People v. Lopez CA4/2

CourtListener 10751624CalctappDec 10, 2025

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Filed 12/10/25 P. v. Lopez CA4/2
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE,

Plaintiff and Respondent, E081552

v. (Super.Ct.No. FSB1400030)

JOSE MARTIN LOPEZ, OPINION

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from the Superior Court of San Bernardino County. Ronald M.

Christianson, Judge. Affirmed and remanded with directions.

Joshua L. Siegel, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and

Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney

General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Arlene A. Sevidal, James M.

Toohey and Jon S. Tangonan, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

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In 2016, Jose Martin Lopez pled guilty to one count of attempted murder and

admitted that he personally and intentionally discharged a firearm in the commission of

the offense. (Pen. Code, §§ 187, 664, 12022.53, subd. (c); unlabeled statutory references

are to this code.) In 2022, Lopez filed a petition to vacate his attempted murder

conviction under section 1172.6. Relying on the testimony presented at the preliminary

hearing and Lopez’s admission of the firearm discharge enhancement, the trial court

summarily denied the petition on the ground that Lopez was the direct perpetrator.

On appeal, Lopez argued that the trial court erred by making an impermissible

credibility determination about the preliminary hearing testimony and by misconstruing

the legal import of the firearm enhancement. In a prior unpublished opinion, we agreed

and concluded that Lopez’s petition sufficiently alleged a prima facie case for relief and

that the record of conviction did not contain facts refuting the allegations. We

consequently reversed the order denying the petition and remanded with directions to

issue an order to show cause.

The Supreme Court granted review, vacated our prior opinion, and transferred the

matter back to us with directions to reconsider the matter in light of People v. Patton

(2025) 17 Cal.5th 549 (Patton). Patton held that in determining whether a petitioner has

demonstrated prima facie entitlement to resentencing relief under section 1172.6, a court

may “rely on unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing

transcript to refute conclusory, checkbox allegations.” (Patton, at p. 564.)

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Lopez now argues that even though the trial court could consider the preliminary

hearing transcript at the prima facie stage, (1) the trial court still could not rely on hearsay

evidence admitted at that hearing, and (2) the nonhearsay evidence does not establish that

he was the sole and direct perpetrator of the shooting. We disagree on the second point,

which is dispositive. The admissible evidence shows that Lopez was prosecuted and

convicted on the still-valid theory that he was the sole perpetrator of the attempted

murder. But we grant Lopez’s request to remand the matter with directions to allow him

to file an amended petition in light of Patton.

BACKGROUND

In 2016, the San Bernardino County District Attorney charged Lopez by amended

information with the premeditated attempted murder of Kent Patrick Hay on New Year’s

Eve in 2013. (§§ 664, 187, subd. (a).) The information also alleged that Lopez

committed one count of shooting from a motor vehicle (§ 26100), along with three

firearm enhancements as to both counts—personal use of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd.

(b)), personal and intentional discharge of a firearm (§ 12022.53, subd. (c)), and personal

and intentional discharge of a firearm causing great bodily injury (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)).

At the preliminary hearing, four police officers testified for the People. No

witnesses testified for the defense. Officer Michele Mahan spoke with Kent in the

hospital one week after the shooting. Kent was hooked up to various machines and had a

tracheotomy but was able to speak. He described what happened on New Year’s Eve in

2013 as follows: As he and his brother, Kevin B., were walking in a grocery store

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parking lot toward the store entrance, the driver of a fancy red truck stopped and yelled

something at them. Neither brother responded. The brothers went inside the store, exited

about five minutes later, and walked to Kent’s car. As they were entering the vehicle, the

same red truck pulled up, and the driver yelled something at them; Kevin responded that

they did not want any trouble. While Kent was standing next to the open driver’s side

door, he heard a gunshot and felt something strike the side of his face. He saw the driver

of the truck and did not know him. Another officer testified about the extent of the

injuries that Kent had sustained from the gunshot wound, as reported to the officer by

Kent several months after the shooting.

Officer Shaun Sandoval was the first officer to arrive at the scene. When

Sandoval arrived, Kent was “extremely distraught,” and Kevin was standing at his side.

When Sandoval first arrived, he attempted to talk to Kevin, but Kevin was too “distraught

at that exact moment.” Sandoval subsequently spoke with Kevin after Kent received

medical attention.

According to Kevin, he and Kent walked in front of a red SUV in the parking lot

while heading toward a grocery store entrance. The driver of the SUV said “East Side”

to them, and Kevin and Kent continued into the grocery store and were inside for about

five minutes. After leaving the store, Kent and Kevin went to their car in the parking lot.

As Kent was attempting to enter the driver’s side front door and Kevin stood at the front

passenger door, a red SUV pulled up behind Kent. Kevin said that the driver was the

only person inside the SUV. Kevin heard a single gunshot and saw the red SUV speed

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out of the parking lot. He described the vehicle as a red SUV with a black roof and large

black rims. Kevin saw the driver but did not recognize him. Kevin said that the driver

was a Hispanic adult male and was wearing a light grey sweatshirt.

Sandoval also spoke with two eyewitnesses who were in the parking lot. Both

described hearing a gunshot and seeing a red SUV leave the lot at high speed

immediately after the shot.

Sandoval was advised of a nearby traffic stop involving a potential suspect, so he

took Kevin and the two eyewitnesses to the scene of the traffic stop to conduct an in-field

identification. The traffic stop was approximately three miles away from the grocery

store. All three witnesses identified the vehicle as the one that they had observed in the

grocery store parking lot. Kevin identified the driver of the vehicle, saying “Yeah, that’s

him.”

Officer Martin Hysen testified about the SUV involved in the traffic stop. When

Hysen arrived at the scene of the traffic stop, he saw a “reddish color SUV with large

black rims,” and the suspect was removed from the SUV. Hysen identified Lopez as the

person who had been removed from the SUV. Hysen searched the SUV and found a

nine-millimeter shell casing on the front passenger’s seat and a nine-millimeter handgun

in an open, unzipped backpack behind the driver’s seat. The handgun and the shell

casing matched.

While jury selection was underway, Lopez pled guilty to attempted murder

without premeditation and to the firearm discharge enhancement under section 12022.53,

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subdivision (c). He was sentenced to the agreed term of 29 years in state prison. The

parties stipulated that the preliminary hearing transcript provided a factual basis for the

plea.

In 2022, Lopez filed a form petition to vacate his attempted murder conviction

under section 1172.6.1 Lopez checked boxes next to statements asserting that (1) an

information had been filed against him that allowed the prosecution to try him for

attempted murder under the natural and probable consequences doctrine; (2) he accepted

a plea offer in lieu of a trial at which he could have been convicted of attempted murder;

and (3) he could not presently be convicted of attempted murder because of changes to

accomplice liability for murder made by Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.)

(Senate Bill 1437). Lopez did not offer any additional facts in support of those

statements.

The People opposed the petition on the ground that the record of conviction

demonstrated that Lopez was the direct perpetrator and was therefore ineligible for relief,

because he could be convicted of attempted murder under a still-valid theory of liability.

They argued that the evidence presented at the preliminary hearing and Lopez’s

admission of the firearm discharge enhancement established that he “was convicted as the

actual killer” and not under any theory of accomplice liability.

At the hearing, the court asked Lopez’s appointed counsel whether she planned to

respond to the People’s opposition, and counsel replied that she was submitting on the

1 The form petition erroneously cites section 1172.7, but the substance of the
petition makes clear that it seeks relief under section 1172.6.

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petition. The court took the matter under submission and issued its ruling at a subsequent

hearing. The court summarized the officers’ testimony from the preliminary hearing and

concluded that the testimony established that Lopez “was prosecuted solely on the theory

that he was the actual shooter in the attempted murder.” The court further concluded that

the firearm discharge enhancement “coincide[d] with that theory.” On the basis of those

conclusions, the court determined that Lopez failed to make a prima facie case for relief

and summarily denied the petition.

DISCUSSION

In his supplemental brief following transfer from the Supreme Court, Lopez

argues that the trial court’s ruling was erroneous because he sufficiently alleged a case for

relief and the record of conviction does not contain facts refuting the allegations of his

petition. In particular, he contends that the trial court could not rely on hearsay evidence

from the preliminary hearing and that the admissible evidence from that hearing, along

with the remainder of the record of conviction, does not refute his prima facie showing of

entitlement to relief.2 We are not persuaded.

Senate Bill 1437 amended section 188 to provide that “[m]alice shall not be

imputed to a person based solely on his or her participation in a crime.” (§ 188, subd.

(a)(3).) One consequence of that amendment is that the natural and probable

consequences doctrine has been eliminated as a theory of liability for attempted murder.

2 Lopez also argues that Patton was wrongly decided. We are bound by Supreme
Court precedent and must therefore reject that argument. (Auto Equity Sales, Inc. v.
Superior Court (1962) 57 Cal.2d 450, 455.)

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(People v. Muhammad (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 268, 275.)

Section 1172.6 provides a procedural mechanism for retroactive application of the

amended law to defendants who were convicted of attempted murder under prior law.

(§ 1172.6.) The process begins with the filing of a petition and declaration stating that

the petitioner meets the following requirements: “First, the charging document allowed

the prosecution to ‘proceed under a theory of . . . attempted murder under the natural and

probable consequences doctrine.’ ([§ 1172.6], subd. (a)(1).) Second, petitioner was

convicted of the attempted murder charge or accepted a plea offer in lieu of trial on such

a charge. (Id., subd. (a)(2).) And third, ‘petitioner could not be presently convicted’ of

the charge, given the changes to homicide law effective in 2019. (Id., subd. (a)(3).)”

(Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 558.)

After allowing the parties to file opposition and reply briefs, the trial court

determines whether the petitioner has made a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief.

(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) In general, the court must assume the truth of the petition’s

allegations unless they are refuted by facts reflected in the record of conviction. (People

v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 971.) Patton further held that if a petition is supported

only by “conclusory, checkbox allegations” and the preliminary hearing transcript

contains “unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts,” then the petition may be denied on that

basis at the prima facie stage. (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 564.)

“If the ‘petitioner makes a prima facie showing,’ then the trial court issues an

order to show cause and holds ‘a hearing to determine whether to vacate the . . .

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conviction and to recall the sentence and resentence the petitioner.’ ([§ 1172.6], subds.

(c), (d)(1).) At this hearing, evidence may be presented and ‘the burden of proof shall be

on the prosecution to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of . . .

attempted murder under’ current law.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 559; § 1172.6,

subd. (d)(3) (section 1172.6(d)(3)).) The admission of evidence at that hearing “shall be

governed by the Evidence Code, except that the court may consider evidence previously

admitted at any prior hearing or trial that is admissible under current law, including

witness testimony, stipulated evidence, and matters judicially noticed.” (§ 1172.6(d)(3).)

“However, hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary hearing pursuant to

subdivision (b) of Section 872 [of the Penal Code] shall be excluded from the hearing as

hearsay, unless the evidence is admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay

rule.” (Ibid.) Subdivision (b) of section 872 (section 872(b)) permits certain law

enforcement officers to testify at a preliminary hearing to “the statements of declarants

made out of court offered for the truth of the matter asserted.”

Whether the record of conviction demonstrates that a petitioner is ineligible for

relief “‘is a purely legal conclusion, which we review de novo.’” (People v. Ervin (2021)

72 Cal.App.5th 90, 99, 101.)

Lopez has failed to make a prima facie showing of entitlement to relief under

section 1172.6. Like the petitioner in Patton, Lopez filed a petition for resentencing

under section 1172.6 “[o]n a preprinted form” in which “ he checked boxes next to

statements indicating that he met the statutory conditions for relief found in section

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1172.6, subdivision (a)(1) through (a)(3) and that he wanted court-appointed counsel to

represent him.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 559.) And he “offered no specific facts

in support of these statements.” (Ibid.) The trial court therefore could “rely on

unchallenged, relief-foreclosing facts within a preliminary hearing transcript to refute

[those] conclusory, checkbox allegations.” (Id. at p. 564.)

Lopez argues that “section 1172.6’s limitation on considering hearsay admitted at

the preliminary hearing under section 872, subdivision (b), at an evidentiary hearing also

applies at the prima facie review stage.” The People disagree. Patton did not address the

issue, because the appellate court had disregarded any testimony admitted under section

872(b). (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 557 & fn. 2.) We also need not resolve the issue.

We assume for the sake of argument that the limitation applicable at the

evidentiary hearing on the consideration of hearsay evidence admitted under section

872(b) at the preliminary hearing also applies to consideration of such evidence at the

prima facie stage. We accordingly limit our discussion to the nonhearsay evidence

admitted at the preliminary hearing and any hearsay evidence admitted under section

872(b) that was “admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule.”

(§ 1172.6(d)(3).)

Hysen’s testimony about the scene of the traffic stop was based on his personal

observation and therefore was not hearsay admitted under section 872(b). (Evid. Code,

§ 702; People v. Veamatahau (2018) 24 Cal.App.5th 68, 73.) Likewise, Sandoval’s

description of the crime scene when he arrived, his conduct at the crime scene, and

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Mahan’s description of Kent’s condition in the hospital were based on the officers’

personal observation and thus also not hearsay. (Veamatahau, at p. 73.)

In contrast, Sandoval’s testimony about Kevin’s account of the shooting was

hearsay admitted under section 872(b). But that testimony was also admissible under the

spontaneous statement exception to the hearsay rule. (Evid. Code, § 1240.)

“Evidence of a statement is not made inadmissible by the hearsay rule if the

statement: [¶] (a) Purports to narrate, describe, or explain an act, condition, or event

perceived by the declarant; and [¶] (b) Was made spontaneously while the declarant was

under the stress of excitement caused by such perception.” (Evid. Code, § 1240.) “For

an out-of-court statement to fall within the spontaneous statement exception to the

hearsay rule, ‘“(1) there must be some occurrence startling enough to produce this

nervous excitement and render the utterance spontaneous and unreflecting; (2) the

utterance must have been before there has been time to contrive and misrepresent, i.e.,

while the nervous excitement may be supposed still to dominate and the reflective powers

to be yet in abeyance; and (3) the utterance must relate to the circumstance of the

occurrence preceding it.”’” (People v. Mataele (2022) 13 Cal.5th 372, 410 (Mataele).)

Statements elicited by law enforcement officers’ questions can still be spontaneous.

(People v. Alvarez (1996) 14 Cal.4th 155, 185-186; People v. Saracoglu (2007) 152

Cal.App.4th 1584, 1588-1590 (Saracoglu).) “‘The crucial element in determining

whether a declaration is sufficiently reliable to be admissible under this exception to the

hearsay rule is . . . the mental state of the speaker.’” (Mataele, at p. 411.)

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When Kent was shot, Kevin was standing near him, just on the other side of the

car. Kevin was too distraught to speak with Sandoval when Sandoval first arrived at the

scene, before Kent had received any medical attention. Sandoval then spoke with Kevin

after Kent received medical attention. The fact that Kevin was initially too distraught to

speak with Sandoval supports the inference that witnessing his brother get shot in the

head was “startling enough to produce [a] nervous excitement and render the utterance

spontaneous and unreflecting.” (Mataele, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p. 410.) The preliminary

hearing testimony does not specify how much time elapsed between Sandoval’s arrival

and Kevin’s statements to him. But given that Sandoval spoke with Kevin at the scene

after Kent received medical attention, not enough time had passed for Kevin to reflect

and deliberate and thus render the statements not spontaneous. (See Saracoglu, supra,

152 Cal.App.4th at p. 1589 [statements to officers made within 30 minutes of exciting

event spontaneous]; People v. Brown (2003) 31 Cal.4th 518, 541 [two and one-half

hours]; In re Emilye A. (1992) 9 Cal.App.4th 1695, 1713 [one to two days].) We

accordingly conclude that Kevin’s statements to Sandoval at the crime scene were

admissible as spontaneous declarations under Evidence Code section 1240. Sandoval’s

preliminary hearing testimony concerning those statements therefore satisfies the

requirements of section 1172.6(d)(3).

The admissible testimony of Hysen, Sandoval, and Mahan demonstrates that

Lopez was prosecuted solely on the theory that he was the actual shooter. Kevin told

Sandoval that the shooter was driving a red SUV with large black rims. Kevin said that

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the driver was the only person inside the SUV when Kent was shot. Hysen identified

Lopez as the person detained at a traffic stop of a reddish SUV with large black rims

about three miles away from the scene of the shooting. Hysen found a spent nine-

millimeter shell casing on the front passenger seat of the SUV and a matching nine-

millimeter handgun in an open backpack behind the driver’s seat. The evidence thus

establishes that the SUV at the traffic stop was the same SUV involved in the shooting

and that Lopez was the person who shot Kent. The record contains no evidence that there

was more than one participant in the crime. The record of conviction thus contains

undisputed evidence that Lopez was the sole and direct perpetrator of the shooting.

In addition, as the Supreme Court noted in Patton, Lopez’s admission of the

section 12022.53, subdivision (c), enhancement for intentional discharge of a firearm in

the commission of the attempted murder “tend[s] to corroborate this view.” (Patton,

supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 563.) Thus, the unchallenged, admissible evidence at the

preliminary hearing and the admission of the firearm enhancement together refute

Lopez’s conclusory, checkbox allegation in his section 1172.6 petition that he could not

be convicted under a now-valid theory of attempted murder liability, because he was

already convicted under a now-valid theory.

Lopez requests, however, that we grant him the same relief that the Supreme Court

granted in Patton, namely, that we give him the opportunity “to plead additional facts on

remand should we affirm.” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 569.) We grant the request

and accordingly “order a remand to the superior court with directions for that court to

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consider an amended petition should [Lopez], within 30 days of that remand, seek to file

one.” (Id. at pp. 569-570.)

DISPOSITION

The matter is remanded to the superior court with directions to give Lopez 30 days

to file an amended petition. The order denying Lopez’s petition is otherwise affirmed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

MENETREZ
J.

We concur:

RAMIREZ
P. J.

FIELDS
J.

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