Digital Garage US v. Cochran CA4/3

CourtListener 10759274CalctappDec 16, 2025

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Filed 12/16/25 Digital Garage US v. Cochran CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

DIGITAL GARAGE US, INC.,

Plaintiff and Respondent, G063388

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-
01345692)
HEATHER COCHRAN,
OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.

Appeal from an order of the Superior Court of Orange County,
Glenn Mondo, Temporary Judge. (Pursuant to Cal. Const., art. VI, § 21.)
Affirmed.
Heather Cochran, in pro. per., for Defendant and Appellant.
Coblentz Patch Duffy & Bass, Hannah L. Jones and Paige B.
Pulley for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Heather Cochran appeals from the workplace violence
restraining order imposed on her pursuant to section 527.8 of the Code of
Civil Procedure.1 The trial court ordered restrictions on Cochran’s contact
with the president and an advisor of her former employer, Digital Garage US,
Inc. (Digital Garage), as well as on her use of Digital Garage’s company-wide
e-mail address, after she made several graphic and disturbing threats of
violence in a series of e-mail communications. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In August 2023, Digital Garage petitioned for a workplace
violence restraining order pursuant to section 527.8 against Cochran (the
petition), whose employment with Digital Garage had terminated almost a
decade earlier. The petition was brought on the ground Cochran had sent
dozens of threatening e-mails to Digital Garage employees, officers, and
board members which put them and certain of their immediate family
members in fear of their safety. The petition specifically sought protection for
its president H.M. as well as for J.I., one of Digital Garage’s advisors and
former directors, as they were particularly targeted in the e-mails.
The petition is supported by H.M.’s nine-page declaration in
which he provided detailed descriptions and quotes from the e-mails Cochran
sent during May 2023 to August 2023. Copies of those e-mails are
authenticated in and attached to H.M.’s declaration. The petition accurately
summarizes the e-mails as containing “racist, hate[]-filled speech, and
explicit threats of violence including that [Cochran] plans to bomb and
murder [Digital Garage] employees of Japanese descent.”

1 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

2
In his declaration, H.M. also stated that previously, between
September 2022 and March 2023, Cochran sent dozens of e-mail messages to
Digital Garage’s company-wide e-mail address in which she “expressed
feelings of disgust and expressions of violence against [Digital Garage]
employees and other people of Asian descent.” Copies of some of the
communications Cochran sent during this time period are also authenticated
in and attached to H.M.’s declaration.
The trial court granted a temporary restraining order pending an
evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing on the petition, the trial
court acknowledged Cochran admitted to the court she sent the e-mails
identified in H.M.’s declaration but claimed to have done so in self-defense.
Following the evidentiary hearing, the trial court granted the
petition. The court found Cochran’s communications to Digital Garage
employees to be “outrageous, threatening, [and] scary” and rejected Cochran’s
explanation that she made them in “self-defense.” The court further found the
communications not only failed to serve any legitimate purpose, but their
content “would seriously alarm or annoy or harass the recipient,” and “cause
a reasonable person to suffer substantial emotional distress.”
The court’s three-year restraining order prohibits Cochran from,
inter alia, harassing, stalking, committing acts of violence, making threats of
violence, or contacting H.M. or J.I. The order further requires her to stay at
least 100 yards away from H.M. and J.I., their workplaces, homes, and
vehicles, as well as Digital Garage’s San Francisco location. The order also
prohibits her from sending e-mails or other electronic messages to the Digital
Garage’s company-wide e-mail address.
Cochran appealed.

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DISCUSSION
“Section 527.8 permits an employer to seek a restraining order on
behalf of an employee who has ‘suffered unlawful violence or a credible threat
of violence from any individual, that can reasonably be construed to be
carried out or to have been carried out at the workplace.’ (§ 527.8, subd. (a).)
A ‘credible threat of violence’ includes a ‘course of conduct that would place a
reasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safety of his or her
immediate family, and that serves no legitimate purpose.’ (§ 527.8,
subd. (b)(2).) After a hearing, if a judge ‘finds by clear and convincing
evidence that the respondent engaged in unlawful violence or made a credible
threat of violence, an order shall issue prohibiting further unlawful violence
or threats of violence.’ (§ 527.8, subd. (j).)” (City of Los Angeles v. Herman
(2020) 54 Cal.App.5th 97, 102.) We must affirm the trial court’s findings if
they are supported by substantial evidence. (Ibid.)
In her appellate briefs, Cochran does not argue insufficient
evidence supports the workplace violence restraining order. Indeed, the
record shows she admitted making the numerous credible threats of violence
against H.M. and J.I. identified in support of the petition. She does not argue
the trial court was laboring under any misapprehension of the governing law
or otherwise committed legal error of any kind in issuing the order. She
provides no legal analysis or citation to relevant legal authority to support
any challenge to the court’s order.
In L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619–620 (L.O.), the
appellate court concluded the defendant forfeited his challenges to a
workplace violence restraining order issued against him. The court explained:
“‘[I]t is a fundamental principle of appellate procedure that a trial court
judgment is ordinarily presumed to be correct and the burden is on an

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appellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the record presented to the
appellate court, that the trial court committed an error that justifies reversal
of the judgment. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] ‘This means that an appellant must
do more than assert error and leave it to the appellate court to search the
record and the law books to test his claim. The appellant must present an
adequate argument including citations to supporting authorities and to
relevant portions of the record. [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Accordingly, the
California Rules of Court expressly require appellate briefs to ‘[s]tate each
point . . . and support each point by argument and, if possible, by citation of
authority’ and to ‘[s]upport any reference to a matter in the record by a
citation to the volume and page number of the record where the matter
appears.’”
The appellate court in L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at page 620
further stated: “‘It is not our place to construct theories or arguments to
undermine the judgment and defeat the presumption of correctness.’
[Citation.] Nor are we ‘required to search the record on [our] own seeking
error.’ [Citation.] Consequently, ‘[w]hen an appellant fails to raise a point, or
asserts it but fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to
authority, we treat the point as waived. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] Likewise,
‘“[i]f a party fails to support an argument with the necessary citations to the
record, . . . the argument [will be] deemed to have been waived. [Citation.]”
[Citations.]’ [Citation.] These rules apply both to parties represented by
counsel and self-represented parties. [Citation.] ‘A party proceeding in
propria persona “is to be treated like any other party and is entitled to the
same, but no greater consideration than other litigants and attorneys.”’”
As Cochran’s appellate briefs do not include appropriate citations
to the record, relevant legal authority or analysis, or any acknowledgment of

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evidence upon which the workplace violence restraining order is based, she
has forfeited any argument the workplace violence restraining order was
erroneously issued. (L.O., supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620.) In any event,
more than substantial evidence supports the trial court’s findings and
issuance of that order. We find no error.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Respondent to recover costs on appeal.

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

WE CONCUR:

MOORE, J.

DELANEY, J.

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