In re S.S. CA2/4

CourtListener 10759405CalctappDec 16, 2025

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Filed 12/16/25 In re S.S. CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FOUR

In re S.S., et al., Persons Coming B344894
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Super. Ct. No. 24LJJP00304A-B)
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.

T.B.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Stephanie M. Davis, Judge. Affirmed.
Gina Zaragoza, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Senior Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

______________________________________________

Mother, T.B., appeals from the juvenile court’s order
terminating jurisdiction over her daughter, H.H., and granting
H.H.’s father sole physical custody with monitored visitation for
mother. Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion
by (1) terminating jurisdiction and (2) improperly delegating to
H.H.’s father the authority to determine whether any in-person
visits will occur. We affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Referral, Petition, and Detention
Mother has two minor children, H.H. (age 8) and S.S. (age
15).1 H.H.’s father is F.H. (father).
In August 2024, the Los Angeles County Department of
Children and Family Services (DCFS) received a referral alleging
mother engaged in a physical altercation with S.S. Mother, S.S.,
and H.H. were living at mother’s boyfriend’s home. According to
the reporting party, mother pushed, choked, tried to bite, and hit
S.S. with a broomstick when he was attempting to leave to stay
with his adult sister, T.S. The reporting party also expressed

1 Mother filed a notice of appeal as to certain orders concerning
S.S., but she did not address those orders in her opening brief, thereby
forfeiting her appeal of them. (Swain v. LaserAway Medical Group,
Inc. (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 59, 72.) We focus on the facts relevant to
H.H.

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concern that mother was physically abusing H.H. Mother
allegedly hit H.H. for stomping on a stairway. H.H. told S.S. it
hurt, and S.S. reported seeing small welts on H.H.’s back and
legs.
A social worker met with S.S. He said the altercation
happened after mother got mad at him when he tried to talk to
her about moving out of her boyfriend’s house. S.S. gathered his
belongings, but mother told him he could not leave. S.S. said
mother got a broomstick and hit him with it. The broomstick
broke, and H.H. was told to hit S.S. with it. Mother was pulling
on his sweatshirt and scratching him, and he pushed her to
defend himself. The social worker observed scratches on S.S.’s
neck, chin, and cheek. The social worker also spoke with adult
sister T.S. T.S. said that when she arrived, she saw S.S. running
with his belongings and mother running with a broomstick. T.S.
pulled out her cellphone to record mother, and mother walked
away. T.S. then took S.S. to her home.
When the social worker spoke with mother, mother said
she was “‘the victim here, not [S.S.]’” Mother said that S.S.
pushed and hit her. Mother also blamed adult sister T.S. for
influencing S.S. DCFS obtained a report from the Sheriff’s
station relating to the incident. The records showed mother told
the police that her “autistic son [S.S.] hit her multiple times.”
The response stated, “No visible injuries. No elder abuse.”
(Boldface omitted.)
The social worker met with S.S. again about a week later.
He reiterated that mother pushed him, tried to bite him, hit him
with a broomstick, and told H.H. to also hit him with a
broomstick. S.S. added that during his Christmas break in 2023,
mother pulled a knife on him and almost stabbed him.

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In September 2024, the juvenile court authorized the
children’s removal from mother. Mother called the social worker
and asked why the children were being removed. She said S.S.
assaulted her and she was the victim. A few days later, DCFS
filed a petition on behalf of the children under Welfare and
Institutions Code2 section 300, subdivisions (a), (b)(1), and (j).
The petition alleged mother physically abused S.S., which placed
H.H. at serious risk of harm.

B. Further Investigation
Father contacted DCFS a few days before the initial
hearing. Father told the social worker he learned from his
stepchildren that H.H. was removed from mother, and he stated
that information mother provided about him being an absent
father was false. He explained that until mother moved in with
her boyfriend, he communicated with mother about H.H. daily
and visited her two to three times a month. Father said things
changed after mother’s boyfriend got involved. Mother changed
her number, and father had not seen H.H. in about three months.
He said he wanted H.H. in his care.
DCFS visited father’s and his fiancé’s home the next day.
Inside one of the bedrooms was a twin size bed that belonged to
H.H. Later the same day, the social worker visited H.H. When
the social worker asked H.H. about father, she responded,
“‘That’s not my dad. My dad is [mother’s boyfriend]!’”
At the initial hearing, the juvenile court noted H.H.
indicated she did not know or have a relationship with father.
The court found a prima facie case the children were persons

2 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.

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described by section 300 and ordered H.H. detained from mother
and father.
The juvenile court held a prerelease investigation hearing
two weeks later. H.H. and S.S. were placed with adult sister
T.S., and mother was permitted to live in the home. The court
noted it had a “major concern” that mother was coaching the
children.
H.H. had a forensic interview in October 2024. When
asked what father was like, H.H. responded, “I forgot.” She said
the last time she saw him was a couple of years ago. She said
that mother did not have father’s phone number because her
“stepdad doesn’t allow her.” When asked if there was something
that she did not like about father, H.H. answered, “Nothing.”
In late October 2024, the social worker observed a visit
between father and H.H. at a park. H.H. called father “‘dad,’”
and they played together. At the end of the visit, H.H. appeared
sad and said she wanted to go with father. Father told the social
worker he used to visit H.H. every other weekend consistently
until mother’s boyfriend interfered. Father texted the social
worker pictures of himself with H.H. throughout the years and
text messages between him and mother proving he had been
involved with H.H. He said that mother told H.H. to say that she
did not know father in court.
The social worker spoke with H.H. about a visit she had
with father in late November 2024. H.H. reported she had a lot
of fun and that no one made her feel sad. She said she did not
feel scared and felt safe.
DCFS held a child and family team meeting with mother.
Mother did not acknowledge there was a problem, denied the
incident with S.S. occurred, and blamed S.S. for everything.

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Mother also minimized father’s involvement with H.H., stating
that he had not seen H.H. since she was one year old. DCFS
recommended that H.H. be released to father and remain
detained from mother.
On Christmas Eve 2024, mother called the social worker
and said H.H. wanted to talk to the social worker. Mother
claimed she did not know about what. H.H. told the social
worker that father smokes during visits and “does not say nice
things” about mother. H.H. said she did not want to spend the
night at father’s home.
A few days later, adult sister T.S. called the social worker
and reported that H.H. said father did not pay attention to her.
T.S. said H.H. told her that another child broke a television in
father’s home and they all got hit. T.S. also said father did not
have a car seat when he picked up H.H. Father denied smoking
in the home or physically disciplining his children. When the
social worker previously told father it had been reported he did
not have a car seat for H.H., he denied the allegation and said he
used a car seat.
Shortly thereafter, adult sister T.S. called the social
worker, discussed recent issues she had with mother, and said
that mother was coaching H.H. DCFS arranged for H.H. to go on
an extended visit with father.
In mid-January 2025, the social worker visited H.H. at
father’s home. Father said he saw text messages between mother
and H.H. in which mother was coaching H.H. on what to say.
Father said he also found deleted messages that mother
encouraged H.H. to delete and that mother was tracking H.H.’s
location after every phone call, which made H.H. upset. At a

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hearing a few days later, the juvenile court released H.H. to
father with monitored visits for mother.
In a March 2025 addendum report, DCFS stated H.H. was
living with father. DCFS stated father was consistent with
H.H.’s needs and was able to create long-term safety in the
household. DCFS recommended the juvenile court terminate
jurisdiction and issue a custody order granting the parents joint
legal custody with full physical custody to father and monitored
visitation for mother.

C. Jurisdiction and Disposition Hearing
On March 11, 2025, the juvenile court held the jurisdiction
and disposition hearing. The court sustained the section 300
petition as amended by interlineation. The court found that H.H.
had been coached, and it found the children’s statements
immediately after the incident credible.
The juvenile court moved directly to disposition. The court
read H.H.’s stipulated testimony that, if called as a witness, H.H.
would state her first choice would be to live with mother because
she missed mother and their dog. H.H.’s second choice was to
live with father because it made her “feel good,” she felt safe at
father’s house, she had never been hurt there, and she had never
gotten into any fights with father or anyone else at his home.
H.H.’s third choice was to live with adult sister T.S. If not
allowed to live with mother, H.H. said she would like to see her
every day. H.H. said she would be sad if the case closed because
she wanted to be with mother but would also feel safe. She also
said she would feel good because she would not have to talk to
social workers anymore.

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The juvenile court noted that while mother had completed
some programs, “her actions and words” suggested she still
lacked insight into the situation. The court found there was a
substantial danger to H.H.’s physical health, safety, protection,
and emotional well-being and no reasonable means to protect
H.H. without removal from mother. Further, the court noted
mother’s claim that father was not a part of H.H.’s life was
untrue, and it concluded that living with father presented no
safety issues for H.H.
The juvenile court terminated jurisdiction but stayed
termination pending receipt of a juvenile custody order granting
the parents joint legal custody and sole physical custody to father
with monitored visits for mother. The court stated mother’s
visits were to be “a minimum of nine hours with a combination of
in-person and video or telephone visits.” The court ordered, “The
exchange of the child is to occur in a neutral location, halfway
between the parents’ residence. [¶] And the parents are to use
Talking Parent or some similar application to communicate and
confirm meeting dates, times, and locations, advise of possible
delays occurring due to traffic or cancellations.” Visits were not
to be monitored by adult sister T.S. or mother’s boyfriend, but by
an agreed-upon person or professional monitor paid for by
mother. The court then discussed the language that was to be
included in the custody order with the parties.
Three days later, the juvenile court signed and filed the
custody order. The order granted father sole physical custody
and the parents joint legal custody. It stated: “Mother to have
monitored visits for a minimum of 9 hours per week. Agreed
upon monitor or professional paid for by the mother. Exchanges
at neutral location, half way between the parents[’] residence.

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[P]arents to use [T]alking [P]arents. The following individuals—
T[.]S[.] . . . and [mother’s boyfriend]—shall not be present during
the mother’s visits.” The court lifted the stay and terminated
jurisdiction over H.H. Mother timely appealed.

DISCUSSION
A. The Juvenile Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by
Terminating Jurisdiction Over H.H.
Mother argues termination of jurisdiction was not in H.H.’s
best interest and was an abuse of discretion. We are not
persuaded.
“Section 361.2, subdivision (a) requires a court ordering
removal of a child first to determine whether there is a
noncustodial parent who wants to assume custody. The court
shall place the child with that parent, unless that placement
would be detrimental to the child’s safety, protection, or physical
or emotional well-being.” (In re A.C. (2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 38,
42.) If the juvenile court places the child with the noncustodial
parent, it may terminate jurisdiction and order that parent
assume custody of the child, or order custody to that parent
subject to continued juvenile court supervision. (§ 361.2,
subd. (b).)
“When deciding whether to terminate jurisdiction, the court
must determine whether there is a need for continued
supervision, not whether the conditions that justified taking
jurisdiction in the first place still exist . . . .” (In re Janee W.
(2006) 140 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1451.) “The question is whether
juvenile court services and ongoing supervision were necessary to
protect the child from harm.” (In re D.B. (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th
613, 624.) We review a juvenile court’s decision to terminate

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jurisdiction for abuse of discretion and may not disturb such a
ruling unless the court made an arbitrary, capricious, or patently
absurd determination. (In re C.W. (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 835,
863.) We will find an abuse of discretion only when we find that
under all the evidence, viewed most favorably in support of the
decision, no judge reasonably could have made the challenged
decision. (Estate of Sapp (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 86, 104.)
In this case, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion
in terminating jurisdiction over H.H. Father was nonoffending
and was ready and willing to care for H.H. since becoming aware
of the dependency proceedings. H.H. was comfortable with
father, and she said she felt safe at his home. DCFS reported
that father was consistent with H.H.’s needs and able to create
long-term safety. DCFS did not identify any safety concerns
regarding father or his care of H.H. that required the juvenile
court’s ongoing supervision. Mother acknowledges that the
juvenile court found services were not necessary to maintain
H.H.’s safety in father’s home. Thus, the juvenile court’s finding
was supported by substantial evidence.
Mother contends there was evidence to dispute the juvenile
court’s finding, such as reports that father drove H.H. without a
car seat and that the children in father’s home were hit after a
television was broken. Mother also argues continued supervision
would have been in H.H.’s best interest because mother had been
a custodial parent since H.H.’s birth, she had a strong bond with
H.H., and H.H. said she wanted to live with mother. Even if the
evidence cited by mother supported contrary findings, this would
not establish that terminating jurisdiction was an abuse of
discretion. (In re Stephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 318–319
[“‘“When two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from

10
the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute its
decision for that of the trial court”’”].) Moreover, mother ignores
evidence showing that, at the time of the disposition hearing,
mother still lacked insight into the issues that led to dependency.
Additionally, the juvenile court found mother lied about father’s
involvement with H.H., and there was evidence that mother
coached H.H. as to what to tell the court and social worker.
Mother further asserts that maintaining jurisdiction to
ensure that she and H.H. continued to receive services and have
visits would have been in H.H.’s best interest. However, the
juvenile court was not required to maintain jurisdiction to allow
mother to receive reunification services. (See In re J.S. (2011)
196 Cal.App.4th 1069, 1082 [once child was placed with
noncustodial, nonoffending parent and “was found not to be ‘at
risk’ in that setting for any of the enumerated harms, the core
predicate for juvenile court jurisdiction disappeared”]; see also In
re Pedro Z. (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 12, 20 [if child is already
placed in a parent’s custody, juvenile court “is not concerned with
reunification”].) Furthermore, mother was enrolled in services at
the time of the disposition hearing, but the court found she had
not made substantial progress in her programs. As to H.H., she
could continue participating in services with father. Lastly, visits
were ordered for mother, and mother could seek enforcement of
the order in family court if necessary. (In re T.H. (2010) 190
Cal.App.4th 1119, 1123.)
Mother fails to demonstrate the juvenile court abused its
discretion. The court reasonably determined that its supervision
was no longer necessary.

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B. The Juvenile Court Did Not Improperly Delegate
Visitation Authority to Father
Mother argues the juvenile court improperly delegated to
father the ability to decide whether any in-person visits will
occur. We disagree.
When a juvenile court terminates dependency jurisdiction,
it may issue a custody and visitation order. (§ 362.4, subd. (a).)
“‘The power to determine the right and extent of visitation by a
noncustodial parent in a dependency case resides with the court
and may not be delegated to nonjudicial officials or private
parties. [Citation.] This rule of nondelegation applies to exit
orders issued when dependency jurisdiction is terminated.’” (In
re A.C. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 796, 799.) Although “[a] visitation
order may delegate to a third party the responsibility for
managing the details of visits, including their time, place and
manner[,]” it may not “delegate discretion to determine whether
visitation will occur . . . .” (In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1123.) We review an order setting visitation for abuse of
discretion. (In re J.M. (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 95, 113; In re R.R.
(2010) 187 Cal.App.4th 1264, 1284.)
Mother contends that, while the custody order signed and
filed by the juvenile court specifies that she is to have visits for a
minimum of nine hours per week with exchanges to occur at a
neutral location halfway between the parties’ residences, the
court stated at the March 11, 2025, disposition hearing that
mother’s visits were to include in-person and video or telephone
visits. Mother contends that if the court’s March 11 oral order is
followed, it results in an improper delegation to father to decide
whether any in-person visits occur.

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As an initial matter, mother did not object or suggest any
modifications to the juvenile court’s visitation order at the
disposition hearing. Nor did she raise the visitation issue she
now raises. Therefore, she forfeited her claim. (In re T.G. (2015)
242 Cal.App.4th 976, 984; Kevin R. v. Superior Court (2010) 191
Cal.App.4th 676, 686.)
In any event, we do not find the juvenile court improperly
delegated visitation authority to father. Mother asserts the
custody order in this case is similar to the improper visitation
order in In re T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th 1119; however, that
case is distinguishable. In In re T.H., the juvenile court’s exit
order provided supervised visitation for the noncustodial parent
“only upon the ‘agreement of the parents[,]’” “effectively
delegat[ing] to [the custodial parent] the power to determine
whether visitation w[ould] occur at all.” (Id. at p. 1123.) The
custodial parent objected to the noncustodial parent having any
visitation at all, and the custodial parent “could conceivably
agree to only one visit a year or less without violating the letter of
the court’s order.” (Ibid.) The juvenile court abused its discretion
“by framing its order in a way that gave [the custodial parent] an
effective veto power over” the noncustodial parent’s visitation
rights. (Id. at p. 1124.)
Unlike in In re T.H., the juvenile court’s visitation order in
this case establishes a minimum amount of weekly visitation for
mother. At the disposition hearing, the court stated mother was
to have monitored visits for a minimum of nine hours per week,
including in-person visits. The written custody order, signed and
filed three days after the disposition hearing, confirms mother’s
visitation includes in-person visits. It requires exchanges for
visits to occur at a neutral location halfway between the parents’

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residences. Consequently, both the court’s oral and written
orders require father to make H.H. available for in-person visits.
If father violates the order, mother would be free to seek
enforcement or modification of the order in a family court. (In re
T.H., supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 1123.)

DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL
REPORTS

MORI, J.
We concur:

ZUKIN, P. J.

TAMZARIAN, J.

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