People v. Serrano CA4/1

CourtListener 10759267CalctappDec 16, 2025

Full text

Filed 12/16/25 P. v. Serrano CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085240

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS319906)

JOSE ANGEL SERRANO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order after judgment of the Superior Court of San
Diego County, Enrique E. Camarena, Judge. Affirmed.
Jose Angel Serrano, in pro per.; and Laura Vavakin, under
appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Jose Angel Serrano appeals from the denial of his postconviction
petition seeking resentencing. His appellate counsel filed a brief pursuant to
People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216 (Delgadillo) and Serrano filed a
supplemental brief. We have reviewed the issues raised in Serrano’s
supplemental brief and independently reviewed the record. We find no
reasonably arguable appellate issues and affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Plea, Sentencing, and Initial Appeal
In November 2021, the district attorney charged Serrano with sodomy

by use of force (Pen. Code,1 § 286, subd. (c)(2)(A); count 1); two counts of
forcible oral copulation (§ 287, subd. (c)(2)(A); counts 2 & 3); oral copulation of
an unconscious person (§ 287, subd. (f); count 4); two counts of sexual
penetration by use of force (§ 289, subd. (a)(1)(A); counts 5 & 6); sexual
penetration of unconscious victim (§ 289, subd. (d); count 7); forcible rape
(§ 261, subd. (a)(2); count 8); rape of an unconscious person (§ 261,
subd. (a)(4); count 9.) The complaint also alleged that the victim was a minor
14 years and older (§ 286, subd. (c)(2)(C); count 1; § 287, subd. (c)(2)(C);
counts 2–4; § 289, subd. (a)(1)(C); counts 5–7.) Counts 4, 7, and 9 included an
enhancement that Serrano administered a controlled substance to the victim
(§ 12022.75, subd. (b)(1).)
In August 2022, Serrano pleaded guilty to counts 2, 3, 5, and 8. For
counts 2, 3, and 5, Serrano admitted the enhancement regarding the victim’s
age. For all counts, he admitted: (1) to the aggravating factor under
California Rules of Court, rule 4.421(a)(3) that the victim was particularly
vulnerable; (2) that the four counts were separate and different acts with the
same victim for the purposes of section 667.6, subdivision (d); and (3) to the
factual basis of the charges.
The court accepted the plea and dismissed the balance of the charges.
As part of the plea, the court agreed to strike the punishment on any

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise
indicated.
2
enhancements. The court explained to Serrano that the admitted
aggravating factor of the victim being vulnerable (as opposed to the separate
enhancements for the victim’s age) would mean the court could consider the
upper terms in sentencing. It also advised that in exchange for the plea and
admissions, he was agreeing to a range of 20 to 32 years. The court
scheduled the sentencing hearing on a date requested by defense counsel to
allow the attorney time to prepare a sentencing mitigation brief.
Before the court could sentence Serrano, he asked to withdraw his plea.
The court found that Serrano failed to meet his burden to withdraw his plea
and denied the motion. The court sentenced Serrano to the upper term for
each count, totaling 32 years of prison. The trial court found it did not have
the discretion to give Serrano credit for the time already served.
Serrano appealed the trial court denying his motion to withdraw his
plea and refusing to award presentence custody credits. (People v. Serrano

(May 17, 2024, D082075) [nonpub. opn.].)2 In this initial appeal, we affirmed
the denial of the motion to withdraw the guilty plea, affirmed the judgment of
conviction, but remanded for the issue of custody credits. (Ibid.)
B. Petition for Resentencing Upon Remand
After the remand, defense counsel filed a “re-sentencing
memorandum.” It provided circumstances in mitigation and argued that
Serrano’s stipulation to the aggravating factor was insufficient to allow for
the imposition of the upper term for each count.
The court declined to consider modifying Serrano’s sentence because
this court’s remand did not include direction to resentence Serrano. The
court simply corrected the credits.

2 On our own motion, we take judicial notice of our records in case
No. D082075.
3
Serrano now appeals the trial court’s denial of the resentencing
request.
DISCUSSION
Serrano’s appellate counsel filed a brief raising no issues and

requesting that we proceed pursuant to Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th 216.3
Serrano submitted a supplemental brief contending that he should be
fully resentenced. He argues that Senate Bill No. 567 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 567) affected section 1170 so that his sentencing must conform to
section 654, as clarified by People v. Dorado (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 717. He
posits the new changes require the court to use the low term as a
presumptive term. Serrano’s contentions in his supplemental brief have no
merit for the reasons we will discuss below.
Serrano is mistaken about when section 1170 was modified in the
manner he claims. Senate Bill 567 was already in place by the time Serrano

was sentenced in April 2023.4 Effective January 1, 2022, the legislature
amended section 1170, subdivision (b) so that the trial court “shall” impose a
sentence not to exceed the middle term, except as otherwise provided.
(Stats. 2021, ch. 731, § 1.3; People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742.)
Serrano misstates the law where he claims the court is to presumptively
impose the lower term. Also, the trial court was authorized to select the

3 Delgadillo merely requires that we “evaluate the specific arguments
presented in [appellant’s supplemental] brief.” (14 Cal.5th at p. 232, italics
added.) However, we have the discretion to conduct an independent review of
the entire record. (Ibid.) Here, we exercised our discretion and reviewed the
entire record for arguable issues.

4 Since Senate Bill 567, the legislature made minor amendments to
section 1170, none of which affect this case. (See e.g. Stats. 2022, ch. 744, § 1;
Stats. 2023, ch. 131, § 155; Stats. 2023, ch. 560, § 2.5.)
4
upper term because Serrano admitted to the aggravating factor of the victim
being particularly vulnerable. (See § 1170, subd. (b)(1) & (2) [court “may”
impose the upper term only if there were justifiable circumstances in
aggravation and the facts underlying those circumstances had been
stipulated to by the defendant].)
Section 1170 permits two bases for resentencing, and neither applies.
Serrano was not under 18 at the time he committed the offense (see § 1170,
subd. (d)(1)(A)), nor has he shown he qualifies for the type of medical
incapacity required by section 1172.2, subdivision (b)(1) or (2). (See § 1170,
subd. (e).) Furthermore, the trial court did not err by declining to resentence
Serrano at a hearing meant to solely address credit for time served. (See
People v. Gonzalez (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 741, 748–749, 751 [trial court’s
correction of custody credits does not affect the rest of the sentence].)
Serrano cites to People v. Dorado, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th 717 to
support his position. In Dorado, we held that the trial court erred when it
relied on the same underlying fact to impose the upper term for multiple
counts. (Id. at p. 737.) Here, Serrano admitted to an aggravating factor that
could be used to impose the upper term for each count. The court correctly
advised him the aggravating factor he admitted could be used to impose the
upper term for each count. (See § 1170, subd. (b).) Dorado is not applicable.
In his supplemental brief, Serrano also makes lengthy, unsworn
statements about the factual basis of the charges to which he pled guilty.
These details are not relevant to the question before us, and proffered facts in
legal briefs are not evidence. (Turrieta v. Lyft (2024) 16 Cal.5th 664, 697 [We
do not consider unsupported factual assertions in appellate briefs that have
no basis in the record].)

5
To the extent Serrano identified any theoretical basis for relief, the
denial of which would amount to an appealable order, we have exercised our
discretion to independently review the record and have not discovered any
potentially meritorious issues for reversal on appeal. Competent counsel has
represented Serrano on this appeal.
DISPOSITION
We affirm.

RUBIN, J.

WE CONCUR:

MCCONNELL, P. J.

O’ROURKE, J.

6

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.