CourtListener 10746881•People v. Sandoval CA2/4
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Filed 12/3/25 P. v. Sandoval CA2/4
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION FOUR
THE PEOPLE, B339267
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No.
v. XCNBA515433)
ADEMIR ADALY SANDOVAL,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Ray G. Jurado, Judge. Affirmed.
G. Martin Velez, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Idan Ivri, Supervising Attorney
General, and Marc A. Kohm, Deputy Attorney General, for
Plaintiff and Respondent.
In November 2022, defendant and appellant Ademir
Sandoval repeatedly went to the home where his romantic
partner and her relatives lived. He threatened residents,
vandalized their vehicles, and used gardening shears to attack
one resident. A jury found Sandoval guilty of stalking, criminal
threats, two counts of vandalism, and assault with a deadly
weapon.
On appeal, Sandoval argues: (1) there was insufficient
evidence for criminal threats and one count of vandalism; (2) the
trial court prejudicially erred by not instructing the jury on
unanimity for criminal threats against two victims; and (3) the
trial court prejudicially erred by not giving a self-defense
instruction on the charge of assault with a deadly weapon. We
reject each argument and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
In or around October 2022, Sandoval lived with his
romantic partner, Griselda A. After they were evicted Griselda
A. moved into a duplex where several of her relatives lived.
Griselda A.’s relatives did not invite Sandoval to live with them.
On November 11, 2022, Sandoval entered the family’s
residence without permission. Griselda A.’s mother, her sister
Ana A., and two of Ana A.’s children were home at the time. Ana
A. testified that Sandoval screamed, “Where the fuck is”
Griselda? Ana A. told him to get out. Sandoval said, “I’m going
to come and get all you motherfuckers.” Ana A. also testified that
Sandoval used the word “kill” several times before he left.
Ana A.’s husband, Alexander L., testified at trial that he
saw Sandoval outside the family’s duplex in the morning on
November 12. Sandoval was running away from Alexander L.’s
car, parked across the street. Alexander L. walked to his car and
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found someone had cut the valve on one of its tires. The tire was
still leaking air when he arrived.
Gladys C., another relative who lived at the duplex,
testified she saw Sandoval ducking near her car in the evening on
November 12. She approached Sandoval, who stood up and ran
away. Gladys C. found her car’s rear tires had been slashed.
On November 14, the family installed security cameras
around their home. Alexander L. testified that, while watching
the cameras’ live video that evening, he saw Sandoval’s car enter
a nearby parking lot. Sandoval walked toward Alexander L.’s
car. Alexander L. hurried outside and found one of his tires
slashed again. He then saw Sandoval across the street near
Gladys C.’s vehicle.
Alexander L. ran across the street to confront Sandoval.
He testified he found Sandoval crouching, holding gardening
shears. Alexander L. asked Sandoval, “What the fuck are you
doing?’ Sandoval stood up and swung the shears at Alexander L.
several times. Sandoval hit Alexander L. above one of his eyes,
causing him to bleed profusely. Sandoval then went to his car
and drove away.
On November 17, 2022, Sandoval returned to the family’s
duplex again. Multiple witnesses testified that Sandoval
smashed parts of Alexander L.’s car with a baseball bat.
The prosecution charged Sandoval with five counts:
(1) stalking, (2) criminal threats, (3) vandalism of Alexander L.’s
car on November 12, 2022, (4) assault with a deadly weapon, and
(5) vandalism of Alexander L.’s car on November 17, 2022. After
trial, the jury found Sandoval guilty on all five counts. He was
sentenced to nine years and four months in state prison.
Sandoval timely appealed.
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DISCUSSION
1. Sufficiency of Evidence
Sandoval argues the trial court erred in denying his
motions for acquittal (Pen. Code, § 1118.1) on the criminal
threats charge and the third count for vandalism. On appeal, we
independently review “ ‘ “whether from the evidence, including all
reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom, there is any
substantial evidence of the existence of each element of the
offense charged.” ’ ” (People v. Stevens (2007) 41 Cal.4th 182,
200.) “[W]e assess whether the evidence is inherently credible
and of solid value” and “view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the jury verdict and presume the existence of every
fact that the jury could reasonably have deduced from that
evidence.” (People v. Mora and Rangel (2018) 5 Cal.5th 442, 488.)
“The defendant bears an enormous burden” when challenging the
sufficiency of the evidence. (People v. Aguilar (2019) 41
Cal.App.5th 1023, 1026.)
A. Criminal Threats
Sufficient evidence supports Sandoval’s conviction for
criminal threats. (Pen. Code, § 422.) This crime’s elements are:
(1) the defendant willfully threatened to commit a crime which
will result in death or great bodily injury to another person,
(2) the defendant made the threat with the specific intent that
the statement is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent
of actually carrying it out, (3) the threat was on its face and
under the circumstances in which it was made so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat, (4) the threat actually caused the person
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threatened to be in sustained fear for his or her own safety or for
his or her immediate family’s safety, and (5) the threatened
person’s fear was reasonable under the circumstances. (In re
George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620, 630.)
Sandoval contends there was insufficient evidence for the
third element. A threat’s “ ‘ “unequivocality, unconditionality,
immediacy and specificity are not absolutely mandated, but must
be sufficiently present in the threat and surrounding
circumstances.” ’ ” (In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p. 635.)
These “ ‘four qualities are . . . the factors to be considered in
determining whether a threat, considered together with its
surrounding circumstances, conveys those impressions to the
victim.’ ” (Ibid.) “When the [defendant’s] words are vague,
context takes on added significance, but care must be taken not
to diminish the requirements that the communicator have the
specific intent to convey a threat and that the threat be of such a
nature as to convey a gravity of purpose and immediate prospect
of the threat’s execution.” (Id. at p. 637.)
The prosecution presented substantial evidence for this
element. It is true that Sandoval’s statement, “I’m going to come
and get all you,” was ambiguous. But Ana A. also testified that
Sandoval used the word “kill” several times, though she did not
recount his exact words. She specifically recalled telling the
police that Sandoval said, “I’m going to kill all you
motherfuckers.” These threats were unconditional.
The surrounding circumstances further support the jury’s
findings. Sandoval entered the family’s home without permission
while Ana A. was in the bathroom. She heard her children
scream. When she confronted Sandoval, she told him to leave
before she called the police. He replied, “I don’t give a fuck.”
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The evidence of Sandoval’s words and their context
constitute substantial evidence that his threat was, “on its face
and under the circumstances . . . so unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate, and specific as to convey to” the victims “a gravity of
purpose and an immediate prospect of execution of the threat.”
(Pen. Code, § 422, subd. (a).)
Sandoval’s reliance on In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th
1132 is misplaced. In that case, a high school student “pounded
on” a locked classroom door. (Id. at p. 1135.) A teacher opened
the door and accidentally hit the student with it. (Ibid.) The
student “became angry, cursed [the teacher] and threatened him,
saying, ‘I’m going to get you’ ” (ibid.) or “ ‘I’m going to kick your
ass’ ” (id. at p. 1136). He made those statements “in response to
his accident with the door.” (Id. at p. 1138.)
Here, Sandoval’s threat was not an immediate, impulsive
response to an accident or injury. Sandoval started the
confrontation by entering Ana A.’s home without permission.
Sandoval remained there for about “four or five minutes.” He
said he did not care if Ana A. called the police. In these
circumstances, Sandoval’s conduct was highly threatening.
Moreover, the court in In re Ricky T. noted the absence of
“evidence of any circumstances occurring after appellant’s
‘threats’ which would” support this element of criminal threats.
(87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1139.) Here, by contrast, the jury heard
evidence of later events supporting its finding that Sandoval’s
statements were sufficiently unequivocal, unconditional,
immediate, and specific. Sandoval partially carried out his threat
three days later when he attacked Ana A.’s husband with
gardening shears.
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Sandoval also argues the prosecution presented insufficient
evidence on the element of sustained fear. “Sustained fear must
occur over ‘a period of time that extends beyond what is
momentary, fleeting, or transitory.’ [Citation.] Courts have held,
for instance, 15 minutes satisfies the sustained fear
requirement.” (People v. Roles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 935, 942.)
The jury heard substantial testimony supporting this
element. After the encounter with Sandoval, Ana A. was scared
and did not want to leave home until her husband returned hours
later. When asked “how long” she was scared, Ana A. answered,
“I’m scared to this day.” She further testified that her daughter,
B.A., cried “the whole day.” This testimony reflected more than
momentary or fleeting fear. The trial court did not err in denying
Sandoval’s motion for judgment of acquittal on the criminal
threats offense.
B. Vandalism
Sandoval argues there was insufficient evidence for his
conviction on count three for vandalism (Pen. Code, § 594, subd.
(a)) of Alexander L.’s car on November 12, 2022.1 Sandoval relies
on the lack of direct evidence. No witness observed him damage
the car’s tire. Alexander L. saw Sandoval near his car but did not
see Sandoval holding any tool capable of damaging the tire valve.
The prosecution, however, presented strong circumstantial
evidence against Sandoval. “ ‘Although it is the duty of the jury
to acquit a defendant if it finds that circumstantial evidence is
susceptible of two interpretations, one of which suggests guilt
and the other innocence [citations], it is the jury, not the
1 Sandoval does not appeal his conviction on count five for
vandalism of Alexander L.’s car on November 17, 2022.
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appellate court which must be convinced of the defendant’s guilt
beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Jones (2013) 57 Cal.4th
899, 960–961.) “ ‘ “If the circumstances reasonably justify the
trier of fact’s findings, the opinion of the reviewing court that the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding does not warrant a reversal of the judgment.” ’ ”
(People v. Abilez (2007) 41 Cal.4th 472, 504.)
Alexander L. testified he saw Sandoval run away from his
car. He then found one of his tires rapidly leaking air. The jury
also heard evidence about Sandoval vandalizing the family’s cars
on three other occasions. This circumstantial evidence
reasonably justifies the jury’s finding that Sandoval also
vandalized Alexander L.’s car on November 12, 2022. The trial
court did not err in denying Sandoval’s motion for judgment of
acquittal on vandalism, count three.
2. Unanimity Instruction
Sandoval contends the trial court erred by not instructing
the jury on unanimity (e.g., CALCRIM No. 3500) regarding
criminal threats. “[T]he jury must agree unanimously the
defendant is guilty of a specific crime.” (People v. Russo (2001) 25
Cal.4th 1124, 1132.) “[W]hen the evidence suggests more than
one discrete crime, either the prosecution must elect among the
crimes or the court must require the jury to agree on the same
criminal act.” (Ibid.) “Where no election is made, the court has a
duty to instruct sua sponte on the unanimity requirement.”
(People v. Curry (2007) 158 Cal.App.4th 766, 783.)
Typically, a unanimity instruction is required when
separate acts may constitute different violations of the same
criminal statute charged in a single count. (See, e.g., People v.
Davis (2005) 36 Cal.4th 510, 561 [robbery with “two distinct
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takings”]; People v. Riel (2000) 22 Cal.4th 1153, 1199 [“two
distinct acts of robbery”]; People v. Diedrich (1982) 31 Cal.3d 263,
280 [“two distinct violations of” bribery statute charged in single
count].) Here, rather than separate criminal events, the same
criminal threats may have constituted discrete crimes against
each of two victims: one against Ana A. and one against her
daughter B.A.
The parties have identified only one case addressing a
unanimity instruction where identical acts could constitute
discrete crimes against two victims. In People v. Carrera (1989)
49 Cal.3d 291, 311, the prosecution charged the defendant “with
one count of robbery of two victims.” No unanimity instruction
was required because both victims “were the joint custodians of
the” money taken, “and the funds were taken from the immediate
presence of both of them by force or violence as to both.” (Ibid.)
This case differs from People v. Carrera because, unlike
most crimes, a criminal threats charge includes an element
personal to the victims: their subjective experience of sustained
fear. (See People v. Roles, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 942
[“sustained fear must be objectively and subjectively
reasonable”]; In re Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 [“A
victim must actually be in sustained fear, and the sustained fear
must also be reasonable under the circumstances”].) The
criminal threats charge against Sandoval arose from the same
statements made simultaneously to Ana A. and B.A. Elements
one through three were identical for both victims. Sandoval
argues the prosecution charged two discrete crimes based on the
elements of sustained fear and objectively reasonable fear.
Because those elements were personal to each victim, the
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evidence suggested more than one discrete crime. Nevertheless,
a unanimity instruction was unnecessary for two reasons.
First, rather than failing to elect between two crimes in a
way that could result in conviction without unanimous
agreement on the specific crime, the prosecution elected that it
had to prove both crimes to sustain any conviction. We reach this
conclusion by reviewing the prosecution’s closing argument. (See
People v. Brown (2017) 11 Cal.App.5th 332, 341 [the prosecution
may elect between discrete crimes in opening statement and/or
closing argument]; People v. Jantz (2006) 137 Cal.App.4th 1283,
1292 [same].)
During closing argument on this count, the prosecution
initially stated it must prove Sandoval threatened to harm “Ana
[A.] or B[.]A.” But as discussed above, this first element
concerned identical conduct (Sandoval’s statements) directed to
both victims. The only elements that could suggest more than
one discrete crime were each victim’s sustained fear and
reasonable fear. For those elements, the prosecutor exclusively
used the conjunction “and” to refer to both victims and used the
plural pronouns “they” or “them.” The prosecutor argued, “I need
to prove to you that the threat actually caused Ana and B[.A.] to
be in sustained fear.” She further argued, “Ana and B[.A.] never
had that fear really go away.” “When did they have time to get
rid of that fear? In fact, that fear stayed in them for so long that
they had to move to Covina.” On the final element, the
prosecutor argued, “I need to next prove to you that Ana and
B[.A.]’s fear was reasonable under the circumstances.” She
concluded, “Under [the] circumstances, Ana and B[.A.] were
reasonably afraid.”
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The prosecutor thus used “and,” “they,” and “them” to refer
to both victims on the only elements that could suggest more
than one discrete crime. Via this argument, the prosecution
informed the jury of its election that convicting Sandoval on this
count required all jurors to unanimously agree he committed the
crime against both Ana A. and B.A.
Second, a unanimity instruction was unnecessary because
Sandoval offered the same defense to both crimes, and the jury
necessarily rejected it as to both. A unanimity instruction “is not
required if ‘the defendant offered the same defense to both acts
constituting the charged crime, so no juror could have believed
defendant committed one act but disbelieved that he committed
the other, or because “ ‘ “there was no evidence from which the
jury could have found defendant was guilty of” the crime based on
one act but not the other.’ ” (People v. Covarrubias (2016) 1
Cal.5th 838, 879; accord People v. Jennings (2010) 50 Cal.4th 616,
679.) Where a juror could have reasonable doubt about the latter
of two crimes charged in a single count, no unanimity instruction
is required if any juror who found defendant committed the latter
crime also necessarily found defendant committed the former
crime. (People v. Riel, supra, 22 Cal.4th at p. 1200 [“It was
conceivable that some, or even all, of the jurors might have had a
reasonable doubt that” a second robbery occurred, but it was
“inconceivable that a juror would believe … that defendant
committed” the second robbery “but somehow find he did not
commit” the first robbery].)
Sandoval offered the same defense to criminal threats
against both victims. He argued the prosecution had only proven
conduct (as recorded on video) that did not rise to the level of
criminal threats, and Ana A.’s testimony about other threatening
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conduct and about the victims’ fear was not credible. No juror
could have rejected Sandoval’s defense with respect to one victim
and accepted it as to the other victim because no witness other
than Ana A. testified about this offense. She testified three
others were home when Sandoval made the threats: two of her
children (including B.A.) and her mother. They did not testify.
Ana A. testified both about Sandoval’s conduct and the fear she
and B.A. felt. To find Sandoval guilty of criminal threats, the
jury necessarily credited Ana A.’s testimony on all elements.
3. Self-Defense Instruction
Finally, Sandoval argues the trial court erred by not
instructing the jury on self-defense as to the charge of assault
with a deadly weapon. “[T]he trial court has a sua sponte duty to
instruct on defenses that the defendant is relying on or that are
supported by substantial evidence and are not inconsistent with
the defendant’s theory of the case.” (People v. Cottone (2013) 57
Cal.4th 269, 293.) “In determining whether the evidence is
sufficient to warrant a jury instruction” on an affirmative
defense, “the trial court does not determine the credibility of the
defense evidence, but only whether ‘there was evidence which, if
believed by the jury, was sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt.’ ”
(People v. Salas (2006) 37 Cal.4th 967, 982.)
The trial court did not err because no substantial evidence
supported this affirmative defense. “Self-defense is limited to the
use of force that was reasonably necessary to defend against the
danger or repel the attack.” (People v. Temple (2025) 110
Cal.App.5th 1281, 1295.) The law limits “the amount of
retaliatory force which may be used against an assault with fists.
Such an assault does not justify the use of a deadly weapon in
self-defense.” (People v. Enriquez (1977) 19 Cal.3d 221, 228,
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disapproved on other grounds by People v. Cromer (2001) 24
Cal.4th 889, 901, fn. 3.)
Even if Alexander L. had been the aggressor and Sandoval
used force only in self-defense, Sandoval plainly used an
unreasonable amount of force. Alexander L. was unarmed. No
evidence suggested he was likely to inflict great bodily injury on
Sandoval. Sandoval fought Alexander L. using sharp gardening
shears or scissors. Sandoval used disproportionate force.
Sandoval relies on Gladys C.’s testimony that she did not
see any weapon in Sandoval’s hands during his altercation with
Alexander L. That one witness — watching the incident from
across the street — did not see Sandoval use a weapon does not
contradict the overwhelming evidence that Sandoval did so.
Alexander L. testified about Sandoval’s weapon in detail.
He was “right in front of” Sandoval and saw him holding
gardening shears. Alexander L. thoroughly described how
Sandoval used the shears as a weapon He also authenticated a
video of himself being wheeled into an ambulance and pointing to
a firefighter holding gardening shears with red handles.
Moreover, police officer Matthew Munoz testified he responded to
the scene and recovered the gardening shears there. We also
note that Sandoval’s appeal does not contest the sufficiency of
evidence for the charge of assault with a deadly weapon.
Assuming the trial court should have instructed the jury on
self-defense, any error was harmless. For such an error, we must
reverse the judgment “ ‘only if, “after an examination of the
entire cause, including the evidence” [citation], it appears
“reasonably probable” the defendant would have obtained a more
favorable outcome had the error not occurred.’ ” (People v.
Blakeley (2000) 23 Cal.4th 82, 93.)
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It is not reasonably probable that a self-defense instruction
would have resulted in a more favorable outcome for Sandoval.
The jury heard copious evidence showing Sandoval struck an
unarmed person with gardening shears, a deadly weapon. The
jury heard no evidence suggesting Alexander L. posed a great
danger to Sandoval. Because self-defense requires using no more
force than reasonably necessary, it is not probable that the jury
would have reasonable doubt based on this affirmative defense.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
TAMZARIAN, J.
We concur:
COLLINS, Acting P. J.
VAN ROOYEN, J.*
* Judge of the San Luis Obispo Superior Court, assigned by
the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the
California Constitution.
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