People v. Deanda CA2/2

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Filed 12/12/25 P. v. Deanda CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B342807

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA097140)
v.

FRANKIE ANTHONY DEANDA,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County. Jacqueline H. Lewis, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with
directions.
Jonathan E. Demson and Cheryl Lutz, under appointments by
the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorneys
General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________________
Frankie Anthony Deanda appeals from an order of the superior
court denying his petition for resentencing under Penal Code1 section
1172.6 (former section 1170.95).2 We affirm and remand with
directions.
BACKGROUND
In March 2013, appellant pleaded no contest to one count of
attempted murder (§§ 664/187, subd. (a)), while admitting that he
personally discharged a firearm (§ 12022.53. subd. (c)). He was
sentenced to 25 years in state prison, consisting of five years for the
attempted murder conviction and 20 years for the firearm
enhancement. As part of the plea agreement, five counts were
dismissed, including three counts of attempted murder.
The preliminary hearing, conducted in June 2012, included the
following evidence relevant to appellant’s conviction: Appellant, who
was a known member of the East Side Bolen Parque Street gang,
approached Leo Rodriguez and three of his friends as they stood in
front of Rodriguez’s house in Baldwin Park in the early morning of
February 19, 2012. Appellant said, “ ‘Where you from?’ ” and
immediately started shooting at the group. Rodriguez was struck in
the forearm and shoulder. Appellant fired numerous shots and then
ran from the scene. Eleven shell casings were later recovered by police.
Appellant filed his operative petition for resentencing under
section 1172.6 in March 2024. The petition was on a preprinted form;
appellant checked all boxes indicating that he was eligible for relief
under section 1172.6 and requested counsel. The trial court ordered
that appellant be appointed counsel and set a review hearing. The

1
Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
Effective June 30, 2022, section 1170.95 was renumbered
section 1172.6, with no change in text. (Stats. 2022, ch. 58, § 10.) For
the sake of simplicity, we refer to the section by its new numbering.

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People opposed the petition, arguing that appellant was ineligible for
relief as the sole perpetrator who acted with the intent to kill.
Appellant, through counsel, filed a reply contending that, by filing the
preprinted form, he made a prima facie showing of an entitlement to
relief and that the trial court was required to set an evidentiary
hearing. The reply argued that the trial court could not properly
consider the preliminary hearing transcript in determining whether a
prima facie showing was made, and that nothing in the record of
conviction otherwise disqualified appellant from relief.
The prima facie review hearing was held in December 2024.
Defense counsel again argued against consideration of the preliminary
hearing transcript. The trial court disagreed, finding that
consideration of the preliminary hearing transcript was appropriate.
The court concluded that the contents of the preliminary hearing,
combined with trial counsel’s later stipulation to a factual basis for the
plea based on the preliminary hearing, demonstrated that appellant
could not make a prima facie showing of an entitlement to relief. The
transcript showed that appellant was a lone actor and he later
admitted to personally and intentionally discharging a firearm, which,
according to the trial court, dispelled any contention that the
prosecution proceeded under a theory of natural and probable
consequences, aiding and abetting, or implied malice. The court
accordingly denied the petition for resentencing.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (SB 1437) eliminated
the natural and probable consequences doctrine as a basis for murder
liability and limited the scope of the felony-murder rule. (People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 957.) SB 1437 also amended section 188
to require that, when the felony-murder rule does not apply, a principal
in the crime of murder “shall act with malice aforethought” and
“[m]alice shall not be imputed to a person based solely on his or her

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participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd. (a)(3); People v. Gentile (2020)
10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843, superseded by statute on another ground as
stated in People v. Oyler (2025) 17 Cal.5th 756, 836.)
SB 1437 authorizes the filing of a petition “ ‘to ensure that
murder liability is not imposed on a person who is not the actual killer,
did not act with the intent to kill, or was not a major participant in the
underlying felony who acted with reckless indifference to human life.’ ”
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 967.) Effective January 1, 2022, Senate
Bill No. 775 (2021-2022 Reg. Sess.) amended section 1172.6 to expand
its coverage to individuals convicted of attempted murder under the
natural and probable consequences doctrine and manslaughter.
(§ 1172.6, subd. (a); People v. Coley (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 539, 544.)
Upon receiving a properly pleaded petition for resentencing
under section 1172.6, the trial court is to appoint counsel to the
petitioner, if requested. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 966.) The court
then conducts a prima facie review to determine eligibility for relief and
issues an order to show cause and sets an evidentiary hearing if a
prima facie showing is made. (Id. at p. 971.) The court may consider
the record of conviction to determine whether the petitioner made the
requisite prima facie showing. (Id. at pp. 971–972.) When, as here, the
petitioner’s conviction resulted from a guilty plea, “the record of
conviction includes the facts ‘the defendant admitted as the factual
basis for a guilty plea.’ ” (People v. Gaillard (2024) 99 Cal.App.5th
1206, 1211–1212.)
In this matter, appellant argued that, by filing the form petition,
he made a sufficient prima facie showing of an entitlement to relief
under section 1172.6. Appellant claimed that the record of conviction
did not disqualify him at the prima facie inquiry stage because the
reviewable record could not properly include the preliminary hearing
transcript. Appellant made no argument that he was entitled to an
order to show cause and evidentiary hearing if the preliminary hearing
transcript was considered. The trial court denied appellant’s petition

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at the prima facie stage based in part on its consideration of the
preliminary hearing transcript.
Subsequent to the trial court’s order, and while this appeal was
pending, the Supreme Court, in People v. Patton (2025) 17 Cal.5th 549
(Patton), held that a trial court may rely on facts within a preliminary
hearing transcript to refute conclusory statements made in a form
section 1172.6 petition. (Id. at p. 564.) The issue appellant raised in
connection with his petition below, therefore, has now been determined
adversely to him, and appellant raises no alternative grounds for
reversal in his opening brief here.
Appellant, however, does request that the matter be remanded to
the trial court with directions to consider an amended resentencing
petition should he, within 30 days of remand, seek to file one.
Appellant bases this request directly on language in Patton, in which
the Supreme Court, while affirming the judgment, ordered the matter
remanded to the trial court to allow for the possible filing of an
amended section 1172.6 petition. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 569–
570 [directing remand “to the superior court with directions for that
court to consider an amended petition should [appellant], within 30
days of that remand, seek to file one”].)
A case decided subsequent to Patton, People v. Glass (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 922, 930–931 (Glass), followed Patton in remanding a
matter arising from the denial of a section 1172.6 petition to allow the
defendant to file an amended petition if he so elected. Even though the
record of conviction on appeal indicated that the defendant was
ineligible for relief under section 1172.6, and although the defendant
did not proffer facts in his trial court reply to support his contention
that his convictions were based on a natural and probable consequences
theory, “ ‘out of an abundance of caution,’ ” the court remanded the
matter to allow the appellant, “within 30 days of remand, to plead
‘additional facts’ in support of his ‘amended petition.’ ” (Id. at pp. 925,
930, citing Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 569–570.)

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The People in this matter assert that we should depart from the
Supreme Court authority expressed in Patton, and followed by Glass,
and affirm the subject order without remand. We decline to do so. The
procedural posture presented in this matter is functionally
indistinguishable from that in Patton and Glass. The People argue that
this matter is different because Patton was issued prior to the time that
appellant’s opening brief was due to be filed. This is a distinction
without a difference as it applies to appellant’s filing of the section
1172.6 petition.
At the time appellant filed his petition and reply in the trial
court, the issue of whether the court could properly consider the
preliminary hearing transcript had not yet been decided by the
Supreme Court. Accordingly, appellant (through counsel) relied on the
argument that the transcript should not be considered. Just as in
Glass, this argument only became necessarily unviable after the matter
was on appeal. The reason for the remand in both Patton and Glass
was to allow the defendant to attempt to show eligibility in the trial
court for relief under section 1172.6 even with consideration of the
preliminary hearing transcript. Appellant here is no differently
situated. To make a prima facie showing, he will need to plead
additional facts in the trial court demonstrating that he is potentially
eligible for relief when the complete record of conviction (including the
preliminary hearing transcript) is considered. (See Patton, supra, 17
Cal.5th at pp. 569–570; Glass, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at 930–931.)
The People further assert that remand is unnecessary because
they contend that appellant is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief based
on his plea hearing admissions. Again, substantively identical
situations were presented in both Patton and Glass, where the
defendants had admitted personal use of firearm allegations during
their plea hearings. (See Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 557; Glass,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at p. 925.) Even though the “record of
conviction currently indicates” that appellant “is ineligible for relief

6
under section 1172.6,” “out of an abundance of caution” (Glass, at
p. 925; see also Patton, at pp. 569–570) we follow Patton and Glass in
remanding the matter to the trial court.
Finally, the People argue that this appeal is properly dismissed
because appellant does not claim error by the trial court but simply
requests remand. We likewise reject this argument. The change in the
law represented by Patton did not present the defendants in either
Patton or Glass with a viable argument based on the record on appeal.
Nevertheless, both courts elected to remand the matter to give the
defendant the chance to proffer a record to make a prima facie case in
light of the new law. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 569–570; Glass,
supra, 110 Cal.App.5th at pp. 930–931.) Appellant, in his reply brief
here, makes various claims regarding how, even after Patton, he may
be entitled to relief under section 1172.6. We do not examine these
claims because they have not yet been presented to the trial court.
Nevertheless, we follow Patton and Glass in concluding that appellant
is entitled to file an amended petition pleading additional facts
supporting relief if he should seek to do so.

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DISPOSITION
The matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to
consider an amended petition should defendant seek to file one within
30 days of the issuance of the remittitur. (People v. Patton (2025) 17
Cal.5th 549, 570.) The trial court’s order is otherwise affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

LUI, P. J.
We concur:

CHAVEZ, J.

SIGGINS, J.*

* Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, Division Three, assigned by the Chief Justice
pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

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