CourtListener 10746144•People v. Ramirez CA2/2
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Filed 12/2/25 P. v. Ramirez CA2/2
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
THE PEOPLE, B336730
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. NA093863)
v.
JOHN SILVA RAMIREZ,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Richard M. Goul, Judge. Affirmed.
Patricia S. Lai, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and Theresa A. Patterson, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
John Silva Ramirez (defendant) appeals from the trial
court’s postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code section 1172.6.1 The court denied the petition
without issuing an order to show cause, concluding defendant
was ineligible for relief because he was convicted as the actual
killer. Based on our independent review of the record, we agree
and affirm the order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On May 2, 2013, defendant and his brother, codefendant
Jose Trinidad Ramirez,2 were charged by information in Los
Angeles County with the murder of Martin Contreras (§ 187,
subd. (a); count 1).
Defendant was charged separately with one count of
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 29800, former subd. (a)(1);
count 2).
As to count 1, it was alleged defendant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury
and death (§ 12022.53, subd. (d)). As to each of the counts, it was
alleged the offense was committed for the benefit of a criminal
street gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (b)(1)(C).)
It was further alleged defendant served one prior prison
term (§ 667.5, subd. (b)), had one prior serious felony conviction
(§ 667, subd. (a)) and suffered one prior strike pursuant to the
“Three Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)–(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)–
(d)).
On July 1, 2015, the jury found defendant guilty of first
degree murder in count 1 and possession of a firearm by a felon
in count 2. As to the murder, the jury found true the allegation
that defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
1
All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Penal Code.
2
As defendant, brother, father, and others mentioned at trial
share the same surname, we refer to each such person either by
party designation or first name to avoid confusion.
2
causing great bodily injury and death. As to each offense, the
jury found true the allegation the offense was committed for the
benefit of a criminal street gang.
On September 29, 2015, the trial court sentenced defendant
to state prison for 80 years to life. In 2017, this court affirmed
the judgment of conviction. (People v. Ramirez (Oct. 4, 2017,
B267429) [nonpub. opn.] (Ramirez I).)
On June 14, 2023, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6. The trial court
appointed counsel for defendant and received briefing from the
parties. On February 9, 2024, the court conducted a prima facie
hearing. Thereafter, the court denied the petition without
issuing an order to show cause, finding defendant was convicted
as the actual killer rendering him ineligible for relief as a matter
of law.
On the same day, defendant filed a notice of appeal.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The facts of this case were set forth in detail in Ramirez I.
They are as follows.
Prosecution evidence
Shortly after midnight on April 20, 2012, Contreras, Jose,
and others, including defendant and Jose’s father Miguel
Ramirez, were drinking at a bar they all frequented. Jose and
Contreras argued inside the bar, and Jose mentioned the
Westside Longo gang several times. Jose told Contreras and his
companions repeatedly they were in his neighborhood and they
should respect that fact.
A short time later, as Contreras and others were leaving
the bar, Jose followed them out and spoke to Contreras. Soon the
two came to blows. After being summoned from inside the bar,
Miguel came out and hit or kicked Contreras. Contreras
responded by hitting Miguel with a backhand, causing Miguel to
fall to the ground and lose consciousness. The bar security guard
sprayed pepper spray into the air surrounding the combatants.
Contreras ran away in one direction, and Jose’s companions ran
3
in another. Jose ran to his white Ford pickup truck. Three
friends of Contreras (Julio V., Orlando M., and Christian L.) left
in Julio’s car to find Contreras.
His friends found Contreras a short time later in front of
his house washing off pepper spray with a hose. As Orlando and
Christian got out of Julio’s car, Jose arrived in his white truck
and parked behind Julio’s car. Jose got out of the truck holding a
steel pipe about the size of a baseball bat and told Julio not to
move. Jose asked whether they had been hanging out with
Contreras, and said such things as, “You mother fuckers, you’re
going to pay; this is not going to end like this.” Christian ran off
as a black Dodge Ram pickup truck arrived on the scene and
parked behind the white truck. Orlando testified that he saw
“Johnny,” or defendant, emerge from the black truck, before he
too ran off. Julio, still seated in his car, and Orlando both heard
a gunshot. Julio testified that it came from behind him and
described it as sounding very close.
At the time of the shooting Contreras and Erika Silva
(Silva) lived together with their four children and her two
cousins. Silva woke up around 1:16 a.m. to the sounds of people
arguing. She then heard a gunshot and went to investigate just
as Contreras came in, bleeding from his waist, near his right hip.
He said he had been shot, and he did not want to die. He was
breathing hard and appeared scared. Silva called 911, and at the
operator’s direction asked Contreras who had shot him. Silva
replied to the operator that Contreras named “Johnny.”
Silva later heard Contreras tell a police officer it was
Johnny Ramirez who shot him. Silva did not know who Johnny
Ramirez was, although she knew Jose since Contreras had
worked for him. Long Beach Police Officer Harrison Moore
testified he was one of the first officers on the scene after the
shooting and had questioned Contreras in English as he lay
wounded on the couch. Contreras was groggy and answered in
English slowly and with difficulty as he slipped in and out of
consciousness. In response to Officer Moore’s question who had
4
shot him, Contreras replied, “Johnny Ramirez,” adding Johnny
was 31 and had left in a two-door black Dodge Ram pickup truck.
Elizabeth C. testified her friend Johnny, whom she
identified as defendant, was visiting her at her apartment
between midnight and 1:00 a.m. on the night of the shooting.
After receiving a call just before 1:00 a.m., defendant left saying
he had to go handle something because Jose and father had
gotten into a fight. He returned about 20 or 30 minutes later,
banging on the door loudly “like he was a cop,” saying let me in
until she opened the door. He appeared “jibbery” and paced
nervously until a car arrived to collect him a few minutes later,
about 1:20 or 1:30 a.m.
Defendant’s cell phone records for the night of the shooting
were admitted by stipulation. Defendant’s cell phone and Jose’s
cell phone were both used at or near the scene of the shooting
between 12:56 a.m. and 1:14 a.m. Jose’s phone called defendant’s
phone at 12:56 a.m., 12:57 a.m., 12:58 a.m., and 1:14 a.m., and
one call was made from defendant’s phone to Jose’s phone at
1:01 a.m. All calls were answered.
Retired Deputy Medical Examiner, Dr. Lisa Scheinin,
testified she performed the autopsy, and determined a large
caliber bullet entered Contreras’s body from behind, although not
so directly behind as to rule out the possibility that Contreras
could see the shooter. The location of the wound was consistent
with an attempt to turn away upon seeing a gun. The bullet
entered the soft tissue near the right hip, traveled slightly
downward into the pelvis, through the pelvic area, and stopped in
the soft tissue of the left groin. The bullet damaged an artery
and two veins, and despite surgery to repair them, Contreras
died of his gunshot wound about 20 hours later.
After Contreras was taken to the hospital, Silva telephoned
Maria, whom she considered her sister-in-law, as Maria’s
husband, Juan Barajas, was Miguel’s nephew and defendant’s
cousin. Barajas testified that sometime between 1:00 a.m. and
3:00 a.m., defendant came to his home and told Barajas to tell his
wife to remain silent, that defendant’s name could not get around
5
because he had problems with the police. Defendant showed
Barajas his tattoos and said he was a “soldier” in his gang,
adding that as a gang member, all he had to do was to give an
order to have Barajas and his family killed if they said anything.
Defendant also explained he had done what he had done because
of his father, and then left. Barajas testified he had already
known defendant was a member and soldier of the Westside
Longo gang. Later that afternoon, Barajas told defendant
Contreras had been gravely injured and was going to die.
Defendant replied the shot they had given him was not enough
for him to die.
Sometime after the night of the shooting, Julio, Christian,
and another friend were parked at a liquor store when Jose drove
up, blocked their car, and said what had happened to Contreras
was nothing compared to what would happen to them if they said
anything. Defendant then arrived in another car, said that this
was his “hood,” to remain quiet about what had happened, and all
would be fine.
Defendant and Jose were arrested in November 2012. A
black Dodge Ram truck registered to defendant and a white Ford
F-250 truck registered to Jose were seized. No gun was located.
Jose was placed in a cell with an informant, their
conversations were recorded, and over an hour of the recordings
were played for the jury, with occasional explanations by the
investigating officer, Detective Teryl Hubert. Among other
things, Jose told the informant his brother was a “rider,” and he
telephoned his brother “to have this fool hit,” and to tell him “this
fool needs to go down” and “be gone.” Jose did not directly say his
brother or defendant shot Contreras, but when the informant
asked whether “you shot that fool,” Jose replied “Nah”; and
replied “yes” when the informant asked, “Your brother?” Jose
then said his brother was being blamed, but it was “some other
fool,” a “homeboy” who was never arrested and was unknown to
the police. Jose said the gun used was a revolver, which was
disposed of by his brother.
6
The prosecution’s gang expert, Long Beach Police Detective
Chris Zamora, testified with regard to gang culture in general,
and in particular, the culture, primary activities, membership,
common signs and symbols of the Westside Longo criminal street
gang. Given a hypothetical question mirroring the facts in
evidence in this case, Detective Zamora expressed his opinion
that the crime described would have been committed for the
benefit of and in association with Westside Longo.
Detective Zamora testified to being familiar with defendant
and Jose, and that in his opinion, they were both members of
Westside Longo. He based his opinion on both men’s prior law
enforcement contact, their gang-related tattoos and the facts
surrounding the investigation in this case. Detective Zamora
explained the gang-related tattoos to the jury as photographs of
the tattoos were shown. On defendant’s chest was “West” and
“LB,” which Detective Zamora said was indicative of Westside
Longo. Above it were two lines with three dots on top, which was
a Mayan numbering symbol, signifying that Westside Longo was
a “Sureño” gang, subservient to the Mexican Mafia prison gang.
One must earn the privilege of wearing such a symbol by putting
in work for the gang, meaning the commission of violent assaults.
Detective Zamora also explained that “rider” is a term in Sureño
criminal street gangs that refers to an active member of the gang
who puts in work for the gang.
Defense evidence
The defense presented testimony of its own gang expert,
Martin Flores, who opined that rather than showing a gang-
related crime, the hypothetical facts described for Detective
Zamora indicated a family dispute and a shooting to benefit the
family name, not a gang. He agreed defendant’s tattoos were
gang related, but did not agree the evidence demonstrated
defendant was an active member of the gang at the time of the
shooting. He noted gang members did not necessarily have
tattoos removed upon leaving the gang. Flores noted it was
common for jail inmates to lie or exaggerate the reasons for their
arrest and incarceration. Flores also testified that “rider” can
7
have many meanings, including the more benign meaning of
“buddy.”
DISCUSSION
Defendant argues the trial court erred in denying
defendant’s petition for resentencing at the prima facie stage
because the record of conviction did not establish as a matter of
law that defendant was ineligible for relief.
I. Applicable law and standard of review
In 2019, Senate Bill No. 1437 (2017–2018 Reg. Sess.)
(Senate Bill 1437) limited accomplice liability under the felony-
murder rule and eliminated the natural and probable
consequences doctrine as it relates to murder, to ensure a
person’s sentence is commensurate with his or her criminal
culpability. (People v. Gentile (2020) 10 Cal.5th 830, 842–843,
superseded by statute on another ground as stated in People v.
Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 869.) The bill amended section 188
by adding a requirement that, except as stated in section 189,
subdivision (e), all principals to murder must act with express or
implied malice to be convicted of that crime. (§ 188, subd. (e)(3).)
It amended section 189 by adding a requirement to the felony-
murder theory that defendants who were not the actual killer or
a direct aider and abettor to the felony with intent to kill must
have been a major participant in the underlying felony and acted
with reckless indifference to human life. (§ 189, subd. (e).)
Section 1172.6 established a procedure for defendants
already convicted of murder under the old law to seek
resentencing in the trial court if they believe they could not now
be convicted of that crime given the above amendments to
sections 188 and 189. If a petitioner is not ineligible as a matter
of law, then an order to show cause should issue and the trial
court may hold an evidentiary hearing. The court sits as the fact
finder and the prosecution has the burden of proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty of murder or
attempted murder under the amended law. (§ 1172.6, subd.
(d)(3); People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 960 (Lewis).)
8
At the prima facie stage of the petition process, the trial
court may not engage in factfinding about the petitioner’s
culpability, but should deny a petition if it is clearly meritless as
a matter of law. (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) In making
this determination, the court should consider the petitioner’s
record of conviction. (People v. Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 462–
471 (Curiel).) “‘[I]f the record, including the court’s own
documents, “contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition,” then “the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner,”’” and deeming him
ineligible for resentencing. (Lewis, at p. 971.)
A petitioner is ineligible for resentencing if the record of
conviction shows he was convicted of murder, attempted murder,
or manslaughter under any theory of liability that remains viable
under Senate Bill 1437. When a defendant is convicted as the
sole and actual perpetrator of a murder or attempted murder, he
is ineligible for resentencing as a matter of law. (People v.
Delgadillo (2022) 14 Cal.5th 216, 233.)
Whether a section 1172.6 petition established a prima facie
case for relief is a purely legal question, which we review de novo.
(People v. Lovejoy (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 860, 865.) We thus
need not consider the precise reasoning of the trial court and may
affirm on any ground. (Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 471.)
II. Relevant trial court proceedings
At trial, witnesses to the shooting described a single
gunshot. The medical examiner found the victim died from a
single gunshot wound to the pelvis and abdominal area.
The trial court instructed the jury on multiple theories,
including direct aiding and abetting; the natural and probable
consequences theory of aiding and abetting, with the target crime
of assault, assault with a deadly weapon, or assault with a
firearm; first and second degree murder with malice
aforethought; first degree premeditated murder; and the natural
and probable consequences theory of coconspirator liability in
which the object of the conspiracy was the uncharged crime was
assault, assault with a deadly weapon, or assault with a firearm.
9
Of the two defendants at trial (defendant and codefendant
Jose), only defendant was alleged to have personally used and
discharged a firearm. The prosecutor repeatedly maintained
defendant was the actual killer, highlighting the evidence in the
record suggesting defendant was the sole shooter and actual
killer. This included evidence from Silva, who testified when
asked who shot him, Contreras replied “Johnny.” Contreras also
informed police at the scene that “Johnny Ramirez” had shot him.
In addition, there was Elizabeth C.’s testimony that defendant
appeared “jibbery” after Contreras had been shot. The prosecutor
argued, “[Defendant] acts jibbery because he has just shot the
victim.” The prosecutor also highlighted Jose’s statements to the
informant in jail, in which Jose admitted he called defendant and
told him to “have this fool hit.” The prosecutor emphasized in
closing argument, “Jose . . . is not the shooter. That’s the shooter,
[defendant].”
In discussing the gun allegations during closing argument,
the prosecutor explained the personal firearm use and discharge
allegations only pertained to defendant. The prosecutor
specified: “There is an allegation that [defendant] personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury or
death to Martin Contreras. That he intentionally discharged it,
and he used it. Those are alleged only as to [defendant] because
he is the shooter in this case.” The prosecutor further explained:
“There’s [sic] gun allegations. Discharge causing death is
the most important one. And there are two kinds of gun
allegations. I’ll get into it in detail, but the essence of it is one of
them is an allegation as to [defendant] only; that he personally
did the shooting. The other one is an allegation that applies to
both defendants that says if you find the gang allegation true,
and you just have to find whether a principal in the crime fired
the gun who killed Martin Contreras. What that does is that can
make a gun allegation applicable to Jose . . . even though we
know that he’s not the shooter. It is [defendant].”
10
The prosecutor urged the jury to find defendant guilty as
the shooter, and to find the principal-armed allegation true as to
Jose.
On July 1, 2015, the jury found defendant guilty of first
degree murder in count 1. The jury found true the allegations
defendant personally and intentionally discharged a firearm,
which caused great bodily injury and death to Contreras, and
personally used a firearm.
III. Relevant section 1172.6 proceedings
During the section 1172.6 proceedings, the prosecution
maintained defendant was ineligible for relief as a matter of law
based on the prosecution’s theory of the case and the jury’s true
finding as to the allegation that defendant personally discharged
a firearm causing great bodily injury and death.
The defense argued a prima facie case for relief had been
stated, arguing a true finding on the firearms enhancement did
not preclude relief under Senate Bill 1437. Defendant argues the
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) enhancement relates only to the
act and does not establish a sufficient mens rea for murder.
The trial court denied relief at the prima facie stage,
finding “it seems clear . . . beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant was—[defendant] was the actual killer in this case.
Otherwise, they could not have found him guilty with the special
allegation that they found true. [¶] So in this case the court
finds that defendant was the actual killer and, therefore, has not
met his prima facie burden.”
IV. The record of conviction establishes defendant is not
eligible for relief under section 1172.6
The record conclusively shows defendant was convicted
under the theory he was the actual perpetrator of the murder
who acted with malice. This theory remains valid, thus
defendant is ineligible for relief as a matter of law.
We independently review the record of conviction to
determine whether a prima facie showing has been made.
(Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 971.) Here, the first degree
murder verdict, the true finding on the personal-discharge
11
firearm allegation, and the trial record show defendant was
convicted as a direct perpetrator who acted with malice.
The jury was instructed that murder is an unlawful killing
with malice aforethought and that the following elements must
be proven: (1) the defendant committed an act that caused the
death of another person; and (2) when the defendant acted, he
had a state of mind called malice.
The jury was further instructed that malice may be either
express or implied. Express malice was defined as the defendant
acting unlawfully with intent to kill. Implied malice was defined
as: (1) the defendant intentionally committed an act; (2) the
natural and probable consequences of the act were dangerous to
human life; (3) at the time defendant acted, he knew his act was
dangerous to human life; and (4) he deliberately acted with
conscious disregard for human life.
We may also consider the prosecution’s theory and the trial
evidence, because the underlying question of whether defendant
is eligible for relief is based on “the factual findings [the jury
verdicts] necessarily reflect.” (People v. Morales (2024) 102
Cal.App.5th 1120, 1131 (Morales); see also People v. Beaudreaux
(2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1247 [“reading all the charges, the
instructions, the verdicts, and the findings as a whole, we see no
legal route Beaudreaux’s jury could have taken to convict him
without finding he was [the victim’s] actual killer”].)
Viewing the record as a whole, the jury’s verdict that
defendant was guilty of first degree murder and he personally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death, render
him ineligible for relief under section 1172.6.
Defendant argues because (1) the complaint or information
allowed the prosecution to proceed under the natural and
probable consequences doctrine or uncharged conspiracy theory
under which malice was imputed and (2) defendant was convicted
of murder following a trial, it cannot be said he was ineligible as
a matter of law. Instead, defendant argues, the jury instructions
allowed the jury to conclude that an aider and abettor could be
guilty of first degree murder under the natural and probable
12
consequences doctrine or the uncharged conspiracy liability
instruction. There was no express finding that would show
defendant’s ineligibility as a matter of law, such as a true finding
as to premeditation. Further, defendant argues, because the trial
court did not instruct that vicarious murder liability as a
consequence of the conspiracy could not be first degree murder,
the jury could have convicted defendant of first degree murder as
a coconspirator without personally harboring an intent to kill.
Defendant cites People v. Offley (2020) 48 Cal.App.5th 588
(Offley) as support for his position. In Offley, at least three
individuals fired shots into a vehicle, killing one person and
seriously wounding another. (Id. at p. 592.) Offley and Keller
were two of five defendants charged with taking part in the
crime. Both Offley and Keller were convicted of one count of
murder, one count of attempted murder, and one count of
shooting at a motor vehicle. (Id. at p. 593.) Offley was convicted
of second degree murder, and Keller was convicted of first degree
murder. The jury found that Offley personally and intentionally
discharged a firearm causing great bodily injury or death under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d). As to Keller, the jury found a
principal to the crimes, but not Keller himself, fired the weapon.
(§ 12022.53, subds. (d) & (e)(1).) Both Offley and Keller filed
petitions for resentencing under section 1170.95 (since
renumbered to § 1172.6), which the trial court denied at the first
stage of review on the ground that the jury found both defendants
personally fired a weapon and proximately caused great bodily
injury or death. (Offley, at p. 597.)
The Offley court reversed, finding an enhancement under
section 12022.53, subdivision (d) does not preclude relief because
it does not show that a defendant acted with malice aforethought.
(Offley, supra, 48 Cal.App.5th at p. 598.) The Offley court noted
section 12022.53 is a “general intent enhancement,” which “does
not require the prosecution to prove that the defendant harbored
a particular mental state as to the victim’s injury or death.”
(Offley, at p. 598) However, the Offley court acknowledged, “Of
course, the trial court may look beyond the abstract of judgment
13
and consider the entire record of conviction, . . . in determining
whether a petitioner has made a prima facie case of
eligibility. . . . In many instances, additional information from
the record will establish that a defendant’s conviction was not
based on the natural and probable consequences doctrine, and
that the jury must have convicted the defendant on the basis
of . . . malice aforethought.” (Id. at pp. 598-599.) The court noted
that in that particular case, the court could not rule out the
possibility that the jury relied on the natural and probable
consequences doctrine in convicting Offley. (Id. at p. 599)
Here, in contrast, the record rules out any suggestion
defendant was convicted under a natural and probable
consequences theory or a conspiracy theory. The prosecution
relied on a theory that defendant was the actual killer, and his
brother Jose was guilty as an aider and abettor. The evidence
exclusively pointed to a single shot being fired, which ultimately
caused the victim’s death. Although defendant’s trial defense
involved a suggestion that an unidentified third party shot the
victim, the jury necessarily rejected such a theory by finding true
the allegation defendant personally and intentionally discharged
a firearm causing great bodily injury and death. The actual killer
in a murder is ineligible for section 1172.6 relief as a matter of
law. (People v. Delgadillo, supra, 14 Cal.5th at p. 233.)
Defendant also relies on In re Ferrell (2023) 14 Cal.5th 593
(Ferrell). The case does not assist defendant. In Ferrell, there
was evidence 17-year-old Ferrell “‘shot one time into the air, and
the second time it just went off.’” There was also evidence Ferrell
was trying to break up a fight at the time. (Id. at p. 598.) There
was eyewitness testimony Ferrell’s first shot was into the air, and
the gun was not aimed at anyone. Two witnesses observed
Ferrell run to the victim and apologize, saying he didn’t mean to
do it. (Ibid.) The jury was instructed on a felony-murder theory,
among other theories, and Ferrell was found guilty of second
degree murder. (Id. at p. 599.)
Ferrell sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing his jury
received instructions which allowed them to convict on an invalid
14
theory of second degree murder. (Ferrell, supra, 14 Cal.5th at
p. 600.) In its discussion of harmless error, the Ferrell court
concluded that the jury’s finding that Ferrell discharged a
firearm and caused death under section 12022.53, subdivision (d),
failed to establish the mental component of implied malice.
Instead, the jury could have found Ferrell shot his friend while
trying to stop a fight without believing he was shooting towards
any person. (Ferrell, at p. 597.)
Here, the jury was instructed on the required element of
malice. Its finding defendant was guilty of first degree murder
necessarily included a finding of malice. Further, in this case,
where the facts showed a targeted killing of a specific individual,
with only one shot fired by defendant, the record precludes
defendant’s eligibility under section 1172.6.
Finally, defendant relies on Curiel, which is also unhelpful
to defendant. Curiel involved a confrontation between rival gang
members including arguments and pushing. (Curiel, supra, 15
Cal.5th at p. 433.) The defendant’s companion took out a gun
and shot one of the rival group. (Id. at p. 442.) At trial, the
prosecutor argued the defendant instigated the confrontation and
was there for backup. (Id. at p. 445.) The jury convicted the
defendant of first degree murder and found true gang-murder
special circumstance allegations. (Id. at p. 447.) Following the
enactment of Senate Bill 1437, the defendant petitioned the court
for resentencing, arguing he had been convicted of first degree
murder under a natural and probable consequences theory. In
response, the prosecution argued the jury’s true finding on the
special circumstance allegation rendered the defendant ineligible
for relief, because the gang-murder special circumstance included
an element of intent to kill. (Curiel, at p. 447.) The Curiel court
granted review to address “whether and under what
circumstances a jury’s finding of intent to kill renders a
defendant who seeks relief under Senate Bill 1437 . . . ineligible
as a matter of law.” (Curiel, at p. 448.)
Here, in contrast, there was no dispute defendant fired the
single shot that struck and killed the victim. The jury found not
15
only defendant had intent to kill, but necessarily found him
guilty as the actual killer. Because the only theory of murder
liability provided to the jury for actual killers was malice murder,
the jury found all the elements necessary for a direct perpetrator
for the crime of murder.
Morales is instructive. In Morales, the defendant had been
convicted of attempted premeditated murder in conjunction with
a robbery of an armored truck. (Morales, supra, 102 Cal.App.5th
at pp. 1123–1128.) Although Morales argued his companion at
the time fired the shots at the driver of the armored truck, the
jury did not credit this defense, finding true allegations that
Morales personally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily
injury during the commission of the robbery and attempted
murder. (Id. at pp. 1127–1128.) Under these circumstances, the
trial court did not err in denying Morales’s petition for
resentencing despite the fact instructions were given on the
natural and probable consequences doctrine. The Morales court
explained the jury’s verdict precluded Morales’s eligibility for
resentencing in spite of the natural and probable consequences
instruction: “these guilty verdicts were not the jury’s only
findings regarding the robbery and attempted premeditated
murder of [the victim]. The jury also found Morales guilty of
assault with an assault weapon and found true the allegation
under section 12022.53(d) that Morales personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm and caused great bodily injury
in the commission of the robbery and attempted premeditated
murder of [the victim]. This means the jury made the factual
finding that Morales was the robber who shot [the victim]
multiple times with an AK-47 semiautomatic rifle.” (Id. at
pp. 1131–1132.)
Similarly, here, the jury’s finding defendant personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm, causing great bodily injury
and death to Contreras, means the jury made the factual finding
that defendant fired the single shot that killed Contreras. Given
the circumstances of this case, we are confident the jury
16
necessarily made all the factual findings required to establish
defendant is guilty of murder as the actual shooter.
V. No due process violation occurred
Defendant argues section 1172.6 creates a liberty interest
protected by the due process clause, and erroneous denial of
defendant’s petition at the prima facie stage therefore violates
due process. (U.S. Const., 5th & 14th Amends., citing Hicks v.
Oklahoma (1980) 447 U.S. 343, 346.)
To the extent there is a state-created due process right
under section 1172.6, such a right only exists if the defendant
meets the eligibility criteria under the statute. Because he is
ineligible for relief as a matter of law, defendant’s argument he
was deprived of a state-created due process right fails. (People v.
Fisher (2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1022, 1030, fn. 7.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed.
CHAVEZ, J.
We concur:
LUI, P. J.
RICHARDSON, J.
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