In re M.P. CA4/2

CourtListener 10758538CalctappDec 15, 2025

Full text

Filed 12/15/25 In re M.P. CA4/2

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

In re M.P., a Person Coming Under the
Juvenile Court Law.

SAN BERNARDINO COUNTY
CHILDREN AND FAMILY SERVICES, E086422

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super.Ct.No. J302143)

v. OPINION

M.P.,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Lynn M. Poncin,

Judge. Affirmed.

Jenie S. Chang, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Laura Feingold, County Counsel, and Joseph R. Barrell, Deputy County Counsel,

for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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INTRODUCTION

In this dependency matter, Mercedes P. (Mother) filed a Welfare and Institutions

Code1 section 388 petition, seeking the return of her infant daughter M.P. with family

maintenance services, or alternatively, family reunification services. The juvenile court

summarily denied the petition. It then terminated Mother’s parental rights following a

contested section 366.26 hearing.

Mother appeals. She contends the juvenile court erred by denying her section 388

petition without holding an evidentiary hearing and by terminating her parental rights.

We affirm.

BACKGROUND2

Mother’s Prior Dependency Proceedings

Before M.P. was born, Mother had three other children removed from her care.

A.U. (age 8) and M.A. (age 1) were removed from Mother in January 2020, following

allegations of sexual abuse of A.U., physical abuse of M.A., domestic violence, and

Mother’s substance abuse. E.P., who was born in August 2020, was removed from

Mother a few days after he was born, due to Mother’s continued substance abuse and

1 All further statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code unless
noted otherwise.

2 Our procedural history does not address the efforts the San Bernardino County
Children and Family Services (CFS) made to comply with the Indian Child Welfare Act
of 1978 (ICWA) and related California law. (25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.; § 224 et seq.)
However, we will note that CFS inquired of several relatives, both on the maternal and
paternal sides, and the juvenile court ultimately found ICWA does not apply. Mother
does not challenge the court’s ICWA finding.

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child welfare history. Mother was granted reunification services for all three children,

but never successfully reunited with them and her reunification services were terminated.

Mother’s parental rights were terminated as to M.A. and E.P. in April 2022. A.U. was

placed with her father, and her dependency proceeding was dismissed in February 2022.

The Current Investigation and Detention

On September 6, 2024—the day after M.P. was born—CFS received a referral

alleging general neglect based on Mother’s history of drug use while pregnant with M.P.

Mother was reported to have tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine at a

prenatal appointment in February 2024, and to have disclosed that despite knowing she

was pregnant, she continued to use methamphetamine daily and to drink alcohol every

weekend, until around May 2024 when she quit “cold turkey.” It was also reported that

M.P.’s father was not involved.

CFS initiated an investigation. Mother confirmed that M.P.’s father was not

involved. M.P.’s father was a man named Oliver. Mother did not know Oliver’s last

name, and she no longer had his contact information. The last time Mother spoke with

Oliver was a few months before M.P. was born.

As to her substance use, Mother told the social worker that she started using

methamphetamine in 2017. She initially stopped in 2020 but began using again in 2022

after her parental rights were terminated to two of her other children. By January 2024,

when Mother found out she was pregnant with M.P., she was using methamphetamine on

a daily basis. Mother reported that she stopped drinking alcohol in January 2024 due to a

kidney infection, but she continued to use methamphetamine daily until March 2024.

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She then reduced her use “to about one to two times per week” until she was able to quit

in May 2024. Mother also used cocaine on at least one occasion while she was pregnant

with M.P.

Mother and M.P. both tested negative for substances when M.P. was born. A

week later, on September 12, 2024, Mother tested positive for opiates. CFS obtained a

detention warrant the next day. M.P. was still in the hospital at the time, with an

unknown discharge date. M.P. had been admitted to the neonatal intensive care unit after

she was born due to her low blood sugar and difficulty feeding. M.P. was born with

hypoglycemia, which is common for a child born to a diabetic mother.

On September 17, 2024, CFS filed a dependency petition with allegations under

section 300, subdivisions (b)(1), (g), and (j). The petition alleged that Mother had an on-

going substance abuse problem (b-1), that the father’s whereabouts and ability to provide

care and support to M.P. were unknown (b-2 & g-3), and that three of M.P.’s half-

siblings had previously been removed from Mother due to concerns of abuse and/or

neglect, thus placing M.P. at a similar risk of harm (j-4).

On September 18, 2024, the juvenile court ordered M.P. detained. The court

authorized supervised visitation on a weekly basis and ordered predisposition services for

Mother.

Jurisdiction and Disposition

In October 2024, Mother provided the social worker with documentation that she

had enrolled in parenting classes, therapy, and an outpatient substance abuse program.

Mother also provided a medical record that showed she had been prescribed

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hydrocodone-acetaminophen for pain at a “post C-section” medical appointment on

September 10, 2024. Mother told the social worker that the reason she tested positive for

opiates on September 12 was because she took the medication as prescribed.

Mother took two drug tests in October 2024—one was negative, and one was

positive for ethanol. Also in October, Mother began her supervised visits with M.P. CFS

did not note any concerns with Mother’s visits throughout the month of October.

At the combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on October 28, 2024,

Mother’s counsel requested the b-1 allegation be amended to proof. Counsel argued that

Mother had been sober for about six months, and there was an explanation for her

positive drug and alcohol tests—the positive drug test was due to Mother’s prescribed

medication, and the positive ethanol test was because Mother was diabetic. The court

noted there had not been any evidence that the positive ethanol test was the result of

Mother being diabetic, but it otherwise granted Mother’s request. The court amended the

b-1 allegation to allege that Mother has a history of substance abuse and a current alcohol

problem which negatively impacts her ability to provide for and protect the child. As

amended, the court sustained the b-1 allegation. It sustained the remaining allegations as

written.

As to disposition, the court heard testimony from Mother that about three weeks

earlier, she had enrolled in an outpatient substance abuse program, individual counseling

and a parenting program. Mother acknowledged that she used methamphetamine for the

first five months of her pregnancy, but maintained she had not used any illegal substances

since May 20, 2024, and she had not consumed any alcohol since January 2024. Mother

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also acknowledged that she did not successfully complete drug and alcohol programming

in the prior dependency proceedings. Mother attended two substance abuse programs

during the course of prior proceedings. She completed the first program in 2020, and

then started a second program, which she did not complete. She dropped out with only a

few sessions remaining, and then relapsed in 2022.

After hearing Mother’s testimony and argument from counsel, the juvenile court

followed the recommendation to bypass Mother’s reunification services under section

361.5, subdivision (b)(10) and (b)(11). The court found Mother’s reunification services

and parental rights had previously been terminated as to M.P.’s half-siblings, and Mother

had not subsequently made a reasonable effort to treat the problems that led to removal.

The court focused primarily on Mother’s substance abuse issue, noting “that the same

issue involving the history of substance-abuse is a reoccurring theme regarding [Mother]

and her children.”

The court also found that Oliver, last name unknown, was the alleged father and

was not entitled to reunification services.

The court initially set the section 366.26 hearing for February 2025, but it was

later continued to June 26, 2025.

Mother’s Section 388 Petition

On June 26, 2025, Mother filed a section 388 petition seeking the return of M.P.

with family maintenance services, or alternatively, family reunification services.

Mother’s petition alleged she had been clean for the past seven months, since

November 30, 2024; she had completed parenting and domestic violence awareness

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programs; and she was enrolled in an outpatient substance abuse treatment program, with

a possible graduation date of July 31, 2025. The petition further alleged that Mother had

been consistently visiting M.P. since the inception of the case, and it would be in M.P.’s

best interest to have her biological mother raise her. In support of her allegations, Mother

attached a progress report from the substance abuse treatment program and certificates

that showed she had completed a 20-week domestic violence awareness program and a

16-session parental education program.

The juvenile court summarily denied Mother’s petition without holding a hearing.

The court concluded the petition did not state new evidence or a change of circumstances,

nor was the proposed change in M.P.’s best interest. The court noted Mother had “a

lengthy history of substance abuse issues” and that the documentation she provided stated

she had a “‘possible graduation date [of] July 31, 2025’” from the substance abuse

program. The court found Mother had only demonstrated “changing” circumstances.

The Section 366.26 Report and Hearing

CFS filed the section 366.26 report on June 13, 2025. By that time, M.P.’s alleged

father Oliver V. had appeared in court, and a court-ordered paternity test established that

he was M.P.’s biological father.

The section 366.26 report recommended the court terminate the parents’ parental

rights and order a permanent plan of adoption. M.P. was nine months old when the

report was filed and did not have any medical, developmental, or emotional issues that

would prevent her adoption. She was crawling, pulling herself up, and able to stand with

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assistance. The only identified need was for occupational therapy “to address some

shakiness when she reaches for things.”

The report stated M.P. had been living with her current caregivers, the maternal

uncle and his wife, for the past six months, since December 19, 2024. M.P. “appear[ed]

to be happy, well taken care of” and had demonstrated “a positive attachment with the

caregivers.” The caregivers were also reported to have “developed a mutual attachment”

with M.P. The caregivers wanted to adopt M.P. and were committed to raising her to

adulthood. They were willing to maintain a relationship with Mother, provided there

were “boundaries and rules.” They were less willing to maintain a relationship with

M.P.’s father. The maternal uncle felt M.P.’s father, “‘should have stepped up … [and]

provided for her.’”

The report also stated that Mother has been consistent in visiting M.P., and that the

visits have been positive, with no concerns noted. The social worker described Mother

bringing age-appropriate toys to the visits and encouraging M.P. to crawl. When M.P.

would get fussy, Mother would “gently rock[] and sway[] [M.P.] to calm her down.” The

social worker noted that during the initial exchange from the caregiver to Mother, M.P.

“does not cry and appears to be happy during the exchange.” However, at the end of the

visits, M.P. “has been observed to reach her arms out to the caregiver.”

The contested section 366.26 hearing was held on June 26, 2025.3 Mother

testified that she has been consistently visiting M.P. since the beginning of the case and

3 The clerk’s transcript identifies the date of the hearing as June 26, 2025. The
reporter’s transcript identifies the date of the hearing as June 25, 2025.

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has not missed any visits. Mother brings toys with her to the visits and a blanket for the

floor. Mother said she feeds M.P., changes her, talks to her, soothes her, and sings and

dances with her. Mother also said that when M.P. sees Mother, she smiles. M.P. taps

Mother and puts her head on Mother’s chest. When the visits end, M.P. looks back at

Mother and throws her arms at Mother.

Following Mother’s testimony, CFS and M.P.’s counsel requested the court

terminate parental rights and set a permanent plan of adoption. Both parents requested

legal guardianship. Mother argued that she met the parental-benefit exception to

adoption, as set forth in In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614 (Caden C.).

Having considered the evidence, the court found M.P. was both generally and

specifically adoptable. It also found that most of Mother’s testimony was consistent with

the section 366.26 report; although one discrepancy the court noted was at the end of the

visits the social worker reported M.P. had been observed reaching her arms out to the

caregiver.

The court found Mother met the first element of the parental-benefit exception

because she maintained regular visitation and contact with M.P., but she did not meet the

second or third elements of the exception. As to those elements, the court found that

M.P. was less than a year old and was only in Mother’s custody for a brief period of time.

The court explained that when such a young child has never lived in the parent’s care, the

law requires the parent to “show more than positive supervised visits to trigger the

exception.” “There must also be evidence that the child will suffer detriment if the

parent/child relationship is severed.” The court found, “[t]here has been no evidence

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presented that there is a relationship between [M]other and [M.P.] that … would benefit

[M.P.] to such a degree that termination of parental rights would be detrimental to

[M.P.].” Having so found, the court terminated both parents’ parental rights.

Mother timely filed a notice of appeal.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 388 Petition

Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion and violated her due

process rights by summarily denying her section 388 petition without holding an

evidentiary hearing. Mother asserts the error cannot be deemed harmless because her

petition stated a prima facie case for relief. As we explain, we disagree.

Section 388 allows a parent, “upon grounds of change of circumstance or new

evidence” to petition the juvenile court “for a hearing to change, modify, or set aside any

order of court previously made.” (§ 388, subd. (a)(1).) “If it appears that the best

interests of the child … may be promoted by the proposed change of order, … the court

shall order that a hearing be held.” (§ 388, subd. (d).)

Section 388 petitions are to be liberally construed in favor of granting a hearing.

(In re Marilyn H. (1993) 5 Cal.4th 295, 309; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 5.570(a).)

However, to obtain “a full hearing” on a section 388 petition, the parent must make a

prima facie showing of their entitlement to relief. (In re Marilyn H., supra, at p. 310.)

This is done by alleging facts, that “if supported by evidence given credit at the hearing,

would sustain a favorable decision on the petition.” (In re J.P. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th

108, 127.)

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“There are two parts to the prima facie showing: The parent must demonstrate (1)

a genuine change of circumstances or new evidence, and that (2) revoking the previous

order would be in the best interests of the children.” (In re Anthony W. (2001) 87

Cal.App.4th 246, 250.) The parent must make a prima facie showing on both elements to

trigger an evidentiary hearing on the petition. (In re Zachary G. (1999) 77 Cal.App.4th

799, 806.) “It is not enough for a parent to show just a genuine change of circumstances

under the statute. The parent must show that the undoing of the prior order would be in

the best interests of the child.” (In re Kimberly F. (1997) 56 Cal.App.4th 519, 529.) “If

the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not show changed circumstances

such that the child’s best interests will be promoted by the proposed change of order, the

dependency court need not order a hearing.” (In re Anthony W., supra, at p. 250; Cal.

Rules of Court, rule 5.570(d)(1).) In this respect, section 388 “provides a means for the

court to address a legitimate change in circumstances while protecting the child’s need

for prompt resolution of his [or her] custody status.” (In re Marilyn H., supra, 5 Cal.4th

at p. 309.)

In assessing whether a petition has made a prima facie showing, the juvenile court

may consider the entire factual and procedural history of the case. (In re J.P., supra, 229

Cal.App.4th at p. 127.) Not every change in circumstance or new evidence will justify

modification of a prior order. (In re A.A. (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 597, 612.) The change

in circumstance or new evidence “must relate to the purpose of the order and be such that

the modification of the prior order is appropriate. [Citation.] In other words, the problem

that initially brought the child within the dependency system must be removed or

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ameliorated.” (Ibid.; In re Angel B. (2002) 97 Cal.App.4th 454, 463–464.) It is not

enough for the parent to show that their circumstances are changing; a parent petitioning

for a hearing under section 388 “must show changed, not changing, circumstances.” (In

re Mickel O. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 586, 615.)

If the liberally construed allegations of the petition do not state a prima facie case

for relief, summarily denying the petition without holding a hearing does not violate the

parent’s due process rights. (In re Jeremy W. (1992) 3 Cal.App.4th 1407, 1413–1414.)

We review the summary denial of a section 388 petition for abuse of discretion.

(In re A.S. (2009) 180 Cal.App.4th 351, 358.) “Under this standard of review, we will

not disturb the decision of the trial court unless the trial court exceeded the limits of legal

discretion by making an arbitrary, capricious or patently absurd determination.” (Ibid.)

Mother’s section 388 petition alleged she had been clean for seven months, since

November 30, 2024; she had completed parenting and domestic violence awareness

programs; and she was enrolled in an outpatient drug treatment program with a possible

graduation date of July 31, 2025. In support of these allegations, Mother provided

certificates of completion from the parenting and domestic violence awareness programs,

and a progress report from the substance abuse program. The progress report reflected

that despite Mother having made “good” and “excellent” progress in the program, she

tested positive in drug/alcohol screening tests on April 23, and May 15, 2025; and that

even though Mother had provided the substance abuse program with a letter from her

doctor that stated her positive tests for alcohol were due to uncontrolled diabetes, the

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clinician at the program still believed Mother “would benefit from continuing

treatment.”4

The record also reflects that this was the third substance abuse program Mother

had attended over the course of her eight-year addiction. Mother completed the first

program in 2020, and then started a second program, which she did not complete. She

dropped out of the second program with only a few sessions remaining and began using

drugs again. By the time Mother found out she was pregnant with M.P. in January 2024,

she was using methamphetamine on a daily basis and continued to use it at least once or

twice a week for the first five months of her pregnancy. Mother’s inability to address her

substance abuse issues after having lost physical custody of one of her children and

having her parental rights terminated as to two of her other children, was the primary

reason the court identified in bypassing Mother’s reunification services.

On this record, we cannot say the juvenile court abused its discretion in

concluding that Mother had “only demonstrated changing circumstances.” Even when

liberally construed, Mother’s section 388 petition alleged she had only been clean for

seven months, since November 30, 2024, and had not yet completed the substance abuse

program in which she was enrolled. Seven months of sobriety, while not insignificant,

was only a brief period of time compared to Mother’s eight-year struggle with addiction,

and Mother had a history of both having quit a substance abuse program with only a few

4 Mother did not attach the letter from her doctor as an exhibit to the petition, nor
did the progress report indicate what substance Mother tested positive for on April 23 and
May 15, 2025.

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sessions remaining and having relapsed after completing a program. (See In re

Cliffton B. (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 415, 423 [“seven months of sobriety since [the father’s

last] relapse … while commendable, was nothing new”]; In re Ernesto R. (2014) 230

Cal.App.4th 219, 223 [the father’s “recent sobriety reflects ‘changing,’ not changed,

circumstances”].)

Mother acknowledges that she was still “in the process of completing her

outpatient substance abuse program,” but contends she made a prima facie showing on

her petition based on the presentation of new evidence—her completion of the parenting

and domestic violence awareness programs. Mother completed these programs after the

disposition hearing, and asserts that because the juvenile court had before it “material

new evidence of Mother completing reunification programs” it should have ordered an

evidentiary hearing on the petition.

We are not persuaded. When a parent’s section 388 petition contains allegations

of new evidence or changed circumstances, along with an allegation that “fatally

undermine[s]” the petition, the juvenile court is not required to hold an evidentiary

hearing. (In re Edward H. (1996) 43 Cal.App.4th 584, 593.) Here, although Mother’s

petition contained allegations of new evidence—her completion of the parenting and

domestic violence awareness programs—it also included allegations that she had only

been clean for seven months and only had a “possible” graduation date from the

substance abuse program in which she was enrolled. This fatally undermined Mother’s

petition because it showed she was still in the process of addressing her substance abuse

issue, which was the juvenile court’s primary concern. (See In re Angel B., supra, 97

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Cal.App.4th at p. 463, see id. at p. 462 [the “simple completion of … classes taken by the

[parent] … does not, in and of itself, show prima facie that either the requested

modification or a hearing would be in the minor’s best interests”]; see also, In re Amber

M. (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 681, 686 [no abuse of discretion in denying § 388 petition

where mother completed domestic violence and sexual abuse treatment programs but

only established a 372-day period of sobriety].)

In sum, to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to an evidentiary hearing on

her petition, Mother needed to show that the facts she alleged, if credited at the hearing,

would support granting the petition. (In re J.P., supra, 229 Cal.App.4th at p. 127.)

Mother did not make that showing because even when liberally construed, the facts

alleged in Mother’s petition showed only that Mother’s circumstances were changing, not

that they had changed. A petition which alleges “merely changing circumstances” and

would require delaying the section 366.26 hearing to see if a parent, who has “failed to

reunify with the child, might be able to reunify at some future point, does not promote

stability for the child or the child’s best interests.” (In re Casey D. (1999) 70 Cal.App.4th

38, 47, overruled on other grounds in Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 636, fn. 5.)

Accordingly, because Mother did not make a prima facie showing of entitlement

to relief on her section 388 petition, the juvenile court did not abuse its discretion or

violate Mother’s due process rights by summarily denying the petition without holding an

evidentiary hearing.

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B. Termination of Parental Rights

Mother also contends the juvenile court erred in terminating her parental rights.

Mother asserts she satisfied the parental-benefit exception to adoption. We disagree.

The purpose of the section 366.26 hearing is to select and implement a permanent

plan for the child after reunification efforts have failed. (In re J.D. (2021) 70

Cal.App.5th 833, 851–852.) “‘[T]he court may select one of three alternative

permanency plans for the dependent child—adoption, guardianship or long-term foster

care.’” “[A]doption is preferred because it ensures permanency and stability for the

minors.” (In re A.S. (2018) 28 Cal.App.5th 131, 152; see § 366.26, subd. (b)(1).)

“‘Adoption is the Legislature’s first choice because it gives the child the best chance at [a

full] emotional commitment from a responsible caretaker.’ [Citation.] ‘Guardianship,

while a more stable placement than foster care, is not irrevocable and thus falls short of

the secure and permanent future the Legislature had in mind for the dependent child.’”

(In re Celine R. (2003) 31 Cal.4th 45, 53.) “Thus, as a general rule, at a section 366.26

hearing, if the trial court finds that the child is adoptable, it must select adoption as the

permanent plan and terminate parental rights. (§ 366.26, subds. (b)(1) & (c)(1).)” (In re

L.A.-O. (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 197, 206.)

At the section 366.26 hearing, “the court presumes that terminating parental rights

is in the child’s best interests, and the party opposing that result must demonstrate a

‘compelling reason for determining that termination would be detrimental to the child’

due to one of [the] six enumerated reasons” set forth in section 366.26, subdivision

(c)(1)(B). (In re A.S., supra, 28 Cal.App.5th at p. 152.) These statutory exceptions

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“permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to choose an option other than

the norm, which remains adoption.” (In re Celine R., supra, 31 Cal.4th at p. 53.)

The statutory exception at issue here is the parental-benefit exception. This

exception applies if “[t]he court finds a compelling reason for determining that

termination would be detrimental to the child” because “[t]he parents have maintained

regular visitation and contact with the child and the child would benefit from continuing

the relationship.” (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i).) To satisfy this exception, the parent

must establish three elements by a preponderance of the evidence: “(1) regular visitation

and contact, and (2) a relationship, the continuation of which would benefit the child

such that (3) the termination of parental rights would be detrimental to the child.”

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 631, 636–637.)

“The first element—regular visitation and contact—is straightforward. The

question is just whether ‘parents visit consistently,’ taking into account ‘the extent

permitted by court orders.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.)

“As to the second element, courts assess whether ‘the child would benefit from

continuing the relationship.’” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) “To satisfy this

element, parents ‘must show more than frequent and loving contact, an emotional bond

with the child, or pleasant visits’ [citations], they must establish a substantial, positive,

emotional attachment between them and the child.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102

Cal.App.5th 803, 816.) “[T]he kind of attachment implying that the child would benefit

from continuing the relationship.” (Caden C., at p. 636.) In assessing this element, the

focus is on the child. (Id. at p. 632.) The court considers such factors as the child’s age

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and particular needs, the length of time the child has spent in parental custody, and the

positive and negative effects of interactions between parent and child, as well as how the

child speaks about, interacts with, or feels about the parent. (Ibid.)

As to the final element, whether the termination of parental rights would be

detrimental to the child, the juvenile court “must decide whether the harm from severing

the child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the child of placement in

a new adoptive home.” (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 632.) The court must ask,

“does the benefit of placement in a new, adoptive home outweigh ‘the harm [the child]

would experience from the loss of [a] significant, positive, emotional relationship with

[the parent?]’ [Citation.] When the relationship with a parent is so important to the child

that the security and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss, termination

would be ‘detrimental to the child due to’ the child’s beneficial relationship with a

parent.” (Id. at pp. 633–634, italics omitted.)

We review the juvenile court’s ruling on whether the parental-benefit exception

applies using a hybrid approach. We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to

the first two elements, and the abuse of discretion standard to the third element.

(Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 639–641.) In applying the substantial evidence

standard of review, “we presume in favor of the order, considering the evidence in the

light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving the prevailing party the benefit of

every reasonable inference and resolving all conflicts in support of the order.” (In re

Autumn H., supra, 27 Cal.App.4th at p. 576.) In applying the abuse of discretion

standard of review, “we determine whether the juvenile court’s decision exceeded the

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bounds of reason and, in so doing, we cannot substitute our view for that of the juvenile

court.” (In re I.E. (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 683, 691.)

At issue here are the second and third elements of the parental-benefit exception,

whether Mother demonstrated that she shared such a substantial, positive and emotional

attachment with M.P., that the harm of severing the parent-child relationship outweighed

the benefit of stability in adoption. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633, 636.)

In assessing this issue, we considered the case of In re Angel B., supra, 97

Cal.App.4th 454. Much like the present case, the mother in In re Angel B. had a history

of struggling with drug addiction, and despite her parental rights having been terminated

as to an older sibling, the mother continued to use drugs while pregnant with Angel.

(Id. at p. 459.) Angel was detained from the hospital soon after she was born and never

lived with the mother. At the disposition hearing, the juvenile court bypassed the

mother’s reunification services. (Ibid.) By the time of the section 366.26 hearing, Angel

was just over a year old, and the mother was doing better. (Id. at pp. 458–459.) She had

enrolled in a residential drug treatment program, completed various classes, and had been

testing clean for four months. She was also consistently visiting Angel, and the visits

were going well. (Id. at p. 459.) However, despite the progress, the juvenile court denied

the mother’s section 388 petition and terminated her parental rights. (Ibid.)

In affirming the termination of parental rights, the court employed reasoning

which is applicable here. The court “note[d] that (1) Angel is very young, too young to

understand the concept of a biological parent; (2) she has spent relatively few hours

visiting with Mother, versus many hours being parented by the foster family; (3) Mother

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and Angel’s interactions have been positive, but nothing in the record indicates that, from

Angel’s point of view, the interactions were particularly like those of a child with her

mother; and (4) there is no evidence that Angel has any particular needs that can be met

by Mother but not by the foster family.” (In re Angel B., supra, 97 Cal.App.4th at

pp. 467–468.) The court went on to conclude that “there was no hint in the record before

the juvenile court that Angel would be harmed in any way if her relatively brief, albeit

happy, visits with Mother were to end.” (Id. at p. 468.)

The same reasoning applies here. M.P. was only nine months old at the time of

the section 366.26 hearing. She had never lived with Mother and had spent over half of

her young life with the current caregivers. In that time, M.P. had developed “a positive

attachment” to the caregivers, and “appear[ed] to be happy, [and] well taken care of.” By

all accounts, Mother was affectionate with M.P. and attentive to her needs during the

visits, but the record does not reveal any particular need of M.P.’s that can be met

uniquely by Mother. There was also no indication that M.P. cried or otherwise exhibited

distress at the end of the visits. To the contrary, the social worker reported that at the end

of the visits M.P. would “reach her arms out to the caregiver.”

“There is no question that there are benefits in continued visits with loving parents

to which the child has some substantial attachment.” (In re Andrew M. (2024) 102

Cal.App.5th 803, 820.) However, “[a] ‘“showing [that] the child would derive some

benefit from continuing a relationship maintained during periods of visitation”’ is not a

sufficient ground to depart from the statutory preference for adoption.” (Id. at p. 818.) It

is only “[w]hen the relationship with a parent is so important to the child that the security

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and stability of a new home wouldn’t outweigh its loss” that termination of parental

rights would be detrimental to the child. (Caden C., supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633–634.)

On this record, given M.P.’s young age, the limited time she spent with Mother,

and the social worker’s report that M.P. had developed “a positive attachment” to the

caregivers and would reach her arms out to the caregiver at the end of visits, the juvenile

court could reasonably conclude that Mother did not establish that her relationship with

M.P. was so positive and substantial that it outweighed the benefits M.P. would receive

from a permanent, adoptive home with her current caregivers.

Accordingly, the juvenile court did not err in concluding the parental-benefit

exception to adoption did not apply in this case.

DISPOSITION

The orders entered by the juvenile court on June 26, 2025, denying Mother’s

section 388 petition and terminating her parental rights are affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

RAMIREZ
P. J.

We concur:

CODRINGTON
J.
FIELDS
J.

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