In re David P. CA2/7

CourtListener 10750789CalctappDec 10, 2025

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Filed 12/10/25 In re David P. CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

In re DAVID P., a Person Coming B344203
Under the Juvenile Court Law.
(Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP00257A)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Respondent,

v.

F.P. et al.,

Appellants.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gabriela H. Shapiro, Juvenile Court
Referee. Affirmed.
Jill Smith, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant Mother.
Christine E. Johnson, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant Father.
Anuradha Khemka, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Appellant Minor.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and William D. Thetford, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
________________________

INTRODUCTION

Mother F.P., father G.M., and minor David M. appeal from
the juvenile court’s order terminating parental rights without a
bonding study to help the court determine whether the parental-
benefit exception applied.1 We conclude appellants have not met
their burden of demonstrating the juvenile court’s decision was
arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd; in other words, that the
court abused its discretion. Accordingly, we affirm.

1 G.M. and David joined F.P.’s argument on appeal that
F.P.’s parental rights should not have been terminated without a
bonding study. G.M. and David do not raise any other issues.
(See Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.200(a)(5) [“Instead of filing a
brief, or as part of its brief, a party may join in or adopt by
reference all or part of a brief in the same or a related appeal.”];
5.725(a)(1) [“[t]he court may not terminate the rights of only one
parent under section 366.26.”].) As a result, we focus on the facts
underlying the proceedings related to F.P.

2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Dependency Proceedings
F.P. and G.M. are the parents of David, born in 2022. On
January 23, 2023, when David was five months old, the
Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family Services
(Department) filed a petition pursuant to Welfare and
Institutions Code section 300, subdivisions (a) and (b).2 The
petition alleged the parents have a history of engaging in violent
altercations in David’s presence. On November 25, 2022, G.M.
hit F.P., pressed a gun to her body, and sexually assaulted her
while David was present. In August and September of 2022,
G.M. hit F.P., causing bruising and other injuries. G.M. also hit
F.P. on multiple other occasions while she was pregnant with
David. The petition further alleged G.M. has a history of
substance abuse and is a current abuser of methamphetamine
and marijuana. The petition alleged F.P. failed to protect David
from the domestic violence between G.M. and F.P. David was
detained from his parents’ custody and placed with a foster
family. F.P. received monitored visits four times a week for a
minimum of two hours and the Department was given discretion
to liberalize visits.
F.P. admitted to the Department’s investigator that “[a]ll of
this is true” and recounted the numerous episodes of domestic
violence that occurred between her and G.M. during their
relationship. She also confirmed she knew G.M. smoked crystal
methamphetamine and marijuana.

2 All section references are to the Welfare and Institutions
Code unless otherwise specified.

3
On March 10, 2023, the juvenile court sustained the
petition as alleged against G.M. and F.P. The court declared
David a dependent of the court pursuant to subdivisions (a) and
(b) of section 300 and removed him from the parents’ custody.
The court further ordered reunification services for both parents
and continued monitored visitation for F.P.
During the 18-month reunification period, F.P. consistently
visited David, as described below. F.P. initially complied
substantially with her court-ordered case plan, attending
31 domestic violence support group sessions (five more than
required), completing 42 individual therapy sessions, and testing
negative for all substances in January 2024.
Throughout the dependency proceedings, F.P. concealed
her ongoing relationship with G.M., who sometimes sat just
outside of the video frame during her telehealth counseling
sessions. F.P.’s individual therapy sessions were terminated in
June 2024 after three consecutive absences. F.P. understood
David was harmed by the domestic violence between her and
G.M. and obtained a six-month restraining order against G.M.
Her therapist, however, concluded F.P.’s “knowledge indicates
she intellectually understands domestic violence: however, her
complex trauma rooted on adverse childhood experiences impairs
client to develop healthy relationships. During the process of
supporting [F.P.] to process and heal complex trauma, the client
disclosed cognitive distortions about self and developing distorted
concepts about love and emotional connections. Emotionally and
psychologically, the client could not apply and process genuinely
the relationship with the father due to her cumulative trauma.”

4
F.P. and G.M. both admitted they continued their
relationship throughout the dependency proceedings. F.P.
relayed to the social worker that G.M. stabbed her in the thigh
with scissors in February 2024. She also admitted he comes to
her home “whenever he wants.” At various times, F.P. provided
the social worker with a number of videos and photographs of her
with G.M. in intimate settings with time stamps indicating they
were together during the reunification period. G.M. accused F.P.
of defaming him to his friends and family and arriving
unannounced at his places of employment.
The Department never liberalized F.P.’s visitation due to
her continued contact with G.M. The court found a substantial
risk of detriment to David if he was returned to F.P. at the six-
month, 12-month, and 18-month review hearings for this reason.
Aside from the initial detention, David resided with the
same caregivers throughout the proceedings. The Department
social workers regularly reported that David was well-cared for
and happy at the caregivers’ home. The caregivers ensured he
received proper medical and therapeutic services. When he
began to speak, he referred to both caregivers as “ma.” F.P.
affirmed her desire to reunify with David but stated that she
would like his caregivers to adopt David if she was unable to do
so. The caregivers expressed their desire to adopt David.

B. F.P.’s Visits with David
As stated, the juvenile court ordered the Department to
provide F.P. with monitored visits at least three times a week.
F.P. regularly visited with David and engaged well with him
throughout the dependency proceedings. In the jurisdiction
report, the Department did not report any missed or late visits.

5
In the six-month status review report, the Department’s social
worker observed F.P. engaged “fairly well” with one-year-old
David, and was prepared for visits by bringing suitable activities,
food, and a change of clothes and diapers for him. The
Department reported, “It was observed that the child has a bond
with their mother by evidence of the child going into the arms of
the mother upon arriving to the monitored family time.”
In the 12-month status review report, the Department
noted the visits with F.P. continued to go well but she visited
David four times and cancelled four times between September
2023 and November 2023. The caregivers cancelled twice during
this time period.
On April 8, 2024, one of the caregivers monitored a visit
between F.P. and David. She reported F.P.’s statements were
incoherent and her lips were white. The caregiver believed F.P.
was “under the influence.” F.P. claimed she was not feeling well
due to her medication. In a May 8, 2024 last minute information
filing, the Department reported the social worker “has observed
during the monitored visits, the child regresses developmentally
such as disengaged, limited to no verbal communication and
instead using gestures to communicate, lack eye contact, is
crying, hiding, but not limited to having a flat affect. Further,
per the caregivers, the child returns to the placement confused
and has a difficult time stabilizing emotionally.”
From May to August 2024, just before the 18-month review
hearing, F.P. visited with David nine times, but cancelled more
than 15 scheduled visits. When she visited, she was prepared
and engaged well with David, including during a three-hour visit
for his birthday. The social worker observed David had “limited
verbal contact with the mother” but “was receptive to engage

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with the mother” by making eye contact or holding F.P.’s hand.
During four visits in August, September, and October 2024, the
social worker observed David engaged with F.P. by holding out
his arms to be picked up, reciprocating hugs, and holding F.P.’s
hand. She played with him, changed his diaper, and fed him
during the visits.
During two six-hour-long visits with David in November
2024, F.P. displayed the same attentiveness and care as the other
visits. F.P. continued to have weekly visits with David in
December 2024 and January 2025. Although several visits were
cancelled due to the fires in Los Angeles, F.P. had four visits with
David in January 2025, just before the court terminated F.P.’s
parental rights. The Department’s human services aide reported,
“During the visits, the mother is nurturing, she plays with the
child, provides basic standards while the child is in her care. The
child is comfortable with the mother, he is receptive and playful.
The mother is good with the child, she plays with him. The child
does not verbalize with the mother, he is just playing with the
mother, the child is not physically engaging with the mother, as
soon as the child arrives to the visits, the child is eating and
playing, he is not in any stress with the mother, and there is no
physical attachment.”

C. Section 366.26 Proceedings
At the 18-month review hearing on August 22, 2024, the
trial court terminated reunification services for F.P. and G.M.
Although the court commended F.P.’s “ability to have good visits
with David because it does appear that mother comes prepared
and has good visits,” the court stated it believed the parents’
compliance with the case plan, “though technical, is not

7
substantive. And so the parents’ compliance is partial.” The
court set a hearing to select and implement a permanent plan
pursuant to section 366.26 for December 19, 2024.
In its subsequent section 366.26 report, the Department
noted F.P. initially visited David weekly but her visits recently
became “inconsistent and sporadic.” Notwithstanding her
continued attentiveness and care for David during their visits,
the Department’s social workers concluded that F.P.’s cancelled
and no-show visits disrupted David’s emotional regulation and
F.P.’s focus appeared to be on her needs rather than those of
David.
The Department conducted an analysis pursuant to In re
Caden C. to evaluate F.P.’s relationship with David.3 It
concluded, “The harm of severing the relationship with the
mother does not outweigh the security, finality, and sense of
belonging that adoption would provide.” “During monitored
visits, the child is receptive to the mother’s affection and
attention and expresses a generally positive affect. However,
despite these interactions, the child does not appear to have a
significant emotional attachment to the mother. While the child
may respond positively in the moment, there is no evidence of a
deep or lasting bond that would indicate a strong, positive
emotional attachment. This suggests that, while the child may
recognize the mother and respond to her affection, the
attachment is not as deep or secure as would be expected for a
primary caregiver.”

3 In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 630.

8
At the December 19, 2024 hearing, F.P.’s counsel requested
a bonding study, citing to David’s young age and the
demonstrated relationship between David and F.P. David’s
counsel did not oppose the request and G.M.’s counsel took no
position because G.M. was unavailable that day.
The court stated it did not believe a bonding study would be
beneficial in this case. It noted a parent is not entitled to a
bonding study. The court stated it could see “David is on the
mother’s lap. He seems happy. Mother is kissing him. . . . I
mean, what else is a bonding expert going to tell me.” The court
stated the bonding expert would need to spend much more than
just one session observing F.P.’s and David’s interactions and
that delay to permanence would not be in David’s best interest at
that juncture. The court further stated a bonding study should
have been requested earlier in the case. The court set a further
permanency hearing pursuant to section 366.26 for January 31,
2025, to allow the Department to conduct a Caden C. analysis as
to G.M. and to evaluate potential additional relatives for
placement.
After a short break in the proceedings for the juvenile court
to further consider the parties’ request for a bonding study, the
juvenile court denied the request, explaining it came “too late” in
the proceedings. The court reasoned, “[t]he court does not believe
that an expert observer or a psychologist who is observing one, or
even a few visits, would be able to provide the court with
sufficient information to change the court’s perception of the
evidence, or even add to the evidence for the court to make an
analysis. And the court recognizes that the court can only
consider the mother’s visitation in light of the visits that were
offered to the mother. But, again, being that the child is

9
nonverbal, I don’t believe that a bonding study would facilitate
the court in making any additional evidence clearer to the court
in making the .26 decisions.” F.P. filed a notice of appeal from
the December 19, 2024 order.
At the subsequent section 366.26 hearings on January 31
and February 13, 2025, David’s counsel moved for a continuance
and renewed a request for a bonding study. The court denied the
continuance and the request. The court stated the parties had an
opportunity to request a bonding study earlier in the proceedings
but did not. The court additionally noted the amount of
information it had due to the more than 18 months of monitored
visitation. The juvenile court then heard testimony from G.M.,
F.P., the Department social worker, and F.P.’s investigator, each
of whom testified regarding the quality and quantity of the
parents’ visits with David.
F.P. testified that she frequently visited David, who is
“always pointing at me. And he’s always happy. And he always
calls me mom, and hugs me.” She explained David did not want
to go home from visits at the beginning but F.P. worked to
transition him, letting him know it was time to go home and to
stop playing. She also tried to teach David numbers and words
during their visits.
F.P.’s investigator testified she observed a January 22,
2025 three-hour visit between F.P. and David. The investigator
reported F.P.’s visit went “really well” because F.P. was on time,
came prepared, was attentive to David’s needs, actively engaged
with him, and used the full three hours allotted to her. The
investigator agreed the visit she observed was similar to the
visits that were described in the Department’s reports. The
social worker testified she had an obligation to remain neutral

10
and provide factual observations in the reports. On cross-
examination, F.P.’s counsel and David’s counsel questioned the
social worker regarding certain discrepancies found in the
reports.
After testimony was concluded, the Department requested
the court terminate parental rights. The Department argued
F.P. lacked the requisite relationship with David because he did
not appear to experience separation anxiety when he was not
with F.P. This was shown by the ease with which David left
visits and his indifference when a visit did not occur. According
to the Department, this was evidence that David lacked a
substantial connection with F.P. The Department further
highlighted F.P.’s lack of credibility due to her hiding her
relationship with G.M. throughout the proceedings. The
Department then observed F.P. had previously accused the
maternal grandmother of physically and sexually abusing her,
yet asked that David be placed with the maternal grandmother
so that F.P. would have better access to David. According to the
Department, this demonstrated that F.P. was focused on her
needs rather than those of David.
David’s and F.P.’s counsel argued the beneficial parent-
child relationship exception applied to preclude adoption. (See
§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(1).) Both counsel argued the information
in the Department’s reports was biased and incomplete,
necessitating information from a neutral third party.4

4 On January 31, 2025, F.P. moved to relieve the social
worker assigned to the case. (See § 16513.5 [authorizing court to
remove social worker “if a preponderance of evidence shows that
a conflict of interest has occurred that would interfere with the

11
The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of F.P.
and G.M. and ordered adoption as David’s permanent plan. The
juvenile court found F.P. regularly visited David but had not
established a sufficient bond with him to warrant applying the
beneficial parental-benefit exception. According to the court, F.P.
did not show that terminating the relationship would be
detrimental to David as weighed against the benefit of adoption
to him. The juvenile court stated that when David returned to
the caretaker, he did not fuss and there was no indication that he
missed F.P. The court observed, “[T]he only evidence before the
court is that David enjoys the play time with [F.P.] and sees it as
fun.” This was insufficient to overcome adoption as the default
option, particularly when David had spent most of his life with
the foster parents.
F.P., G.M., and David timely appealed.

social worker’s ability to objectively carry out his or her duties”].)
F.P. alleged the social worker and David’s foster mother
“berated” her and accused her of bullying during a visit with
David on December 20, 2024. F.P. argued the social worker
mischaracterized the encounter in her report, and F.P. submitted
a recording of the interaction. The court denied the motion,
stating, among other things, that there was a failure of proof
because the purported evidence of bias submitted by mother was
an illegally-obtained recording in Spanish and the translation
was not certified. Appellants do not challenge this ruling on
appeal.

12
DISCUSSION

The sole issue on appeal is whether the trial court abused
its discretion when it denied the parties’ request for a bonding
study. We conclude the court acted within its discretion.

A. Governing Law and Standard of Review
A parent may avoid termination of parental rights by
proving, among other statutory exceptions, that the parental-
benefit exception applies. (See In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th
614, 630 (Caden C.).) “What it requires a parent to establish, by
a preponderance of the evidence, is that the parent has regularly
visited with the child, that the child would benefit from
continuing the relationship, and that terminating the
relationship would be detrimental to the child.” (Id. at p. 629.)
“[I]n assessing whether termination would be detrimental, the
trial court must decide whether the harm from severing the
child’s relationship with the parent outweighs the benefit to the
child of placement in a new adoptive home.” (Id. at p. 632.)
Because the court faces a “complex task” when determining
whether the parental-benefit exception applies, “courts should
seriously consider, where requested and appropriate, allowing for
a bonding study or other relevant expert testimony.” (Caden C.,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 633, fn. 4, 634; accord, In re P.S. (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 541, 555.) A party may request a bonding study
to be conducted at any time before or during the trial of an action
pursuant to Evidence Code section 730.5

5 Evidence Code section 730 provides in pertinent part:
“When it appears to the court, at any time before or during the

13
“To be clear, parents are not automatically entitled to the
appointment of a bonding expert under Evidence Code
section 730; a sufficient need for one must be shown.” (In re P.S.,
supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 559; accord, In re M.V. (2023)
87 Cal.App.5th 1155, 1179 [“‘[t]here is no requirement in
statutory or case law that a court must secure a bonding study as
a condition precedent’ to terminating parental rights”].) Thus,
“the denial of a belated request for [a bonding] study is fully
consistent with the scheme of the dependency statutes, and with
due process,” as such studies may delay permanency and require
a continuance of the section 366.26 permanency planning
hearing. (In re Richard C. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 1191, 1197
(Richard C.).) “[J]uvenile courts should consider the particular
circumstances of the family that will bear on how much time will
be needed to obtain a useful and informative study.” (In re P.S.,
at p. 558.)
The court’s power to appoint an expert under this statute is
discretionary and reviewed for abuse of discretion. (See In re
P.S., supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 553.) We will not disturb the
ruling unless we find the court exceeded the limits of discretion
by making an arbitrary, capricious, or patently absurd
determination. (See In re Aaron R. (2005) 130 Cal.App.4th 697,
705-706.)

trial of an action, that expert evidence is or may be required by
the court or by any party to the action, the court on its own
motion or on motion of any party may appoint one or more
experts to investigate, to render a report as may be ordered by
the court, and to testify as an expert at the trial of the action
relative to the fact or matter as to which the expert evidence is or
may be required.”

14
B. The Juvenile Court’s Denial of the Request for a Bonding
Study Made at the Section 366.26 Hearing Was Not
Arbitrary, Capricious or Patently Absurd
Here, the court denied the request for a bonding study
because it came “too late” in the proceedings and based on its
conclusion that a bonding study was unnecessary to help the
court in making its permanency findings. The court acted within
its discretion when it denied the bonding study.
We are persuaded by the reasoning in Richard C., supra,
68 Cal.App.4th at pages 1194 to 1195, which presented
substantially similar facts. Richard C. held the juvenile court did
not abuse its discretion when it denied a mother’s request for a
bonding study after the court had terminated reunification
services and after the agency had prepared a section 366.26
report, as this was “too late in the proceedings to be a necessary
part of the court’s efforts to develop a permanent plan for the
children.” (Id. at p. 1194.) Richard C. explained, when
reunification services have been terminated, “‘the focus shifts
from the parent’s interest in reunification to the child’s interest
in permanency and stability.’” (Id. at p. 1195.) Richard C.
reasoned that allowing bonding studies “after the termination of
reunification services would frequently require delays in
permanency planning,” and that the “Legislature did not
contemplate such last-minute efforts to put off permanent
placement.” (Id. at p. 1197.) Although “it is not beyond the
juvenile court’s discretion to order a bonding study late in the
process under compelling circumstances, the denial of a belated
request for such a study is fully consistent with the scheme of the
dependency statutes, and with due process.” (Ibid.)

15
Like the mother in Richard C., F.P. has similarly failed to
demonstrate the “compelling circumstances” that would warrant
a belated bonding study. F.P. requested a bonding study at the
December 19, 2024 hearing, after the juvenile court had
terminated reunification services on August 22, 2024, and after
the Department had issued its section 366.26 report addressing
the Caden C. factors as to F.P. The juvenile court was within its
discretion to determine the delay required in obtaining a bonding
study would adversely impact David’s interest in permanency
and stability.
Further, as stated, the juvenile court reasonably concluded
it had abundant other evidence to make its determination. It
heard testimony from F.P., G.M., the Department social worker,
and an investigator hired by F.P. Each witness generally
testified positively about F.P.’s visits with David, including that
she was prepared, interacted appropriately, and engaged with
David the entire time. The court also relied upon a record that
contained 18 months of visitation logs. The monitors gave
detailed, objective, and positive remarks about F.P.’s interactions
with David during visits. F.P.’s own investigator testified she
was unable to provide information that would differ from what
was documented in the visitation logs. There does not appear to
be anything in the record that suggests it was difficult for the
juvenile court to assess F.P.’s bond with David or that an expert’s
analysis was necessary under the circumstances presented. It
was within the court’s discretion to decide that a belated bonding
study was not needed for it to interpret the evidence, particularly
when weighed against the additional delay that would likely
result. (See Richard C., supra, 68 Cal.App.4th at p. 1195; In re
Lorenzo C. (1977) 54 Cal.App.4th 1330, 1341 [“The applicable

16
standard of review is whether, under all the evidence viewed in a
light most favorable to the juvenile court’s action, the juvenile
court could have reasonably refrained from ordering a bonding
study.”].)
We are not persuaded by F.P.’s argument that a bonding
study would not have resulted in any delay because the court set
further permanency hearings for January and February of 2025,
two months after F.P. made her initial request for a bonding
study. There is no indication a bonding study would have been
successfully completed within that time frame. When F.P. made
her request on December 19, 2024, she did not indicate she had a
person in mind for the bonding study, much less that that
person’s schedule would accommodate an expedited study. F.P.’s
own investigator viewed only one visit during that two-month
period. The juvenile court stated an expert would need to observe
more than one visit to complete a bonding study.
Nor are we persuaded by F.P.’s argument that the
Department presented a biased report of her visits with David,
necessitating an independent third party review. The juvenile
court rejected this argument at the contested section 366.26
hearing and in denying F.P.’s motion to disqualify the social
worker. The juvenile court was entitled to credit the social
worker’s testimony and determine she was credible. (See In re
Cole C. (2009) 174 Cal.App.4th 900, 918; In re Brequia Y. (1997)
57 Cal.App.4th 1060, 1068.) The social worker testified she was
required to and did present an impartial report. Moreover, the
Department’s reports included observations from multiple
monitors, and F.P. does not contend that all the monitors were
biased. Nor does F.P. dispute the monitors’ factual reports of her
visits with David, which included the date of occurrence, that

17
F.P. fed and played with David, and that David transitioned
easily when the visit was over.
We also reject F.P.’s argument that “[w]ithout the
assessment of a qualified professional, improper factors and
expectations were relied on, and the juvenile court was ‘reduced
to arbitrary decisions based upon [an] emotional response.’” The
purported improper factors cited by F.P. are those relied upon by
the Department, rather than the juvenile court. F.P. has not
demonstrated the court acted arbitrarily based on an emotional
response. Indeed, the juvenile court explained its reasons for the
permanency ruling. After reviewing the evidence before it and
the arguments of the parties, the court concluded that although
the record shows David enjoys playing with F.P. and “sees it as
fun,” terminating their relationship would not be detrimental to
David because David does not appear to miss F.P. when their
visits were skipped and he did not appear to be troubled when
the visits ended. The court reached this conclusion based on the
extensive evidence detailed in the Department’s reports, and by
observing their interaction during the hearings. As such, F.P.
does not show the juvenile court’s determination was arbitrary or
an emotional response, much less that a bonding study was
necessary to avoid an erroneous result. (See In re Angel B. (2002)
97 Cal.App.4th 454, 468 [affirming the juvenile court’s conclusion
that the parental-benefit exception did not apply where “there
was no hint in the record before the juvenile court that Angel
would be harmed in any way if her relatively brief, albeit happy,
visits with Mother were to end”].) In all events, F.P.’s sole
contention on appeal is that the juvenile court abused its
discretion when it rejected the requests for a bonding study. By
failing to address the Caden C. elements, F.P. has forfeited a

18
challenge to the court’s permanency ruling on the ground the
court relied on improper factors. (See In re J.F. (2019)
39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79 [an appellant’s failure to support an issue
with reasoned argument and citations forfeits the issue].)

DISPOSITION

The court’s order terminating parental rights is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J. FEUER, J.

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