People v. Torrez CA6

CourtListener 10749182CalctappDec 8, 2025

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Filed 12/8/25 P. v. Torrez CA6
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

THE PEOPLE, H052519
(Santa Clara County
Plaintiff and Respondent, Super. Ct. No. C2014269)

v.

DENIS ALEXANDER TORREZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

In July 2024, after a bench trial, Denis Alexander Torrez was convicted on three
counts of aggravated sexual assault, and the following month he was sentenced to a total
of 45 years to life in prison. Torrez appealed, and we appointed counsel to represent him
on appeal. Counsel filed a brief stating the case and the facts, but raising no issues.
Instead, counsel asked us to review the record independently and determine whether there
are any arguable issues. Torrez in turn filed a supplemental brief asserting three errors.
We have reviewed the issues raised by Torrez and the full appellate record
pursuant to People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende). (See also People v. Kelly
(2006) 40 Cal.4th 106 (Kelly).) As explained below, we conclude that there is no
arguable issue for appeal that would result in a disposition more favorable to Torrez, and
we therefore affirm the judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Offenses
When Jane Doe was 10 or 11 years old, Torrez rented a room from her
grandparents, who lived next door. Roughly a year later, Doe’s father moved out, and
Torrez, whom Doe believed was having an affair with her mother, moved in with Doe,
her older sister, her older sister’s boyfriend, and her younger brother. Later, Torrez and
Doe’s mother had two children together.
When Doe was 11 years old, Torrez began molesting her while her mother was out
of the house working a night shift. Eventually the molestation escalated to attempted oral
copulation and vaginal penetration with his fingers and penis. When Doe was 13 years
old, she told her mother that Torrez was abusing her, but Torrez denied the abuse, and
Doe’s mother believed him. Afterwards the abuse mostly stopped, but when Doe was
14 years old, Doe’s mother whipped Doe with an electric cord, and Doe fled to her
father’s house. When police responded to the father’s report of physical abuse, Doe told
them about Torrez’s sexual abuse. Police arrested Torrez the next day.
B. The Charges
Torrez was eventually charged with 17 offenses, including lewd or lascivious acts
upon a minor and various forms of aggravated sexual assault on a minor. Torrez and the
prosecutor agreed to a bench trial on three charges: (1) aggravated sexual assault by
penetration on a minor under 14 and seven or more years younger than the defendant, in
violation of Penal Code section 269, subdivision (a)(5), (2) aggravated sexual assault by
rape on a minor under 14 and seven or more years younger than the defendant, in
violation of Penal Code section 269, subdivision (a)(1), and (3) aggravated sexual assault
by oral copulation on a minor under 14 and seven or more years younger than the
defendant, in violation of Penal Code section 269, subdivision (a)(4).

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C. The Trial
At trial, pursuant to an agreement with Torrez, the prosecutor submitted Doe’s
testimony from the preliminary hearing. In that testimony, Doe described how Torrez
would grab her head and push his penis toward Doe’s mouth, touching her cheek with it.
Doe said she always turned her head away and avoided Torrez’s penis, except for one
time when it made brief contact with her mouth. Doe also described an incident in which
Torrez took off her shorts and underwear, began touching her again, and then put his
penis inside her. Doe testified that on another occasion Torrez took off her pants, held her
legs down, and then put his penis inside her vagina. A third time Torrez partially inserted
his penis into Doe but was interrupted by Doe’s younger brother calling to her.
Torrez testified in his own defense but presented no other evidence. He denied all
of Doe’s allegations of sexual touching and penetration. He expressed no opinion about
why Doe might have fabricated these allegations.
After hearing closing arguments, the trial court found Torrez guilty of all three
counts of aggravated sexual assault.
D. The Sentence
The trial court sentenced Torrez to 15 years to life in prison on each of the three
counts, running consecutively for a total of 45 years to life in prison. The court also gave
Torrez credit for 1,394 days of custody and 208 days of good time. Finally, the trial court
imposed two restitution fines of $300 each. Torrez’s ability to pay the fines imposed was
not disputed.
Torrez filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. DISCUSSION
We have reviewed the entire record under Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d 436, and Kelly,
supra, 40 Cal.4th 106, including the three errors asserted by Torrez. This review

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disclosed no arguable issue on appeal, and therefore we conclude that appellate counsel
has complied fully with her responsibilities. (Wende, at p. 441.)
A. Arrest
Torrez contends that he was “arrested without a warrant and probable cause.”
Even if we assume this contention to be true, it provides no arguable basis for appeal
because Torrez’s conviction rested on Jane Doe’s testimony, not on any self-incriminating
statements or other evidence derived from Torrez’s arrest.
A defendant may move to suppress physical evidence obtained after an illegal
search or seizure, including those following unlawful arrests, but the defendant must raise
the issue before trial unless there was no earlier opportunity to do so. (People v.
Frederickson (2020) 8 Cal.5th 963, 1013, citing Penal Code, § 1538.5, subd. (h); see also
id., § 1538.5, subd. (g).) A defendant also may move to suppress any post-arrest
statements that were coerced (People v. Massie (1998) 19 Cal.4th 550, 576) or elicited
from custodial interrogation without knowing and intelligent waiver of the rights to
remain silent, to have an attorney present, or to have counsel appointed (for indigent
defendants). (People v. Sapp (2003) 31 Cal.4th 240, 266.)
There are no grounds for suppression here. Torrez’s arrest did not lead to the
evidence that provided the basis for his conviction. The conviction was based on
testimony from Doe, who disclosed to the police on October 25, 2020 that Torrez had
molested her, including the penetration and oral copulation that led to Torrez’s
conviction. Torrez’s arrest occurred on October 26, 2020, the next day. Moreover, no
statements by Torrez or evidence derived from his arrest was submitted at trial, and the
defense did not move to suppress any evidence or otherwise challenge Torrez’s arrest.

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As a consequence, even if Doe’s statements to the police did not provide probable
cause for Torrez’s arrest, his arrest would not provide any arguable basis for overturning
Torrez’s convictions.
B. Sufficiency of the Evidence
Torrez next claims there was insufficient evidence to support his convictions
because the trial court’s verdict rested solely on Jane Doe’s testimony, and there was no
corroborating evidence “such as the testimony of a medical provider.” In fact, it is well-
established that a single witness’s testimony can provide an adequate basis for a
conviction.
California courts have long recognized that a single witness’s testimony can
provide the basis for a conviction if the testimony provides substantial evidence of the
crime charged. Indeed, “[e]ven where there is a significant amount of countervailing
evidence, the testimony of as single witness that satisfies the [substantial evidence]
standard is sufficient to uphold the finding.” (People v. Barnwell (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1038,
1052 (Barnwell); see also People v. Contreras (2013) 58 Cal.4th 123, 160 [“when the
proponent of evidence seeks to establish a material fact through the ‘testimony of a single
witness’ as to whom no corroboration is legally required, jurors may ‘believe’ such
testimony, and accept it as ‘sufficient for the proof of that fact’ ”]; People v. Jones (2013)
57 Cal.4th 899, 963 [“ ‘[U]nless the testimony is physically impossible or inherently
improbable, testimony of a single witness is sufficient to support a conviction.’ ”].)
Doe’s testimony at the preliminary hearing provided substantial evidence of
Torrez’s crimes. The substantial evidence standard is satisfied “if the record contains
reasonable, credible evidence of solid value upon which a reasonable trier of fact could
have relied.” (Barnwell, supra, 41 Cal.4th at p. 1052.) Doe’s detailed testimony about
various instances of sexual abuse by Torrez, escalating from inappropriate touching to the

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three assaults that led to the instant convictions, provided such evidence. (See, e.g.,
People v. Paz (2017) 10 Cal.App.5th 1023, 1041 [jurors were “entitled to credit” the
victim’s uncorroborated testimony about a sexual assault].)
Doe’s testimony also explained the lack of corroborating medical evidence. While
Doe reported the abuse when she was 14, she testified that Torrez had started assaulting
her when she was 12 and had largely stopped doing so when she was 13, after she told
her mother about the abuse. As a consequence, it is unlikely that medical examination
could have produced evidence of assaults that occurred months or years earlier, and
therefore the lack of medical evidence does not cast doubt on Doe’s testimony or on the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting Torrez’s convictions.
C. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Torrez contends trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing to
call Torrez’s wife (Jane Doe’s mother) to testify. This contention does not provide an
arguable basis for appeal either.
As our Supreme Court has recognized, a criminal defendant’s right to counsel
under both the California and the United States Constitutions “includes the right to
effective legal assistance.” (People v. Mai (2013) 57 Cal.4th 986, 1009 (Mai).) In
assessing a claim of ineffective assistance, we consider whether counsel’s representation
fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms
and whether the defendant suffered prejudice to reasonable probability, that is, a
probability sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome. (People v. Strickland
(1984) 466 U.S. 668, 694.) In assessing the performance of counsel, “we accord greater
deference to counsel’s reasonable tactical decisions” (People v. Farnam (2002) 28 Cal.4th
107, 148), and “there is a ‘strong presumption that counsel’s conduct falls within the wide
range of reasonable professional assistance.’ ” (People v. Weaver (2001) 26 Cal.4th 876,

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925.) The burden of overcoming this presumption is “ ‘difficult to carry on direct
appeal.’ ” (People v. Mickel (2016) 2 Cal.5th 181, 198.) Indeed, claims of ineffective
assistance are “more appropriately resolved in a habeas corpus proceeding” unless one of
three circumstances applies: “(1) the record affirmatively discloses counsel had no
rational tactical purpose for the challenged act or omission, (2) counsel was asked for a
reason and failed to provide one, or (3) there simply could be no satisfactory
explanation.” (Mai, at p. 1009.)
At this stage, Torrez cannot overcome the deference afforded trial counsel’s
tactical decision and the strong presumption that trial counsel’s performance was
reasonable. Indeed, declining to call Doe’s mother as a witness for the defense was, on
its face, reasonable. Doe testified that, when she was 13 years old, she told her mother
that Torrez was abusing her. Thus, it was entirely possible that Doe’s mother would have
corroborated Doe’s testimony about her earlier disclosure and thereby bolstered Doe’s
credibility (and, by extension, the prosecution’s case). We therefore must presume that
Torrez’s trial counsel had a sound tactical reason for refusing to call Doe’s mother as a
witness and that there is no arguable basis for Torrez to claim ineffective assistance of
counsel on direct appeal.
III. DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.

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____________________________
BROMBERG, J.

WE CONCUR:

____________________________________
DANNER, ACTING P. J.

____________________________________
KULKARNI, J.

People v. Torrez
H052519

 Judge of the Santa Clara County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice

pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution

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