People v. Reno CA2/8

CourtListener 10746885CalctappDec 3, 2025

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Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Reno CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B343770

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. MA062610-01)
v.

RALPH RENO,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Kathleen Blanchard, Judge. Appeal dismissed.

A. William Bartz, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.

_______________________
Pursuant to People v. Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, we
review an order denying Ralph Reno’s motion for resentencing
brought under Penal Code1 section 1172.1, subdivision (a)(1).
Because we find the order is not appealable, we dismiss the
appeal.
BACKGROUND
On October 1, 2014, a jury found appellant guilty of two
counts of robbery in violation of section 211 and two counts of
false imprisonment by violence in violation of section 236. The
jury also found true enhancements for personal use of a weapon
(a pellet gun) under section 12022, subdivision (b)(1). Reno
waived jury trial on allegations that he had sustained three prior
convictions of a serious or violent felony which were also strike
convictions under the Three Strikes Law. On May 1, 2015, he
admitted all three prior convictions. That same day, the court
struck two of the prior felony/strike convictions and imposed a
total sentence of 22 years four months in state prison.
On November 18, 2024, Reno filed a request for recall of
sentence and resentencing under Assembly Bill No. 600 and
Penal Code section 1172.1. On December 6, 2024, the trial court
denied the request. In doing so, the trial court held: “AB 600
amended Penal Code section 1172.1, in relevant part, to allow:
‘the court may, on its own motion, within 120 days of the date of
commitment or at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at
the time of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new
statutory authority or case law,’ recall a sentence. Penal Code
section 1172.1, subdivision (c), specifically reads: ‘A defendant is

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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not entitled to file a petition seeking relief from the court under
this section. If a defendant requests consideration for relief
under this section, the court is not required to respond.’ [¶]
Notwithstanding subdivision (c), the court has reviewed the
request, and finds that recall of the sentence herein on its own
motion would be inappropriate. The request to do so is
DENIED.” Reno timely appealed.
We appointed counsel to represent Reno on appeal. On
September 23, 2025, counsel filed a no issue brief pursuant to
People v. Delgadillo. Counsel advised us they told Reno he could
file his own supplemental brief within 30 days and they sent him
transcripts of the record on appeal and a copy of the brief.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.1—the Recall and Resentencing Statute
Section 1172.1 endows a trial court with authority to recall
the sentences of incarcerated defendants and resentence them
under certain circumstances. Like its predecessor provisions,
section 1172.1 is a statutory exception to the general rule that
“ ‘once a judgment is rendered and execution of the sentence has
begun, the trial court does not have jurisdiction to vacate or
modify the sentence.’ ” (People v. King (2022) 77 Cal.App.5th 629,
637–638.)
Under section 1172.1, a trial court may recall and
resentence “at any time” upon the recommendation of the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation,
the Board of Parole Hearings, the district attorney of the county
in which the defendant was sentenced, or the Attorney General if
the Department of Justice originally prosecuted the case.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (a)(1).) Until recently, the statute also provided

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that a trial court may recall and resentence “on its own motion”
within 120 days of the date of commitment. Effective January 1,
2024, the 120-day provision was expanded. Now a trial court
may recall a sentence and resentence a defendant on its own
motion “at any time if the applicable sentencing laws at the time
of original sentencing are subsequently changed by new statutory
authority or case law.” (Ibid.; Assem. Bill No. 600 (2023–2024
Reg. Sess.).) Once a trial court decides to recall and resentence, it
may either reduce the sentence by modification or vacate the
conviction and impose judgment on “any necessarily included
lesser offense or lesser related offense, whether or not that
offense was charged in the original pleadings.” (§ 1172.1,
subd. (a)(3).)
Notably, section 1172.1, by its terms, denies a defendant
the right to petition the court for recall and resentencing.
(§ 1172.1, subd. (c) [“[a] defendant is not entitled to file a petition
seeking relief from the court under this section,” and “[i]f a
defendant requests consideration for relief under this section, the
court is not required to respond.”].) As to a right to appeal, the
statute provides: “After ruling on a referral authorized by this
section, the court shall advise the defendant of their right to
appeal.” (Id., subd. (d).)
II. The Right to Appeal Generally
The right to appeal is statutory only, and a party may not
appeal a trial court’s judgment, order or ruling unless such is
expressly made appealable by statute. (Teal v. Superior Court
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 595, 598.) Criminal defendants are entitled to
appeal from “any order made after judgment, affecting the
substantial rights of the party.” (§ 1237, subd. (b).)

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III. The Definition of “Substantial Rights”
Our Supreme Court has not provided “a comprehensive
interpretation of the term ‘substantial rights’ as used in section
1237, subdivision (b).” (People v. Loper (2015) 60 Cal.4th 1155,
1161, fn. 3 (Loper).) But Loper did discuss how to approach
formulating a definition. There, the court addressed the question
whether a defendant has the right to appeal a trial court’s denial
of a request for compassionate release properly made by the
Secretary of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
under section 1170, former subdivision (e). That statute is
similar to section 1172.1 in that both statutes do not give
defendants the right to make a request for relief themselves. For
relief under section 1170, only the Secretary of the Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation or the Board of Parole Hearings
may make such a request. (§ 1170, former subd. (e).)
In deciding that the denial of a request for compassionate
release affects substantial rights, our Supreme Court in Loper
noted: “Although the defendant has no independent right to
initiate compassionate release proceedings in the trial court, the
Secretary [of the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation]
evaluated defendant’s medical condition and made a
recommendation for compassionate release on his behalf. By
providing a mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from
custody, section 1170 [former subdivision (e) implicates a
prisoner’s substantial interest in personal liberty. Moreover,
although section 1170 [former subdivision] (e) authorizes the trial
court to exercise discretion whether to release a prisoner for
compassionate reasons, the statute also establishes clear
eligibility criteria (§ 1170[, former subd.] (e)(2)), suggesting that
discretion is not unfettered when evidence is presented satisfying

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the statutory criteria. These factors lead us to conclude the trial
court’s ruling clearly affected defendant’s substantial rights for
purposes of section 1237, subdivision (b).” (Loper, supra,
60 Cal.4th at p. 1161, fn. 3.)
We glean from this footnote that the combination of three
factors dictates whether a defendant’s substantial rights in
personal liberty are implicated: 1) the Legislature sets up a
mechanism for releasing eligible prisoners from custody; 2) that
mechanism is used to get the issue of release from custody before
the trial court; and 3) that mechanism includes a list of eligibility
statutory criteria that must then be followed by the trial court in
making its ruling, suggesting that the trial court’s discretion is
not unfettered. We also glean from the extended discussion in
Loper on standing that whether or not the defendant has the
express right to initiate the request for sentencing relief is
immaterial to determining whether substantial rights are
affected. (See Loper, supra, 60 Cal.4th at pp. 1161–1165
[defendant may appeal an adverse decision on a postjudgment
motion or petition if it affects substantial rights, even if someone
else brought the original motion].) Indeed, we find that it is use
of the mechanism set up by the Legislature, coupled with
legislatively mandated factors to consider, that are determinative
of whether substantial rights are affected by the statute.
Keeping these three factors in mind, we hold that section
1172.1 does not implicate a defendant’s substantial rights where,
as here, a defendant has personally filed a petition not authorized
by statute. It is true that the Legislature created a mechanism
for release, satisfying the first of the three criteria set out above.
However, that mechanism, authorized for use by only designated
entities or persons, was not followed in this case. Section 1172.1,

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subdivision (c) expressly provides: “A defendant is not entitled to
file a petition seeking relief from the court under this section. If
a defendant requests consideration for relief under this section,
the court is not required to respond.” The statute also expressly
provides that where an authorized request for relief is denied, a
defendant must be advised of their appellate rights, inferring a
right to appeal a properly authorized request. (§ 1172.1,
subd. (d).)
Here, Reno filed an unauthorized request for relief to which
the trial court was not obligated to respond. Thus, the second
criterion—that the authorized mechanism be used to obtain the
requested relief—has not been satisfied. This, we emphasize,
stands apart from a standing analysis per se.
We also adopt the analysis of our colleagues in Division 2
who concluded that orders denying requests for relief from
defendants personally, as opposed to those from authorized third
parties, are not appealable. (People v. Hodge (2024)
107 Cal.App.5th 985.) As Presiding Justice Lui wrote, “[T]he
second sentence of section 1172.1, subdivision (c) does undermine
any claim that defendants have a substantial right at stake when
they file an unauthorized request for resentencing. That
sentence excuses the trial court from any responsibility to rule on
such a request, or even to respond. It follows that a defendant
who chooses to file an unauthorized request for resentencing has
no right to a ruling. The defendant may have a liberty interest at
stake in any decision as to whether they should remain
incarcerated. But a defendant has no right to demand that the
trial court actually make such a decision. If the defendant has no
right to a decision, the trial court’s choice not to make one does
not deprive the defendant any right, much less a substantial

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one.” (Id. at p. 996.) Under Hodge, where a statute expressly
relieves the court of any obligation to adjudicate a request for
relief filed by defendants personally, it follows that defendants do
not have a substantial right in this particular pathway toward
resentencing. (Ibid; see also People v. Faustinos (2025)
109 Cal.App.5th 687, 697 (Faustinos) [order declining to act on
defendant’s unauthorized section 1172.1 petition not an
appealable order]; People v. Brinson (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 1040,
1047 [same]; People v. Roy (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 991, 996
[same].)
We add that our analysis does not change where, as here,
the trial court issued an order explaining why it was denying the
request (instead of ignoring the request, as it was authorized to
do). It is the Legislature’s mechanism and the use of that
mechanism that is paramount in deciding whether substantial
rights are affected, not the format of the trial court’s order.
(Faustinos, supra, 109 Cal.App.5th at p. 698 [trial court’s
statements did not make a nonappealable order appealable,
because appealability depends upon the nature of the decision
made, not the court’s justification for its ruling.].)
We find the order denying Reno’s section 1172.1 petition is
not an appealable order because Reno did not invoke the
procedures mandated by the statute. We therefore do not
address the merits of his supplemental brief.

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DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

VIRAMONTES, J.

UZCATEGUI, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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