CourtListener 10747036•People v. Smith CA5
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Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Smith CA5
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
THE PEOPLE,
F086451
Plaintiff and Respondent,
(Super. Ct. No. BF181640A)
v.
GEORGE RICHARD SMITH, OPINION
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Kern County. John R.
Brownlee, Judge.
William Safford, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Defendant and
Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant Attorney General,
Kimberley A. Donohue, Assistant Attorney General, Ivan P. Marrs, Edrina Anderson, and
Jennifer M. Poe, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
Defendant George Richard Smith raises several claims after being convicted of
several crimes following the murder of his wife. We conclude the court erred in
admitting hearsay evidence, but the error was not prejudicial. The Attorney General
concedes that sentencing error occurred. We accept that concession, reverse the sentence
and remand for resentencing, while otherwise affirming the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In an amended information filed on April 26, 2023, the Kern County District
Attorney charged defendant with willful, deliberate and premeditated murder (count 1,
Pen. Code,1 § 187, subd. (a)) with a deadly weapon enhancement (§ 12022, subd.(b)(1));
arson of an inhabited structure (count 2, § 451, subd.(b)); and reckless evasion of a peace
officer (count 3, Veh. Code, § 2800.2).) The amended information also alleged several
sentencing factors under California Rules of Court, rule 4.421 (rule 4.421).
A jury convicted defendant of second degree murder, finding the
premeditation/deliberation allegation not true. The jury also convicted defendant of arson
and reckless evading of a peace officer. The jury found the deadly weapon enhancement
true.
Defense counsel agreed to a court trial of the sentencing allegations. At the court
trial, the court found true beyond a reasonable doubt three sentencing allegations: that
count 1 involved great violence, great bodily harm, or cruelty, etc. (rule 4.421(a)(1)), that
defendant used a weapon (rule 4.421(a)(2)) as to count 1,2 and that the manner in which
1 Subsequent statutory references are to the Penal Code unless otherwise noted.
2 While additional sentencing factors were alleged in the information as to count 1,
the prosecutor only sought these two findings at the court trial. The court’s minute order
reflected not true findings as to the factors alleged in the information but abandoned at
trial. As discussed further below, the court also found not true the factors alleged as to
count 3. While the prosecutor did not abandon these factors at trial, the trial evidence
was submitted without additional evidence or argument.
2.
count 2 was committed indicated planning, sophistication, or professionalism (rule
4.421(a)(8)).
The court sentenced defendant to 15 years to life in prison on count 1, plus one
year for the weapon enhancement, plus a consecutive upper term of eight years on count
2, plus a concurrent upper term of three years on count 3.
FACTS
Fire and Discovery of Victim’s Body
Ridgecrest Police Detective Franklen Mixon responded to a fire at the home of
George and Vickie Smith on June 30, 2020, shortly after 10:06 a.m. With the fire
extinguished, Detective Mixon entered the house and discovered a deceased female in a t-
shirt and no underwear on a bed in the master bedroom. She was identified as
defendant’s wife, Vickie Smith. Something was covering her face, which appeared to
one of the detectives to be a thin sheet. A piece of fabric on the bed had “red stuff” on it,
which detectives believed to be blood. Defendant George Smith was not in the home; a
doorbell camera video from one of defendant’s neighbors, showed defendant leaving the
house in his truck at 10:03 a.m. on June 30, 2020.
Vickie’s throat had been “basically slit from ear to ear,” with a cut five and a half
inches long. The cut was deep enough to cause sharp-force damage to the bone of the
neck/spine.
The largest amount of blood was not found directly under Vickie, but instead to
the right of her right arm, which the crime scene investigator opined may have been due
to being moved postinjury.
Chris Cagle, a Kern County firefighter assigned as an investigator with the arson
investigation unit, was dispatched to the fire at approximately 10:30 a.m. Due to travel
time, he arrived on scene likely two hours after the initial dispatch. Cagle observed the
most substantial fire damage had occurred near a couch in the living room. Cagle
eliminated several possible accidental causes in the area, including several nearby outlets.
3.
In the area the fire likely originated, Cagle found an upside down mixing bowl. Cagle
turned it over and smelled a strong odor of gasoline. Underneath the mixing bowl was a
plastic item that was melted to the floor. Cagle said the item’s shape and pattern was
consistent with being a fuel can.
Cagle also located a spot in the master bedroom with significantly more damage
compared to its surroundings. There was also a “V pattern” of soot in the room, which
often points to the fire’s area of origin. Cagle believed the bedroom fire originated on a
portion of a bed in the room, which now had exposed coils.
Cagle also observed that the hallway between the living room and master bedroom
had less damage. This led Cagle to conclude that two separate fires had started, one in
the master bedroom and one in the living room.
Ultimately, Cagle ruled out accidental causes of the fires, and opined that their
cause was “incendiary or arson.”
Defendant’s Arrest
Later, on June 30, 2020, at around 5:00 p.m., Ridgecrest Police Officer Nathan
Lloyd was notified via dispatch that a suspect vehicle (a gold Toyota Tundra) had entered
the City of Ridgecrest. Officer Lloyd pursued the vehicle with his lights and siren
activated. The vehicle did not comply with stop signs and at one point drove an
estimated 70 miles per hour in a residential zone, evading Officer Lloyd after one or two
minutes of pursuit. Officer Lloyd identified defendant as the driver at trial.
Kern County Sheriff’s Deputy Kevin Parsons eventually located defendant’s
vehicle at an ARCO station. Deputy Parsons contacted defendant inside the convenience
store. Defendant initially refused to provide his name, then said his name was Michael
Smith. Defendant appeared to be intoxicated and slurred his words a “little bit,” but he
could walk.
Ridgecrest Police Captain Aaron Tucker was dispatched to the ARCO station.
Captain Tucker observed a shotgun laying on the passenger floorboard of defendant’s
4.
vehicle and a revolver on the front passenger seat. A search of the truck did not locate
any weapons capable of causing Vickie’s injuries. Multiple cans of Bud Ice were located
on the front passenger floorboard.
Officer Parsons handcuffed defendant and sat him on a curb near the ARCO
station. Officer Parsons was surreptitiously recording at the time. Officer Parsons spoke
with defendant about the guns in his vehicle before defendant said,
“I- I did a fucking bad fucking thing. I don’t know why they fucking
brought those things out. I never fucking used them. I’m a fucking idiot. And,
we cleared it – stuck it totally, and we cleared it, turned to, uh, Kennedy Meadows.
Sat there for a while, watched the fucking river and came back. And that’s it.
You guys, I fully expected you guys to find me… Here we go. This is what I
expected to happen. You guys didn’t fuck around because it’s been only minutes
since I’ve been back in town. […] I don’t know what happened. I don’t know
what happened. Oh, my God, I don’t know what the fuck happened. […] I don’t
know what happened. That’s why I came back to face my fucking fate. Here I
am. ‘Cause, I realize that it was fucking bullshit. I don’t know what the fuck
happened, I don’t. […] I deserve whatever happens.”
Shortly thereafter, defendant continued, “I love my wife so fucking much. Oh my
God. [unintelligible3] That’s why I had to come back and be a man and fucking face this
shit.”
When asked about drinking, defendant said, “I drank a little bit of beer. I have not
been really drunk.” Defendant told Parsons he had been fighting with Vickie over bills.
Defendant said he makes the money and she spends the money.
Defendant continued:
“I’ve got to tell you guys, I did come back here for you guys to catch me. I did. I
came back [for] you guys [to] catch me, because this is fucking bullshit. I can’t
believe I did this.”
3 The transcript of the recording indicates defendant said, “I killed her” here.
However, we have reviewed the audio of the call (Exhibit 78) – which is the actual
“evidence” admitted for the jury’s consideration. It appears to us defendant might have
actually said, “I can’t believe—” instead of “I killed her.”
5.
Defendant said he had gone up to Kernville. He said, “I went further up there than
I’ve ever been in my whole life, just to fucking go up there and see it, ‘cause I know this
is my last of my days, and came back.” Defendant again claimed he “only drank a couple
of beers the whole time.”
Officer Mike Ogas then took custody of defendant. Ogas left the recorder on even
after placing defendant in his patrol vehicle. Defendant said, “Oh my God. I’m so
fucked. I needed to fucking run from them. I should have killed myself. Motherfucker.
They caught me. The motherfuckers, they fucking caught me. Fuck. That sucks so
bad.” Defendant later continued, “I’m not going to try to get away or nothing. I already
fucked up.” He said, “I’m not going to try to get away. I- I know what I did and I’m
ready to fucking face it. So, I’m not going to get away from you guys. Oh, God.” Later
still, defendant said, “I’m going to be a man and take it like a man. What I fucking did
was stupid. I fucking love my wife.”
Defendant later stated:
“I came back so you guys could catch me and you guys did. And, it’s fully
what I expected to happen. I’ll be a man about it. It’s fucking bullshit. It’s my
wife and I fucking love her so much. I’d fucking die for her in a fucking split
second and I stabbed her. [¶] What the fuck. She’s a major fucking alcoholic.
But still, I dealt with it for years and years. I guess I finally fucking lost it. I’m
probably not supposed to tell you that shit. I- I- I fucked up. I fucked up. Oh my
God. Oh my God. I can never live with myself again. I should have killed myself
or something. I can’t fucking believe I didn’t kill myself. I- I protected her all her
fucking life. [unintelligible] I was a dumbass. Oh my God. I’m a very
hardworking man, too. Just like you. Every fucking day. Blue collar. I worked
my fucking ass off and shit, and I can’t believe that something like this fucking
happened. I just can’t fucking believe it.”
Profile DNA results from stains on defendant’s clothing matched defendant’s
DNA. Vickie was excluded as a potential contributor to the stains.
Autopsy
Vickie’s autopsy was performed by medical examiner Dr. Eugene Carpenter, Jr.
Dr. Carpenter opined that, based on the condition of her body, Vickie was lying on her
6.
back at the time of the fire. There was no soot in Vickie’s airways, indicating she was
not breathing smoke for a reasonably significant amount of time. It was “fair to say” that
Vickie died within 10 to 15 minutes of her neck injury.
There were bruises on Vickie’s body that occurred before she died. One bruise on
the left temple area of her head was one and a half by one inch in size. This injury was
consistent with an injury that could render someone unconscious. Another bruise one-
quarter inch in size was located at the top of the left lateral shoulder. Both bruises were
consistent with being “fresh” bruises. However, it could not be conclusively determined
that the bruises were fresh, because carbon monoxide can change blood to a “very cherry
red” color.
There were no signs of neck compression on Vickie’s body. However, that did not
rule out the possibility Vickie had been choked recently.
There were additional slight cuts at the margins of the gaping neck wound.
Hypothetically, these marks could be caused by “wiggling” the cutting instrument to
disengage it or to go deeper. The wound could have been caused by a machete or heavier
kitchen knife.
There was a “considerable amount” of air in Vickie’s heart, which was not normal.
It can be caused by decomposition or when the person’s throat is cut while their heart was
still beating.
Dr. Carpenter did not observe any defensive wounds on Vickie’s body.
Dr. Carpenter determined Vickie’s cause of death to be a cut throat and the
manner of death to be a medical homicide.
Friends and Neighbors
Denise O. (Denise) testified that she and Vickie were best friends who had known
each other for about 25 years. The two talked frequently on the phone and met in person
once or twice a month. Vickie referred to defendant – whose middle name is Richard –
as “Rich.”
7.
On June 21, 2020,4 Vickie sent Denise a text message reading: “So only telling
u..pls don’t tell jeff6..but rich [redaction] choked me..pls don’t tell anyone.”5
On June 24, Vickie sent Denise a text message reading: “I’m ok and yes he was
drinking but that’s no excuse..he’s done this twice to me [redaction] he keeps apologizing
and professing his love…I told him the next time this happens I will call the police and
he will go away for along [sic] time..”
On June 25, Vickie sent Denise a text message reading: “Rich just beat the fuck
out of me all over the living room..there’s a good chance he might [be] arrested after
work tomorrow.”
June 2020 was the first time Denise had heard the allegations Vickie made in the
text messages. In the more than 20 years they were friends, Denise had never seen marks
or bruising on Vickie.
Other Friends and Neighbors
Several friends, neighbors, and family members testified that defendant was
nonviolent and had positive things to say of his relationship with Vickie.
One of defendant’s neighbors testified defendant seemed visibly agitated a couple
days prior to June 30, 2020. The neighbor also heard arguments coming from
defendant’s house in the months prior.
Defendant’s Testimony
Defendant testified that he is an alcoholic. He drank “a lot” on weekends, and
would have “a couple of beers after work” on weekdays.
In June 2020, there were several stressors affecting defendant. Drinking was the
“number one” stressor. This included both defendant’s drinking and Vickie’s drinking.
4 Subsequent references to dates in June are to June 2020.
5 A portion of this text message was redacted, as will be explained later in the
opinion. The quotation provided here is what the jury saw in the exhibit.
8.
Additionally, defendant was “getting behind in bills” and was “in between jobs.”
Defendant and Vickie were both on medication for depression.
Defendant would go to the store when needed because Vickie would not wear a
mask or use hand sanitizer. Vickie had several medical conditions that made her
susceptible to COVID.
Vickie carried around a trash can in which she would vomit “all the time” due to
her drinking. Vickie drank pretty much every day. Vickie was beginning to have
seizures due to her drinking. Vickie would have defendant go to the store after work to
get alcohol for the next day.
In June 2020, Vickie and defendant would get in verbal arguments. The two
argued daily. Vickie used to pay the bills and cook, but she was no longer doing
anything during the days because she spent them drinking. Sometimes Vickie would not
shower for a week.
Vickie would become upset when defendant would try to get her to drink less.
The two would get into arguments and both would raise their voices. In the week prior to
Vickie’s death, they would often argue, then calm down for 30-60 minutes, then resume
arguing.
Defendant indicated that he was surprised to hear about Vickie’s text messages
referenced in prior testimony. Defendant denied choking Vickie in June 2020 and
testified their arguments were never physical in June 2020.
Defendant got a job about three weeks prior to June 30, 2020. During his first
week back to work, Vickie began drinking more. Additionally, defendant felt that doing
physical labor at work made him “more vulnerable” to getting into arguments.
Vickie told defendant she wanted more alcohol than he was buying her. Since
Vickie was now home alone, she could go to the store and buy E&J Brandy and Mike’s
Hard Liquor, which is 24 ounces of eight percent alcohol.
9.
Defendant’s Testimony Concerning June 29, 2020
On June 29, 2020, defendant would have returned from work around 5:45 p.m.
Defendant’s daughter’s boyfriend, Ben H., was present at defendant’s home (or arrived
shortly thereafter). Defendant heard the TV in the bedroom and concluded Vickie was
home (though he had not seen her yet). Ben stayed for about 30 minutes, then left.
Defendant then went to the bedroom and greeted Vickie. She was “drunker than usual.”
Defendant was concerned because “it was getting worse” and Vickie was “killing
herself.”
Vickie said she wanted Arby’s. Before defendant left to get the food, Vickie
asked him to get alcohol on the way back. Defendant went to Arby’s, then the liquor
store. Defendant purchased two 24-ounce Bud Ice beers (5.5 percent alcohol
concentration) for himself and a pint of E&J Brandy for Vickie.
Defendant returned home around 8:00 p.m. and began to drink his first beer.
Defendant’s hamburger fell on the ground, so defendant decided not to eat dinner. Vickie
asked that defendant get more alcohol for the next day. Defendant returned to the liquor
store and purchased two more 24-ounce Bud Ice beers for himself and a pint and a half of
E&J Brandy for Vickie. Defendant returned home and drank all four beers between
8:00 p.m. and 10:00 p.m.
Defendant and Vickie began arguing about paying bills. They raised their voices
during the argument. It was more intense of an argument than usual and it resulted in
defendant staying up later than his usual 9:00 p.m. bedtime. Vickie was “mad as hell.”
She did not like when defendant pointed out she was not showering for extended periods.
Vickie was unable to get up without assistance and was “barely” able to walk.
Around 9:40 p.m., they “calmed down” and were watching TV. Eventually, the
two sat on the sofa and defendant rubbed Vickie’s feet. At 10:00 p.m., defendant took
two propranolol pills for anxiety and two Seroquel pills for sleeping, set his alarm, and
kissed Vickie on the forehead. Defendant had never taken two propranolol pills at once
10.
before, nor had he ever taken two Seroquel pills at once. However, defendant was more
anxious than normal due to the argument. Defendant felt intoxicated before taking the
pills.6 When defendant went to the bedroom,7 he was not in a good mood and was still
“slightly upset.” Defendant then went to sleep.
The next thing defendant remembered was looking out the window and seeing
Carlos outside in his truck. On a typical day, defendant would leave for work at 4:30
a.m. when he would get a ride with a man named Carlos Herrera.
The next thing defendant remembered after that was being at a store in South Lake
Isabella, about one hour and 10 or 15 minutes away. Defendant did not recall leaving his
house or driving to the store. Defendant next remembered waking up in his truck with
multiple firearms, parked off the side of the road. Defendant did not know how the guns
got into his vehicle, nor did he remember how much he drank during these time periods.
Defendant next remembered having a police car behind him and then being interviewed
at a police station. Defendant did not recall being in a police car.
Defendant denied having any recollection of harming Vickie. Defendant denied
having any recollection of a house fire. Defendant’s “blackouts” ended while he was in a
jail cell in Bakersfield.
Defendant testified he owned a filleting knife capable of making the injuries that
Vickie sustained.
Dr. Michael Musacco
Dr. Michael Musacco was called as a witness both by the defense during its case-
in-chief and by the prosecution in rebuttal. Dr. Musacco is a psychologist with training
and experience regarding alcohol and the effects of intoxication.
6 Defendant testified that he had previously told a doctor that he did not feel
intoxicated, but he claimed that was because he defined drunk and intoxicated differently.
7 On weekdays, defendant slept in the bedroom and Vickie slept on the couch.
Vickie would sleep with the TV on, which defendant did not prefer.
11.
Dr. Musacco testified that alcohol can impact a person’s mental functioning and
stress can aggravate these effects. The extent to which alcohol can affect mental
functioning depends on several factors, including tolerance, body weight and gender.
Alcohol would have less effect on a heavy male who drinks frequently compared to a
light female who does not drink much. Alcohol “shuts off” the frontal portion of the
brain, which recognizes danger or inhibits behavior.
Dr. Musacco further testified that Seroquel can cause memory loss and alcohol can
increase the potency of Seroquel. However, the effects lessen in a person who drinks and
takes Seroquel all the time.
Dr. Musacco testified that he would expect that a functional alcoholic would be
aware of their actions and conduct most of the time. Thirty hours is a “pretty long time”
for a blackout, and is not “in the wheelhouse” of what Dr. Musacco typically thought for
a blackout. “[P]erhaps” it could occur with the right combination of drugs and alcohol,
but at a certain point a person would transition from a blackout to passed out. Drinking
during a blackout can prolong the blackout.
Dr. Musacco interviewed defendant while defendant was in custody on January
12, 2022, and January 18, 2022. Defendant told Dr. Musacco he was a functional
alcoholic and that Vickie was a dysfunctional alcoholic. Defendant said he discovered
Vickie had been sneaking extra alcohol from the store, which made him upset.
Defendant told Dr. Musacco he had not consumed any alcohol the night of the argument.
Defendant told Dr. Musacco he never physically abused his wife.
DISCUSSION
I. The Court Did Not Err in Excluding Evidence of Vickie’s BAC and Prior
Drunken Beratements of Defendant
Defendant contends the court erred in excluding evidence of Vickie’s blood
alcohol concentration (BAC) and prior drunken beratements of defendant.
12.
A. Additional Background
1. Pre-Trial Filings
Defendant filed several motions in limine. In one of those motions, defendant
sought to introduce evidence at trial of Vickie’s BAC. The motion claimed that a
toxicology report indicated Vickie’s BAC was .17 percent at the time of the “incident.”
Defendant argued that circumstantial evidence of what occurred that night/morning was
necessary “especially” considering that he was “in a state of blackout at the time of the
incident.” The prosecution countered that evidence of Vickie’s BAC was irrelevant
(Evid. Code, § 210) and unduly prejudicial (Evid. Code, § 352).
Defendant also filed an offer of proof, which included a defense investigator’s
report. The report detailed interviews with people who described Vickie’s personality
and drinking habits. Defendant’s friend described Vickie as “very difficult to be around”
and said she “ ‘had a mouth on her.’ ” Vickie was “verbally abusive” to defendant and
had cut him down in front of others.
Another of defendant’s friends said Vickie was a heavy drinker and did not treat
defendant well. Sometimes “Vickie would joke around with [defendant] and there were
5-6 times when [the friend] saw Vickie hit [defendant’s] hands with the remote when he
did not do what she wanted.” This friend’s wife told the defense investigator that Vickie
was a challenging person to be around and treated defendant poorly when sober and even
worse when drinking. Vickie would cut defendant down and call him “ ‘stupid.’ ”
Vickie’s drinking got worse during the last couple years of her life.
One of Vickie’s family members said Vickie was “not nice” to defendant when
she drank. Vickie would talk down to him and was “very disrespectful and demeaning to
him.” Vickie drank heavily.
The investigator’s report described what she was told by one of defendant and
Vickie’s couple friends as follows:
13.
“Vickie did not treat her any differently after she had been drinking. She said
Vickie was mostly a happy drunk with her. She would see Vickie’s mood change
with [defendant] after she had been drinking. [The friend] noticed that Vickie’s
mood after she had been drinking depended on how things were with her and
[defendant]. If Vickie had been complaining to her about [defendant ] when she
was sober, she was more likely to get moody and sad or upset more easily when
she was drunk.”
She also said Vickie would antagonize defendant when she was drunk and
“verbally abuse” him over “stupid stuff.”
Defendant’s neighbor said Vickie’s drinking had gotten worse over the last few
years. The neighbor did not see her outside often, but when she was outside she seemed
heavily intoxicated.
Ben H. told the investigator that on the day he was at defendant’s house, Vickie
seemed drunk and was mumbling.
2. Court Discussion
In discussing defendant’s in limine motion, the court observed:
“[That Vickie was] berating him [on the night in question] is pure speculation. I
don’t see -- because there is nobody there to say that she was berating him or
giving him a hard time while this was going on. I don’t how see the B.A.[C.]
could come in because we have no idea of her tolerance level as to the alcohol. [¶]
So I’d be keeping out the B.A.[C.] and how it may [have] affected her that night.
You can call the witnesses about the bucket and their perceived intoxication as
relevant to the text messages. But there’s no way of knowing if she was riding
him that night. Musacco cannot testify to the victim’s alcohol use or how it would
have affected the defendant because nobody can testify as to what occurred that
evening if the murderer or the person, the defendant, blacked out. It would be
pure speculation.”
The following exchange ensued:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: … I do have numerous witnesses that I plan on
bringing in that say that when she is drinking she argues with him even more and
at a greater level based on their own observations when she’s intoxicated versus
when she’s not and that that’s when they see her antagonizing him. [¶] So is the
Court excluding those witnesses from testifying about their observations about
when she’s antagonizing my client when she’s drunk?
14.
“THE COURT: If you have witnesses that will testify that what was going
on on the day of the homicide, that she was drunk and antagonizing him and they
saw that, I would be tempted to allow that. But what was happening leading up to
that, we have no information that it was happening on the date that apparently set
him off.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay. So the Court is excluding witnesses
from saying in general when she gets drunk she antagonizes him and is mean to
him.
“THE COURT: Yes, ma’am.”
Later, the following exchange occurred:
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I know that the Court has already ruled that I
can’t ask witnesses about Vickie’s prior drinking and how she treated [defendant]
when drinking. [¶] My plan is -- and I just want to make sure I’m not in violation
of the Court’s ruling -- is to ask character witnesses about part of their basis for
their opinion that [defendant] is nonviolent and seeing how when Vickie would be
mean or aggressive towards him he didn’t react and he would avoid confrontation.
I think that that’s fair game without getting into the alcohol portion to explain their
reasoning for why they believe him to be nonviolent and treated her well, but I just
don’t want to ask that or mention it in opening and be in violation of the Court
order.
“THE COURT: [Prosecutor]?
“ [PROSECUTOR]: I think the whole nature of the character evidence is to
show that she mistreated the defendant. I think that was the thrust of the Court’s
ruling, excluding the prior drinking.
“THE COURT: We end up getting back to, [defense counsel], that she may
have given him a hard time in the past, but we don’t know necessarily that she was
doing it on the night in question. We do have the one witness that said she looked
to be intoxicated and had a bucket or whatever it was, but do we end up getting
conduct in conformity there with that she acted mean [on] previous occasions but
he didn’t react. [¶] So you’re not getting into Vickie. You’re getting into the fact
that when provoked, he did not do anything.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Right. Which would be the basis for some of
their opinions that my client is not violent.
“THE COURT: That’s actually a little bit of a backdoor way of getting in
that she was mean to him, which we have no idea that that happened on this night.
However, your proposition is that he was a mild-mannered guy. [¶] What do you
15.
think about that, [prosecutor], going towards the proposition that it’s towards him,
not necessarily towards Vickie?
“[PROSECUTOR]: I think that if the character witnesses for the defense
testify that he was a calm, mild-mannered guy, disregarding the provocation by the
victim, I think those statements would be fine.
“THE COURT: I was thinking about that. [¶] Can you do that, [defense
counsel]?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think my concern with it is the fact that no
opinion -- just saying he’s a mild- mannered person or he’s nonviolent, it’s not the
ultimate conclusion that carries the weight. It’s the basis for the opinion. [¶] If
they’re just saying, well, he’s nonviolent, but then the argument is going to be they
haven’t seen him in certain situations, it goes to the weight of their testimony, the
fact that they’ve seen him in situations where he could have been from -- where he
was provoked and he could have reacted but he instead chose to avoid
confrontation.
“THE COURT: Are you going to call witnesses that will say that when --
the provoker was somebody other than Vickie?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: All of them except for one person says that it
was -- that it was always when it was Vickie. I have -- gosh. I have maybe six --
seven or eight character witnesses, and the overwhelming majority is all of them
saying when Vickie was provoking him.
“[PROSECUTOR]: Judge.
“THE COURT: Yes.
“[PROSECUTOR]: If the defense was a voluntary manslaughter request
for heat of passion or sudden quarrel, that evidence may very well be relevant, but
that’s not where this case is shaking up to be.
“THE COURT: Funny you mention that, [prosecutor], because somewhere
last week I wrote that down. [¶] But if I ask [defense counsel] how she’s going to
proceed on that, she’s not going to tell me.
“[PROSECUTOR]: Well, I understand that it’s just an abstract thought at
this point because we don’t actually have any evidence to analyze whatever is
going to happen, right?
“THE COURT: Right.
16.
“[PROSECUTOR]: At some point my case is going to be done and
something will happen that may affect the Court’s ruling on the testimony that the
character witnesses are able to give. If there is evidence of heat of passion or
sudden quarrel, then maybe that stuff comes in, but it certainly won’t now if the
defense, as it stands now -- from what I’m reading, and obviously there’s no real
evidence of it yet -- that it’s a blackout and I don't remember what happened. That
is completely different than heat of passion, sudden quarrel. If that makes sense.
“THE COURT: It does. It does. [¶] You almost summarized exactly what
I had written down, [prosecutor], in that are we going to get into [voluntary
manslaughter] -- we have an interesting area where if the defendant gets up there
and says he blacked out, he has no recollection of what was going on, it would be
very difficult to argue [voluntary manslaughter] if he can’t remember that. Okay?
[¶] What I see is you attempting to get in information of [voluntary manslaughter]
despite the fact that defendant is going to testify to blackout by saying in the past,
she had been real mean to him and he never reacted. [¶] Would that be that, well,
on this particular night, since he can’t remember, he eventually did react and,
therefore, I give the voluntary manslaughter instruction, and that would be --
prevent the People from cross-examining on [voluntary manslaughter] since we
have other people saying what he might have done on the night in question,
despite the fact him having a blackout. Puts me in a bad spot.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Do you want my comments?
“THE COURT: Absolutely.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: So I did put this in my in limine motions, in one
of the motions. There are so many. It was one related to Dr. Musacco. [¶] I
know that the Court has already made its ruling, but my position was that defense
should get voluntary manslaughter just based on the fact that [defendant] told
Dr. Musacco that they were in an argument on that night, and that she was
intoxicated, and that when she’s intoxicated is when she gets into the more
aggressive arguments with him, and that -- and treats him in a certain way, and
how there’s also going to be testimony that the week leading up to the incident,
that a neighbor heard more arguing coming from the area of the residence, verbal
arguments not physical, but it was verbal arguments, that his perceptions of
[defendant] and how he knows [defendant] is that [defendant] appeared to be more
stressed out and something appeared to be bothering him in a way that he had
never seen before with [defendant]; so I think the totality of all of that evidence
does get defense to voluntary manslaughter. [¶] I also think that -- and I respect
the Court’s ruling. I think that the Court’s ruling, though, about Vickie and not
being allowed to get into how she treated [defendant] takes away part of the basis
to get to voluntary manslaughter, but assume it all came in, I would absolutely be
17.
requesting it. [¶] The other request that I do have is I would like to file at least the
character witness statements with the Court, at least, so we have the offer of proof
for appellate purposes as well as to what the witnesses would be offering on those
topics. I know I’ve stated it on the record, but I would like to file that with the
Court, if that’s okay, as well, and I can bring that next time.
“THE COURT: You can. [¶] My concern is that if you call witnesses to
talk about what led up to all of this, but on the night in question we have nobody
testifying that Vickie was riding him to the point where he snapped and he killed
her, okay, I don’t have any of that information. So I don’t know what the
relevance is of the fact that Vickie had irritated him in the past as to whether or not
she had irritated him on the night in question. [¶] Now, your point is is that it
goes to the fact that he has been pushed in the past and he never snapped. Okay?
[¶] Doesn’t that fall in line with [prosecutor] and help [prosecutor] by saying that,
well, they never snapped in the past, what would make him snap this particular
night?
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: If I may.
“THE COURT: Sure.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: I think that a lot of the evidence in this case can
be used both ways. I think that some of, like, what can go for the prosecution it
can go for the defense, and I think that’s with different things in this case. [¶] I do
note that there are -- there is certain case law that says, for instance, if someone in
the past -- this is not this case, but if someone in the past has said, ‘I want to kill
you,’ that that can be used as circumstantial evidence for their intention on the
night of the incident. [¶] And so I think that when you’re getting at with -- and
circumstantial evidence is treated the same as direct evidence under the law; so I
do think that when there is evidence of an argument on that night and the week
leading up to it and escalating the week leading and the argument on that night, I
absolutely do think that the past is circumstantial evidence from what was
happening on that night that I can use to argue both [defendant’s] mental state and
the whole situation in its totality. But I also think that they’re two separate issues
that are already being conflated into one here. Because one is the everything
about how she treated him and how that impacted the night at issue as for
voluntary manslaughter, that sort of thing. [¶] The other part that is getting
conflated, but it’s actually a separate issue, is the basis for the character witnesses’
opinions that he’s nonviolent because it carries much less weight for a character
witness to get up on the stand and just say, ‘I know [defendant]. He’s nonviolent,’
versus having specific examples to support their opinion as to why he’s
nonviolent. [¶] And I do think that if the Court does stand by its previous ruling
about the past and how Vickie treated [defendant] and that not being admissible as
to what she was doing on the night of the incident, I think the Court could give a
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limiting instruction, perhaps, but I think that it’s important for the basis of the
character witnesses’ statements to be able to provide concrete examples, instead of
just someone saying nonviolent and not being able to say why.
“THE COURT: [Defense counsel], well done. [¶] I’ll tell you what, if you
want to file those affidavits with the Court of what you think the witnesses will
say, I would like to read those and take a look at it. [¶] I did literally just write
down, ‘Goes to character of Defendant, not to how Vickie was treating him on that
night.’ I could write a limiting instruction on that. But let me take a look at what
you propound or propose these witnesses are going to say, and then I’ll have a
better idea about that. I’m not saying no.
“[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Okay.
“THE COURT: Okay? [¶] Not saying yes, but I’m not saying no. [¶] But
you are right. We’re going to get into the point on this where I’m not sure when
the evidence goes out how the jury is going to take it, either for the prosecution or
the defense or somewhere in the middle, which makes this case even more
interesting.”
3. Revisiting Issue Midtrial
Midtrial, before defendant testified, defense counsel informed the court of her
intent to call several witnesses to testify to defendant’s character and “how the victim
would treat [defendant] under the influence of alcohol.” The court stated:
“I’m going to go ahead and reserve a ruling on the latter until I hear what
[defendant] has to say tomorrow. I gave a Court-indicated that it’s unlikely that
we get into that, but since I have no idea how he’s going to testify or what he’s
going to say, I’ll just wait on the back burner, and since they’re coming anyway,
they can certainly testify as to his character, not a violent person, et cetera.
Whether or not we’ll get into Vickie’s drinking remains to be seen.”
After defendant testified, defense counsel renewed the request to have witnesses
echo defendant’s testimony that Vickie’s drinking was bad and getting worse. She
argued that such testimony would make defendant’s testimony more credible to the jury.
The prosecutor responded, arguing:
“The victim’s state of mind is not relevant. Her being intoxicated or her being an
annoying bitch that night is not relevant in this particular type of homicide. It
might be, depending on what evidence was presented, but we haven’t reached that
point yet, provocation or heat of passion. [¶] We have a blackout defense where
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[defendant] says he doesn’t remember anything. So whatever she was doing that
night is completely irrelevant. [¶] The fact that she wants -- that [defense
counsel] wants to have evidence that corroborates [defendant], I can understand
that from a trial perspective, and there’s a lot of available evidence that will
corroborate [defendant] that does not involve the intoxication of or lack thereof of
the victim. That is not a defense to the crimes charged under these facts. [¶] So I
think to allow that stuff is irrelevant and unduly prejudicial.”
The court observed that this type of evidence would be relevant in a normal case
“where we had a defense of provocation.” However, in this case, defendant claimed he
did not remember the killing. The court observed the evidence might have been relevant
if there had been more evidence on defendant’s state of mind. The court excluded the
witnesses from testifying as to the victim’s drinking. Defendant’s counsel again
requested to introduce evidence that Vickie’s BAC was .17 percent, and the court “noted”
her objection.
4. Jury Note
During deliberations, the jury sent a note saying, “ ‘Full autopsy.’ ” The court
asked the jury if they wanted “ ‘the readback of the autopsy.’ ” The jury responded,
“ ‘No. They wanted the findings of the autopsy, the – the blood alcohol of the victim,’ a
lot of things like that.” The court then conferred with counsel, which agreed with the
answer the court gave: “All evidence regarding the autopsy has been presented to you. If
you require readback about any of the evidence that was presented on this issue, please
advise.”
Defense counsel asked to reopen the evidence phase to present Vickie’s BAC to
the jury (§ 1094), and the court denied that request.
B. Law
Defendant claims the court erred in excluding Vickie’s BAC, and the proffered
testimony of friends, family and neighbors indicating Vickie had verbally berated
defendant in the past and that it was worse while she was drinking. We conclude below
that the court did not err.
20.
1. Heat of Passion
“ ‘The heat of passion requirement for manslaughter has both an objective and a
subjective component.’ ” (People v. Choyce (2025) 18 Cal.5th 86, 104.)
The subjective component is that “[t]he defendant must actually, subjectively, kill
under the heat of passion.” (People v. Choyce, supra, 18 Cal.5th at p. 104.)
“With respect to the objective component, ‘ “this heat of passion must be such a
passion as would naturally be aroused in the mind of an ordinarily reasonable person
under the given facts and circumstances.” ’ [Citation.] To satisfy this objective standard,
‘ “the accused’s heat of passion must be due to ‘sufficient provocation,’ ” ’ which must
come from the victim. [Citation.] The provocation which incites the defendant to
homicidal conduct in the heat of passion must be caused by the victim or by conduct
reasonably believed by the defendant to have been engaged in by the victim. [Citation.]
‘Adequate provocation and heat of passion must be affirmatively demonstrated.’ ”
(People v. Choyce, supra, 18 Cal.5th at pp. 104-105.)
2. Evidence Code Section 352
A trial court has discretion to “exclude evidence if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the probability that its admission will (a) necessitate undue
consumption of time or (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice, of confusing the
issues, or of misleading the jury.” (Evid. Code, § 352.)
Appellate courts “must not disturb the trial court’s exercise of discretion
‘ “ ‘except on a showing that the court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious
or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of justice.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Hinojos (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 524, 549.)
C. Analysis
We conclude the proffered evidence was not enough to raise an inference of heat
of passion. Although there may have been relevant evidence on the topic, the evidence
21.
was not substantial.8 That is, the evidence was not sufficient to support a reasonable
inference of heat of passion. As explained below, there are far too many speculative
leaps from the proffered evidence to heat of passion. The evidence had very little
probative value and was properly excluded under Evidence Code section 352.
1. Circumstantial Evidence
First, evidence that a person was seen acting in a particular manner under a
particular set of circumstances does not establish that they always act in that manner in
those circumstances.9 Specifically, evidence that Vickie had berated defendant while
8 Relevance is a very low bar. The prosecutor, trial court, and the Attorney General
overstated their position by arguing the evidence at issue was irrelevant. The evidence is
technically relevant as to whether defendant acted with malice. The Attorney General
acknowledges that a killer’s state of mind is proven with evidence of provocation but
posits that no substantial evidence that defendant’s reason was actually obscured here. In
other words, the evidence does not establish the subjective prong of heat of passion.
However, evidence relevant to one element of a crime does not become irrelevant simply
because other elements of the crime are unproven.
Whether the evidence raises an inference of heat of passion is a different question.
Relevant evidence can merely be consistent with a particular inference, which is not the
same as the relevant evidence independently supporting the inference. “[T]he law
distinguishes between facts that can ‘logically and reasonably be drawn’ from the
evidence [citation] versus evidence which ‘merely raises a possibility’ a particular fact is
true. [Citation.] The former is called a reasonable inference; the latter is called
speculation and is ‘not a sufficient basis for an inference of fact.’ ” (People v. Bell (2020)
47 Cal.App.5th 153, 180.) While the evidence at issue here is technically relevant, that
does not mean that heat of passion can “logically and reasonably be drawn” from that
evidence, as we discuss later in this opinion.
9 On this point, we note that one of the witnesses essentially told the defense
investigator that Vickie’s conduct while drinking was not uniform, stating:
“Vickie did not treat her any differently after she had been drinking. She said
Vickie was mostly a happy drunk with her. She would see Vickie’s mood change
with [defendant] after she had been drinking. [The friend] noticed that Vickie’s
mood after she had been drinking depended on how things were with her and
[defendant]. If Vickie had been complaining to her about [defendant] when she
was sober, she was more likely to get moody and sad or upset more easily when
she was drunk.” (Italics added.)
22.
drunk in the past does not mean Vickie always berated defendant while drunk.10
Consequently, the truly material question remains unaddressed by the evidence – i.e.,
whether Vickie berated defendant in this particular instance.
Defendant correctly points out that circumstantial evidence – not just direct
evidence – can be substantial. And of course that is true. But not all circumstantial
evidence is substantial. Some circumstantial evidence only weakly suggests a particular
fact is true, while other circumstantial evidence is strong enough to support an inference
the fact is true. Only the latter type of evidence is sufficiently “substantial” to merit
consideration by a jury.
“Fundamentally, whether evidence ‘raises’ or ‘supports’ a particular inference is a
matter of probability. Relevant evidence increases the apparent probability a particular
fact is true. Some evidence increases that apparent probability greatly, and other
evidence does so slightly. There is a point on the spectrum above which the probabilistic
connections between the evidence and proposed inference are deemed ‘reasonable’ and
below which weaker probabilistic connections are deemed ‘speculation’ or ‘conjecture.’
(Evid. Code, § 600, subd. (b) [an inference is a deduction of fact that may logically and
‘reasonably’ be drawn from another fact].) In this way, the law distinguishes between
facts that can ‘logically and reasonably be drawn’ from the evidence [citation] versus
evidence which ‘merely raises a possibility’ a particular fact is true. [Citation.] The
former is called a reasonable inference; the latter is called speculation and is ‘not a
sufficient basis for an inference of fact.’ ” (People v. Bell, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at
p. 180.)
Thus while circumstantial evidence can be “substantial,” other times
“circumstantial evidence only slightly increases the apparent probability a particular fact
is true.” (People v. Bell, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 180.) “For example, consider
10 This fact does not render the evidence irrelevant. Rather, we merely conclude that
the evidence does not independently support an inference of heat of passion.
23.
evidence that a defendant was in the same city where a murder occurred. Certainly, the
apparent probability of [the] defendant’s involvement is slightly higher if he was in the
same city where the crime occurred than if he was in another state. But at most, we could
say such evidence is ‘not inconsistent with’ the defendant having committed the murder.
[Citation.] We would not say this evidence ‘supports’ an inference the defendant
committed the murder. Similarly, the fact a defendant was seen with the killer before and
after the murder is insufficient to raise an inference the defendant was involved in the
murder.” (Id. at pp. 180-181.)
Here, the evidence that Vickie berated defendant while drunk in the past “merely
raises a possibility” that she actually berated him while drunk on the specific
night/morning in question.
2. Sufficient Provocation
Second, even if we do assume Vickie acted in the way the witnesses had seen her
act toward defendant while drunk in the past, it would still be speculation to find heat of
passion here. The terms used by the witnesses (e.g., Vickie would cut down defendant
verbally, would be “not nice” to him, “disrespectful” and “verbally abusive”) each
encompass a wide range of verbal conduct. We do not know where Vickie’s conduct fell
on this spectrum on the night/morning in question. This is crucial, because while
defendant argues that words alone can be sufficient provocation (see People v. Millbrook
(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1122, 1147), they rarely are. (See, e.g., People v. Gutierrez
(2009) 45 Cal.4th 789, 826-827; People v. Manriquez (2005) 37 Cal.4th 547, 585-586;
People v. Lucas (1997) 55 Cal.App.4th 721, 739.) The jury had no grounds to determine
which the case here was.
3. Subjective Prong of Heat of Passion
Third, the evidence proffered by the defense goes only to the objective prong of
heat of passion. Even if that prong were undoubtedly satisfied, heat of passion does not
apply absent evidence of the subjective prong as well. The only evidence we have on
24.
that issue arguably cuts against defendant. The proffered testimony indicated that
defendant did not react negatively to Vickie’s “verbal abuse” in the past. If anything, this
is circumstantial evidence that defendant would not have reacted with his reason
obscured if/when Vickie berated him before the killing. In any event, there is no
affirmative evidence that defendant’s reason was obscured.
There are simply too many speculative steps from the proffered evidence to infer
heat of passion. Because heat of passion was not a viable theory, without more, the
probative value of the evidence was virtually non-existent.
In contrast, the evidence posed a risk of undue prejudice. The evidence was
essentially character evidence, offered to prove that on a specific occasion Vickie acted in
conformity with prior bad acts. The risk inherent to nearly all negative character
evidence is that the jury will not limit its consideration of the evidence to its allowable
purposes but will instead seek to punish the person for their prior bad acts or character.
The specific risk here is that the jury would base its decisions, in part, on inflamed
emotion/reduced sympathy for the victim.
Because the evidence posed a risk of undue prejudice and had very little probative
value, we cannot say the trial court’s exclusion of the evidence was “ ‘ “ ‘arbitrary,
capricious or patently absurd.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Hinojos, supra, 110 Cal.App.5th 524 at p.
549.)
II. The Court Did Not Err in Declining to Instruct the Jury on Heat of Passion
Defendant claims the court erred in declining to instruct the jury on heat of
passion.
A. Additional Background
The defense requested that the court instruct the jury with CALCRIM No. 570 on
heat of passion voluntary manslaughter. Defense counsel emphasized that defendant
testified he and Vickie were having arguments that escalated the week prior to the killing,
that he was “ ‘mad as hell’ ” at one point, and that they often resumed arguing after a
25.
cool-down. She also pointed to evidence that defendant told officers he had finally lost
it.
The court denied defense counsel’s request and did not instruct the jury with
CALCRIM No. 570. The court observed that since defendant testified he had blacked
out, there was no evidence “as to what it was that set him off or what it was that put him
in the position of a voluntary [manslaughter] type of mental state.”
B. Law
“[T]o warrant instructions on provocation and heat of passion, there must be
substantial evidence in the trial record to support a finding that, at the time of the killing,
[the] defendant’s reason was (1) actually obscured as a result of a strong passion; (2) the
passion was provoked by the victim’s conduct; and (3) the provocation was sufficient to
cause an ordinary person of average disposition to act rashly or without due deliberation
and reflection, and from this passion rather than from due deliberation or reflection.”
(People v. Wright (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1481, italics added.)
The need for instruction arises not upon “ ‘the existence of “any evidence, no
matter how weak,” ’ ” but rather upon evidence “ ‘ “substantial enough to merit
consideration” by the jury.’ ” (People v. Moye (2009) 47 Cal.4th 537, 553.)
C. Analysis
As explained in the previous section of this opinion, we concluded that the
evidence proffered by the defense but excluded by the trial court was insufficient to
support an inference of heat of passion. However, defendant also contends that evidence
admitted at trial was independently sufficient to warrant a heat of passion instruction. He
cites evidence that his arguments with Vickie escalated in the month of June and
especially during the week before her death; on the evening of June 29, 2020, he came
home to find his wife “drunker than usual” and unable to sit up; and they argued with
Vickie being “mad as hell” at defendant’s questions. Defendant acknowledges his
26.
testimony that they reached a state of calm before he went to bed, but notes that
sometimes in the past their arguments could resume after a period of calm.
None of the evidence alters our conclusion. Again, the evidence still boils down
to this: Vickie sometimes berated defendant when drunk, she was drunk on the night in
question, the two argued and then calmed down. Again, finding heat of passion on this
evidence would be speculation. First, it is speculative to infer that the argument resumed
later. To the contrary, the evidence indicated that the argument had ended, they were
calm, and that the defendant kissed Vickie on the forehead and went to sleep. It is pure
speculation that defendant might have later woken up and resumed the argument with
Vickie.
Even if there had been evidence of a resumed argument, it would still be
speculation to find heat of passion. Because evidence of an argument without specific
evidence of what was said and done during the argument is not evidence of sufficient
provocation. As we have noted, while words alone could theoretically be sufficient
provocation in some limited circumstances (see People v. Millbrook, supra, 222
Cal.App.4th at p. 1147), they do not suffice in many other circumstances. (See, e.g.,
People v. Gutierrez, supra, 45 Cal.4th at pp. 826-827; People v. Manriquez, supra, 37
Cal.4th at pp. 585-586; People v. Lucas, supra, 55 Cal.App.4th at p. 739.) This is a very
fact-intensive, case-specific question for which there was insufficient evidence upon
which to formulate an answer. That is why it would have been improper to submit the
issue to the jury. The court did not err in declining to instruct on heat of passion.
III. CALCRIM No. 626 Did Not Shift Burden of Proof to Defendant
Defendant claims that CALCRIM No. 626, given by the trial court in this case,
improperly shifted the burden of proof to him.
A. Law
“When a person renders himself or herself unconscious through voluntary
intoxication and kills in that state, the killing is attributed to his or her negligence in self-
27.
intoxicating to that point, and is treated as involuntary manslaughter.” (People v. Ochoa
(1998) 19 Cal.4th 353, 423.)
The prosecution bears the burden of proving every element of the charged
crime(s), and that burden cannot be shifted to the defendant. (E.g., Sandstrom v.
Montana (1979) 442 U.S. 510, 524.)
“We must consider the [jury] instructions together as a whole, to determine
whether it is reasonably likely a jury would interpret an instruction in a particular way,
because we presume jurors understand and correlate all of the instructions.” (People v.
Burton (2018) 29 Cal.App.5th 917, 925.)
B. Court’s Instructions
The court instructed the jury:
“A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption
requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it
beyond a reasonable doubt… Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, he’s entitled to an acquittal and you must find him not
guilty.”
The court later gave CALCRIM No. 626 as follows:
“Voluntary intoxication may cause a person to be unconscious of his or her
actions. A very intoxicated person may still be capable of physical movement but
may not be aware of his or her actions or the nature of those actions.
“A person is voluntarily intoxicated if he or she becomes intoxicated by
willingly using any intoxicating drug, drink, or other substance, knowing that it
could produce an intoxicating effect or willingly assuming the risk of that effect.
“When a person voluntary[ily] causes his or her own intoxication to the
point of unconscious, the person assumes the risk that while unconscious he or she
will commit acts inherently dangerous to human life. If someone dies as a result
of the actions of a person who was unconscious due to voluntary intoxication, then
the killing is involuntary manslaughter. Involuntary manslaughter has been
proved if you find beyond a reasonable doubt that, one, the defendant killed
without legal justification or excuse; two, the defendant did not act with the intent
to kill; three, the defendant did not act with a conscious disregard for human life;
28.
and four, as a result of voluntary intoxication, the defendant was not conscious of
his actions or the nature of those actions.
“The People have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was not unconscious. If the People have not met this burden, you must
find the defendant not guilty of murder.”
C. Analysis
We agree that there is something unusual about elements of a crime requiring
findings that that the defendant did not intend to kill, did not act with conscious disregard
for human life and was not conscious of his actions or their nature. However, what
matters here is that the instruction did not shift the burden of proof to defendant.
By definition, a defendant bears the burden of proof when the instructions provide
for a negative consequence to the defendant if there is a failure of proof. Here, however,
the instructions make clear that if there is a failure of proof as to the elements of a crime
(e.g., involuntary manslaughter), then defendant is not to be convicted of that crime. As
noted above, the court told the jury,
“A defendant in a criminal case is presumed to be innocent. This presumption
requires that the People prove a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Whenever I tell you the People must prove something, I mean they must prove it
beyond a reasonable doubt… Unless the evidence proves the defendant guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt, he’s entitled to an acquittal and you must find him not
guilty.”
Consider the hypothetical posed by the defendant himself. What if the jury found
defendant killed without legal justification/excuse, did not act with intent to kill, did not
act with a conscious disregard for human life, but was “dissatisfied with the state of the
evidence on the question” of whether defendant was conscious of his actions or their
nature? In other words, the first three elements of involuntary manslaughter were proven
beyond a reasonable doubt, but the fourth was not. In this circumstance, the instructions
make quite clear what the jury would have to do: acquit defendant of both involuntary
manslaughter and murder. First, the instructions would have the jury acquit of
involuntary manslaughter because one of its four elements was not proven as required.
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(CALCRIM No. 626 [“Involuntary manslaughter has been proved if you find beyond a
reasonable doubt that” all four elements are true (italics added)].) Second, the
instructions would have the jury acquit of murder because the jury was told: “The People
have the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was not
unconscious. If the People have not met this burden, you must find the defendant not
guilty of murder.” Thus, a failure of proof as to the consciousness element would have
defendant acquitted of involuntary manslaughter and murder. Obviously, a defendant
does not bear a burden of proof if the failure to carry the burden results in a favorable
outcome.
Because the instructions make clear the prosecutor bore the burden of proof – even
as to the elements that are counterintuitive – there was no chance the jury concluded
defendant bore the burden of proof. Even defendant acknowledges that the “obvious
candidate for proving any element of any offense beyond a reasonable doubt was the
prosecutor.” We would take it a step further and say, as the instructions made clear, the
only candidate for proving an element of an offense beyond a reasonable doubt was the
prosecutor.
Defendant argues it is absurd to require a prosecutor to prove intent to kill and
lack of intent to kill at the same time, and a desire to avoid that potential absurdity would
have led the jury to conclude defendant bore the burden of proof. We see no absurdity.
The instructions require proof of intent to kill in order to establish murder and proof of
lack of intent to kill in order to establish involuntary manslaughter.
For these reasons, we conclude CALCRIM No. 626 did not shift the burden of
proof to defendant.
IV. Certain Portions of Vickie’s Text Messages Were Inadmissible Hearsay
Because They Were Not Supported By Independent Evidence Defendant Was
Aware of Her State of Mind
Defendant contends the court erred in admitting Vickie’s text messages to
Denise O.
30.
A. Additional Background
As described in the factual summary of the trial evidence near the beginning of
this opinion, evidence of text messages between Vickie and her friend Denise were
admitted at trial. These messages had previously been the subject of in limine
proceedings described below.
Before trial, the prosecution sought admission of the messages as evidence of
Vickie’s state of mind and defendant’s motive for murder. (Evid. Code, § 1250.)
Defendant sought to exclude the messages on hearsay, confrontation clause, and
character evidence grounds.
The court indicated that the text messages would likely be admitted under
Evidence Code sections 1250 and 1252 – except for references to rape which were
excluded as unduly prejudicial. The court observed that the evidence suggested
“defendant was aware of her intent to call law enforcement and would go directly to
motive for the murder.” )
The text messages were ultimately admitted at trial except for the rape allegations,
which were redacted.11
In closing argument, the prosecutor read the text messages, and noted the last one
was sent at 11:30 p.m. the evening before she was killed. In discussing the text messages
during closing argument, the prosecutor stated the jury could “evaluate the statements for
the truth.” He stated the text messages were evidence defendant had been “attacking” her
11 According to the People’s trial brief, Vickie texted Denise, “So only telling u..pls
don’t tell jeff6..but [defendant] raped last night and he choked me..pls don’t tell anyone.”
In the message admitted in evidence, the phrase “raped last night and he” was redacted.
Vickie also texted Denise, “ ‘I’m ok and yes he was drinking but that’s no
excuse..he’s done this twice to me and ive only been raped twice,, so guess who’s doing
it,, he keeps apologizing and professing his love…I told him the next time this happens I
will call the police and he will go away for along [sic] time.. [redaction].’ ” In the
message admitted in evidence, the phrase “and ive only been raped twice,, so guess who’s
doing it,,” was redacted.
31.
for days. The prosecutor also claimed that Vickie’s text messages demonstrated an
“[e]xcellent motive for murder.”
Defense counsel sought to undermine the text messages in closing argument. She
told the jury, “I’m not conceding as to the validity of what was in the text messages,
because as you heard, they came from a questionable source, but if you do believe what’s
in the text messages, you learned that, according to Vickie, that is when [defendant] was
drinking; so that also follows that he was drinking on this date as well.”
B. Law
Evidence Code section 1250 provides, in part,
“(a) Subject to Section 1252, evidence of a statement of the declarant’s then
existing state of mind, emotion, or physical sensation (including a statement of
intent, plan, motive, design, mental feeling, pain, or bodily health) is not made
inadmissible by the hearsay rule when:
(1) The evidence is offered to prove the declarant’s state of mind, emotion,
or physical sensation at that time or at any other time when it is itself an
issue in the action; or
(2) The evidence is offered to prove or explain acts or conduct of the
declarant.” (Evid. Code, § 1250, italics added.)
Even if a statement satisfies section 1250, it is inadmissible if it “was made under
circumstances such as to indicate its lack of trustworthiness.” (Evid. Code, § 1252.) “ ‘A
statement is trustworthy within the meaning of section 1252 of the Evidence Code when
it is “ ‘made in a natural manner, and not under circumstances of suspicion.’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Dworak (2021) 11 Cal.5th 881, 907.)
“[E]vidence of the decedent’s state of mind, offered under Evidence Code section
1250, can be relevant to a defendant’s motive—but only if there is independent,
admissible evidence that the defendant was aware of the decedent’s state of mind before
the crime and may have been motivated by it.” (People v. Riccardi (2012) 54 Cal.4th
758, 820, disapproved on other grounds by People v. Rangel (2016) 62 Cal.4th 1192,
1216.)
32.
“On appeal, determination of preliminary facts by the trial court made in the
course of deciding the admissibility of hearsay evidence will be upheld if supported by
substantial evidence.” (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 831, disapproved on
other grounds by People v. Rangel, supra, 62 Cal.4th at p. 1216.) Findings on
preliminary facts can be implied findings. (E.g., People v. Kerley (2018) 23 Cal.App.5th
513, 559.)
C. Analysis
Both parties agree that the statements (1) “I told him the next time this happens I
will call the police and he will go away for along [sic] time,” and (2) “there’s a good
chance he might [be] arrested after work tomorrow” were hearsay.12 The Attorney
General contends the statements were still admissible, however, under Evidence Code
section 1250 “because they reflect Vickie’s mental state and were offered to prove her
conduct, including her future conduct in accordance with her expressed intent. The
statements by Vickie were relevant because they showed Vickie’s intent to contact law
enforcement, which was probative of [defendant’s] motive for the killing.”
The Supreme Court’s opinion in Riccardi imposes an additional requirement on
motive evidence offered under Evidence Code section 1250. Namely, that “evidence of
the decedent’s state of mind, offered under Evidence Code section 1250, can be relevant
to a defendant’s motive—but only if there is independent, admissible evidence that the
defendant was aware of the decedent’s state of mind before the crime and may have been
motivated by it.” (People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 820.) This requirement
appears nowhere in the text of Evidence Code section 1250. In imposing this
requirement, Riccardi cited cases from other states, but nothing from California. If
Riccardi were a decision from a court of appeal, we would decline to follow it. As it is a
Supreme Court decision, we must apply it here.
12 The Attorney General also acknowledges that the statement “I’m ok” was hearsay.
Defendant contends that all of the key assertions in the text messages were hearsay.
33.
The Attorney General contends there was sufficient independent evidence as
required by Riccardi. First, he points to testimony from a neighbor that he heard arguing
from defendant’s house in the months leading up to Vickie’s death and defendant
appeared visibly agitated just days prior to her death. While this evidence is relevant and
helpful to the prosecution, it is not evidence defendant was aware that Vickie did or
planned to call law enforcement.
The Attorney General also cites defendant’s testimony stating he and Vickie had
frequent arguments in June 2020, which increased in intensity and frequency in the week
leading up to her death, that he told Dr. Musacco he was upset with Vickie on the day she
died because she had been sneaking alcohol, and that Vickie was angry with him too.
Again, none of this evidence indicates defendant was aware that Vickie did or planned to
call police.
There was insufficient independent evidence defendant knew Vickie intended
to/did contact law enforcement, so the hearsay portions of the text messages could not be
properly admitted as evidence of motive under Evidence Code section 1250 pursuant to
Riccardi.
D. Non-hearsay Statements
Before turning to whether this error was prejudicial, we note that some portions of
the text messages were not hearsay and therefore will not be considered in the prejudice
analysis. Specifically, Vickie’s statements describing defendant’s violence towards her
(e.g., that defendant “choked” her, and had “done this twice,” and that he had “just beat
the fuck out of me all over the living room”) were not hearsay. Instead, they were
“indirect declarations of her state of mind, because they contained descriptions or
assessments of defendant’s conduct that engendered [her] fear or altered her conduct.”
(Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 823, italics added.)
Defendant counters that “the claims about [defendant’s] alleged violent conduct
were hearsay if they were admitted to prove that the conduct happened.” But the
34.
People’s motion in limine offered the text message statements to prove Vickie’s state of
mind.
Defendant analogizes People v. Sanchez (2016) 63 Cal.4th 665, where the
Supreme Court observed that when evaluating an expert’s opinion, juries must also
consider the truth or falsity of the facts upon which the opinion is based. Defendant
rephrases Sanchez’s holding to fit the present case as follows: “ ‘If [a witness conveys]
case-specific out-of-court statements to explain the bases for his [state of mind, intent, or
plan], those statements are necessarily considered by the jury for their truth, thus
rendering them hearsay.’ ” (Id. at p. 684.) Importing Sanchez’s holding from its
distinguishable context contravenes Riccardi’s conclusion that indirect statements of the
declarant’s state of mind that contain descriptions or assessments of defendant’s conduct
are not hearsay. We see no reason to disregard Riccardi’s on-point discussion in favor of
a discussion in the distinguishable context of an expert opinion.
E. Harmlessness
We next ask whether the error in admitting the hearsay portions of the text
messages was prejudicial. Our state Constitution requires us to use the Watson13 standard
for prejudice. Under Watson, we only reverse if “ ‘after an examination of the entire
cause, including the evidence,’ ” it appears “reasonably probable that a result more
favorable to the appealing party would have been reached in the absence of the error.”
(Id. at p. 836.)
Defendant disagrees, contending the error violated his federal constitutional right
to due process and a fair trial. We disagree. “[A]s a general matter, the federal
Constitution does not mandate particular rules concerning the admission of evidence.”
(People v. Fuiava (2012) 53 Cal.4th 622, 698.) “ ‘[O]nly when evidence “is so extremely
unfair that its admission violates fundamental conceptions of justice,” [citation], [has the
13 People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818.
35.
court] imposed a constraint tied to the Due Process Clause.’ ” (Ibid.) Our Supreme
Court has applied Watson to analogous errors, and we will do so here. (E.g., People v.
Flores (2020) 9 Cal.5th 371, 411.)
We conclude that while the evidence was helpful to the prosecution, it is not
reasonably probable defendant would have achieved a better result if the evidence had
been excluded. The hearsay evidence bore directly on motive. However, motive is not
an element of defendant’s charged crimes. While motive is relevant, it is merely indirect
evidence of the ultimate issues bearing on the jury’s verdict. It is true that evidence
defendant had a motive to kill Vickie tends to prove the killing was not accidental, but
that inference was independently supported by other evidence. Specifically, the nature of
Vickie’s injuries, the defendant’s statements while in police custody, the substantial
arguments between defendant and Vickie including on the night in question, and the
consciousness of guilt suggested by the arson and attempt to flee.
Moreover, the defense relied, in part, on the text messages to support its voluntary
intoxication theory. Specifically, defense counsel argued to the jury that the text
messages suggested defendant was drinking on the day in question. Consequently, in the
Watson counterfactual where the evidence was properly excluded, defense counsel would
not have been able to make this specific argument.
In sum, we conclude that it is not reasonably probable defendant would have had a
more favorable outcome if the hearsay statements had been excluded.
V. DEFENDANT SUFFERED NO PREJUDICE FROM THE EXCLUSION OF
THE PROFFERED STATEMENT VICKIE ALLEGEDLY MADE TO
DENISE O. OVER THE PHONE
Defendant contends the court prejudicially erred by excluding a statement Vickie
allegedly made to Denise over the phone.
36.
A. Additional Background
As described in the factual summary of this opinion, Vickie’s friend Denise
Denise testified at trial. During cross-examination, defense counsel requested a sidebar
with the court.
Defense counsel put the sidebar discussion on the record later, saying she had
requested to introduce certain evidence under Evidence Code section 356. She observed
that one of Vickie’s text messages stated, “He keeps apologizing and professing his
love.” Defense counsel stated that, under the rule of completeness, she wanted to
introduce evidence of statements made during a phone call between Vickie and Denise.
Specifically, that Vickie had told Denise on the phone that defendant would drink to the
point of blacking out, and would not remember what he had done. Defense counsel
offered that to indicate that defendant was only apologizing as to what he had been told
he had done, not anything he actually remembered to have done. The prosecutor
responded that the defense’s true reason for wanting the evidence in was not to offer
context to the text messages, but instead to begin setting up the broader “blackout”
defense.
The court denied the defense request to admit the evidence, but said it would
review legal citations provided by defense counsel and that they could revisit the issue.
Defense counsel later renewed the request, but it was denied.
B. Law
“Where part of an act, declaration, conversation, or writing is given in evidence by
one party, the whole on the same subject may be inquired into by an adverse party; when
a letter is read, the answer may be given; and when a detached act, declaration,
conversation, or writing is given in evidence, any other act, declaration, conversation, or
writing which is necessary to make it understood may also be given in evidence.” (Evid.
Code, § 356.)
37.
“ ‘ “The purpose of this section is to prevent the use of selected aspects of a
conversation, act, declaration, or writing, so as to create a misleading impression on the
subjects addressed.” ’ ” (People v. Hardy (2018) 5 Cal.5th 56, 104.) “ ‘ “ ‘[T]he courts
do not draw narrow lines around the exact subject of inquiry. “In the event a statement
admitted in evidence constitutes part of a conversation or correspondence, the opponent
is entitled to have placed in evidence all that was said or written by or to the declarant in
the course of such conversation or correspondence, provided the other statements have
some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission or declaration in evidence.” ’ ” ’ ”
(People v. Clark (2016) 63 Cal.4th 522, 600.) This includes admission of portions “ ‘of
the same interview or conversation, even if they are self-serving’ so long as they ‘ “have
some bearing upon, or connection with, the admission ... in evidence.” ’ ” (People v.
Johnson (2022) 12 Cal.5th 544, 604.)
“A trial court’s ruling under Evidence Code section 356 is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.” (People v. Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at p. 605.) “ ‘To establish an abuse of
discretion, defendants must demonstrate that the trial court’s decision was so erroneous
that it “falls outside the bounds of reason.” [Citations.] A merely debatable ruling
cannot be deemed an abuse of discretion. [Citations.] An abuse of discretion will be
“established by ‘a showing the trial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary,
capricious, or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifest miscarriage of
justice.’ ” ’ ” (People v. Johnson, supra, 12 Cal.5th at pp. 605-606.)
The Watson standard for prejudice applies to claims of error under Evidence Code
section 356. (E.g., People v. Riccardi, supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 804.) Accordingly, we ask
whether it is “reasonably probable that a result more favorable to the appealing party
would have been reached in the absence of the error.” (People v. Watson, supra, 46
Cal.2d at p. 836.)
38.
C. Analysis
Defendant claims the court’s refusal to admit the proffered evidence was
prejudicial error. We conclude the exclusion was not prejudicial because it is not
reasonably probable that the admission of the proffered evidence would have led to a
more favorable outcome for defendant. We therefore do not reach the question of error.
The proffered evidence would have suggested that defendant sometimes got
inebriated to the point of blacking out. It would not have shown that defendant was in
such a state during the relevant timeframe for Vickie to be able to make up instances of
violence leaving defendant no choice to accept that they happened. While the evidence
was technically relevant, it was only marginally probative as to whether defendant
committed the acts of violence claimed by Vickie. In contrast, defendant directly and
expressly testified that he was never violent with Vickie in June 2020. Given the direct
testimony undermining Vickie’s text message claim of domestic violence in June 2020,
there is no reasonable probability that offering less direct, marginally-probative, second-
hand, cumulative evidence on the issue would have altered the ultimate outcome in
defendant’s favor.
VI. NO CUMULATIVE PREJUDICE
Defendant claims the errors addressed in parts I-V of this opinion were
cumulatively prejudicial. However, we concluded that the erroneous admission of
hearsay statements in the text message was not prejudicial. The only other possible
prejudice to consider is the court’s exclusion of evidence suggesting defendant’s
admission to prior bad acts was not based on personal recollection but instead what he
was told. As stated in the preceding section, the risk of prejudice with this alleged error
is profoundly low because defendant was able to adduce far more direct and probative
evidence on the topic: his own testimony denying violent behavior towards Vickie in
June 2020.
39.
Consequently, we are left with an error of modest detriment to the defense case
and an alleged error of exceedingly low detriment. Together, these do not aggregate to
constitute prejudice.
VII. ABSENCE OF PERSONAL JURY TRIAL WAIVER BY DEFENDANT
REQUIRES REVERSAL OF SENTENCE
Defendant challenges the court’s imposition of the upper term of eight years in
prison on count 2 (arson of an inhabited structure). He contends the court improperly
found the crime was committed in a manner that indicates planning, sophistication or
professionalism after improperly relying upon counsel’s waiver of the right to a jury trial,
instead of defendant’s personal waiver. The Attorney General concedes error but
contends it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
A. Law
Under certain circumstances, a sentencing court can aggravate the defendant’s
sentence when the crime was committed in a manner that “indicates planning,
sophistication, or professionalism.” (Rule 4.421(a)(8).) The factor may be used to
aggravate the sentence when the court is convinced that the level of planning,
sophistication, “ ‘when compared to other ways in which such a crime could be
committed’ [citation], make the crime committed by the defendant ‘distinctively worse
than the ordinary.’ ” (People v. Charron (1987) 193 Cal.App.3d 981, 994-995.)
When a court improperly relies upon a factor that was not properly proven at a jury trial,
the error “is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that a jury would have found true all of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court
to justify an upper term sentence.” (People v. Lynch (2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 768.)
B. Analysis
Defense counsel agreed to a court trial of the sentencing allegations, but there is
no indication defendant himself personally waived a jury trial. (See Cal. Const. art. I,
§ 16 [“A jury may be waived in a criminal cause by the consent of both parties expressed
40.
in open court by the defendant and the defendant’s counsel.” (italics added)]; People v.
French (2008) 43 Cal.4th 36, 47 [“When the constitutional right to jury trial is involved,
we have required an express waiver even in cases in which the circumstances make it
apparent that all involved—the trial court, the prosecutor, defense counsel, and the
defendant—assumed that the defendant had waived or intended to waive the right to a
jury trial.”].) The Attorney General acknowledges the error, but contends it was harmless.
The Attorney General argues there is no reasonable doubt that a jury would have
found defendant committed count two in a manner that “indicates planning,
sophistication, or professionalism.” (Rule 4.421(a)(8).) The Attorney General relies on
the evidence that defendant started two fires in separate parts of the house, placed a fuel
can under a mixing bowl, and fled the house after starting the fire. We acknowledge that
a factfinder could infer planning, sophistication, or professionalism from the multiple
fires and purported attempt to hide the fuel. We cannot say it is overwhelming evidence,
nor dispel all reasonable doubts a jury could have possible found the factor untrue.
First, we fail to see how fleeing the house after starting the fire is evidence of
planning, sophistication, or professionalism at all.
Second, while starting two fires and potentially attempting to hide one fuel source
indicates some level of sophistication or professionalism beyond the alternative, it is only
moderately persuasive evidence on the issue. Setting a second fire is not a particularly
compelling indicator of sophistication or professionalism, except that it is modestly more
thorough than setting one fire. Evidence that the defendant may have tried to hide the
fuel source under a mixing pot shows somewhat more sophistication than a typical arson,
but not overwhelmingly so given that it was quickly discerned by the arson investigator.
In sum, while there was evidence from which a factfinder could have accepted the
prosecution’s position,14 it was not so overwhelming as to dispel all reasonable doubts
14 As a result, we reject defendant’s substantial evidence challenge.
41.
any reasonable juror could have found the factor untrue. Under the present standard of
review, we must find the error prejudicial and remand for resentencing.
VIII. TRIAL COURT’S RELIANCE ON DEFENDANT’S PRIOR
CONVICTIONS WITHOUT CERTIFIED COPIES IN THE RECORD WAS
ERROR
Defendant argues the court’s aggravation of count 3’s sentence was improper.
A. Additional Background
The amended information filed April 26, 2023, alleged five sentencing factors as
to count 3. Specifically, that the crime involved great violence or bodily harm, etc. (rule
4.421(a)(1)), defendant was armed with a weapon (rule 4.421(a)(2)), the victim was
particularly vulnerable (rule 4.421(a)(3)), the manner the crime was committed indicates
planning, sophistication or professionalism (rule 4.421(a)(8)), and that defendant took
advantage of a position of trust (rule 4.421(a)(11)).
At the court trial on the sentencing allegations, the prosecutor “submitted” as to
the allegations for count 3. After announcing its decisions as to sentencing allegations on
other counts, the court stated it “will make no findings as to Count 3.” The minute order
for the hearing stated the court found all of the enhancement allegations as to count 3 not
true.
At sentencing, the court spoke before outlining the individual sentences on each
count,
“After review of the factors referenced in aggravation, the upper term is
warranted. Regarding any potential upper term selections, 1170(b) of the Penal
Code requires specific facts that arise from the crime to be pled and proven to
select the upper term for the crime and enhancements. However, pursuant to
1170(b)(3) of the Penal Code, the Court may consider the defendant’s prior
convictions as specified in the selection of the upper term for the crime but not the
enhancements without being pled and proven. Thus, this sentence stems from the
defendant’s prior record and/or [what] was found true by the Trial Court, as I
stated.” (Italics added.)
The court imposed the upper term of three years on count 3.
42.
B. Law
“The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term only when there are
circumstances in aggravation of the crime that justify the imposition of a term of
imprisonment exceeding the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true beyond a reasonable
doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a court trial.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).)
One exception to this rule is that “the court may consider the defendant’s prior
convictions in determining sentencing based on a certified record of conviction without
submitting the prior convictions to a jury.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3) [“notwithstanding”
subd. (b)(2)].)
C. Analysis
Both parties allege an error with respect to the sentencing on count 3. The
Attorney General says the court improperly relied on defendant’s prior convictions
without certified copies of the records of those convictions. Accordingly, the Attorney
General asks for a remand for resentencing. Defendant says that because the prosecutor
did not present any argument or evidence on the five rule 4.421 allegations on count 3, it
should not have a chance to seek aggravation on remand.
It is true that the prosecutor simply “submitted” on the five factors under rule
4.421 attached to count 3, without providing additional evidence or argument. It is also
true that the court found those five factors untrue as to count 3. However, defendant
argues that because the factors were found not true, the upper term is now “categorically
unavailable.” Apart from the factors under rule 4.421, sentencing courts may also
“consider the defendant’s prior convictions.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) Consequently, the
fact that the court found the five rule 4.421 factors not true is no barrier to aggravating
the sentence based on defendant’s prior convictions pursuant to section 1170, subdivision
(b)(3). Accordingly, we reject defendant’s claim.
43.
However, the Attorney General notes that the only evidence of the prior
convictions in the record was the probation report. That does not suffice, because section
1170, subdivision (b)(3) requires that the finding be “based on a certified record of
conviction.” (§ 1170, subd. (b)(3).) Because defendant is going to be resentenced on
other grounds as well, the prosecution will have the opportunity to provide certified
records at resentencing.
D. Conclusion
For the reasons explained, we reject defendant’s claims of trial error, but will
remand for resentencing due to sentencing error. Because of these conclusions, we do not
reach defendant’s remaining contentions.
DISPOSITION
Defendant’s sentence is reversed and the matter remanded for resentencing. In all
other respects the judgment is affirmed.
GUERRA, J.*
WE CONCUR:
HILL, P. J.
SNAUFFER, J.
* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
44.
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