cause.”
On September 25, Flanagan and Ditty e-mailed the Vargas on behalf of
the Board. They continued to allege the Vargas performed construction on
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their property without obtaining prior approval from the ARC, which
included the “drive path” down to the easement road and the “pool”; and
requested the Vargas submit additional plans that included a five-foot fence
around the perimeter of their property, claiming the “water containment
structure” posed the same safety hazards for the community as a “pool.”
A few days later, the Vargas received additional correspondence from
Prescott Management, “as directed by the Board.” The letter noted it would
be “counter-productive” to involve attorneys, as Tibor had threatened, and
suggested an alternative: “If you continue to feel that the Association’s
conditions for plan approval as delineated in our letter of September 25 are
unreasonable, the appropriate next step in the process would be Informal
Dispute Resolution (IDR), [and] a meeting of the parties (not attorneys) to
seek resolution.”
I. The IDR
The parties informally met in mid-October 2014 in an attempt to
resolve their dispute. At trial, Tibor testified that during the IDR, Flanagan
told him if the Vargas would submit a photograph showing the five-foot
masonry retaining wall was a barrier to entry, Flanagan would recommend
the Board lift the CDO; and that they shook on their “verbal agreement.” As
requested, the Vargas submitted the requested photograph showing the five-
foot barrier wall.
On October 15, 2014, as a result of the IDR and its receipt of the
requested information from the Vargas, the Association confirmed the
parties’ agreement that would lead to the lifting of the CDO. Based on its
understanding the water containment structure would be used as a “pond”
“and not for swimming/wading or for aquatic life,” there would be “no
mechanical filters and/or pumps as equipment on the plans as approved,” and
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the two “ ‘windows’ in the wall structure” would be “glassed-in or otherwise
filled in so that the entire backside of the structure presents a 5 foot
protective barrier,” the Board agreed to take no further action regarding the
alleged violations of the CDO and lift the Order.
Tibor refused to sign the proposed agreement. He testified the
proposed agreement included terms not discussed by the parties at the IDR
and omitted others they had agreed to, including requiring the Association to
process any new changes to the Revision 2 Plans expeditiously. He also
objected to the proposed agreement because it required them to admit
wrongdoing by failing to follow the CC&Rs in constructing the Project. The
Board, as a result, kept the CDO in place.
J. The Association Fines the Vargas After the City’s Final Inspection
The City thereafter extended the Vargas’s building permit, which was
set to expire on August 30, 2014, for another six months. In February 2015,
the City did a final inspection, accepted “the submitted as built record
drawing and refunded to [the Vargas their] cash permit deposit.” The
Vargas, however, deemed the Project incomplete, as work “not mandated” by
the City remained outstanding due to the CDO.
In September 2015, the Board summoned the Vargas to a hearing as
part of its enforcement action. At the October 7, 2015 hearing, the Board
fined the Vargas $75 as a result of the unresolved CDO and what it claimed
was their ongoing violation of the CC&Rs.
K. Trial Court Proceedings
1. The Operative Pleadings
In April 2018, Tibor alone filed an action against the Association, Ditty,
and Demere,4 alleging causes of action for declaratory relief; breach of
4 Flanagan was not named in the lawsuit.
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fiduciary duty; civil assault (Demere and Ditty only); and civil battery
(Demere). Defendants in response moved to add Ligia as an indispensable
party. After additional pleadings, the Vargas filed their second amended
complaint (SAC), which is the operative pleading in this case, alleging the
same four causes of action. Paragraph 36 of the SAC alleges Defendants
breached their fiduciary duty by, among other acts, “refusing to rescind the
Cease and Desist Notice.”
2. Jury Trial
With the CDO still in place, the matter proceeded to a two-phase trial
in August 2022. Phase one involved the Vargas’s legal claims and phase two
the parties’ equitable claims and defenses. In phase one, the jury by special
verdict found the Association breached its fiduciary duty to the Vargas by:
“(1) not lifting the CDO, (2) not approving Plaintiffs’ Revision 2 improvement
plans within 60 days of receipt, and (3) issuing a notice of hearing on
September 18, 2015, by conducting a disciplinary hearing on October 7, 2015,
and by imposing a monetary fine.”
The jury also found Ditty and Demere similarly breached their
fiduciary duties as Board members to the Vargas; Ditty liable for assaulting
Tibor; and Demere not liable for assault or battery. The jury awarded Tibor
and Ligia damages for the breaches of fiduciary duty by the Association,
Ditty, and Demere; and Tibor damages for Ditty’s assault.
3. Bench Trial
Prior to the commencement of phase two involving the Vargas’s
declaratory relief cause of action, Defendants filed a motion to amend their
answer to include the affirmative defense of equitable estoppel. The Vargas
stipulated to the inclusion of this defense and the matter proceeded to a
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bench trial in October 2022 against the Association on the sole issue of
whether the June 14, 2013 CDO remained valid and enforceable.
At the conclusion of phase two, the trial court ruled the Vargas were
entitled to a “limited declaration” that the CDO was no longer in force and
effect. In so doing, the court rejected the Association’s equitable estoppel
defense, finding there was insufficient evidence that the Association relied to
its detriment upon any alleged misrepresentations by the Vargas. The court
noted the Association did not lift the CDO after the Vargas submitted the
Revision 2 Plans due to what it considered were unsatisfactory responses to
its inquires, “thus demonstrating that the [Association] was not relying on
anything the Plaintiffs said or did” to support this defense.
The trial court also refused to defer to the Board’s decision to keep the
CDO in place for all these years. The court noted the evidence in phase two,
“which presumably is the evidence upon which the jury relied in reaching its
verdict” in phase one, included both the minutes of the September 3, 2014
executive committee meeting and the October 15, 2014 letter following the
IDR, in which the Board expressed a willingness to overlook any alleged
unauthorized improvements and lift the CDO if the Vargas filled in the two
holes in the water containment structure and agreed it could not be used for
swimming or aquatic life. The court found this evidence supported the
finding “that perpetuation of the . . . CDO was not necessary to ensure the
best interests of the [Association] and its members were protected.” The
court therefore declined to give deference to the decision not to lift the CDO.
4. Judgment and Postjudgment Order
On March 6, 2023, the trial court entered judgment in favor of the
Vargas. On June 12, 2023, the court added an award of $337,060.90 and
$32,260.98 in attorney fees and costs, respectively, to the judgment, after
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denying Defendants’ motions for new trial and judgment notwithstanding the
verdict (JNOV).
On September 15, 2023, the court ordered the Association to levy a
special assessment to cover the emotional distress damages in the Vargas’s
judgment. On January 10, 2024, the court stayed the September 15 order,
ruling it would “remain in place for the duration of the pending appeal to the
fullest extent of the law.”
DISCUSSION
I
Breach of Fiduciary Duty
Defendants argue they owed no duty to the Vargas “to lift the CDO,
unconditionally approve the Revision 2 plans, and waive Respondents’
violation of the governing documents.” Instead, they argue they owed a
fiduciary duty to the membership of the Association as a whole and not to any
one member, and that whether a duty is owed is a question of law subject to
de novo review.
The Vargas argue that when Defendants established the conditions it
deemed appropriate for lifting of the CDO, following the Board’s executive
committee session on September 3, 2014, it already had exercised the duty it
owed to all members of the Association, including the Vargas; and that
whether the Association breached its duty and proximately caused the
Vargas damages were factual questions reviewed for substantial evidence.
As we explain, both parties are partly correct.
A. Duty
1. Guiding Principles
The three elements of a breach of fiduciary cause of action are existence
of a fiduciary relationship, breach of fiduciary duty, and damages. (Oasis
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West Realty, LLC v. Goldman (2011) 51 Cal.4th 811, 820.) Whether a
fiduciary duty exists is a question of law subject to de novo review. (Green
Valley Landowners Assn. v. City of Vallejo (2015) 241 Cal.App.4th 425, 441
(Green Valley).) However, whether a defendant breached its duty and caused
the plaintiff damages are reviewed for substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
“[I]n recognition of the increasingly important role played by private
homeowners’ associations . . ., the courts have recognized that such
associations owe a fiduciary duty to their members.” (See Cohen v. Kite Hill
Community Assn. (1983) 142 Cal.App.3d 642, 650–651 (Cohen), citing Raven’s
Cove Townhomes, Inc. v. Knuppe Development Co. (1981) 114 Cal.App.3d 783,
799 (Raven’s Cove).) This duty “extends to individual homeowners, not just
the homeowners association.” (Cohen v. S & S Construction Co. (1983) 151
Cal.App.3d 941, 945, italics added (S & S Construction).)
Directors of a homeowners association likewise owe a fiduciary duty to
the members they serve. (Corp. Code, § 7231, subd. (a) [a director shall act
“in good faith, in a manner such director believes to be in the best interests of
the corporation and with such care, including reasonable inquiry, as an
ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar
circumstances”]; Frances T. v. Village Green Owners Assn. (1986) 42 Cal.3d
490, 513 (Frances T.) [“Directors of nonprofit corporations . . . are fiduciaries
who are required to exercise their powers in accordance with the duties
imposed by the Corporations Code”]; Ravens Cove, supra, 114 Cal.App.3d at
p. 799 [“it is well-settled that directors of nonprofit corporations are
fiduciaries”].)
Relevant here, homeowners associations must exercise their authority
to approve or disapprove an individual homeowner’s construction or
improvement plans in good faith and in conformity with their declaration of
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covenants and restrictions. (Ironwood Owners Assn. IX v. Solomon (1986)
178 Cal.App.3d 766, 772 (Ironwood) [“When a homeowners’ association seeks
to enforce the provisions of its [covenants, conditions, and restrictions] . . . , it
is incumbent upon it to show that it has followed its own standards and
procedures prior to pursuing such a remedy, that those procedures were fair
and reasonable and that its substantive decision was made in good faith, and
is reasonable, not arbitrary or capricious.”].)
Membership in a homeowners’ association is typically mandatory, as is
true in the instant case, “[a]nd the powers of such associations are extensive.”
(Cohen, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at p. 651.) A member is required to submit to
the authority of the association, which includes “ ‘restrictions upon the use
and enjoyment of the property contained in the declaration.’ ” (Ibid.) “With
power, of course, comes the potential for abuse. Therefore, the [a]ssociation
must be held to a high standard of responsibility: ‘The business and
governmental aspects of the association and the association’s relationship to
its members clearly give rise to a special sense of responsibility upon the
officers and directors . . . . This special responsibility is manifested in the
requirements of fiduciary duties and the requirements of due process, equal
protection, and fair dealing.’ ” (Ibid.)
2. Analysis
Based on the foregoing authorities, we independently conclude the
Association and Board members Ditty and Demere owed the Vargas a
fiduciary duty to exercise their authority over the Vargas’s Project in good
faith and in conformity with their own directives and the CC&Rs. (See
Ironwood, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 772; S & S Construction, supra, 151
Cal.App.3d at p. 945; Cohen, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d at pp. 650–651.)
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In mid-August 2014, the Board informed the Vargas it could not
approve their Revision 2 Plans due to ongoing concerns regarding the “water
containment structure”; the scope of the backyard hardscape; and the lack of
any fencing around their property, which allegedly posed a threat to public
safety due to the water containment structure. In response, the Vargas noted
the Revision 2 Plans included the purpose, dimensions, and functionality of
the water containment structure. They noted the structure was “sheltered on
three sides by buildings” and “enclosed on two sides with a wall measur[ing]
about 5 feet from the outside and about 3 to 4 feet from the inside[,] forming
an[] ‘interior courtyard.’ ”
Regarding the backyard hardscape, the Vargas claimed the seven-foot-
wide trail leading to the easement road “was clearly shown on the plans
approved by the [Association],” and that the City viewed the hardscape
changes to be in “substantial conformance” with those plans. Finally,
because the water containment structure was “walled off” and “protected
from the outside by 5-foot tall walls and building walls with controllable
entry/exit points,” they considered a perimeter fence unnecessary.
As summarized ante, against this backdrop the Board’s executive
committee met on September 3, 2014. The minutes from that meeting—
subsequently approved by the Board—provided that executive committee
members Flanagan and Ditty were “interfacing with the City building
department to get their position on the pool/catch basin, and whether a fence
will be required”; and that “if the City reports that all safety requirements
have been met the Cease and Desist order will be lifted.”
A week later, Prescott Management wrote the Vargas “that once
confirmation has been received from the City that all drainage and hardscape
construction, including the catch basin/pool area, are deemed safe by the
19
City[,] the Cease and Desist order will likely be lifted. The Executive
Committee will communicate the City’s decision to [Prescott Management] at
their earliest opportunity, which will in turn be communicated to you.” Both
Flanagan and Ditty were included on Prescott Management’s September 10
e-mail to the Vargas.
That confirmation came on September 17, 2014, when the City notified
Prescott Management, Board members Flanagan and Ditty, and the Vargas
that the City’s engineering department had no further comment on the
Revision 2 Plans, that it was “not requesting a fence along the City easement
or [the Vargas’s] property line,” and that it had approved the Revision 2
Plans after the Vargas revised them to change the designation of “pool” to
“retaining pond.” The following day, the Vargas sent Prescott Management a
copy of the City’s approval stamp and asked the Association to lift the CDO
“without further delay.”
Thus, the record belies Defendants’ contention on appeal that it did not
owe a fiduciary duty to the Vargas “to decide one way or the other” whether
to approve the Revision 2 Plans and lift the CDO. To the contrary, that duty
arose on September 17, 2014, when the City approved the Revision 2 Plans,
thereby triggering Defendants’ self-imposed obligation to lift the CDO, per
the Board’s decision at its September 3 executive session.5
Defendants, however, argue that “several” Supreme Court cases
establish that a homeowners association’s fiduciary duty is to the
5 Accordingly, we conclude the trial court properly instructed the jury
with Judicial Council of California Civil Jury Instruction (CACI) No. 4100 as
follows: “A Homeowners’ Association and its Board Members owe a fiduciary
duty to their Homeowners. A fiduciary duty imposes on a Homeowners’
Association and its Board Members a duty to act with the utmost good faith
in the best interests of their Homeowners.”
20
membership as a whole and not to any individual member. We note that
Defendants cite to only one Supreme Court case, Frances T., which, as we
explain, is inapposite, and merely distinguish one or two other cases that
suggest a fiduciary duty is owed to individual members of an association.
Frances T. involved an action brought by an owner against a
homeowners association and the individual members of its board, after she
was raped and robbed in her unit by an unknown third party. (Frances T.,
supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 495.) As relevant to our discussion, the plaintiff
alleged causes of action for negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, averring
the defendants failed to provide adequate exterior lighting in the common
area near the plaintiff’s unit and required her to remove lighting she had
installed at her own expense. (Id. at p. 498.) Frances T. concluded the trial
court erred in granting the defendants’ demurrer on the plaintiff’s negligence
cause of action, holding the defendants owed her the same duty of care a
landlord owed a tenant in a “traditional landlord-tenant relationship.” (Ibid.)
Although it reversed that portion of the judgment sustaining the
defendants’ demurrer to the plaintiff’s negligence cause of action, Frances T.
affirmed the judgment as to the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary cause of action.
(Frances T., supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 514.) In so doing, the court noted the
plaintiff’s allegations against the association involved only its “duty to her as
a tenant rather than as a shareholder” (ibid.), and that a fiduciary
relationship generally does not exist between a tenant and landlord (id. at p.
513). As to the individual board members, the court found the plaintiff had
“alleged no facts to show that these directors had a fiduciary duty to serve as
the Project’s landlord.” (ibid.)
Preliminarily, we disagree with Defendants’ assertion that Frances T.
upheld the dismissal of the plaintiff’s breach of fiduciary duty cause of action
21
based on its conclusion the homeowners association and/or its individual
directors owed a duty to the membership as a whole but not to the plaintiff
individually. In our view, Frances T. upheld the dismissal of the fiduciary
duty cause of action based on its conclusion there was no breach of duty by
the defendants.
Frances T. noted the defendants “fulfilled” their fiduciary duty “by
strictly enforcing the provision in the CC&Rs that prohibited alteration of the
common areas except with the prior written consent of the board” (Frances T.,
supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 514, italics added); that the “directors,” as opposed to
the homeowners association, “had no fiduciary duty to exercise their
discretion one way or the other with regard to plaintiff’s lighting so long as
their conduct conformed to the standard set out in section 7231 [of the
Corporations Code]” (i.e., they acted in good faith) (Frances T., at p. 514,
second italics added); and that because, as to the directors, “a good faith
mistake in business judgment does not breach the statutory standard,
plaintiff’s third claim [for breach of fiduciary duty] does not state a cause of
action” (ibid., italics added).
Frances T. is also factually distinguishable from the instant case. The
basis of the Vargas’s breach of fiduciary duty cause of action stems not from
allegations they were in a traditional landlord-tenant relationship with
Defendants, or that Defendants failed to protect them from foreseeable
criminal acts of third parties, but rather as a result of Defendants’ handling
(or mishandling) of the Vargas’s Project. This duty arose not from a “common
law relationship” between the parties, as was the case in Frances T. (Frances
22
T., supra, 42 Cal.3d at p. 513), but from the Association’s CC&Rs6 and the
standards and criteria Defendants alone established for the Vargas’s Project.
We therefore reject Defendants’ contention they did not owe a fiduciary duty
to the Vargas.
B. Breach
Defendants contend the judgment should be reversed because the jury
erroneously found they breached their fiduciary duties. Defendants contend
there was no breach because the Vargas’s plans were “nonconforming” and
included “a structure whose use to this day remains undefined.” We find this
contention unavailing.
1. Additional Background
The Vargas’s homeowners association expert, Robert Griswold, testified
concerning the standards of care applicable to Defendants and their handling
of the Vargas’s Project. Griswold opined that the Association fell below the
standard of care when it refused to lift the CDO following the Board’s
September 3, 2014, executive committee session and the City’s decision two
weeks later approving the Revision 2 Plans. Griswold noted the Defendants
still had not lifted the Order at the time of trial in August 2022, years after
the City gave its final approval.
6 The CC&Rs provide in part, “[n]o alterations in the exterior design or
color of any structure, including additions, shall be made without the prior
written approval of the ARC.” (Art. V, § 1. (b), italics added.) Article 6
provides an owner must seek prior written approval of the ARC “for
structures, additions, fences, pools, patio structures, outbuildings,
landscaping and all other improvements to be made to any Lot” (Art. VI, § 1);
the ARC shall review the plans and specifications and if written approval is
not forthcoming within sixty days from the date of receipt of said submittals,
“such inaction shall be deemed to be approval” (id., § 3); and enforcement of
the ARC and Board decisions, following an appeal from a decision of the ARC,
“shall be the responsibility of the Board” (id., § 7).
23
Griswold also rejected the Board’s position that it had the authority,
separate and apart from the City, to impose additional safety requirements
on the Vargas before approving their Project and lifting the CDO. Griswold
opined the Board’s concern about being sued due to the water containment
structure was overblown. He added the City’s experts, including engineers
and architects, had reviewed the Revision 2 Plans for compliance with state
and local building codes; that once the City approved the Vargas’s Revision 2
Plans, Defendants should have lifted the CDO; that in refusing to do so, they
took the position they knew more about safety and building codes than the
City’s experts; and that the City, and not Defendants, were the “final
authority” when it came to compliance issues.
Moreover, although the City sent the Vargas a settlement proposal in
October 2014 that potentially would have resolved the parties’ dispute,
Griswold opined the Vargas were not unreasonable in rejecting that proposal
because it required them to admit wrongdoing. In his opinion, that was “a
real big sticking point” for Defendants, as the issue for them became more
about “egos or personalities” and less about the Vargas’s Project.
2. Analysis
We conclude the evidence is more than sufficient to support the jury’s
finding that Defendants breached their fiduciary duty to the Vargas when
they refused to lift the CDO, after the City determined no further safety
measures were necessary.7 (See Green Valley, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at
7 As a result of our decision, we deem it unnecessary to decide whether
the jury erred when it separately found Defendants breached their fiduciary
duties by (1) failing to approve the Revision 2 Plans within 60 days of the
Vargas’s submission and (2) imposing a fine on the Vargas in late 2015 in
support of Defendants’ enforcement action.
24
p. 441; accord, Elation Systems, Inc. v. Fenn Bridge LLC (2021) 71
Cal.App.5th 958, 964 (Elation) [substantial evidence is “ ‘ “such evidence as a
reasonable fact trier might accept as adequate to support a conclusion;
evidence which has ponderable legal significance, which is reasonable in
nature, credible and of solid value” ’ ”].)8
When the Board made its decision on September 3, 2014, it had all the
necessary information regarding the Project, including the water
containment structure. Thus, whether or not the Revisions 2 Plans allegedly
were “nonconforming” was then immaterial to the Board’s decision to lift the
CDO. In our view, what Defendants are asking us to do now is reweigh the
evidence and the credibility of the parties and make a new finding in their
favor. This we cannot and will not do. (See Elation, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at
p. 964; Green Valley, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 441; accord, In re Marriage
of Balcof (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1509, 1531 [“[t]he Court of Appeal is not a
second trier of fact”].)
C. The Rule of Judicial Deference
Defendants contend the trial court erred when it failed to afford judicial
deference to the Association’s decision not to lift the CDO, following the City’s
approval of the Project. Specifically, they contend the court ignored their
“presumed expertise” and “overstepped” its authority by accepting the
Vargas’s “argument that the City’s approval of Respondents’ Revision 2 plans
8 In light of our decision, we reject Defendants’ alternate contention that,
absent a fiduciary duty, the Vargas’s claim against Defendants was merely
one for breach of contract (i.e., based on the CC&Rs), which precludes
recovery of noneconomic damages. (Erlich v. Menezes (1999) 21 Cal.4th 543,
559 [“damages for mental suffering and emotional distress are generally not
recoverable in an action for breach of an ordinary commercial contract in
California”].)
25
should have ended Appellants’ inquiry, truncating [their] decision to place
reasonable conditions on its approval.” We are not persuaded.
1. Guiding Principles
The Supreme Court in Lamden v. La Jolla Shores Clubdominium
Homeowners Assn. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 249, 253 (Lamden) adopted a rule of
judicial deference when the board of a homeowners association, “upon
reasonable investigation, in good faith and with regard for the best interests
of the community association and its members, exercises discretion within
the scope of its authority under relevant statutes, covenants and
restrictions.”
The rule of judicial deference, like the related business judgment rule
(discussed post), is an affirmative defense. (Ekstrom v. Marquesa at Monarch
Beach Homeowners Assn. (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1111, 1122–1123.)
Defendants therefore had the burden of establishing the requisite elements
for applying the rule. (Affan v. Portofino Cove Homeowners Assn. (2010) 189
Cal.App.4th 930, 941–942 (Affan).) Where, as here, the trier of fact finds the
defendant failed to meet this burden, the issue on appeal becomes
“ ‘whether the evidence compels a finding in favor of the appellant as a
matter of law.’ ” (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems,
Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 466 (Sonic); accord Dreyer’s Grand Ice
Cream, Inc. v. County of Kern (2013) 218 Cal.App.4th 828, 838 (Dreyer’s).)
To satisfy this burden on appeal, the defendant must show the evidence
supporting that new finding was “ ‘(1) “uncontradicted and unimpeached” and
(2) “of such a character and weight as to leave no room for a judicial
determination that it was insufficient to support a finding.” ’ ” (Sonic, supra,
196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466; accord, Dreyer's, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 838.)
“ ‘This is ‘an onerous standard’ [citation] and one that is ‘almost impossible’
26
for a losing [party] to meet, because unless the trier of fact made specific
factual findings in favor of the losing [party], we presume the trier of fact
concluded that ‘[the party’s] evidence lacks sufficient weight and credibility to
carry the burden of proof.’ ” (Estes v. Eaton Corp. (2020) 51 Cal.App.5th 636,
651 (Estes), citing Ajaxo, Inc. v. E*Trade Financial Corp. (2020) 48
Cal.App.5th 129, 163–164 and Bookout v. State of California ex rel. Dept. of
Transportation (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1478, 1486.)
The Lamden rule is not unlimited. (Affan, supra, 189 Cal.App.4th at p.
940.) “It is a rule of deference to the reasoned decisionmaking of homeowners
association boards concerning ordinary maintenance. It does not create a
blanket immunity for all the decisions and actions of a homeowners
association. The Supreme Court’s precise articulation of the rule makes clear
that the rule of deference applies only when a homeowner sues an association
. . . that meets the enumerated criteria.” (Ibid.; id. at p. 943 [homeowners
association “failed to establish the factual prerequisites for applying the rule
of judicial deference” at trial, where “there was no evidence the board
engaged in ‘reasonable investigation’ [citation] before choosing to continue its
‘piecemeal’ approach to sewage backups”].)
2. Analysis
This case may have been turned out differently had the Board not
resolved on September 3, 2014, to lift the CDO if the City reported no safety
concerns regarding the Vargas’s Revision 2 Plans. The Vargas own expert
acknowledged that the Board’s initial issuance of the CDO, directing the
Vargas to stop “all work on their driveway” (i.e., trail) pending the July 9
2014 Board meeting, was “appropriate.” If the Vargas then had challenged
that decision, the Defendants would have a stronger argument for application
of the rule of judicial deference to the Association’s decision making.
27
But that finding would require us to ignore the evidence, summarized
ante, that the Association decided against lifting the CDO, after repeatedly
representing (including through its manager) that it would do so if and when
the City determined the Vargas’s Revision 2 Plans met all safety measures.
The court found this evidence supported its decision in phase two of the trial
that “perpetuation of the . . . CDO was not necessary to ensure that the best
interests of the [Association] and its members were protected”; and that, in
light of the jury’s breach of fiduciary duty findings against the Association,
“and given the absence of sufficient evidence to demonstrate that a reversal
of the September 3, 2014 decision was in the best interest of the [Association]
and its members,” application of the rule of judicial deference was
unwarranted.
Relying on a string of cases including Harvey v. The Landing
Homeowners Assn. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 809 (Harvey), Defendants contend
the trial court erred by refusing to apply the rule of judicial deference to the
Association. In Harvey, we applied the Lamden rule to uphold summary
judgment for the homeowners association, concluding the “undisputed”
evidence showed the board of the association, “upon reasonable investigation”
and in “good faith,” properly exercised its discretion to allow homeowners to
use, under certain conditions, portions of the common area for storage. (Id. at
pp. 820–822.)
Defendants reliance on Harvey is misplaced, as the jury here found the
Association failed to act in good faith in exercising, through the Board, its
“authority and presumed expertise” with respect to the Vargas’s Project. (See
Harvey, supra, 162 Cal.App.4th 820–821.) The record therefore does not
compel a favorable finding for the Association as to this defense. (See Estes,
28
supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 651; Dreyer’s, supra, 218 Cal.App.4th at p. 838;
Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)
D. The Business Judgment Rule
Defendants similarly contend the business judgment rule, codified in
Corporations Code section 7231,9 applied to the Board’s decision making
regarding the imposition of, and ultimately its choice not to lift, the CDO, due
to what it claimed were ongoing safety concerns. For reasons already
discussed, we conclude this related rule of deference does not apply in this
case.
1. Guiding Principles
“The business judgment rule is a judicial policy of deference to the
business judgment of corporate directors in the exercise of their broad
discretion in making corporate decisions. [Citation.] ‘The rule is based on
the premise that those to whom the management of a business organization
has been entrusted, and not the courts, are best able to judge whether a
particular act or transaction is helpful to the conduct of the organization’s
affairs or expedient for the attainment of its purposes. [Citations.] The rule
establishes a presumption that directors’ decisions are based on sound
business judgment, and it prohibits courts from interfering in business
decisions made by the directors in good faith and in the absence of a conflict
9 As noted, Corporations Code section 7231, subdivision (a) requires a
director to act in “good faith” in the performance of his or her duties and with
“such care” as an “ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use
under similar circumstances.” Subdivision (c) of this statute goes on to state
that “[a] person who performs the duties of a director in accordance [with the
preceding subdivisions] . . . shall have no liability based upon any alleged
failure to discharge the person’s obligations as a director.” (Corp. Code,
§ 7231, subd. (c).)
29
of interest.’ ” (Everest Investors 8 v. McNeil Partners (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th
411, 429–430 (Everest).)
As was the case with the rule of judicial deference applicable to a
homeowners association, a court is required to defer to the discretionary
decision making of board members of an association only if they acted in good
faith. (See, e.g., Lamden, supra, 21 Cal.4th at p. 257 [“ ‘The . . . business
judgment rule . . . insulates from court intervention those management
decisions which are made by directors in good faith in what the directors
believe is the organization’s best interest.’ ”]; accord, Lauckhart v. El Macero
Homeowners Assn. (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 889, 906 [“ ‘The [business
judgment] rule . . . prohibits courts from interfering in business decisions
made by the directors in good faith and in the absence of a conflict of
interest.’ ”]; Everest, supra, 114 Cal.App.4th at pp. 429–430.)
2. Analysis
Similar to its findings regarding the Association, the jury found Ditty
and Demere failed to act in good faith “when making decisions about how to
handle the issues related to the Vargas’ home improvement project.” We
conclude substantial evidence supports these findings. (Elation, supra, 71
Cal.App.5th at p. 964; Green Valley, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at p. 441.)
As summarized, both Board members attended the September 3, 2014
executive session; both were involved in the ongoing dispute involving the
Vargas’s Project, as Demere expressed concerns about the scope of the Project
to Flanagan and sat on the Board when it decided not to lift the CDO; and
Ditty, for his part, was on the executive committee formed by the Board and
was the Board member who e-mailed Tibor on September 23, 2014, blaming
the Vargas for “cutting corners and ignoring protocol,” and accusing them of
“lack[ing] candor.”
30
As we have discussed, the trial court relied on the jury’s findings, as
well as the evidence adduced in phase two of the trial—including the absence
of evidence demonstrating that a reversal of the September 3, 2014, decision
of the executive committee was in the best interest of the Association and its
members—when it ruled no deference should be given to the Board’s decision
to keep the CDO in place.
In light of these facts, we conclude the evidence does not, as a matter of
law, compel a finding that the business judgment rule applied to the decision
making of Ditty and Demere to keep the CDO in place, following the City’s
approvals. (See Estes, supra, 51 Cal.App.5th at p. 651; Dreyer’s, supra, 218
Cal.App.4th at p. 838; Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 466.)
II
Ligia’s Emotional Distress Damages
Defendants contend the trial court erred when it applied the
“continuing violation doctrine” and found Ligia’s claim of emotional distress
damages was not time-barred. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
In their respective post-trial motions, Defendants contended—
ostensibly for the first time—that Ligia’s breach of fiduciary claim was time-
barred. The trial court disagreed. In so doing, it recounted in detail the
procedural history of the case.
Briefly, Tibor alone filed a complaint against Defendants on April 5,
2018, which he amended later that year. In December 2019, Defendants filed
a motion to add Ligia as an indispensable party. In February 2020, the trial
court granted that motion in part, ordering that Ligia be added to Tibor’s
breach of fiduciary and declaratory relief causes of action. On March 13,
31
2020, the Vargas filed their SAC, which, for the first time, included Ligia as a
party.
The trial court found the four-year statute of limitations applied to
Ligia’s breach of fiduciary duty claim; that her claim accrued in
September/October 2014, based on Griswold’s opinion that the Association
then should have lifted the CDO; and that Ligia therefore should have
asserted her claims “no later than September or October 2018.” The court,
however, found Defendants engaged in “an indivisible pattern of conduct
sufficient to toll the statute of limitations under the continuing violation
doctrine”; it therefore denied their respective new trial and JNOV motions.
B. Governing Principles
The statute of limitations for breach of fiduciary duty for nonfraudulent
conduct is four years. (Code Civ. Proc., § 34310; William L. Lyon &
Associates, Inc. v. Superior Court (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 1294, 1312
[“[b]reach of fiduciary duty not amounting to fraud or constructive fraud is
subject to the four-year ‘catch-all statute’ of Code of Civil Procedure section
343”]; accord, City of Vista v. Robert Thomas Securities, Inc. (2000) 84
Cal.App.4th 882, 889 [four-year statute of limitations applies to breach of
fiduciary duty, unless the gravamen of the claim is actual or constructive
fraud, in which case the statute of limitations is three years].)
The period in which a plaintiff must bring suit or be barred, runs from
the moment a claim accrues. (Code Civ. Proc., § 312 [an action must “be
commenced within the periods prescribed in this title, after the cause of
action shall have accrued”].) “Traditionally at common law, a ‘cause of action
10 Code of Civil Procedure section 343 provides: “An action for relief not
hereinbefore provided for must be commenced within four years after the
cause of action shall have accrued.”
32
accrues “when [it] is complete with all of its elements”—those elements being
wrongdoing, harm, and causation.’ ” (Aryeh v. Canon Business Solutions, Inc.
(2013) 55 Cal.4th 1185, 1191 (Aryeh), quoting Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA,
Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788, 797.) “This is the ‘last element’ accrual rule:
ordinarily, the statute of limitations runs from ‘the occurrence of the last
element essential to the cause of action.’ ” (Aryeh, at p. 1191, quoting Neel v.
Magana, Olney, Levy, Cathcart & Gelfand (1971) 6 Cal.3d 176, 187.)
“To align the actual application of the limitations defense more closely
with the policy goals animating it, the courts and the Legislature have over
time developed a handful of equitable exceptions to and modifications of the
usual rules governing limitations periods. These doctrines may alter the
rules governing either the initial accrual of a claim, the subsequent running
of the limitations period, or both.” (Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) One
such exception is the continuing violation doctrine.
“ ‘The continuing violation doctrine aggregates a series of wrongs or
injuries for purposes of the statute of limitations, treating the limitations
period as accruing for all of them upon commission or sufferance of the last of
them.’ ” (Willis v. City of Carlsbad (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 1104, 1124, quoting
Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1192.) “Consequently, the continuing violation
doctrine ‘allows liability for unlawful . . . conduct occurring outside the
statute of limitations if it is sufficiently connected to unlawful conduct within
the limitations period.’ ” (Willis, at p. 1124, quoting Richards v. CH2M Hill,
Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 798, 802.) “For the continuing violation doctrine to
apply, a plaintiff must show the defendant engaged in ‘a pattern of
reasonably frequent and similar acts [that] may, in a given case, justify
treating the acts as an indivisible course of conduct actionable in its entirety,
33
notwithstanding that the conduct occurred partially outside and partially
inside the limitations period.’ ” (Willis, at p. 1124, quoting Aryeh, at p. 1198.)
C. Analysis
Defendants contend the trial court erroneously applied the continuing
violation doctrine when it found they engaged in “an indivisible pattern of
conduct sufficient to toll the statute of limitations,” after Defendants refused
to lift the CDO “in derogation of [the Board’s] September 3, 2014 minutes.”
Defendants claim their “last act” regarding the CDO took place on October
16, 2015, when they fined the Vargas as part of their enforcement action; and
that Ligia’s cause of action was time-barred under the four-year limitations
period because she did not join the action until March 13, 2020, when the
Vargas filed their SAC.
Initially, we note that Defendants have failed to set forth the standard
of review applicable to their claim of error on this issue. “ ‘Arguments should
be tailored according to the applicable standard of appellate review.’ Failure
to acknowledge the proper scope of review is a concession of a lack of merit.”
(Sonic, supra, 196 Cal.App.4th at p. 465.)
Reaching the merits, we independently conclude it would be inequitable
under the facts of this case to apply the four-year limitations period and bar
Ligia’s breach of fiduciary duty claim against Defendants. Significantly, it
was Defendants who brought Ligia into this case when they filed a motion in
December 2019 to add her as an indispensable party, ostensibly after the
applicable four-year limitations period had run, as they now claim on
34
appeal.11 In addition, Defendants neither raised the statute of limitations
defense in their unsuccessful summary judgment motion, which they filed in
October 2020, or during phase one of the trial, when the jury was empaneled.
(See Bartel v. Chicago Title Ins. Co. (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 655, 679 (Bartel)
[“resolution of the statute of limitations is normally a question for the trier of
fact”].)
In addition, Ligia’s claim for damages against Defendants was not
based on contract principles, as Defendants posit, but instead on their
breaches of fiduciary duty as a result of her being a homeowner in the Lomas
Serenas residential development. As we have noted, this duty is ongoing and
requires the Association, through its Board, to act with the utmost good faith
and in the best interests of Ligia, Tibor, and the other members of the
Association, to follow its own standards and procedures, and to ensure those
procedures are fair and reasonable and not arbitrary or capricious. (See
CACI No. 4100; Ironwood, supra, 178 Cal.App.3d at p. 772; S & S
11 Perhaps anticipating a forfeiture argument by the Vargas, Defendants
contend in their opening brief that the statute of limitations is
“jurisdictional” and cannot be waived, as support citing Cowan v. Superior
Court (1996) 14 Cal.4th 367. Although the Vargas have not specifically
addressed this issue on appeal, we are constrained to point out that the
statute of limitations most certainly can be waived. (See, e.g., Adams v. Paul
(1995) 11 Cal.4th 583, 597 [“The statute of limitations is an affirmative
defense that is forfeited if not appropriately invoked by the defendant.”];
accord, Shenefield v. Kovtun (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 925, 934 [“If not timely
and appropriately invoked by a defendant, a statute of limitations defense is
waived.”].) Cowan does not hold otherwise. (Cowan, at pp. 370–371 [the
defendant, facing capital murder charges, may waive the statute of
limitations and plead guilty to the lesser included offense of voluntary
manslaughter when it is to his benefit, even though prosecution of that lesser
offense was time-barred].)
35
Construction, supra, 151 Cal.App.3d at p. 945; Cohen, supra, 142 Cal.App.3d
at pp. 650–651.)
Defendants’ duty to Ligia therefore did not end when they decided in
September/October 2014 to keep the CDO in place (indefinitely), thereby
placing the burden on her and her husband to take affirmative steps to
rescind the CDO. The burden instead was on Defendants to follow the
Board’s directives and the Association’s “Rules Enforcement Policy,” which
was in place at all times relevant in this case, and which applied to “all
violations and infractions of the governing documents.”
The Rules Enforcement Policy provides, “[i]f the violation continues, or
if the response [by the homeowner] is otherwise unsatisfactory, even after the
imposition of a monetary penalty, the Board or its appointed committee may
impose additional or continuing fines until such time as the matter is
satisfactorily resolved.” And, if the matter is not satisfactorily resolved after
a fine has been issued, as occurred here, “the Board may refer the matter to
the Association’s legal counsel,” which may result in the homeowner being
sued and “liable for the Association’s legal costs and fees.” Here, however,
there is no indication in the record that, following their imposition of the fine
against the Vargas in October 2015, Defendants took any additional steps to
“satisfactorily resolve[ ]” the parties’ dispute over the CDO.
Under these circumstances, we conclude it would be inequitable for
Defendants to leave the CDO in place for years, despite having an ongoing
fiduciary duty to Ligia and a procedure in place to end continuing “violations
and infractions of the governing documents”; to force her into this lawsuit by
claiming she was an indispensable party, only to later assert that, when it
did so, the applicable statute of limitations had run; and then to wait until
their posttrial motions to raise the limitations bar, when the question
36
regarding its application could have been resolved by the jury in phase one,
given the facts on which this defense was based were susceptible of more
than one “legitimate inference.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103,
1112; Bartel, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th at p. 679.)
In reaching our decision, we find Vaca v. Wachovia Mortgage Corp.
(2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 737 (Vaca) inapposite. In Vaca, the Court of Appeal
affirmed the judgment of dismissal following the sustaining of the
defendants’ demurrer. (Id. at p. 740.) In rejecting the plaintiff’s claim the
defendants engaged in “continuing wrongs” that postponed the start of the
limitations period, the Vaca court noted the plaintiff’s amended complaint
included “no allegations defendants did anything wrong after making the
fraudulent mortgage loans in 2000 and 2001” (id. at pp. 744–745); contrasted
a continuing wrong from a continuing injury (id. at p. 745); and concluded a
continuing injury sustained in consequence of a completed wrong will not
delay the commencement of the statute of limitations (ibid.).
Unlike the facts of Vaca, in which the plaintiff complained she
continued to suffer injury years after discovering the defendants’ wrongdoing
(by fixed dates), here Defendants’ wrongdoing continued up until they were
ordered to lift the CDO in late 2022, based on the ongoing fiduciary duties
they owed the Vargas. (See Aryeh, supra, 55 Cal.4th at p. 1198 [“[W]here
misfeasance is ongoing, a defendant’s claim to repose, the principal
justification underlying the limitations defense, is vitiated.”]) Vaca therefore
does not inform our analysis in this case.
37
III
Assault
Ditty contends the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s finding
he “threaten[ed] to touch Tibor Varga in a harmful or an offensive manner.”
We disagree.
A. Additional Background
Tibor testified he attended the Board’s April 6, 2016 open forum
meeting. Prior to the meeting, he sent an e-mail regarding his perceived
right to photograph the Board and record the meeting, noting it twice had
refused such requests, including on July 9, 2014, when he had been
summoned to appear following the issuance of the CDO. With his camera in
the off position, Tibor began to address the Board when Ditty suddenly
“jump[ed] up and rush[ed]” him, coming so close Tibor could “feel” Ditty’s
“body heat.” Tibor repeatedly yelled, “ ‘Do not touch me. Do not touch me.’ ”
At about the same time, Demere also approached Tibor and attempted to
“manipulate” Tibor’s camera. While remaining seated, Tibor turned his
camera on to deter Ditty and Demere from “physically harming” him.
Demere responded by “pushing the buttons” of the camera to interfere with
Tibor’s recording.
Tibor, however, was able to capture “two small snippets” of the
altercation thatwere shown to the jury. During one such recording, Ditty
demanded that Tibor erase any video and asked Tibor if he was “enjoying
this.”
B. Guiding Principles
We review the jury’s factual findings for substantial evidence. (Elation,
supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 964; Green Valley, supra, 241 Cal.App.4th at
38
p. 441.) “We will reverse a jury’s verdict only if it is unsupported by any
substantial evidence, meaning to prevail on appeal defendants must show
that the evidence was such as would justify a directed verdict in their favor.”
(Mathews v. Happy Valley Conference Center, Inc. (2019) 43 Cal.App.5th 236,
251, citations omitted (Mathews).)
“ ‘Generally speaking, an assault is a demonstration of an unlawful
intent by one person to inflict immediate injury on the person of another then
present.’ [Citation.] A civil action for assault is based upon an invasion of
the right of a person to live without being put in fear of personal harm.”
(Lowry v. Standard Oil Co. (1944) 63 Cal.App.2d 1, 6–7 (Lowry) [pointing a
gun at another may constitute assault unless the person knows the gun is
unloaded].) “Apprehension of harmful or offensive contact, intentionally
done, is the basis of assault. [Citation.] Mere words, however threatening,
will not amount to an assault. [Citation.] The tort of assault is complete
when the anticipation of harm occurs.” (Thomas et al., Cal. Civil Practice:
Torts (2021) § 12:4, citing among other authorities Kiseskey v. Carpenters’
Trust for So. California (1983) 144 Cal. App. 3d 222, 232.)
C. Analysis
The record shows Ditty “jumped up” and “rushed” Tibor at the April 6
Board meeting, coming so close Tibor could “feel” Ditty’s “body heat.” Ditty
did so almost immediately after Tibor placed his camera in front of him and
began addressing the Board regarding his purported right to record the
meeting and photograph the Board. Afraid he would be “physically harmed,”
Tibor turned on his camera, while repeatedly yelling, “ ‘Do not touch me.’ ”
Tibor was “shaken” by the incident, testifying that everyone at the meeting
was in “shock[ ].”
39
This evidence alone is sufficient to support the jury’s finding of
threatened harmful or offensive contact by Ditty. But the record also shows
there was a prior history between Ditty and Tibor leading up to the April 6
Board meeting. This evidence further supports the jury’s assault finding.
As summarized, on September 23, 2014, Ditty responded to an e-mail
Tibor had sent about an hour earlier, asking whether the Vargas’s contractor
could resume construction. Ditty wrote the “current situation” involving the
CDO was “a direct result of [the Vargas’s] lack of candor and penchant for
cutting corners and ignoring protocol”; that their plans had been “grossly
inadequate,” “misleading,” and “intentionally vague”; and that they had only
themselves to blame for their current situation. Based on this and other
evidence, Griswold opined the issue for Defendants—including Ditty—
became more about “egos” and “personalities” and less about the Vargas’s
Project and resolving the parties’ stalemate.
When viewed in its entirety, we conclude this evidence—including the
reasonable inferences to be drawn from it (Do v. Regents of University of
California (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1492)—amply supports the jury’s
finding that Ditty “threaten[ed]” to touch Tibor “in a harmful or an offensive
manner.” (See Elation, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 964; Mathews, supra, 43
Cal.App.5th at p. 251.)
In reaching our decision, we find the decision of Plotnik v. Meihaus
(2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 1590 (Plotnik), on which Ditty relies, distinguishable.
There, the Court of Appeal relied on Penal Code section 240,12 and cases
interpreting criminal assault, to reverse a portion of a judgment based on the
12 Penal Code section 240 defines assault as “an unlawful attempt,
coupled with a present ability, to commit a violent injury on the person of
another.”
40
defendants’ civil assault of the plaintiff. (Plotnik, at p. 1604.) In reaching its
decision, Plotnik found there was insufficient evidence that the defendants
“committed an act that could or was ‘inten[ded] . . . to inflict immediate
injury’ ” on the plaintiff. (Ibid.)
Here, we conclude the trial court properly instructed the jury regarding
the elements of civil assault when it gave CACI No. 1301.13 In addition, we
note Ditty did not object to CACI No. 1301 at trial. (See Suman v. BMW of
North America, Inc. (1994) 23 Cal.App.4th 1, 9 [“When a trial court gives a
jury instruction which is correct as far as it goes but which is too general or is
incomplete for the state of the evidence, a failure to request an additional or a
qualifying instruction will waive [or forfeit] a party’s right to later complain
on appeal about the instruction which was given.”].)
Finally, unlike the facts of Plotnik, we conclude there is sufficient
evidence in the record to support the jury’s finding that Ditty “committed an
act that could or was ‘inten[ded] . . . to inflict immediate injury’ ” on Tibor.
(See Plotnik, supra, 208 Cal.App.4th at p. 1604.) For all these reasons, we
reject Ditty’s claim of error based on insufficiency of the evidence.
13 The trial court instructed the jury with CACI No. 1301 as follows:
“Tibor Varga claims that Thomas Demere and Anthony T. Ditty assaulted
him. To establish this claim, Tibor Varga must prove all of the following: [¶]
1. That Thomas Demere and Anthony T. Ditty each threatened to touch Tibor
Varga in a harmful or an offensive manner; [¶] 2. That it reasonably
appeared to Tibor Varga that Thomas Demere and Anthony T.
Ditty were about to carry out the threat; 3. That Tibor Varga did not consent
to Thomas Demere and Anthony T. Ditty’s conduct; [¶] 4. That Tibor Varga
was harmed; and [¶] 5. That Thomas Demere and Anthony T. Ditty’s conduct
was a substantial factor in causing Tibor Varga’s harm. [¶] A touching is
offensive if it offends a reasonable sense of personal dignity. [¶] Words alone
do not amount to an assault.” As noted, the jury found Demere not liable for
assault of Tibor.
41
IV
Special Assessment
Defendants contend the trial court erred when, in response to the
Vargas’s postjudgment motion, it ordered the Association to levy an
emergency special assessment on its members to pay the money portion of
the judgment. The Vargas counter, arguing this issue is “academic” because
the court stayed the order until this appeal is final. We agree with the
Vargas.
A. Additional Background
Following entry of judgment, in July 2023 the Association notified its
members that a special assessment may be necessary to cover the Vargas’s
damage awards. After receiving verified copies of the Association’s financial
records, the Vargas moved for an order directing the trial court to levy the
assessment pursuant to Civil Code section 5610, subdivision (a).14 This
statute is an exception to Civil Code section 5605, subdivision (a),15 which
limits a common interest development’s ability to impose regular and special
assessments on its members.
14 Civil Code section 5610 provides in part: “[Civil Code s]ection
5605 does not limit assessment increases necessary for emergency situations.
For purposes of this section, an emergency situation is any one of the
following: [¶] (a) An extraordinary expense required by an order of a court.”
(Civ. Code, § 5610, subd. (a).)
15 Subdivision (a) of Civil Code section 5605 states: “Annual increases in
regular assessments for any fiscal year shall not be imposed unless the board
[of a common interest development] has complied with paragraphs (1), (2),
(4), (5), (6), (7), and (8) of subdivision (b) of Section 5300 with respect to that
fiscal year, or has obtained the approval of a majority of a quorum of
members, pursuant to Section 4070, at a member meeting or election.”
42
In its September 15, 2023 order granting the Vargas’s motion, the trial
court found the Association lacked executable assets to pay the judgment or
post a bond to stay enforcement, and had decided against levying the
assessment on its members. In making its decision, the court relied on James
F. O’Toole Co., Inc. v. Los Angeles Kingsbury Court Owners Assn. (2005) 126
Cal.App.4th 549 (O’Toole). O’Toole held the plaintiff’s judgment against the
defendant homeowners association was an “extraordinary expense,” requiring
the association to levy a special emergency assessment to pay the plaintiff,
which had provided work that benefited the association and its members
following the 1994 Northridge earthquake. (Id. at p. 555.)
Key to the issue on appeal, on January 10, 2024, the trial court stayed
its September 15 order, ruling it would “remain in place for the duration of
the pending appeal to the fullest extent of the law.”
B. Analysis
Defendants concede that, if the judgment is affirmed after exhaustion
of their appellate rights, the Vargas are “protected by . . . the certainty of
collecting under O’Toole.” In light of this concession and the trial court’s stay
of the September 15 order for the duration of this appeal, we deem it
unnecessary to resolve this issue on appeal.
On the one hand, if Defendants subsequently succeed in overturning
the judgment in this case, the September 15 order imposing the levy will
likely become moot. (See Consol. etc. Corp. v. United A. etc. Workers (1946)
27 Cal.2d 859, 863 [a court is tasked with the duty “ ‘to decide actual
controversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect, and not to give
opinions upon . . . abstract propositions, or to declare principles or rules of
law which cannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it’ ”]; accord,
Shaw v. Los Angeles Unified School Dist. (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 740, 772 [“It
43
is well settled that appellate courts will decide only actual controversies. We
will not opine on moot questions or abstract propositions, nor declare
principles of law that cannot affect the matter at issue on appeal.”].) On the
other hand, if Defendants are unsuccessful in any further appeal, they
concede the Vargas are entitled to relief under Civil Code section 5610,
subdivision (a), as set forth in the September 15 order.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The Vargas are entitled to their costs on
appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(2).)
O'ROURKE, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
IRION, J.
44
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