CourtListener 10754789•People v. Santana CA4/1
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Filed 12/12/25 P. v. Santana CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THE PEOPLE, D086346
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No. INF2101134)
DIEGO SANTANA,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Riverside County,
Jerry C. Yang, Judge. Affirmed.
Carl Fabian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant
and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Robin
Urbanski and Flavio Nominati, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
I. INTRODUCTION
Diego Santana appeals from his 13-count sex crime conviction.
Santana challenges nine counts (2, 4, 6, and 8–13), claiming insufficient
evidence supported the jury’s findings that he committed those crimes by
using force or duress. Finding substantial evidence of duress, we affirm.
II. BACKGROUND
While she was between seven and 12 years old, Jane Doe lived in a
house with her immediate and extended family, including Santana, who was
in his early twenties. Santana was the brother of Doe’s stepfather, and Doe
called him “Uncle Diego.”
During those years, Santana repeatedly sexually abused Doe while the
two were alone in his bedroom. Santana raped and sodomized Doe, orally
copulated Doe, touched Doe’s chest with his mouth and hands, digitally
penetrated Doe’s vagina, and kissed Doe on the lips. Santana also made Doe
masturbate him, suck his nipples, and orally copulate him.
Santana would move Doe’s body to accomplish these acts. Sometimes
Santana made Doe’s head move back and forth while she orally copulated
him, and he would push her head into his bare chest. Santana also
positioned Doe’s body how he wanted, he held her down on one or two
occasions, and he yanked her hair in another.
Doe’s body shook during the abuse. She was scared and Santana made
her do things she did not want to do.
When Santana would disrobe Doe or tell her to take clothes off, Doe felt
she had to obey. Despite knowing she would endure abuse, Doe complied
when Santana called her into his room because Doe was afraid Santana
would hurt her mother and brothers. Santana never explicitly threatened
Doe or her family, but Doe still believed Sanatana might harm them.
Santana was bigger, older, and stronger than Doe, he got mad at Doe and her
brothers when they did not listen, and Doe feared angering Santana.
2
Ultimately, Doe grew tired of being violated, and her fear for herself
and her family led her to disclose the abuse when she was 12. Doe first told
her mother’s friend, who then informed Doe’s mother, and they reported
Santana to the police that day.
Police arrested Santana and interviewed him at the police station.
When asked if Doe’s allegations of sexual abuse were true, Santana stated,
“[u]nfortunately, yes.” Santana then attempted to qualify his admission and
asserted his right to counsel.
The Riverside County District Attorney’s Office charged Santana with
two counts of sexual intercourse or sodomy with a child who is 10 or younger
(Pen. Code,1 § 288.7, subd. (a); counts 1 & 3); two counts of oral copulation or
sexual penetration of a child who is 10 or younger (§ 288.7, subd. (b); counts 5
& 7); one count of aggravated sexual assault against a child under 14 by rape
(§§ 269, subd. (a)(1); 261, subd. (a)(2); count 2); one count of aggravated
sexual assault against a child under 14 by sodomy (§§ 269, subd. (a)(3);
286, subd. (c)(2); count 4); one count of aggravated sexual assault against a
child under 14 by sexual penetration (§§ 269, subd. (a)(5); 289, subd. (a);
count 6); one count of aggravated sexual assault against a child under 14 by
oral copulation (§§ 269, subd. (a)(4); 287, subd. (c)(2); count 8); and five counts
of lewd acts on a child under 14 (§ 288, subd. (b)(1); counts 9–13). Counts 2,
4, 6, and 8–13 alleged that Santana committed the acts by using force,
violence, duress, menace or fear of bodily injury.
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3
The jury found Santana guilty of all 13 counts. The trial court
sentenced Santana to 180 years to life in prison.2 Santana’s timely appeal
followed.
III. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“ ‘In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence, we review the entire
record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
discloses evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid value such that a
reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt. [Citations.] Reversal on this ground is unwarranted unless it appears
“that upon no hypothesis whatever is there sufficient substantial evidence to
support [the conviction].” ’ ” (People v. Veale (2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 40, 45
(Veale).) Accordingly, the “defendant bears an enormous burden in claiming
there is insufficient evidence to sustain his molestation convictions,” and “[i]f
the verdict is supported by substantial evidence, we are bound to give due
deference to the trier of fact and not retry the case ourselves.” (Id. at p. 46.)
B. There Was Sufficient Evidence That Santana Accomplished Counts 2, 4,
6, and 8–13 by Duress
1. Duress
To be guilty of counts 2, 4, 6, and 8–13, Santana had to commit the acts
by “force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily
injury” on the victim or another. (§§ 269, subd. (a)(1), (3), (4) & (5); 261,
subd. (a)(2); 286, subd. (c)(2); 287, subd. (c)(2); 289, subd. (a); 288,
subd. (b)(1).) “ ‘The very nature of duress is psychological coercion.’ ” (People
2 Santana received 25-year-to-life terms for counts 1 and 3, 15-year-to-
life terms for counts 2 and 4–8, and 8-year terms for counts 9–13.
4
v. Barton (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 496, 518.) It is defined as “ ‘ “a direct or
implied threat of force, violence, danger, hardship or retribution sufficient to
coerce a reasonable person of ordinary susceptibilities to (1) perform an act
which otherwise would not have been performed or, (2) acquiesce in an act to
which one otherwise would not have submitted.” ’ ” (People v. Soto (2011)
51 Cal.4th 229, 246, italics omitted.)3
To determine if the defendant used duress, we look at “[t]he totality of
the circumstances includ[ing] the victim’s age, her relationship to the
perpetrator, threats to harm the victim, physically controlling the victim
when the victim attempts to resist, warnings to the victim that revealing the
molestation would result in jeopardizing the family, and the relative physical
vulnerability of the child.” (People v. Thomas (2017) 15 Cal.App.5th
1063, 1072 (Thomas).)
For example, “ ‘[d]uress can arise from . . . the relationship between the
defendant and the victim and their relative ages and sizes. [Citations.]
“Where the defendant is a family member and the victim is young, . . . the
position of dominance and authority of the defendant and his continuous
exploitation of the victim” [are] relevant to the existence of duress.’ ” (Veale,
3 As noted by Santana for the first time in his reply brief, the trial court
instructed the jury with an outdated version of CALCRIM No. 1111, the
pattern instruction for lewd acts under section 288, subdivision (b)(1). The
trial court instructed the jury that “[d]uress means a direct or implied threat
of force, violence, danger, hardship, or retribution that causes a reasonable
person to do or submit to something that he or she would not otherwise do or
submit to.” The current version of CALCRIM No. 1111 states, “[d]uress
means the use of a direct or implied threat of force, violence, danger,
hardship, or retribution sufficient to cause a reasonable person to do [or
submit to] something that he or she would not otherwise do [or submit to].”
(Original italics omitted, italics added.) Nonetheless, Santana does not seek
reversal on this ground, and we do not believe failing to use the current
version of CALCRIM No. 1111 effected the outcome in this case.
5
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 49.) Duress can also be shown by “a defendant’s
attempt to isolate the victim and increase or maintain her vulnerability to his
assaults.” (People v. Cochran (2002) 103 Cal.App.4th 8, 15.) Further, “[t]he
fact that the victim testifies the defendant did not use force or threats does
not preclude a finding of duress.” (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1072.)
2. Santana’s Supporting Authority
Santana compares his case to, or distinguishes it from, three appellate
decisions: Schulz,4 Veale, and Espinoza.5
Schulz involved an uncle who molested his niece numerous times when
she was between the ages between six and 10. (Schulz, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 1002–1004.) In one incident, when the niece was between seven and
eight, the uncle grabbed the niece’s arm, and the niece ran to the corner of
the room where she screamed and cried while the uncle fondled her. (Id. at
p. 1003.) The court found sufficient evidence of duress in this incident
because the uncle “took advantage not only of his psychological dominance as
an adult authority figure, but also of his physical dominance to overcome her
resistance to molestation.” (Id. at p. 1005.)
In Veale, the seven-year-old victim testified that her stepfather did not
threaten her or use physical force when he repeatedly molested her while the
two were alone in her or the stepfather’s bedroom. (Veale, supra,
160 Cal.App.4th at pp. 46–47.) On at least one occasion, the bedroom door
was locked, and on two occasions the victim got angry, preventing the abuse.
(Ibid.) The victim feared that if she told anyone about the abuse, her
4 People v. Schulz (1992) 2 Cal.App.4th 999 (Schulz).
5 People v. Espinoza (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th 1287 (Espinoza).
6
stepfather would kill her or her mother. (Id. at p. 47.) From this evidence,
the court determined that “[a] reasonable inference could be made that
defendant made an implied threat sufficient to support a finding of duress.”
(Ibid.) The court relied on the victim’s perceived threat of harm, the age and
size disparity between the victim and the stepfather, and the stepfather’s
position of authority. (Ibid.)
In Espinoza, the defendant molested his 12-year-old stepdaughter, who
had limited intellectual abilities, on five occasions. (Espinoza, supra,
95 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1292–1293.) The victim testified that she was “ ‘too
scared to do anything’ when defendant was molesting her,” and she “was
afraid that defendant ‘would come and do something’ if she reported the
molests.” (Id. at p. 1293.) The court found insufficient evidence of duress
because the “defendant simply lewdly touched and attempted intercourse
with a victim who made no oral or physical response to his acts.” (Id. at
p. 1320.) The court explained that “[w]hile it was clear that [the victim] was
afraid of defendant, no evidence was introduced to show that this fear was
based on anything defendant had done other than to continue to molest her.”
(Id. at p. 1321.)
Santana distinguishes his case from Schulz and Veale, arguing that
Doe did not demonstrate any resistance. Santana also asserts that unlike
Veale, but like Espinoza, there was no evidence that he directly or impliedly
threatened Doe. Santana relies on the trial court’s ruling regarding
aggravating sentencing factors where it stated, “I don’t find that there were
any threats of great bodily harm.” Santana further contends that he was a
young adult with no familial relationship to Doe, Doe was older than the
victim in Veale during some of the abuse, and Santana’s door was never
locked.
7
3. Analysis
Contrary to Santana’s claims, he had a familial relationship with Doe.
Santana was the brother of Doe’s stepfather, Doe called Santana “Uncle
Diego,” and the two lived in the same house. And despite being young,
Santana was nonetheless an adult who was bigger and stronger than Doe.
The evidence also suggested Santana had authority in the home because he
would get angry at Doe and her brothers when they did not listen.
Although Doe was 12 years old for some of the abuse, Santana began
exploiting her when Doe was seven and continued to do so for approximately
five years. As such, this case is more like Shulz and Veale, where “[b]ecause
of [Doe’s] young age, [Doe] was more susceptible to being coerced through fear
and due to defendant’s position of authority.” (Veale, supra, 160 Cal.App.4th
at pp. 49–50.)
As for Doe’s resistance, that is merely one factor to be considered under
the totality of the circumstances. (Thomas, supra, 15 Cal.App.5th at p. 1072.)
Accordingly, that Doe did not cry and scream like the victim in Shulz or get
mad like the victim in Veale does not necessarily defeat a finding of duress.
Further, resistance could be inferred from some of the evidence. In some
instances, Santana had to manipulate Doe’s body, which was shaking.
Santana occasionally positioned Doe, moved her head back and forth, held
her down, and yanked her hair. This indicates that Doe resisted at least
some of Santana’s acts.
Turning to threats, Doe’s situation is like Veale where there were no
explicit threats, but the court still found an implied threat based in part on
the victim’s fear that the defendant would harm her or her mother. (Veale,
supra, 160 Cal.App.4th at p. 47.) Similarly in this case, Doe feared that
Santana would harm her brothers or her mother. And unlike Espinoza, Doe’s
8
fear was not just based on the continued sexual abuse. In addition, Doe
observed Santana get angry when she and her brothers did not listen to him.
Doe also repeatedly stated that she was scared, and that Santana
“made” or “makes” her perform the various sexual acts, which is indicative of
an implied threat. (See, e.g., People v. Pitmon (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d
38, 47–48 [finding duress despite victim’s denial of threats because the victim
“had consistently stated defendant had ‘made’ him engage in the prohibited
sex acts”].) Further, as noted above, Santana asserted physical control over
Doe at times by manipulating her body. “Physical control can create ‘duress’
without constituting ‘force.’ ” (Schulz, supra, 2 Cal.App.4th at p. 1005.)
Regarding the trial court’s finding that the crimes did not involve
threats, the trial court appeared to be addressing express threats of great
bodily harm. Duress may exist when there is an implied threat of hardship
or retribution. (People v. Soto, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 246.) Further, the trial
court’s finding is not controlling under the substantial evidence standard.
“ ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘If the circumstances reasonably justify the trier of fact’s findings, the
opinion of the reviewing court [or any other court], that the circumstances
might also reasonably be reconciled with a contrary finding does not warrant
a reversal of the judgment.’ ” ’ ” ’ ” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th
899, 961.)
Finally, Santana is correct that he did not abuse Doe behind a locked
door, as Santana’s bedroom had no door. But the doorway was covered by a
sheet or blanket that prevented anyone from seeing or hearing what
happened inside of Santana’s room. Hence, Santana still isolated Doe in his
room to accomplish the abuse.
Under the totality of these circumstances, there was sufficient evidence
of duress. Based on the disparity between Santana and Doe’s ages and sizes,
9
their familial relationship, Santana’s use of isolation and physical control
throughout his continued exploitation of Doe, Doe’s observations of Santana’s
anger when she or her brothers misbehaved, and Doe’s belief that Santana
would harm her family, the jury could reasonably infer that Santana
impliedly threatened retribution to accomplish the acts in counts 2, 4, 6, and
8–13.6
IV. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
RUBIN, J.
WE CONCUR:
McCONNELL, P. J.
KELETY, J.
6 Finding sufficient evidence of duress, we do not consider whether
Santana’s acts were committed by force.
10
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