CourtListener 10748319•Selker v. Xcentric Ventures CA4/1
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Filed 12/5/25 Selker v. Xcentric Ventures CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF CALIFORNIA
MARK SELKER, D084428
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v. (Super. Ct. No.
37-2022-00005365-CU-BT-NC)
XCENTRIC VENTURES, LLC,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael D. Washington, Judge. Affirmed.
Dickinson Wright and Bennett Evan Cooper for Defendant and
Appellant.
Hogue & Belong and Jeffrey L. Hogue, Tyler J. Belong; Williams
Iagmin and Jon R. Williams for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Defendant and appellant Xcentric Ventures, LLC (Xcentric) appeals an
order denying its Code of Civil Procedure section 425.161 special motion to
strike plaintiff and respondent Mark Selker’s first amended class action
complaint. Selker brought causes of action for violation of the Unfair
Competition Law (UCL; Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200 et seq.) and breach of the
covenant of good faith and fair dealing, alleging in part that Xcentric, which
operates a consumer review/complaint website called “Ripoff Report,”
encourages negative commentary via reports against individuals and
businesses so as to force them into paying it exorbitant fees to remove or
mitigate the report’s impact. In denying Xcentric’s motion, the court found
Xcentric did not address the relevant inquiry: whether the allegations giving
rise to the asserted liability relating to Xcentric’s effort to extort fees from
persons who had reports issued about them, as well as its editorial control
over reports by assigning them to certain categories, were protected under
any of the categories of section 425.26, subdivision (e). It ruled Selker had
presented evidence establishing minimal merit to his claims, including with
evidence that Xcentric had placed certain labels on the negative report, and
was thus acting as an “information content provider” that was not entitled to
immunity under the federal Communications Decency Act (CDA; 47 U.S.C. §
230).
Xcentric contends the court erred in various ways by its ruling. It
argues its reports published on a public website constitute protected activity
under section 425.16, subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4), as the website qualifies as
a public forum and its content—aiming to inform the public about allegedly
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
Section 425.16 is also known as the anti-SLAPP (strategic lawsuit against
public participation) statute. (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7
Cal.5th 871, 882, fn. 2 (Wilson).)
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unscrupulous businesses and their practices—are matters of public concern.
Xcentric contends the report involving Selker specifically is a matter of public
concern given his operation of multiple businesses and the nature of the
report’s allegations against him. It contends the court erred by finding
certain allegations to be collateral or merely incidental to Selker’s claims, and
also by basing its ruling on the illegality exception to the anti-SLAPP statute,
because no evidence conclusively established it engaged in extortion and it
was undisputed Xcentric did not assign categories to the reports on its
website. Xcentric finally contends the court erred by finding Selker
demonstrated a probability of prevailing on his claims, in part because the
CDA bars them.
We conclude Xcentric failed to make a threshold showing that Selker’s
UCL cause of action arises from protected activity. Accordingly, we affirm
the order.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
We summarize the background facts primarily from Selker’s operative
first amended complaint, undisputed facts from affidavits, and other facts in
the light most favorable to Selker, the party opposing the anti-SLAPP
motion. (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(2); Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1067 (Park); Murray v. Tran (2020) 55
Cal.App.5th 10, 16.)
Xcentric operates a website, www.ripoffreport.com (the website), which
permits third-party users to post reports about their negative experiences
with businesses and individuals. In October 2017, Xcentric published a
report about Selker and his business, Selker Fine Art, from “boba” in
Encinitas, California. The report stated: “Mark Selker rents a rooms [sic] in
a large home in Cielo Estates in Rancho Santa Fe, California and I was his
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landlord. He operates an art business called Mark Selker Fine Art and also
is an aspiring movie maker. While in my home he caused a lot of problems
with the other tenants making up stories about the home and causining [sic]
genral [sic] unharmony in the household. Since he paid his rent on time I
overlooked the problems but he was given notice immediately upon revealing
that he had been accused of improper filming of a child during a recent
relationship. This was information that he offered on his own and
immediately regretted backtracking his story.”
Selker tried to have Xcentric remove or redact the report. Instead, it
demanded that he pay a fee and sign an arbitration agreement, or pay $5,500
for a service entitled No-Index to “de-index” the report from online search
engines.
After the report was published, Selker had difficulty obtaining
prospective tenants, had an unexpected decline in business sales, and was
terminated from his role in another business in which his equity position was
reduced from 33 percent to five percent. His personal life and relationships
suffered, and he had to stop using his last name for business and personal
matters.
In late January or early February 2022, Xcentric offered Selker a
discounted rate of $2,500 for its No-Index service. Selker paid for the service,
but the report was allowed to remain on the site. Selker also asked to
participate in Xcentric’s “VIP Arbitration Program,” but Xcentric presented
its arbitration agreement on a take it or leave it basis and would not permit
Selker to negotiate any terms. Selker did not sign it.
Selker filed a putative class action complaint alleging causes of action
for violation of the UCL and breach of the implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing. Based on an arbitration clause in connection with Xcentric’s No
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Index service, the trial court ordered to arbitration Selker’s UCL cause of
action to the extent it pertained to that service, as well as his breach of
covenant cause of action. The court also sustained with leave to amend a
demurrer filed by Xcentric, in part ruling that Selker did not sufficiently
allege harm (at least harm that did not stem from the defamatory third-party
report, for which Xcentric was protected under the CDA) so as to state a UCL
cause of action.
Selker filed a first amended complaint with the same causes of action.
He alleged Xcentric urged consumers, including persons acting anonymously,
to post negative reviews via reports against businesses and individuals so as
to force those businesses and individuals into paying the website substantial
fees to remove or mitigate the report’s impact. He alleged that immediately
under the section of the website encouraging consumers to post their negative
reviews, the website solicited business owners and proprietors to pay money
to take down the negative report via an exclusive arbitration program.
Selker alleged that no matter the circumstances, once a report is submitted,
Xcentric “will not take it down. Instead, it only offers the victim—the subject
of the report—an opportunity to submit a rebuttal refuting all or a portion of
the content of the report.” He alleged that “by refusing to take down its
reports, [Xcentric] extorts money from the victims of false reports by
requiring them to pay exorbitant penalty payments in order for [Xcentric] to
remove the report.”
As for the report written about him, which he alleged identified him by
name as well as his city, state and residential community, Selker alleged that
Xcentric updated the report in February 2022 with content. Selker alleged
the report “insinuated [he] may have committed a crime against a minor,
which was defamatory, false, and made with malice” and that the report “was
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made solely for purposes of harassment and perceived cyberharassment,
cyberstalking, and a form of a ‘revenge post.’ ” He alleged Xcentric “took
editorial control and assigned the report to the categories of ‘Questionable
Activities’ and ‘Sex Offender’ on its own.”
In support of his UCL cause of action, Selker alleged that he and the
classes of plaintiffs had been subjected to “extortive measures by requiring
exorbitant fees before even consideration of the removal, redaction, or de-
indexing reports—even those that violate [Xcentric’s] terms of use.” He
alleged Xcentric obtained valuable property, money, and services from him
and the class by its unfair, unlawful, or fraudulent business practices.2
Xcentric filed a special motion to strike the complaint under the anti-
SLAPP statute. It argued Selker’s operative complaint was an attack on its
first amendment rights to participate in matters of public concern, namely
“hosting a website dedicated to consumer complaints, soliciting reviews, and
making editorial decisions about the third-party content . . . .” Xcentric
pointed to Selker’s allegations that it solicited “ ‘purely negative,’ ”
2 For his claim of breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing,
Selker alleged Xcentric “entered into a contract with users of its platform to
abide by certain terms of service, including (without limitation): not to post
anything that is defamatory; not to post anything ‘with the sole intention to
harass or bully any particular individual, including, but not limited to
content that may be perceived as cyberharassment, cyberstalking,
cyberbullying, or an unclassified form of a “revenge post” ’; [and] reserve[ed]
the right to remove private personal information and unsubstantiated
allegations of serious criminal acts” but Xcentric received a report that
violated one or more of its terms of service, and had an obligation to remove
or at least redact the report. He alleged that when notified of the report,
Xcentric charged him an exorbitant fee to de-index terms, and required him
to sign a contract with unconscionable terms along with another exorbitant
fee “only to potentially have the report redacted.” Selker alleged that conduct
amounted to extortion, and Xcentric did not otherwise act fairly and in good
faith.
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“ ‘exclusively negative,’ ” or “ ‘only negative’ ” reports; updated reports on its
own and updated the report about Selker “ ‘with content’ ”; sold reports to
other websites that reposted them; left up negative reports even if they
violated Xcentric’s terms of service; could post negative content about an
individual or business itself, and then extort fees from victims of defamatory
posts; took editorial control and assigned the report about Selker to the
categories of “ ‘Questionable Activities’ ” and “ ‘Sex Offender’ ” on its own; and
demanded that Selker pay for Xcentric’s services. Xcentric argued Selker’s
new allegations arose out of protected conduct under section 425.16,
subdivision (e)(3), as the website was a public forum and his allegations—
concerning a consumer’s statements about the quality of a seller’s product—
arose from matters in connection with an issue of public interest. According
to Xcentric, the alleged conduct also involved “an exercise of free speech in
connection with public issues and issues of public interest” within the
meaning of section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) because “[b]y operating the
website as an internet public forum for consumer reviews, Xcentric directly
facilitated public commentary—i.e., exercises of free speech—on public
issues.” Xcentric argued Selker could not meet the anti-SLAPP statue’s
second prong and meet the elements of his claims because he could not allege
loss of money caused by its VIP arbitration service for purposes of his UCL
claim; he could not present evidence to support his assertedly false
allegations concerning its purported conduct with regard to the negative
report; and it was immune from liability under the CDA.
Xcentric supported its motion with a declaration from its founder and
manager Edward Magedson. Magedson averred that Xcentric makes
redactions in reports that violate its terms of service. Among other things, he
stated Xcentric took no part in authoring the report about Selker; did not
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assign reports to categories; did not update or assign categories to the report
about Selker; and never demanded Selker pay Xcentric for any services.
Rather, he explained to Selker that he did not need any paid services to post
a rebuttal to the report about him. Magedson averred that Selker told him
he wanted to engage in both the VIP arbitration program and Xcentric’s No-
Index service, and Selker and Xcentric entered into a contract for the No-
Index service, but Selker took issue with some of the arbitration contract
terms, and ultimately decided against arbitration.
In opposition, Selker argued Xcentric mischaracterized the theory of
liability alleged in his operative complaint. According to him, he alleged
Xcentric violated the UCL “through its extortive business practice of
soliciting purely negative and defamatory posts to [Xcentric’s] website for the
purpose of charging the victims of these negative and defamatory posts
exorbitant sums of money to have the posts removed by [Xcentric]—the only
company with the power to remove such posts.” He stated “the question is
not whether the third-party’s post is protected, but whether [Xcentric’s]
predatory and extortive business practice is protected by the First
Amendment.” He argued Xcentric’s conduct constituted extortion, which was
not a constitutionally protected activity. Though Selker conceded that
publicly available websites were public forums, he argued mere publication
on a website did not convert private information into a matter of public
interest and in his case, the statements contained in his negative report—
which were about his history as a tenant and landlord and insinuated he was
sexually deviant—were not made in connection with any public interest or
topics of widespread interest. As for the report’s claim of improper filming of
a child, Selker argued the report was too vague to determine whether it was
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of concern to the public.3 Selker submitted a declaration of his counsel
attaching pages of Xcentric’s website, as well as e-mail correspondence
between himself and Magedson assertedly showing how Xcentric “executes its
extortionary scheme.” Selker argued “[t]he limited evidence available shows:
(1) [Xcentric] specifically targets negative or defamatory reports that will
create ‘business value’ for [Xcentric]; (2) [Xcentric] asserted the only way it
would remove the defamatory post is if Selker paid an exorbitant fee; and (3)
Magedson unilaterally and arbitrarily controls (and increases) the price of
[Xcentric’s] services.” He maintained he thereby demonstrated the minimal
probability of success on his claim. Selker argued the CDA did not apply to
Xcentric because (1) his alleged theories of liability did not impose liability by
treating Xcentric as the publisher or speaker of the report and (2) Xcentric
was both an interactive computer service and information content provider in
view of its feature that “steer[ed] the substance of the reports” by requiring
users to identify negative report categories such as “Child Sex Trafficking” or
“Child Predator.”
The trial court denied Xcentric’s motion. It found based on the first
amended complaint’s allegations, “the activity that gives rise to the asserted
liability relates to: (a) whether [Xcentric] has violated [the UCL] through ‘[a]
systematic course of illegal efforts to extort exorbitant fees from persons in
California who have had reports issued about them’ . . . and (b) whether
3 Selker argued: “For instance, the statement lacks any information
about: (i) whether the ‘accused improper filming’ was true or false; (ii) what
specifically made the alleged filming ‘improper[’;] (iii) whether the child
involved was filmed with parental consent; (iv) whether the child was
Selker’s own child; and (v) whether the alleged filming was lawful or
unlawful. It is difficult to imagine how such a false and vague accusation—
though extremely hurtful to Selker—would rise to the level of ‘public
interest.’ ”
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[Xcentric] ‘took editorial control and assigned the report to the categories of
“Questionable Activities” and “Sex Offender” on its own.’ ” The court found
Selker’s allegations concerning the “boba” complaint—as well as other
allegations concerning Xcentric’s conduct in targeting or seeking out negative
commentary, updating reports, allowing negative reviews to remain, and
doing business with other companies—were collateral and provided to give
context to the claims.
The court agreed that statements posted on Internet message boards
questioning and/or criticizing the business practices or ethics of public
individuals, companies and their officers are generally matters of public
interest and concern subject to section 425.16 protection. However, the court
was “not entirely persuaded that the boba report contained issues of public
interest because [Selker] is not a public figure and the statements regarding
[Selker] as a tenant and landlord do not affect a large number of people nor
do they involve actions of widespread public interest.” It found “the
statement in the report regarding the ‘improper filming of a child’ arguably
involves an action of widespread public interest.” But the court ruled
Xcentric did not demonstrate it was entitled to anti-SLAPP protection:
“[T]he problem relating to the first prong of the analysis is that [Xcentric] has
not addressed whether the allegations giving rise to the asserted liability
relating to extortion and [Xcentric] taking editorial control by assigning
reports to certain categories are protected under any of the subdivisions of
[section] 425.26[, subdivision] (e).” It ruled that “[e]xtortion is not a
constitutionally protected form of speech,” observing that “ ‘[e]xtortion
criminalizes making threats that by themselves may not be illegal; for
example, in blackmail cases, “the threat is to do something in itself perfectly
10
legal, but that threat nevertheless becomes illegal when coupled with a
demand for money.” ’ ”
The court ruled the CDA did not immunize Xcentric’s conduct. It
reasoned Selker “is not attempting to impose liability against [Xcentric] for
its role as a publisher or speaker. Rather, [Selker’s] theory of liability is
based on allegations that [Xcentric] is engaged in an unfair scheme of
exclusively soliciting negative reports for the purpose of price-gouging the
victims in order to hide, redact or remove such reports. Further, [Selker]
alleges that [Xcentric] is not simply publishing content by other parties but is
going inside those reports and ‘steering’ the reports into categories created by
Defendant (‘Slumlord, Criminal, Sexual Abuser’).” The court observed that
Selker alleged Xcentric “contributes to the negative and defamatory nature of
the reports by steering [them] into negative categories (fraud, theft, child
predator, slumlord, sexual abuser, child sex trafficking and sexual
misconduct against a patient just to name a few)” and that “[Xcentric] then
allegedly extorts money from the subjects of the negative reports to remove,
redact or de-index the report.” It ruled Xcentric had “failed to present
evidence demonstrating that it does not place labels on reports in an effort to
direct reports into certain negative categories.”
Finally, the court ruled Selker had shown minimal merit in his claims
via e-mail threads establishing that Xcentric “specifically solicits negative or
defamatory reports for the purpose of extorting excessive fees from victims of
those reports to remove them.”
Xcentric filed this appeal.
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DISCUSSION
I. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“The Legislature enacted . . . section 425.16 to combat ‘a disturbing
increase’ in strategic lawsuits against public participation (SLAPPs):
‘lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional
rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances.’ ”
(Geiser v. Kuhns (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1238, 1242.) “ ‘To that end, the statute
authorizes a special motion to strike a claim “arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue.” ’ ” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1008-1009 (Bonni).) Section 425.16 “does not insulate defendants from any
liability for claims arising from the protected rights of petition or speech. It
only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early stage, meritless claims
arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.)
The statute’s protection extends to “any written or oral statement or
writing made in a place open to the public or a public forum in connection
with an issue of public interest” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(3)) as well as “any other
conduct in furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or
. . . free speech in connection with a public issue or an issue of public
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interest.” (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(4); Geiser v. Kuhns, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p.
1243.)4
“[W]hen a defendant seeks to strike a plaintiff’s claim under the anti-
SLAPP statute there are two inquiries: First, does the claim call for the anti-
SLAPP statute’s protections? Second, if so, does it have sufficient merit?”
(Serova v. Sony Music Entertainment (2022) 13 Cal.5th 859, 871-872.)
In this two-pronged inquiry, “ ‘the moving defendant bears the burden of
establishing that the challenged allegations or claims “aris[e] from” protected
activity in which the defendant has engaged. [Citations.] If the defendant
carries its burden, the plaintiff must then demonstrate its claims have at
least “minimal merit.” ’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 884.)
When determining whether conduct is protected under the anti-SLAPP
statute, we “look not to First Amendment law, but to the statutory definitions
in section 425.16, subdivision (e).” (City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1
Cal.5th 409, 422.) “The defendant’s first-step burden is to identify the
activity each challenged claim rests on and demonstrate that that activity is
protected by the anti-SLAPP statute. A ‘claim may be struck only if the
speech or petitioning activity itself is the wrong complained of, and not just
evidence of liability or a step leading to some different act for which liability
is asserted.’ [Citation.] To determine whether a claim arises from protected
activity, courts must ‘consider the elements of the challenged claim and what
4 Section 425.16, subdivision (e) identifies two other categories of
statements or writings that are “ ‘ “in furtherance of” ’ a defendant’s free
speech or petition rights: ‘(1) any written or oral statement or writing made
before a legislative, executive, or judicial proceeding, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law, [and] (2) any written or oral statement or
writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or review by a
legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official proceeding
authorized by law[.]’ ” (Gaynor v. Bulen (2018) 19 Cal.App.5th 864, 877.)
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actions by the defendant supply those elements and consequently form the
basis for liability.’ [Citation.] Courts then must evaluate whether the
defendant has shown any of these actions fall within one or more of the four
categories of ‘ “act[s]” ’ protected by the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Wilson, supra,
7 Cal.5th at p. 884; see also Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1009.)
“If the defendant makes the required showing, the burden shifts to the
plaintiff to demonstrate the merit of the claim by establishing a probability of
success.” (Baral v. Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 384.) This second step is a
“ ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he plaintiff’s second-step
burden is a limited one. The plaintiff need not prove her case to the court
[citation]; the bar sits lower, at a demonstration of ‘minimal merit’ [citation].
At this stage, ‘ “[t]he court does not weigh evidence or resolve conflicting
factual claims. Its inquiry is limited to whether the plaintiff has stated a
legally sufficient claim and made a prima facie factual showing sufficient to
sustain a favorable judgment. It accepts the plaintiff’s evidence as true, and
evaluates the defendant’s showing only to determine if it defeats the
plaintiff’s claim as a matter of law.” ’ ” (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p. 891.)
But “a plaintiff seeking to demonstrate the merit of the claim ‘may not rely
solely on its complaint, even if verified; instead, its proof must be made upon
competent admissible evidence.’ ” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v.
Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 940.) If the plaintiff cannot make
the required showing, the court will strike the claim. (Bonni, supra, 11
Cal.5th at p. 1009.)
We review de novo whether Xcentric met its burden of demonstrating
that the activity from which the lawsuit arises falls within the scope of the
anti-SLAPP statute’s protection. (Geiser v. Kuhns, supra, 13 Cal.5th at p.
1250; Meads v. Driggers (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 28, 35.) “[W]e may affirm
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the trial court’s order ‘if it is correct on any ground, regardless of the trial
court’s reasoning.’ ” (Meads, at p. 36.)
II. Claims Arising from Protected Activity
We first ask whether Xcentric met its burden to establish that Selker’s
UCL claim arises from activity protected under section 425.16, meaning that
it demonstrated that protected activity itself “underlies or forms the basis for
the claim.” (Park, supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1062-1063.) At this first step,
Xcentric “must identify the acts alleged in the complaint that it asserts are
protected and what claims for relief are predicated on them.” (Bonni, supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 1010.) “ ‘[A]ssertions that are “merely incidental” or
“collateral” are not subject to section 425.16. [Citations.] Allegations of
protected activity that merely provide context, without supporting a claim for
recovery, cannot be stricken under the anti-SLAPP statute.’ ” (Bonni, at p.
1012.) “[T]o the extent any acts [supporting Selker’s claim of recovery] are
unprotected, the claims based on those acts will survive.” (Ibid.)
The elements of the challenged claim are used to assess what “ ‘actions
by [Xcentric] supply those elements and consequently form the basis for
liability.’ ” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 1009, 1015; Sandoval v. Pali
Institute (2025) 113 Cal.App.5th 616, 628.) Our analysis is not confined to
the entire cause of action; we must “analyze each claim for relief—each act or
set of acts supplying a basis for relief, of which there may be several in a
single pleaded cause of action—to determine whether the acts are
protected[.]” (Bonni, at p. 1010.)
The UCL prohibits “any unlawful, unfair or fraudulent business act or
practice.” (Bus. & Prof. Code, § 17200; accord, Zhang v. Superior Court
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 364, 370.) “By proscribing ‘any unlawful’ business act or
practice . . . , the UCL ‘ “borrows” ’ rules set out in other laws and makes
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violations of those rules independently actionable. [Citation.] However, a
practice may violate the UCL even if it is not prohibited by another statute.
Unfair and fraudulent practices are alternate grounds for relief.” (Zhang, at
p. 370.) The action has narrow remedies; “ ‘[p]revailing plaintiffs are
generally limited to injunctive relief and restitution. [Citations.] Plaintiffs
may not receive damages . . . or attorney fees.’ ” (Id. at p. 371.) “ ‘Restitution
under [the UCL] is confined to restoration of any interest in “money or
property, real or personal, which may have been acquired by means of such
unfair competition.” . . . A restitution order against a defendant thus
requires both that money or property have been lost by a plaintiff, on the one
hand, and that it have been acquired by a defendant, on the other.’ ” (Ibid.)
In his operative pleading, Selker alleges Xcentric:
• “uniquely targets and seeks out negative commentary via
‘reports’ against individuals and businesses to force them into paying [it]
substantial fees to remove or mitigate the impact of the report” and
“encouraged exclusively negative reviews and allegations against businesses
and proprietors”;
• made “solicitations to consumers” on its home page, “urging them
to post negative reviews about those they’ve done business with”;
• on its website appearing immediately after the consumer
solicitation “solicited business owners and proprietors to pay [it] money to
take down the negative report via [its] exclusive arbitration program”;
• “permits negative reviews to be posted by anonymous parties” or
under fake names so it “could post negative content about an individual or
business itself, and then extort fees from victims of defamatory posts”;
• “requires the victims of reports to pay their extortion fees . . .
before it will even reveal the anonymous poster”;
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• “intentionally does not remove reviews even though those reviews
violate [its] terms of service so they can extort more money from businesses
and individuals who are the subject of the report”;
• “has various other additional income streams where it promises
to mitigate the impact of a negative review in exchange for compensation”;
and
• “allows other websites claiming to be neutral review sites to post
the reports about businesses and individuals.”
Selker goes on to allege specifics about the report posted by boba,
including that Xcentric “took editorial control and assigned the report to the
categories of ‘Questionable Activities’ and ‘Sex Offender’ on its own.” He
alleges “[a]ll of the acts described herein are unlawful and in violation of
public policy” and additionally “such acts are immoral, unethical, oppressive,
fraudulent, and unscrupulous, and thereby constitute unfair, unlawful, or
fraudulent business practices in violation of [the UCL].”
A. Allegations Giving Rise to Liability Versus Incidental or Collateral
Matters
The parties dispute what allegations form the basis of Selker’s UCL
claim and Xcentric’s alleged liability. As Xcentric frames it, Selker complains
about “speech” and consumer statements or activities concerning consumer
goods. Xcentric refers to case law involving “ ‘consumer’s statements about
the quality of a seller’s products and service and her unhappiness with them
. . .’ ” or “ ‘peaceful activities . . . which inform [consumers] about issues they
care about . . . .’ ” It argues it had constitutional protections afforded to it
“because of the website’s expressive activities . . . .”
On that premise, Xcentric asserts its “entire goal in maintaining the
website is to facilitate transparency to consumers regarding the quality and
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trustworthiness of companies or individuals that offer services to the public,
so that any potential consumer can be fully informed before interacting with
those businesses or people.” It maintains that such consumer statements are
matters of public interest for purposes of both subdivisions (e)(3) and (e)(4) of
section 425.16. Xcentric asks us to reject Selker’s “attempted reframing,”
suggesting this is a situation where his lawsuit is “ ‘masquerading’ ” as
something it is not so as to chill the exercise of free speech. It broadly argues
the complaint “and each claimed injury—centers on [Selker’s] humiliation
from the report’s being made public on the website”; that the unflattering
report “is the only set of facts that gives life to the [first amended complaint]
at all.” According to Xcentric, the proper analysis of what is incidental or
collateral requires that we “look to the thrust of the claim.”
Interspersed in these contentions are arguments about how the
superior court erred in its analysis, including by applying a test that ignores
the broad reach of the anti-SLAPP statute, or misreading and
mischaracterizing the first amended complaint, thus failing to recognize the
protected activity at the heart of Selker’s claim. These arguments ignore the
manner in which we review the court’s ruling on appeal. As stated above, it
does not matter if the court used an incorrect standard if it reached the
correct result. (Meads v. Driggers, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 36.) The
superior court’s specific reasoning is not relevant on appeal.
We are not persuaded by Xcentric’s framing of Selker’s first amended
complaint. Even assuming a consumer complaint about a business is anti-
SLAPP protected activity, a claim may be struck only if the protected activity
itself is the wrong complained of, not just evidence of liability or a step
leading to a different act for which liability is asserted. (Wilson, supra, 7
Cal.5th at p. 884; Rand Resources, LLC v. City of Carson (2019) 6 Cal.5th
18
610, 621 [“[A] claim does not ‘arise from’ protected activity simply because it
was filed after, or because of, protected activity, or when protected activity
merely provides evidentiary support or context for the claim”]; Park, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 1060.) Here, we agree with Selker that his UCL claim targets
Xcentric’s unlawful or unfair business practices, not boba’s negative report, or
even Xcentric’s hosting of negative consumer reports on its website. The
injurious practices—and the acts for which liability is asserted—are
Xcentric’s solicitation of exclusively negative reports, including by anonymous
individuals, for the purpose of forcing the reports’ subjects to compensate it
for services to remove or mitigate the impact of the consumer’s damaging
complaints. Other allegations regarding the boba complaint and its
emotional or financial impact on Selker do not give rise to UCL liability,
which does not permit damages. (Zhang v. Superior Court, supra, 57 Cal.4th
at p. 371.) Those allegations in our view are collateral or incidental, and
provide context to the conduct giving rise to liability under the UCL. They
therefore do not trigger anti-SLAPP protection. (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at
p. 1012.)
Further, Xcentric misses the mark when it argues we must look to the
thrust or principal thrust to identify the foundation for Selker’s claim. For
those principles, it relies in part on Okorie v. Los Angeles Unified School
District (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 574. Bonni, however, disapproved Okorie and
use of the “gravamen” or “principle thrust” test to “determine the essence or
gist of a . . . mixed cause of action.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at pp. 1011-
1012 & fn. 2; see also Sandoval v. Pali Institute, Inc., supra, 113 Cal.App.5th
at p. 628 [Although at one time courts were applying a gravamen test in the
first step of an anti-SLAPP analysis, the Supreme Court has made clear it is
19
not the proper inquiry].)5 Though Bonni stated it may be proper to invoke
the gravamen test to determine whether particular acts alleged within a
cause of action supply the elements of a claim (versus being incidental
background, id. at p. 1012), Xcentric has not attempted to discuss the UCL’s
elements. In our view, this omission, as well Xcentric’s reliance on Okorie’s
discussion of a “complaint’s leitmotiv” (Okorie, at p. 595), shows it is not
using the “gravamen” approach in the manner Bonni says is permissible.
Because Xcentric misidentifies the activity forming the basis for
Selker’s UCL claim as speech or the damaging boba report, it arguably has
failed to meet its first step anti-SLAPP burden. “If a cause of action contains
multiple claims and a moving party fails to identify how the . . . conduct
underlying some of those claims is protected activity, it will not carry its first-
step burden as to those claims.” (Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011; see
Park v. Nazari (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 1099, 1108 [defendant moving to strike
entire complaint did not carry its first-step anti-SLAPP burden in part where
it did not identify each claim for relief and relied on the improper “gravamen”
analysis].) But Xcentric does touch on Selker’s extortion allegations, so we
5 Bonni explained: “If we were . . . to adopt [the] proposed gravamen
approach, we would again risk saddling courts with an obligation to settle
intractable, almost metaphysical problems about the ‘essence’ of a cause of
action that encompasses multiple claims. [Citation.] The attempt to reduce a
multifaceted cause of action into a singular ‘essence’ would predictably yield
overinclusive and underinclusive results that would impair significant
legislative policies. Striking a cause of action that rests in part on
unprotected activity constrains a plaintiff’s ability to seek relief without
advancing the anti-SLAPP’s goals of shielding protected activity, which
would have been fully served by striking from the complaint only the
allegations of protected activity. Conversely, refusing to strike any part of a
cause of action that rests in part on protected activity defeats the legislative
goal of protecting defendants from meritless claims based on such conduct.”
(Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1011.)
20
will address whether any of its points establish conduct protected under
section 425.16, subdivisions (a)(3) or (a)(4).
B. Public Forum for Purposes of Section 425.16, Subdivision (e)(3)
Xcentric argues its public website is a public forum. Selker, who
conceded the point below, does not meaningfully contest the issue; he merely
notes that Xcentric cites authority for the “uncontroversial proposition that
websites can be ‘public forums . . . .’ ” The law is more clear: “Websites
accessible to the public . . . are ‘public forums’ for purposes of the anti-SLAPP
statute.” (Barrett v. Rosenthal (2006) 40 Cal.4th 33, 41, fn. 4; see also Muddy
Waters, LLC v. Superior Court (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 905, 917 [“Internet
postings on websites that ‘ “are open and free to anyone who wants to read
the messages” ’ and ‘accessible free of charge to any member of the public’
satisfies the public forum requirement of section 425.16”; citing cases].) This
does not help Xcentric where the “wrong complained of” (Park, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 1060) is not “any written or oral statement or writing” made on
Xcentric’s website, but its business conduct summarized above. Accordingly,
as to section 425.16, subdivision (a)(3), Xcentric has not demonstrated it is
entitled to anti-SLAPP protection.
C. Public Issue or Issue of Public Interest
Xcentric can qualify for protection under subdivision (e)(4) of section
425.16 if it shows Selker’s complaint is based on “any other conduct in
furtherance of the exercise of the constitutional right of petition or the
constitutional right of free speech in connection with a public issue or an
issue of public interest.” (§ 425.16, subdivision (a)(4).)
The Bonni court addressed how to determine whether challenged
conduct falls within section 425.16(e)(4)’s “catch-all” protection. It observed
the statute “does not . . . ‘define precisely how, or to what extent, conduct
21
must further the exercise of speech or petition rights to merit protection.”
(Bonni, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1020.) Bonni explains that we must ask
“whether [the conduct] furthered [the defendant’s] speech or petitioning
rights because [it bears] some ‘substantial relationship’ to [defendant’s]
‘ability to [petition or] speak on matters of public concern.’ ” (Bonni, at p.
1020.) The “inquiry . . . turns . . . on whether [Xcentric’s] conduct advances
[its] ‘ability to speak [or petition] on matters of public concern.’ ” (Id. at p.
1022.) Thus, in Bonni, involving hospitals’ adverse disciplinary actions based
on their view of a doctor’s suspect competence (which was “not speech at all,”
id. at p. 1021), the court found “no [apparent] connection between the
Hospitals’ choice of which doctors should receive staff privileges and its
ability to speak or petition on public issues.” (Id. at p. 1022.) This was the
case even though the discipline “triggered a peer review hearing, an official
proceeding during which the Hospitals’ medical executive committee
petitioned in support of its action, and the suspensions supplied the occasion
for reports to the Medical Board . . . and [a] Data Bank. . . . But that sort of
causal link does not mean the suspensions advanced the Hospitals’ ability to
speak or to petition on matters of public concern in any substantial way. . . .
Section 425.16, subdivision (e)(4) does not extend protection to every bit of
conduct factually related to actual speech . . . .” (Id. at pp. 1022-1023.)
Xcentric does not engage in this analysis with respect to its business
practice of soliciting negative consumer reports, and promotion of services to
compel subjects of reports to pay to remove or mitigate their impact. Rather,
Xcentric argues Selker’s extortion allegations “cannot take the complaint
outside of the anti-SLAPP statute because extortion has not been
‘conclusively established’ ” and as a result, the “illegality exception” cannot
apply. This argument refers to the principle that a defendant may not seek
22
anti-SLAPP protection “based on a claim that the plaintiff’s action arises
from activity by the defendant in furtherance of [its] exercise of protected
speech or petition rights” when “either the defendant concedes, or the
evidence conclusively establishes, that the assertedly protected speech or
petition activity is illegal as a matter of law.” (Flatley v. Mauro (2006) 39
Cal.4th 299, 320.) It is true that Selker made arguments below seeking to
apply this illegality exception. But regardless of the label Selker placed on
Xcentric’s conduct or the possible applicability of the illegality exception,6 it
remains Xcentric’s burden to establish that the conduct serving as the basis
for Selker’s claim was protected. As in Bonni, we see no connection between
Xcentric’s business conduct and its ability to speak on public issues. (Bonni,
supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 1022.)
Xcentric further argues Selker’s allegations that it assigned labels to
the reports on its website likewise does not overcome anti-SLAPP protection
because it presented undisputed evidence via Magedson’s declaration that it
did not assign such labels or categories.7 On the first step of the anti-SLAPP
6 Flatley made clear that when faced with a claim of illegal conduct, “[i]f
. . . a factual dispute exists about the legitimacy of the defendant’s conduct, it
cannot be resolved within the [anti-SLAPP statute’s] first step but must be
raised by the plaintiff in connection with the plaintiff’s burden to show a
probability of prevailing on the merits.” (Flatley v. Mauro, supra, 39 Cal.4th
at p. 316.)
7 In response, Selker reframes his allegations as stating that Xcentric
“contributes to extortionary value by steering [the reports] into negative and
inflammatory categories (e.g. ‘Fraud,’ ‘Theft,’ ‘Child Predator,’ ‘Slumlord,’
etc.) to maximize their impact,” then adds content to identify the reports’
targets. But the allegation is that Xcentric “took editorial control and
assigned the report to the categories . . . on its own.” Selker’s point is that
the allegations take Xcentric outside of CDA immunity, which we do not
reach as it is implicated in the anti-SLAPP motion’s second prong.
23
analysis, we are not required to accept the complaint’s allegations as true if
the defendant submits contrary evidence. (Wilson, supra, 7 Cal.5th at p.
887.) Rather, we may look beyond the pleadings to consider evidentiary
submissions by the parties. (Ibid.) Xcentric is correct that Selker offered no
evidence to dispute Magedson’s assertion. But the point does not help
Xcentric, which has not demonstrated the other business activity underlying
Selker’s claim qualifies for protection.
We conclude Xcentric failed to make a threshold showing that Selker’s
UCL cause of action arises from protected activity. Accordingly, the burden
does not shift to Selker to demonstrate that his claim has minimal merit, and
we need not reach the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis. (Baral v.
Schnitt, supra, 1 Cal.5th at p. 396 [only “[i]f the court determines that relief
is sought based on allegations arising from activity protected by the statute”
is the “second step . . . reached”].)
DISPOSITION
The order denying Xcentric’s anti-SLAPP motion is affirmed. Selker is
entitled to his costs on appeal.
O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:
DO, J.
BUCHANAN, J.
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