People v. Webster CA4/1

CourtListener 10750784CalctappDec 10, 2025

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Filed 12/10/25 P. v. Webster CA4/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D084999

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCS326609)

FELIPE J. WEBSTER ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Maryann D’Addezio, Judge. Affirmed.
James R. Bostwick, Jr., under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney General, Eric C.
Swenson and Heather M. Clark, Deputy Attorneys General.
Following his guilty plea to battery on a peace officer (Pen. Code,1
§ 243, subd. (c)(2)), Felipe J. Webster appeals from the judgment. He
contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for pretrial mental
health diversion pursuant to section 1001.36.
We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion. The
evidence supports a finding that Webster would pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety if treated in the community within the meaning of
section 1001.36, subdivision (c)(4). Accordingly, we affirm the judgment.
I.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
In ruling on the motion for pretrial mental health diversion, the trial
court relied on the factual description contained in the police reports attached
to Webster’s motion. We accordingly look to those police reports in setting

forth the following summary of the relevant facts.2
A. The Incident on May 14, 2023
The incident that gave rise to Webster’s prosecution occurred on May
14, 2023. Webster and his girlfriend were loudly arguing outside their

1 Unless otherwise indicated, all further statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 In their respondent’s brief, the People cite extensively from the
reporter’s transcript of Webster’s preliminary hearing that occurred on July
17, 2023. However, the trial court did not have the testimony from the
preliminary hearing before it when it ruled on the motion for mental health
diversion. The preliminary hearing was presided over by a different trial
court judge, and no transcript from the preliminary hearing was introduced
during the proceedings on the motion for mental health diversion.
Accordingly, we do not rely on the reporter’s transcript from the preliminary
hearing when setting forth the relevant factual background or analyzing the
merits of Webster’s appeal.

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apartment, and the girlfriend then locked herself inside her car. Webster
used a knife to try to pry open the locked car door. One witness described the
knife as a “butter knife.” Another witness described it as “a knife used to cut
meat, like a butcher knife.”
A neighbor intervened to tell Webster to calm down because he was
scaring the neighbor’s family members. Webster reacted by yelling at the
neighbor and telling him to go back to Mexico. In response, the neighbor took
off his shirt to prepare to fight with Webster. The neighbor’s statement
explains what happened next. “While he was yelling at me, he still had the
butter knife in his hand. He then raised the knife to his chest as if he was
squaring up to fight with me. . . . During this, my wife came out and got in
between us to try and separate us. I was scared that he was going to stab my
wife, so I pushed her out of the way, and I continued toward the male and

threw a punch. He rushed towards me, and we both began fighting.”3
When a friend of the neighbor approached to break up the fight,
Webster ran at him with the knife and stabbed toward him in a downward
motion. The friend dodged the knife (which he described as a butcher knife),
but Webster punched him in the face. Next, the 15-year-old stepson of the
neighbor tried to intervene, and Webster punched him in the chest.
Webster eventually went back inside his apartment, from which he
continued to yell at his neighbors. Multiple police officers arrived and
attempted to contact Webster, but he would not leave his apartment.
Webster was very agitated and yelled at the officers. Among other things,

3 We note that although the neighbor was the witness who used the term
“butter knife,” he also said he was afraid Webster was going to “stab” his wife
with it. The neighbor’s fear that his wife would be stabbed suggests that the
knife was sharp and had the potential to be used as a dangerous weapon.

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Webster told the officers, “You can suck my f---ing d--k,” and threatened, “I’ve
got dogs too, if you guys want to try to come in. I’ve got a big ass dog.”
The police officers decided to detain Webster’s girlfriend because she
was moving in and out of the apartment, creating a safety issue. When one of
the officers moved to physically detain the girlfriend, Webster charged out of
his apartment toward the officer and yelled, “You’re going to get f---ing
dropped.” Webster inserted his thumb into the officer’s eye socket and
applied pressure, resulting in a subconjunctival hemorrhage that required
medical attention.
Other officers reacted by taking Webster to the ground. Webster
actively resisted the officers as they attempted to get him under control.
While resisting, Webster grabbed the baton of one of the officers. According
to that officer’s statement, “At some point as I held down Webster, I saw my
baton in Webster’s hand. It is unknown if it fell out of my baton holster or
Webster grabbed it. I put my knee on Webster’s hand to gain control of it and
physically pulled my baton away from him. I then threw my baton away
from Webster. Webster was handcuffed shortly after.” When Webster exited
his apartment, he let out his two pit bull dogs. One of the dogs bit down
aggressively on a police officer’s shoe, causing significant pain in the officer’s
foot.
B. Webster’s Motion For Pretrial Mental Health Diversion
An information was filed against Webster on July 31, 2023, charging
him with assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)); battery (§ 242);
resisting an officer (§ 69); and battery on a peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)).
On October 6, 2023, Webster filed a motion for pretrial mental health
diversion pursuant to section 1001.36. The motion sought mental health
diversion in two pending cases: (1) the instant case arising from the incident

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on May 14, 2023, and (2) another pending case in which Webster was charged
with a battery that occurred on June 23, 2023. The police report from the
June 23, 2023 incident describes an unprovoked physical attack by Webster
on the property manager at the same apartment complex where the earlier
incident occurred. Specifically, the apartment manager went to Webster’s
apartment to investigate reports of a loud and physical argument and
because she wanted to collect Webster’s overdue rent. Webster told her,
“ ‘[F]--ck off bitch we don’t have the money,’ ” and “ ‘[Y]ou can’t do sh-t about
this.’ ” When the property manager started to try to record the interaction,
Webster pushed her against the wall and punched her in the chest six or
seven times.
To support his motion, Webster attached police reports regarding the
two incidents, along with a psychologist’s evaluation dated September 8,
2023, and recent progress notes from Webster’s psychiatrist. Those
psychiatrist’s notes showed that changes were made to Webster’s psychiatric
medication following the May 14, 2023 incident and again following the June
23, 2023 incident. The psychologist’s report discussed the fact that Webster
had received mental health intervention “for the past 3 to 4 years” and
continued to participate in a county-run program.
In his evaluation, the psychologist concluded that Webster suffers from
several mental disorders, namely, bipolar I disorder, major depressive
disorder, posttraumatic stress disorder, and cannabis use disorder.
According to the psychologist, Webster’s mental disorders played a significant
role in the May 14, 2023 incident because “it appears that he experienced a
type of manic episode that caused him to act inappropriately.” The
psychologist further opined that Webster would be unlikely to pose a danger
to the community if granted mental health diversion because he “appears to

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be functioning in a stable and well directed fashion” and “indicates a desire to
participate meaningfully in his treatment program.”
The People opposed the motion for mental health diversion. Among
other things, the People contend that Webster did not meet the suitability
requirements for mental health diversion because “his current situation has
shown he will not respond adequately to treatment while remaining in the
public sector, and he poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety.”
As the People argued, “The facts show that [Webster] is consistently
dangerous, volatile, and reactive to his environment. If his cases were
diverted, [Webster] would be released into the same environment and
[Webster] would be back where he started. It is necessary that [Webster] be
placed into a controlled environment where his medication intake can be
monitored, he can physically attend therapy sessions, and his dangerous and
volatile aggression can be controlled.”
On November 1, 2023, the trial court held a hearing on Webster’s
motion. In the course of that hearing, Webster became agitated while the
trial court was explaining its preliminary thoughts, including the significance
of Webster’s use of a knife during the incident. Webster interrupted, “I’m
military trained. I don’t need a knife. I have military experience. I don’t
need a knife.” The trial court ignored the comment and continued speaking.
Webster again interrupted, stating, “There is laws and statutes that says I
was in the right,” and “That’s part of my mental disability.” Webster’s
remarks were apparently delivered in an agitated manner, as the bailiff
stated, “You need to calm down sir.”
The trial court immediately commented on Webster’s behavior in court
by stating, “And I have to say that the behavior here in court leaves the
Court even more concerned that when faced with information that he doesn’t

6
like or that is in any way critical of him, he gets extremely agitated.” Later
in the hearing, the trial court again commented on the significance of
Webster’s inappropriate in-court behavior: “And now even with a change in
medication, he’s unable to regulate himself in court appropriately and makes
some sort of comment that, ‘I don’t need a knife. I’m military trained.’ And I
take that statement to mean, ‘I don’t need a knife to hurt someone. I can do
it with my bare hands.’ ” The prosecutor informed the trial court that
Webster became agitated and was unable to control himself during the
preliminary hearing on July 17, 2023, as well: “I will let the Court know this
-- the defendant’s speaking out in court, this is not the first time this
happened. There was a similar incident at the preliminary hearing during
which we actually had to take a recess before the Honorable Judge
McLaughlin because the defendant kept having outbursts while the victim
was testifying about the knife and about the altercation with [his girlfriend].
So this is not the first time this has happened.”
The trial court denied the motion for mental health diversion. The trial
court concluded that although Webster met the eligibility requirements for
mental health diversion, he did not meet the suitability requirements.
Specifically, the trial court ruled that Webster would “pose an unreasonable
risk of danger to public safety,” based on the risk that “he will kill someone if
he doesn’t get his anger under control.” The trial court explained, “I’m not
disputing that his mental health issues . . . [were] a significant factor. My
issue is . . . that I am afraid that without supervision -- diversion, he’s on his
own -- without close supervision, that he is at risk of committing an -- and I’ll
just be pointblank. I’m afraid he’s going to kill someone. That his anger is
out of control. That I do think he needs a treatment. I do think it needs to be
more supervised . . . . But the level of anger over the -- and the response to it,

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using a weapon, going after his significant other, swinging that weapon at
bystanders, who were just trying to help her to leave, so he arms himself with
both a weapon, and it appears he armed himself with two pit bulls because
the pit bulls went after one of the officers, had its mouth around the foot of
one of the officers. Grabs a -- grabs a weapon. I don’t know if he took it --
how he got it, but he had a weapon in his hand. That situation alone could
have resulted in the death of one of the police officers.” The trial court
concluded by stating, “I feel for him. But diversion -- this type of diversion is
not meant for people that we are afraid are going to commit a very serious
offense. And I think it’s in his best interest that he have more supervision to
hopefully prevent that from happening.”
C. Subsequent Proceedings and Appeal
On November 20, 2023, Webster pled guilty to one count of battery on a
peace officer (§ 243, subd. (c)(2)), and the remaining counts were dismissed.
The trial court placed Webster on felony probation for two years, on the
condition, among others, that he serve 365 days in local custody and
participate in mental health treatment and counseling as appropriate.
Webster obtained a certificate of probable cause and now appeals from
the denial of his motion for pretrial mental health diversion.
II.
DISCUSSION
A. Applicable Legal Principles
“In 2018, the Legislature enacted sections 1001.35 and 1001.36 to
create a pretrial diversion program for defendants with certain mental health
disorders. [Citation.] Pretrial diversion ‘allows for the suspension of criminal
proceedings and potential dismissal of charges upon successful completion of
mental health treatment.’ ” (Vaughn v. Superior Court (2024)

8
105 Cal.App.5th 124, 133 (Vaughn).) Pursuant to section 1001.36, a trial
court is authorized to grant mental health diversion when a defendant meets
the statute’s eligibility and suitability criteria.
A defendant is eligible if the trial court determines two requirements
are satisfied: (1) a defendant has been diagnosed with a recognized mental
health disorder, and (2) the disorder was “a significant factor in the
commission of the charged offense.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (b)(2).) After
determining eligibility, the trial court “must consider whether the defendant
is suitable for pretrial diversion.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c).)
A defendant is suitable if: (1) in the opinion of a qualified mental
health expert, the defendant’s mental health disorder would respond to
treatment; (2) the defendant consents to diversion and agrees to a waiver of
speedy trial rights; (3) the defendant agrees to comply with treatment
requirements; and (4) “[t]he defendant will not pose an unreasonable risk of
danger to public safety, as defined in Section 1170.18, if treated in the
community.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(1)–(4).)
The statute defines an “unreasonable risk of danger to public safety” by
reference to the definition found in section 1170.18. Section 1170.18, in turn,
defines “the concept as ‘an unreasonable risk that the petitioner will commit
a new violent felony within the meaning of’ subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv) of section
667 . . . .’ ” (People v. Williams (2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 990, 1001.) Violent
offenses enumerated in section 667, commonly referred to as “ ‘super
strikes,’ ” include “any homicide offense (including any attempted homicide
offense), solicitation to commit murder, assault with a machine gun on a
peace officer or firefighter, possession of a weapon of mass destruction, any
serious or violent felony punishable by life imprisonment or death, and
certain sex offenses.” (Williams, supra, at p. 1001.) In deciding whether a

9
defendant poses an unreasonable risk of danger to public safety, “[t]he court
may consider the opinions of the district attorney, the defense, or a qualified
mental health expert, and may consider the defendant’s treatment plan, the
defendant’s violence and criminal history, the current charged offense, and
any other factors that the court deems appropriate.” (§ 1001.36, subd. (c)(4).)
Even where the defendant meets the statute’s eligibility and suitability
criteria, the trial court retains some “residual discretion” to deny diversion.
(Vaughn, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 134.) That discretion “is not
unfettered and must be exercised ‘ “consistent with the principles and
purpose of the governing law.” ’ ” (Id. at p. 135.)
We review a trial court’s ruling on mental health diversion for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Graham (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th 787, 795.) “ ‘A court
abuses its discretion when it makes an arbitrary or capricious decision by
applying the wrong legal standard [citations], or bases its decision on express
or implied factual findings that are not supported by substantial evidence.’ ”
(Ibid.)
B. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion
Webster contends that the trial court abused its discretion in denying
his motion because “[t]he evidence does not show that [Webster] would pose
an unreasonable risk to public safety” if he was treated in the community for
his mental health conditions.
a. The Trial Court Was Not Required to Credit the Conclusion in the
Psychologist’s Evaluation
To support his contention that the trial court’s ruling was not
supported by substantial evidence, Webster first relies on the psychologist’s
evaluation. Webster points to the psychologist’s conclusion that Webster was
“in the low moderate range of risk for acting out in an aggressive fashion,”
that medication and ongoing treatment “should help to minimize any

10
potential for aggressive behavior,” and that because Webster “appears to be
functioning in a stable and well directed fashion” and participating in
treatment, it was “unlikely he would pose a danger to the community at
large.” According to Webster, the trial court reached its ruling by “ignoring
[the psychologist’s] report.” The argument lacks merit.
For one thing, the trial court’s comments at the hearing show that it
did not “ignor[e]” the psychologist’s evaluation. On the contrary, the trial
court relied on the psychologist’s evaluation for its conclusion that Webster
was eligible for mental health diversion. It also looked to the psychologist’s
evaluation for information about whether Webster was attending his mental
health counseling sessions.
Moreover, as the finder of fact, the trial court was entitled to credit the
psychologist’s evaluation on some subjects but to find it unpersuasive when
analyzing whether, in light of all of the evidence presented, granting mental
health diversion to Webster would pose an unreasonable risk of danger to
public safety. (See People v. Brown (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 113, 124
[explaining that although a psychologist concluded that the defendant “would
not continue to pose an unreasonable risk if medicated—it [was] not the only
evidence that the trial court considered,” and “the existence of some evidence
in support of either conclusion is not a sufficient basis for this court to
supplant the findings of the trial court”].) Significantly, although the trial
court did not expressly explain why it decided not to credit the psychologist’s
conclusion that Webster would not pose a danger to public safety, the value of
the psychologist’s conclusion was subject to question because the trial court
was presented with evidence that was not available to the psychologist when
he evaluated Webster’s potential danger to the public. Specifically, the
psychologist was not aware that, even while receiving psychiatric medication

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and mental health counseling, Webster (1) violently attacked the property
manager on June 23, 2023, and (2) became so agitated during two court
appearances that he was unable to control himself and was disruptive. Those
facts cast doubt on the psychologist’s conclusion that Webster “appears to be
functioning in a stable and well directed fashion” and had only a “low
moderate” risk of acting out aggressively.
b. Webster’s Challenge to the Accuracy of the Trial Court’s Factual
Statements Are Without Merit
Webster also contends that the trial court’s “reasons” for its ruling
“were factually incorrect” in several ways.
First, Webster argues that “the evidence does not show that Webster
was attacking [his girlfriend] with a knife.” Instead, as Webster points out,
witnesses reported he was using the knife to attempt to pry open the car door

after his girlfriend locked herself inside.4 However, Webster’s argument
relies on a mischaracterization of the trial court’s ruling. The trial court did
not state that Webster attacked his girlfriend with a knife. Instead, in
explaining its ruling, the trial court referred to Webster’s “level of
anger . . . and the response to it, using a weapon, going after his significant
other, swinging that weapon at bystanders.” In earlier comments, the trial
court made clear that Webster used the knife to try to prevent his girlfriend

4 In his reply brief, Webster emphasizes that it was not resolved whether
he used a butter knife or a butcher’s knife, and he points out that a butter
knife “which usually has a rounded tip and no sharp edges, is not considered
a deadly weapon.” As we have noted, however, even the witness who used
the term “butter knife” viewed it as a dangerous weapon, as he was afraid his
wife would be “stab[bed]” by it. Further, regardless of the characteristics of
the knife, Webster was using it to try to stab the neighbor’s friend, which
shows that Webster viewed the knife as a weapon. Webster’s willingness to
attack bystanders with any kind of weapon is significant in assessing the
potential danger he poses to the public.

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from leaving, not to attack her. “It sounds like she’s trying to get away. He
arms himself with a knife, be it a butcher knife, a steak knife, or a butter
knife, it’s a knife. He tries to prevent her from leaving by using the knife.”
Second, Webster states that “the trial court incorrectly characterized
[him] as an aggressor against bystanders.” According to Webster, that
statement is incorrect because “the aggression was initiated by Webster’s
neighbors.” However, Webster has not cited to any specific statement by the
trial court characterizing Webster as “an aggressor against bystanders.”
Instead, the trial court referred to Webster’s act of “swinging that weapon at
bystanders, who were just trying to help her to leave.” That is an accurate
statement. The neighbor intervened in the dispute between Webster and his
girlfriend. Webster reacted angrily and raised his knife, to which the
neighbor responded by throwing a punch. Importantly, Webster also
attacked two other people—the neighbor’s friend and stepson—who were not
aggressors.
Webster next faults the trial court for stating that “it appears
[Webster] armed himself with two pit bulls because the pit bulls went after
one of the officers.” According to Webster, this statement was inaccurate
because “the report does not indicate that Webster intentionally employed
the dogs in an attack on the officers.” However, the trial court’s statement is
a fair characterization of the evidence. The police report states that while
refusing to come out of the apartment, Webster said, “I’ve got dogs too, if you
guys want to try to come in. I’ve got a big ass dog.” Then, when Webster
charged out of the apartment, he let out his dogs, one of whom bit a police
officer. Based on those facts, the trial court reasonably stated that it
“appear[ed]” Webster had armed himself with the dogs.

13
Finally, Webster takes issue with the trial court’s reference to his act of
grabbing a police officer’s baton. Referring to Webster’s act of “grab[bing]”
the baton, the trial court stated, “I don’t know if he took it -- how he got it,
but he had a weapon in his hand. That situation alone could have resulted in
the death of one of the police officers.” At another point in the hearing, the
trial court observed, “[I]f he would take the baton from a police officer, what
would stop him from taking a firearm when he’s at this agitated state?”
Arguing that “the evidence does not show that Webster intended to use the
baton against an officer,” Webster challenges the trial court’s statement that
the situation “could have resulted in the death” of an officer. Webster’s
criticism of the trial court is without merit. Based on the police officer’s
statement, Webster was not able to use the baton against the officers because
the officer reacted by forcibly taking the baton from Webster. Moreover, the
trial court was correct to observe that if Webster was able to grab a baton, he
could just as well have grabbed a firearm if it was available. Webster’s acts
of (1) going after bystanders with a knife, (2) attacking a police officer’s eye
with his thumb, (3) resisting the officers as they tried to restrain him, and
(4) grabbing the police baton, when taken together, support the trial court’s
reasonable inference that the situation could have resulted in the death of a
police officer if Webster had been able to access a deadly weapon.
c. The Case Law Cited by Webster Is Inapposite
In arguing that insufficient evidence supports the trial court’s ruling,
Webster contends that his case is similar to People v. Whitmill (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 1138. We are not persuaded, as the defendant’s conduct in
Whitmill was nothing like Webster’s uncontrolled violent conduct on May 14,
2023, and again on June 23, 2023.

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In Whitmill, based on his act of firing a gunshot into the air during a
confrontation with his girlfriend, the defendant pled guilty to the discharge of
a firearm with gross negligence. (Whitmill, supra, 86 Cal.App.5th at pp.
1142, 1147.) The defendant had no history of violent offenses, and during the
incident at issue, the defendant reacted by “running away from further
confrontation, throwing away his firearm, and peacefully complying with law
enforcement’s request that he come forward and (presumably) be arrested.”
(Id. at p. 1151). Based on those facts, Whitmill concluded that insufficient
evidence supported a finding that the defendant posed a risk of committing a
super strike if granted mental health diversion. Whitmill is inapposite here
because, in contrast to the largely conflict-avoidant and compliant defendant
in Whitmill, Webster acted in an extremely violent manner throughout the
May 14, 2023 incident and again on June 23, 2023, including launching an
attack on responding police officers.
In sum, Webster has failed to persuade us that insufficient evidence
supports the trial court’s finding that mental health diversion would pose an
unreasonable risk of danger to public safety. The evidence shows that
Webster continued to engage in uncontrolled, agitated and sometimes violent
behavior in the time period after the May 14, 2023 incident despite the fact
that he was participating in ongoing psychiatric treatment and mental health
counseling. In light of Webster’s continued uncontrolled behavior, Webster’s
conduct on May 14, 2023, in which he physically attacked and injured a police
officer, grabbed a police weapon, and used a knife against his neighbors
established an unreasonable risk that Webster would commit the super
strike of homicide or attempted homicide if he continued to receive mental
health treatment in the community rather than under the conditions of
increased supervision that would result from a criminal conviction.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

IRION, Acting P. J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, J.

RUBIN, J.

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