CourtListener 10748383•People v. Ruiz CA2/3
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Filed 12/5/25 P. v. Ruiz CA2/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
THE PEOPLE, B341076, B342337
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA498768)
v.
EMILIO RUIZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from orders of the Superior Court of Los Angeles
County, Yvette Verastegui, Judge. Reversed and remanded with
directions.
Aurora Elizabeth Bewicke, under appointment by the
Court of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Michael J. Wise,
Deputy Attorneys General for Plaintiff and Respondent.
‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗‗
In this consolidated decision, Appellant Emilio Ruiz
appeals the superior court’s orders denying his petitions for
resentencing under Penal Code section 1170.911 based on mental
health and substance-related conditions arising from military
service. On appeal, Ruiz argues that the superior court erred by
not granting him a public hearing to determine whether he meets
the statutory criteria for relief, and whether he merits
resentencing in the interest of justice. Because the court did not
follow the required procedure for adjudicating the petitions, we
reverse and remand for further proceedings.
BACKGROUND
I. Original plea and sentence
On September 10, 2021, the District Attorney filed a
complaint charging Ruiz with one count of murder (§ 187, subd.
(a); count 1) and two counts of driving under the influence of an
alcoholic beverage causing injury (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a);
counts 2 & 3).2 The complaint alleged Ruiz personally inflicted
great bodily injury (§ 12022.7, subd. (a)) as to counts 2 and 3.
Additionally, the complaint alleged probation ineligibility based
on four prior felony convictions (§ 1203, subd. (e)(4)).
On December 8, 2023, Ruiz waived his right to a
preliminary hearing and entered into a negotiated plea
agreement with the District Attorney. Ruiz pleaded no contest to
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2 We do not provide the factual background because the facts
underlying the offenses in this case are not relevant to the issue
raised on appeal.
2
manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a); added count 4) and two counts of
driving under the influence of an alcoholic beverage causing
injury to two different victims (Veh. Code, § 23153, subd. (a);
count 2 & added count 5). Ruiz admitted to the personal
infliction of great bodily injury enhancement (§ 12022.7, subd.
(a)) as to count 2 and one added aggravating circumstance that
he was “on probation, mandatory supervision, postrelease
community supervision, or parole when the crime was
committed.” (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 4.421(b)(4)).
In accordance with the plea agreement, the court sentenced
Ruiz to 11 years in state prison.
II. First petition for resentencing
On August 12, 2024, Ruiz filed a petition for resentencing
under section 1170.91. In the petition, Ruiz alleged that he is
serving or served in the military, and that he is suffering from
traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder, substance
abuse, and mental health problems. Ruiz further alleged that he
believed the judge did not consider his service-connected trauma,
injury, or condition as a factor in deciding his sentence. Ruiz did
not submit any evidence to support his petition.
On August 28, 2024, the superior court denied the petition
in chambers without holding a hearing in the presence of Ruiz
and the prosecutor. In a written order, the court, citing People v.
Hester (2000) 22 Cal.4th 290, 295 (Hester), stated Ruiz “ha[d]
received the benefit of his bargain and may not thereafter trifle
with the courts by attempting [to] better his or her bargain.” On
September 30, 2024, Ruiz appealed from the August 28, 2024
order.
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III. Second petition for resentencing
On September 30, 2024, Ruiz filed a second petition for
resentencing under section 1170.91 that included evidence
pertaining to his military service and his service-related post-
traumatic stress disorder, traumatic brain injury, and other
health issues.
On October 15, 2024, the superior court denied the petition
without holding a hearing in the presence of Ruiz and the
prosecutor. The court, again citing Hester, supra, 22 Cal.4th at
p. 295, reasoned that Ruiz “ha[d] received the benefit of his
bargain and may not thereafter trifle with the courts by
attempting [to] better his or her bargain.”
On November 19, 2024, Ruiz appealed from the court’s
October 15, 2024 order.
DISCUSSION
Ruiz argues that the superior court erred by denying his
petition for resentencing without holding a properly noticed
public hearing as required by section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(3).
We agree.
I. Standard of review
We interpret the requirements of section 1170.91 de novo.
(People v. Bonilla-Bray (2020) 49 Cal.App.5th 234, 237 (Bonilla-
Bray).)
II. Resentencing under section 1170.91
If a “court concludes that a defendant convicted of a felony
offense is, or was, a member of the United States military who
may be suffering from sexual trauma, traumatic brain injury,
post-traumatic stress disorder, substance abuse, or mental health
4
problems as a result of the defendant’s military service,” it must
“consider the circumstance as a factor in mitigation when
imposing a sentence.” (§ 1170.91, subd. (a); 3 see also People v.
Sherman (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 325, 329.)
Section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(1) provides a procedural
mechanism for a defendant “currently serving a sentence for a
felony conviction, whether by trial or plea,” to petition for
resentencing “if the circumstance of suffering from sexual
trauma, traumatic brain injury, post-traumatic stress disorder,
substance abuse, or mental health problems as a result of the
person’s military service was not considered as a factor in
mitigation at the time of sentencing.”
Upon receiving a section 1170.91 petition for resentencing,
the trial court “shall determine, at a public hearing held after not
less than 15 days’ notice to the prosecution, the defense, and any
victim,” whether the defendant satisfies the statutory criteria for
relief. (§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(3), italics added.) “At that hearing,
the prosecution shall have an opportunity to be heard on the
[defendant]’s eligibility and suitability for resentencing.” (Ibid.)
If the trial court finds that the defendant satisfies the
criteria for relief, it “may, in the interest of justice, and
regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after a
trial or plea . . . [¶] [r]educe the [sentence or] [¶] [v]acate the
conviction and impose judgment on any necessarily included
3 Section 1170.91 “does not apply to a person convicted of, or
having one or more prior convictions for, an offense specified in
[section 667, subdivision (e)(2)(C)(iv)] or an offense requiring
registration pursuant to [section 290, subdivision (c)].” (§
1170.91, subd. (c).) These exclusions are not relevant to this
appeal.
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lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that
offense was charged in the original pleading, and then resentence
the defendant to a reduced term of imprisonment with the
concurrence of both the defendant and the [prosecutor].”
(§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(3)(A)–(B).)
III. Analysis
Ruiz initially filed a form petition for resentencing under
section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(1), alleging, without any
evidence, that he served in the military, that he suffers from
service-connected post-traumatic stress disorder and mental
health issues, and that the trial court did not consider these
circumstances as mitigating factors at the time of sentencing.
Notably, the statute is silent on what evidence, if any, is
required for a facially sufficient petition. The statute also does
not contain a clear procedural mechanism for summarily denying
a petition without a hearing in the event a trial court finds the
petition to be facially insufficient, either for failure to
demonstrate that the defendant suffers from a qualifying
condition resulting from his military service, or failure to show
that the trial court did not consider this circumstance as a
mitigating factor for sentencing.
In any event, here, the superior court did not find the
petition to be facially insufficient, such that a hearing was not
warranted. Rather, the court erroneously believed Ruiz was
ineligible for relief because he had entered into a plea agreement
and had already received the “benefit of his bargain.”
In 2022, the Legislature amended section 1170.91,
subdivision (b)(3) to provide relief in the interest of justice,
“regardless of whether the original sentence was imposed after
trial or plea.” (Stats. 2022, ch. 721, § 1, eff. Jan. 1, 2023.)
6
According to People v. Harrell (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 161, 168
(Harrell), in amending section 1170.91, subdivision (b)(3), “the
Legislature clearly intended to make persons serving a stipulated
sentence eligible for relief.”
“[T]he general rule in California is that [a] plea agreement
will be ‘ “deemed to incorporate and contemplate not only the
existing law but the reserve power of the state to amend the law
or enact additional laws for the public good and in pursuance of
public policy.” ’ [Citation.] That the parties enter into a plea
agreement thus does not have the effect of insulating them from
changes in the law that the Legislature has intended to apply to
them.” (Doe v. Harris (2013) 57 Cal.4th 64, 66.)
Upon accepting the terms of a negotiated plea agreement,
the court “ ‘ “lacks jurisdiction to alter the terms . . . unless, of
course, the parties agree.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.]” (Harrell,
supra, 95 Cal.App.5th at p. 168.) But “the terms of the plea
bargain include future changes in the law.” (Ibid.) Harrell
concluded that a court does not alter the terms by implementing
these future changes in the law. (Ibid.)
Here, the superior court erred by summarily denying Ruiz’s
petition in chambers without notice to him, the prosecutor, or the
victims. The court failed to hold “a public hearing” where it could
determine whether Ruiz “satisfie[d] the statutory requirements
for relief” and, if so, whether resentencing was warranted “in the
interest of justice.” (§ 1170.91, subd. (b)(3)(A)–(B); Bonilla-Bray,
supra, 49 Cal.App.5th at p. 239 [holding that the trial court erred
in summarily denying petition under § 1170.91 without a public
hearing].)
The Attorney General argues that a hearing was not
necessary in this case because the court did “consider[] the fact of
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appellant’s military service at the original sentencing hearing” in
2023, and also was aware that Ruiz “had a substance abuse
problem.”4 To support this argument, the Attorney General
points to Ruiz’s waiver of the court’s formal advisement of “armed
forces and veteran’s rights” when arraigned on the amended
complaint prior to his plea, defense counsel’s comment when
filing materials for Ruiz’s future parole consideration, and a box
checked in the probation officer’s report indicating Ruiz suffered
from a “significant substance abuse problem.” We reject the
Attorney General’s argument.
First, the original sentencing court specified that Ruiz’s
waiver of an advisement of “armed forces and veteran’s rights”
was “for purposes of re-arraignment only.”5 Similarly, after
4 Alternatively, the Attorney General argues that Ruiz
forfeited his claim on appeal by failing to object at the sentencing
hearing. The Attorney General is correct that “complaints about
the manner in which the trial court exercises its sentencing
discretion and articulates its supporting reasons cannot be raised
for the first time on appeal.” (People v. Scott (1994) 9 Cal.4th
331, 356.) But Ruiz is not challenging the manner in which the
trial court exercised its sentencing discretion; rather, he is
claiming that the trial court failed to fulfill its statutory
sentencing obligation. Where the challenge is not to the trial
court’s exercise of discretion, but to the court’s failure to comply
with a statutory obligation, forfeiture is not warranted. (People v.
Panozo (2021) 59 Cal.App.5th 825, 840.)
5 After the complaint was amended to add the charges
included as terms of the plea of agreement, the trial court asked
defense counsel, “With that, [defense counsel], for purposes of re-
arraignment only, waive reading of the amended complaint,
advisement of rights, including armed forces and veteran’s rights,
entering a plea of not guilty, denying any and all special
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sentencing, the court received documents pertaining to Ruiz’s
military service for future parole purposes.6 Both references to
military service were not raised for consideration at sentencing,
as required under the statute. Section 1170.91 requires a trial
court to consider a defendant’s qualifying condition as a result of
his or her military service as a factor in mitigation “when
imposing a sentence.” (§ 1170.91, subd. (a), italics added.)
Nothing in the record indicates that the sentencing court was
aware that Ruiz suffered service-related mental health
allegations and enhancements?” (Italics added.) Defense counsel
responded affirmatively.
6 After the conclusion of the sentencing hearing, defense
counsel notified the court:
“Your Honor, I prepared a defense
mitigation report. One of the reasons I prepared
it is, Mr. Ruiz is a decorated combat veteran. He
has a great many medical issues, and he was
informed by a doctor this week that it appears
count[y] jail may have lost his medical records;
so I’m going to file – and I’ve talked to [the
prosecutor]. He has no objection. I’ll file defense
mitigation brief with medical records and other
supporting documents.”
The trial court judge asked whether the mitigation report was
being filed “for future purposes when Mr. Ruiz is up for parole.”
Defense counsel responded, “Correct.” The trial court clarified,
“[s]o the only thing for the court to do today would be to accept it
for filing, make it part of the criminal record. But there’s nothing
further for this court to do.” Defense counsel responded
affirmatively.
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conditions, as he now claims, and considered them as mitigating
factors at the time of sentencing. Moreover, and critically, the
superior court did not deny Ruiz’s petition on that basis.
Our decision is limited to whether, under the circumstances
of this case, Ruiz is entitled to a public hearing under section
1170.91, subdivision (b)(3); we take no position on whether Ruiz
satisfied the statutory criteria for relief or whether resentencing
is warranted in the interests of justice.
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DISPOSITION
We reverse the superior court’s orders summarily denying
Ruiz’s petition for resentencing under section 1170.91. We
remand the matters for the superior court to conduct a noticed
public hearing in accordance with section 1170.91, subdivision
(b)(3).
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
HANASONO, J.
We concur:
EDMON, P. J.
ADAMS, J.
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