Washington v. Stein CA2/5

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Filed 12/12/25 Washington v. Stein CA2/5
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION FIVE

EARL J. WASHINGTON et al., B343990
(Los Angeles County
Plaintiffs and Appellants, Super. Ct. No.
22STCV03806)
v.

CHARLIE Z. STEIN et al.,

Defendants and
Respondents.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Theresa M. Traber, Judge. Affirmed.

Earl J. Washington, in pro per., and for Plaintiff and
Appellant Lola Mitsuk.

Davidovich Stone Law Group, Niv V. Davidovich, and Jodi
C. Rosner for Defendants and Respondents.

******
Plaintiffs Earl Washington and Lola Mitsuk (collectively,
plaintiffs) sued their current landlord’s attorneys based on emails
those attorneys sent communicating their clients’ refusal to lease
a different unit in the same complex to plaintiffs and rebuffing
plaintiffs’ accusations that the refusal was discriminatory. The
trial court dismissed plaintiffs’ claims against the attorneys
under our anti-SLAPP statute (Code Civ. Proc., § 425.16).1 This
was correct, so we affirm.
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
I. Facts
A. Plaintiffs sue their landlord and property
manager
In March 2020, plaintiffs leased a unit in an apartment
building located in the Hollywood Heights neighborhood of Los
Angeles (the building).
In January 2022, plaintiffs sued their then-landlord
Wellington Yang (Yang), three of Yang’s limited liability
companies, and the building’s then-onsite property manager. The
complaint alleged nine causes of action based on allegations that
building management had improperly left fire doors open; had
not allowed plaintiffs to replace the washing machine in their
unit; had closed the building’s pool, gym, and lounge after
plaintiffs signed their lease; had withdrawn rent payments from
plaintiffs’ account on inconsistent dates; had stopped vacuuming
the hallways and providing tenants with air filters; had ignored
plaintiffs’ repair requests; had installed surveillance cameras in
common areas; and had threatened to tow plaintiffs’ car.

1 “SLAPP” is short for Strategic Lawsuit Against Public
Participation. All further statutory references are to the Code of
Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated.

2
Plaintiffs later alleged that when they complained, the property
manager moved into the unit above theirs and began making
excessive noise that could be heard through the walls.
B. The building’s ownership changes hands
In November 2022, while the lawsuit was pending, Yang
sold the building to Kambiz Hakim, Steven Hakim, and
Alexander Hakim (collectively, the Hakims), who hired
Quantumprime Realty LLC (Quantumprime) and Nicholas
Eliopoulos as property managers. Yang disclosed plaintiffs’
ongoing lawsuit to the Hakims and warned it was “likely that
[Washington] will sue [them] for whatever causes he concocts.”
C. Washington requests to view another unit, and
the new management refuses; when he threatens a lawsuit,
management refers him to their attorney
On November 27, 2023, Washington emailed Eliopoulos
and Suzanna Owens (an agent of Quantumprime), expressing a
desire to look at another unit in the building that had been listed
online as available for rent. Just 32 minutes later, Washington
sent a follow up email demanding a response “or [he] will add”—
presumably, to his ongoing lawsuit—“th[e new landlord’s] failure
to agree to show me an available apartment for rent as
harassment and discrimination.” Just four minutes after that,
Washington sent a third email stating, “You are not allowed to
discriminate on the basis of race or any other protected status.”
Less than one hour after that, Washington sent a fourth email
complaining that no one had responded to his nearly two-hour
barrage of emails, and indicated he would “call[] . . . in 30
minutes.”
Owens responded approximately 20 minutes after the
fourth email, informing Washington that Eliopoulos was in a

3
meeting, but indicating that the building typically did not allow
“unit transfers within a property.” Washington replied, “There is
no rule that a current tenant cannot respond to [a] public ad for
let of a unit.”
The next morning, Owens emailed Washington, informing
him that she relayed his interest to Quantumprime’s legal team,
and instructed Washington to “reach out to them directly.”
Washington ignored her instructions, and instead emailed Owens
to tell her that he “might have to file a complaint against you for
housing discrimination.”
D. The attorney tells Washington that his clients
will not rent him another unit because he is a “problem
tenant”
Less than an hour after Washington’s email threatening
litigation, attorney Charlie Stein emailed Washington to tell him
that he represents the Hakims and the property managers, and
that Washington should direct further communications to his
office. Stein went on to tell Washington that his clients are “not
required to show you that unit nor rent it to you as long as their
decision to refuse to do so is not for a discriminatory reason,” and
provided two nondiscriminatory reasons for his clients’ decision:
(1) the building’s general policy to relocate tenants only when
necessary due to habitability concerns or reasonable
accommodation requests; and (2) Washington’s “litigious
nature”—evidenced by his “decision to subpoena records” and his
other “false allegations”—which rendered him a “problem tenant”
who would not have received a recommendation from a prior
landlord and therefore “would have been initially rejected.”
Washington responded to each of Stein’s points line-by-line.
In response to Stein’s instruction to direct further

4
communications to his office, Washington said: “I only ‘have to’
speak to you if we are in or anticipating litigation. Are we?” In
response to Stein’s explanation that Washington was a “litigious”
and “problem tenant,” Washington said: “Is this (ironically) an
invitation to litigate? . . . I would be under obligation to bring an
action against you if you were to publish such a falsehood without
factual support.” And in response to Stein’s conclusion that
Washington’s “request to move into another unit in the property
is hereby denied,” Washington said: “I never made a request. I
made a complaint for housing discrimination to LAHD.”
Less than an hour later, Washington sent Owens another
email, saying: “Are you going to show me the property? Yes or
no? If no, why?”
Stein then told Washington that while he was free to file
“whatever complaint [he wants] to LAHD,” LAHD would
“investigate and determine that no such claim is supported by
fact.” He reiterated: “My client will not grant you a tour of
another unit nor will they be accepting your application to move
into any other unit in your current property or any other property
that they manage.”
In response, Washington—who is a lawyer—replied, “I
think we must discuss the possibility of a lawsuit against you for
defamation and a lawsuit against your clients for housing
discrimination.” He invited Stein “to meet and confer with my
attorney (me as attorney and not a tenant)” and signed the email
“Earl, a tenant.”
Stein sent one final email, telling Washington: “Should you
decide to bring action against me or my client, we will countersue
and bring appropriate action against you.” He wished

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Washington “the best of luck on [his] housing search for a unit
elsewhere.”
II. Procedural Background
A. Plaintiffs add the new owners, the new property
management company, and their attorneys to their
ongoing lawsuit
On September 9, 2024, plaintiffs amended their complaint
in the lawsuit for the fourth time, now alleging a total of 14
claims against the prior defendants plus the Hakims, two of their
LLCs, Quantumprime, Eliopoulos, Stein and Stein’s law firm.2
Against Stein and Stein’s law firm, plaintiffs alleged claims
for (1) harassment by a landlord under Civil Code section 1940.2;
(2) violation of Tenant Anti-Harassment Ordinance No. 187109;
(3) intentional infliction of emotional distress; (4) negligence; (5)
violation of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (Civ. Code, §§ 51, 51.5, &
52); (6) violation of the Fair Employment and Housing Act
(FEHA) (Gov. Code, § 12920 et seq.); and (7) violation of the
Unfair Competition Law (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.).
Plaintiffs’ sole factual allegations against Stein and the
firm pertain to the emails Stein sent Washington on behalf of
Stein’s clients in November 2023.
B. The trial court grants the attorney-defendants’
anti-SLAPP motion
Stein and the firm filed a special motion to strike pursuant
to the anti-SLAPP statute. Specifically, they argued that

2 The two LLCs were 3 Shadows, LLC and Hakim Holdings,
LLC. Stein’s firm was Davidovich Stein Law Group, LLP at the
time, but has subsequently changed its name to Davidovich Stone
Law Group, LLP.

6
plaintiffs’ claims against them relied entirely on protected
activity (namely, attorney communications on behalf of a client),
and that plaintiffs did not have a probability of prevailing
because the litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47) barred those
claims.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion. Specifically, they argued
that the gravamen of their claims related to Stein and his firm’s
unprotected activity of “aiding and inciting others to
discriminate,” and that plaintiffs were likely to prevail both
because the litigation privilege does not apply to communications
not relating to any pending or imminent litigation and because
the more specific provisions of the Unruh Civil Rights Act, FEHA,
and the Unfair Competition Law supersede the privilege.
After a full round of briefing and a hearing, the trial court
granted Stein and his firm’s anti-SLAPP motion on December 9,
2024 and awarded $12,800 in attorney fees pursuant to section
425.16, subdivision (c).
C. Plaintiffs appeal
Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
The anti-SLAPP statute “provides a procedure for weeding
out, at an early stage, meritless claims arising from protected
activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384, italics
omitted.) Specifically, the anti-SLAPP statute protects—and
thus “subject[s] to a special motion to strike”—any “cause of
action . . . arising from any act of [a] person in furtherance of the
person’s right of petition or free speech under the United States
Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a
public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) When a party moves to
strike a cause of action under the anti-SLAPP statute, a trial

7
court has two tasks. (Barry v. State Bar of California (2017) 2
Cal.5th 318, 321.) First, the court must evaluate whether the
moving party has “made a threshold showing that the challenged
cause of action arises from protected activity.” (Rusheen v. Cohen
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 1048, 1056.) Second, and only if the moving
party has made this threshold showing, the court must examine
whether the nonmoving party has “established . . . a probability
that [it] will prevail” on the challenged causes of action. (§
425.16, subd. (b)(1); Peregrine Funding, Inc. v. Sheppard Mullin
Richter & Hampton LLP (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 658, 669.) We
review de novo the trial court’s resolution of each question. (Abir
Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v. Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882,
887.)
I. Plaintiffs’ Claims Arise From Protected Activity
A cause of action “aris[es] from” protected activity when the
“cause of action itself” is “based on” “protected activity.” (City of
Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69, 78, first italics added;
see Briggs v. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19
Cal.4th 1106, 1114 [“arise[s] from” means “based upon”].)
Whether a cause of action is “based upon” protected activity turns
on whether its “‘“principal thrust or gravamen”’” is protected
activity—that is, whether the “‘core injury-producing conduct’”
warranting relief under that cause of action is protected activity
(Colyear v. Rolling Hills Community Assn. of Ranco Palos Verdes
(2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 119, 134, italics omitted); what matters is
the “actual activit[y]” giving rise to the claim, not the “label[]” of
the cause of action. (Contreras v. Dowling (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th
394, 410 (Contreras).) “[W]hether [activity] is protected under
the anti-SLAPP statute” turns “not [on] First Amendment law,
but [rather on] the statutory definitions in section 425.16,

8
subdivision (e).” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th
409, 422.) Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16, subdivision (e)
defines four categories of protected activity. Two are pertinent
here—namely, (1) “any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other
official proceeding authorized by law,” and (2) “any written or
oral statement or writing made in connection with an issue under
consideration or review by a legislative, executive, or judicial
body, or any other official proceeding authorized by law.” (§
425.16, subds. (e)(1) & (2).) Communications by attorneys
representing clients in pending or anticipated litigation,
including litigation before administrative tribunals—fall within
these categories of protected activity. (Nirschl v. Schiller (2023)
91 Cal.App.5th 386, 402; Briggs, at p. 1115.)
Plaintiffs’ claims against Stein and the firm are all based
on protected activity. The core-injuring conduct underlying all of
those claims are the emails that Stein sent Washington after
Washington threatened to sue Stein’s clients. Those emails are
protected activity within the meaning of the anti-SLAPP statute
because all of those emails were sent under the looming shadow
of Washington’s repeated threats of litigation. Before Stein sent
his first email to Washington, (1) Washington had sued the prior
landlord and its property manager, (2) Washington threatened
Owens that he would “add” the failure of Stein’s clients to show
him an apartment “as harassment and discrimination,” (3)
Washington informed Owens that she was “not allowed to
discriminate on the basis of race or other protected status” and
that there was “no rule that a current tenant cannot respond to
[a] public ad for let of a unit,” and (4) Washington threatened to
“file a complaint against [Quantumprime] for housing

9
discrimination.” And after Stein sent his first email, Washington
continued to threaten litigation by (1) sarcastically asking
whether Stein’s responsive email was “an invitation to litigate”
and (2) reporting that he “made a complaint for housing
discrimination to LAHD.”
Plaintiffs resist this conclusion with what boil down to four
arguments.
First, plaintiffs argue the conduct of Stein and his firm
loses its status as protected activity under the anti-SLAPP
statute because plaintiffs have alleged that Stein and his firm are
in cahoots with their clients to “prevent [plaintiffs] from
participating in housing opportunities.” We reject this argument
because plaintiffs offer nothing but allegations of conspiracy and
aiding and abetting, which is not enough to deprive the pre-
litigating conduct of Stein and his firm of its status as protected
activity. (Contreras, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 413 [“Conclusory
allegations of conspiracy or aiding and abetting do not deprive [a
moving party’s] actions of their protected status”].)
Second, plaintiffs offer two reasons why Stein’s emails were
not made in anticipation of litigation (and hence are not
“protected activity”). To begin, plaintiffs assert that Stein’s
emails are not related to anticipated litigation because Stein and
his clients were not planning to sue. We reject this argument
because what matters is whether an attorney’s communication
occurred under the shadow of anticipated litigation—regardless
of who is casting that shadow by anticipating suit. (See
California Physicians’ Service v. Superior Court (1992) 9
Cal.App.4th 1321, 1330 [defensive actions taken in response to
litigation are protected by the litigation privilege; thus, a party’s
act in filing an answer is protected by the litigation privilege].)

10
Plaintiffs next assert that even they were not anticipating
litigation because Washington’s repeated threats to “add” Stein’s
clients to the ongoing litigation, reminding them what the law
requires, and stating that he would “file a complaint against
[Quantumprime] for housing discrimination” were not “serious.”
Although a prelitigation communication constitutes protected
activity only if it relates to litigation that is “contemplated in
good faith and under serious consideration” (Action Apartment
Assn., Inc. v. City of Santa Monica (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1232, 1251
(Action Apartment)), we reject Washington’s efforts to downplay
the plain and inexorable import of his own words: His threats of
litigation were serious because Washington is a lawyer who had,
while representing himself, already sued his prior landlord and,
indeed, went on to sue the very people—Stein’s clients and Stein
himself—that he now says he did not seriously intend to sue.
Third, plaintiffs argue that the conduct of Stein and his
firm are “unlawful acts,” and hence cannot be protected activity
under the anti-SLAPP statute. Conduct does not fall outside the
definition of protected activity merely because it is alleged to be
unlawful; to be exempt from the anti-SLAPP statute, the conduct
must be criminal and that criminality must be either conceded by
the defendants or conclusively established as a matter of law.
(Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39 Cal.4th 299, 320.) Plaintiffs have
done no more than allege that Stein and his clients have engaged
unlawful acts in violation of statutory and tort law. (Kashian v.
Harriman (2002) 98 Cal.App.4th 892, 910-911 [“conduct that
would otherwise come within the scope of the anti-SLAPP statute
does not lose its coverage . . . simply because it is alleged to have
been unlawful”].)
Fourth and finally, plaintiffs argue that the trial court’s

11
conclusion that Stein’s responsive emails were protected activity
rested on the erroneous premise that Washington had already
sued Stein’s clients. We need not consider this argument because
our task when engaging in de novo review is to “‘review[] the trial
court’s ruling, not its rationale,’” so any error in the trial court’s
reasoning is irrelevant. (Stockton Mortgage, Inc. v. Tope (2014)
233 Cal.App.4th 437, 446.)
II. Plaintiffs’ Claims Lack Minimal Merit
Once a moving party establishes that a plaintiff’s cause(s)
of action are based upon activity protected by the anti-SLAPP
statute, the nonmoving party must then “establish[] . . . a
probability that [it] will prevail” on those cause(s) of action; it
does so by showing that those cause(s) of action have “minimal
merit”—that is, by showing that the complaint is legally
sufficient and by adducing evidence that, if credited, makes a
“prima facie factual showing sufficient to sustain a favorable
judgment.” (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 94; Baral v.
Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384-385; Finton Construction Inc. v.
Bidna & Keys, APLC (2015) 238 Cal.App.4th 200, 211; § 425.16,
subd. (b)(1).) This is an “evidentiary motion”; allegations alone
do not suffice. (Contreras, supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 416.)
Plaintiffs level what reduce down to six causes of action
against Stein and the firm: (1) intentional infliction of emotional
distress, (2) negligence, (3) tenant harassment (under both the
Civil Code and the Los Angeles Municipal Code), (4) housing
discrimination (under both the Unruh Civil Rights Act and
FEHA), (5) tenant retaliation (under FEHA), and (6) violation of
the Unfair Competition Law (based on the alleged violations of
the Unruh Civil Rights Act and FEHA). Plaintiffs cannot carry
their burden of showing a probability of prevailing on any of

12
these claims. The sole evidence plaintiffs submit in support of
their claims against Stein and the firm are the emails Stein sent
to Washington.
California’s litigation privilege (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b))
bars any claim based on any communication “(1) made in judicial
or quasi-judicial proceedings[, which includes administrative
proceedings]; (2) by litigants or other participants authorized by
law; (3) to achieve the objects of the litigation; and (4) that [has]
some connection or logical relation to the action.” (Silberg v.
Anderson (1990) 50 Cal.3d 205, 216; Ribas v. Clark (1985) 38
Cal.3d 355, 364-365 [though originating with tort actions, the
litigation privilege is “no less relevant” to statutory claims]; Wise
v. Thrifty Payless, Inc. (2000) 83 Cal.App.4th 1296, 1303 [“The
litigation privilege . . . encompasses actions by administrative
bodies and quasi-judicial proceedings”].) The litigation privilege
extends to communications made before judicial proceedings are
initiated, including “letters to opposing counsel,” as long as those
communications bear “some relation” to litigation “contemplated
in good faith and under serious consideration.” (Contreras,
supra, 5 Cal.App.5th at p. 415; Action Apartment, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 1251; Rubin v. Green (1993) 4 Cal.4th 1187, 1193-
1194.) “‘“Any doubt about whether the privilege applies is
resolved in favor of applying it.’”” (Contreras, at p. 415.) Because
Stein’s emails constitute communications on behalf of his clients
made in direct response to Washington’s threats to sue Stein’s
clients for housing discrimination, and because the content of the
emails—Stein’s rebuttal to Washington’s accusations—are
directly related to that threatened litigation, the litigation
privilege applies and bars plaintiffs’ claims. Indeed, the litigation
privilege “cover[s] precisely the type of communications at issue

13
here.” (Ibid.; see Rubin, at pp. 1194-1195 [collecting cases]; see
generally Osborne v. Pleasanton Automotive Co., LP (2024) 106
Cal.App.5th 361, 382-394 [applicability of the litigation
privilege’s bar means a claim lacks minimal merit].)
Plaintiffs resist this conclusion with two categories of
arguments.
First, plaintiffs again assert that Stein’s communications
were not made in the shadow of anticipated litigation. We reject
that argument for the reasons stated above.
Second, plaintiffs argue that the litigation privilege does
not bar their statutory claims (namely, their claims under Civil
Code section 1940.2, the Los Angeles Municipal Code, the Unruh
Civil Rights Act, FEHA, or the Unfair Competition Law) because
those statutes supersede Civil Code section 47.
This argument only affects a subset of plaintiffs’ claims. It
does not apply to plaintiffs’ claims for negligence or intentional
infliction of emotional distress, both of which are tort claims and
thus remain barred by the litigation privilege. It does not apply
to plaintiffs’ claim for violation of the Los Angeles Municipal
Code, which is a local law preempted by the litigation privilege
enacted by our state Legislature. (Action Apartment, supra, 41
Cal.4th at p. 1242.) And it does not save plaintiffs’ claim for
violation of Civil Code section 1940.2, which regulates the
conduct of “landlords” (Civ. Code, § 1940.2, subd. (a)) and does
not impose liability on a landlord’s agent, which is at best what
the emails establish Stein and his firm to be.
As to plaintiffs’ remaining claims (under the Unruh Civil
Rights Act, FEHA, and the Unfair Competition Law), plaintiffs’
argument fails on its merits. To be sure, the litigation privilege
will not bar liability imposed by a different state statute if

14
applying the privilege would ““‘effectively immunize conduct that
the [other statute] prohibits’” . . . thereby encouraging, rather
than suppressing “‘the mischief at which it was directed.’”’”
(Winslett v. 1811 27th Ave., LLC (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 239, 254-
255.) On this basis, courts have held the litigation privilege does
not bar statutory claims for retaliatory eviction (ibid.), litigation
abuse by debt collectors (Komarova v. National Credit
Acceptance, Inc. (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 324, 340), or crimes
premised on certain attorney conduct (Action Apartment, supra,
41 Cal.4th at p. 1246). However, in each instance, the courts
determined that the litigation privilege yielded to the other
statute because that statute “regulate[d] conduct occurring in
legal proceedings” and “would be significantly or wholly
inoperable if [their] enforcement were barred when in conflict
with the [litigation] privilege.” (Ibid.; People v. Potter Handy,
LLP (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 938, 945, 949; Bassi v. Bassi (2024)
101 Cal.App.5th 1080, 1102-1103.) Applying the litigation
privilege to conduct regulated by the Unruh Civil Rights Act,
FEHA, or the Unfair Competition Law carries no such risk. The
statutes prohibiting housing discrimination and retaliation do
not premise liability on litigation-related activity, and there is no
indication that the Legislature intended them to fall outside the
litigation privilege’s ambit or that requiring a plaintiff to support
their claims with non-litigation-related activity would gut those
statutes’ purposes. (See Cabral v. Martins (2009) 177
Cal.App.4th 471, 488-489 [rejecting argument that a statutory
claim against an attorney for revising client’s will to avoid child
support obligations supersedes the litigation privilege because
the child support evasion statute is not specifically aimed at
attorney conduct].) Plaintiffs can still prosecute their claims

15
against the landlords based on the landlords’ refusal to lease a
new unit to them; they just cannot seek redress against the
landlord’s attorneys for the mere act of communicating the
landlord’s position in response to threatened litigation.
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Stein and his firm are entitled to
their costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS.

______________________, P.J.
HOFFSTADT
We concur:

_________________________, J.
MOOR

_________________________, J.
KIM (D.)

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