CourtListener 10745312•People v. Matthews CA2/8
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Filed 12/1/25 P. v. Matthews CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B333927
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA158270
v.
LANCE MATTHEWS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Connie Quinones and Hector E.
Gutierrez, Judges. Affirmed.
Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
A jury convicted Lance Matthews of second degree
robbery. The court sentenced him to 25 years to life under the
Three Strikes Law. Matthews appeals. His court-appointed
counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436,
441-442. Matthews submitted his own brief raising a number of
issues. We requested and received additional briefing about one
issue. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Undesignated
statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
I
We begin with a summary of the facts and pertinent
procedural background.
A
Delorean W. worked as a security guard at a 7-11 store
with a Shell gas station. We follow the parties’ and trial court’s
lead in including only the initial of this individual’s surname and
refer to him by his first name. One evening, Delorean arrived
early to work and sat in his car with the driver’s side door open,
smoking a blunt, waiting for his 7:00 p.m. shift to begin.
At about 6:45 p.m., a black BMW sedan backed into a spot
by the air pump near Delorean. Delorean saw Matthews get out
of the car. As Matthews passed the rear of the BMW, Delorean
saw him get a gun from the trunk and put it in the front pocket of
his hoodie. Matthews approached Delorean with the driver’s door
between them. He kept his right hand in his hoodie pocket.
Matthews asked Delorean, “Where you from?” Delorean replied
that he did not gang bang. Matthews then said, “You know what
2
it is. I need all of that,” and pointed at Delorean’s jewelry.
Delorean could see the outline of the gun in Matthews’s pocket.
Because he was afraid of being shot, Delorean handed Matthews
all of the jewelry he was wearing: three gold necklaces and ten
rings, including his wedding rings. He also gave Matthews the
$20 that was in his wallet, which was sitting in his lap.
Matthews said, “I should really pop you.” He then returned to
the BMW walking backwards, watching Delorean the whole time.
Once in the car, Matthews drove away.
Delorean sat in shock for a few minutes, then tried to follow
Matthews, but got caught in traffic. He did get a picture of the
BMW’s license plate. Delorean returned to his workplace and
told his coworkers what happened. He then went home and
contemplated bringing his gun to work, but decided against
it. He returned to work.
At around 11:45 p.m., “Abraham,” the owner of the 7-11
called the police and reported the robbery. Officers came to the
store and spoke with Delorean. He told the officers he did not
want to testify but eventually told them what had happened.
Delorean gave police the BMW’s license plate number.
About a week later, Detective Daniel Pearce took over the
investigation. He watched surveillance video at the 7-11.
Technical difficulties prevented him from downloading the video,
but he recorded it on his cell phone. The BMW belonged to one
Sharon Palmer. Pearce found a photograph of Matthews
matching Delorean’s description. Matthews’s neck tattoo was
unique.
Police watched Palmer’s residence and eventually took
Matthews and Palmer into custody. Delorean identified
Matthews as the robber.
3
Pearce and his partner spoke to Matthews after the field
identification. Matthews was in an interrogation room in
handcuffs. Matthews asked if he was under arrest, and Pearce
said that had yet to be determined. Pearce then read Matthews
his Miranda rights. Matthews did not refuse to speak to the
officers or ask for an attorney.
Pearce asked Matthews about the night of the robbery.
Matthews claimed when he pulled into the gas station, Delorean
had called out to him. When Matthews approached, Delorean
tried to sell him drugs. Matthews said he was not interested, and
Delorean appeared agitated. Matthews said the way Delorean
was sitting and appeared to be clutching something made
Matthews believe Delorean had a gun. Because of this,
Matthews simulated a gun in his pocket with his hand.
Matthews claimed Delorean gave him the jewelry voluntarily.
Matthews told officers he could probably get it back if they
released him. He said it had been pawned. At the end of the
interview, the officers told Matthews he was under arrest.
B
An information charged Matthews with robbery and
possession of a firearm as a felon and alleged four prior
convictions for robbery in 1995 and two 2019 convictions for
criminal threats and assault with a deadly weapon.
Matthews elected to represent himself and signed a Faretta
waiver.
After a preliminary hearing at which Pearce, but not
Delorean, testified, Judge Julian C. Recana held Matthews to
answer on the robbery charge but dismissed the gun possession
charge due to insufficient evidence. The prosecutor filed an
amended information dropping the possession charge.
4
Judge Teresa P. Magno presided over the pre-trial
proceedings. The court appointed stand-by counsel for Matthews.
C
After the parties announced ready for trial, the court
assigned them to Judge Hector E. Gutierrez’s court for trial.
Judge Gutierrez ruled on various motions. Matthews asked
Judge Gutierrez to rule that the prosecutor could not mention
that Matthews had a gun during the robbery. Judge Gutierrez
ruled that it would be proper for the prosecutor to argue Delorean
believed Matthews was armed because the prosecutor needed to
prove “fear of force” to meet the elements of robbery.
While testifying, Delorean became emotional. When
Matthews asked the record to reflect that Delorean was glaring
at him during direct examination, Delorean responded, “For the
record, I’m finally looking at the man that robbed me.” Delorean
became increasingly agitated when Matthews questioned
him. At one point, Delorean told Matthews to “shut up” and that
he was not very smart, for which he apologized to the court. The
court noted Matthews’s questioning seemed to be egging
Delorean on at times.
Near the end of the prosecutor’s case, the court asked
Matthews what witnesses he would be calling. Matthews stated
he wanted to call his investigator and one of the officers who
came to the 7-11 the night of the robbery, Andrew Jenkins or
Jesse Cota. The court asked Matthews whether he had served
subpoenas on the officers. Matthews said he had not. The court
asked the prosecutor whether he had them under subpoena, and
he said he did not. The court explained to Matthews that it did
not have the power to compel the officers to attend if he had not
5
served them with subpoenas. Matthews asked for a continuance
to do so, which the court denied.
Matthews explained to the court he wanted one of the
officers to testify to authenticate footage from their body worn
cameras. He suggested having his investigator authenticate the
footage. The prosecutor objected the investigator had no personal
knowledge of the footage and that, in any event, the footage
would be hearsay not subject to an exception. The court reviewed
a transcript of the footage and agreed. Although Matthews
wanted the footage to show that Delorean had not wanted to
speak to the officers, none of his statements were inconsistent
with his testimony in court.
The jury convicted Matthews of second degree robbery.
Matthews requested a bench trial on his priors and aggravating
circumstances. The court allowed him a short continuance to
prepare.
D
At the next hearing, Matthews argued the court should
strike some of his prior strikes. He asserted three of the four
1995 convictions should be stricken because they all arose from a
single event or omission. He argued his 2019 convictions should
be stricken because he had been misled by that court about how
long he would need to remain in prison before he accepted the
plea deal.
The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Matthews had suffered each of the six prior convictions alleged
by the prosecutor.
The court considered the alleged aggravating factors and
found true that Matthews had been armed, he had engaged in
violent conduct, he had suffered prior convictions as an adult and
6
sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings that are
numerous and of increasing seriousness, he had served a prior
term in prison and county jail, he had committed the offense
while on parole, and he had previously performed unsatisfactorily
on parole. (California Rule of Court, Rule 4.421(a)(2), (b)(1),
(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5).)
The court found the crime did not show a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness. (California Rule of Court,
Rule 4.421(a)(1).)
Matthews then informed the court he intended to move for
a new trial, and the court continued the matter.
At the following hearing, the court heard and denied a
motion for a trial transcript. The court then turned to
Matthews’s motion to strike a prior conviction and his motion
under People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 923–924.
The court denied the Sumstine motion, rejecting
Matthews’s arguments that a conviction under section 245 did
not constitute a strike and that the 2019 conviction was invalid
because of the court’s alleged misadvisement about Matthews’s
credit calculation at the time of his plea. The court denied
Matthews’s motion for a new trial. The court then turned to
Matthews’s People v. Romero (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1418
motion. The court noted Matthews was young at the time of the
1995 convictions.
E
Before Judge Gutierrez could pronounce judgment,
Matthews gave oral notice that he intended to file a motion under
the Racial Justice Act (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1). Matthews
agreed with the court’s characterization that Matthews “fe[lt]
7
that the court ruling against you is in and of itself evidence of
discrimination,” as well as the court’s “embroilment.”
At the prosecutor’s suggestion, the court paused the
proceedings and transferred the matter to another court. Judge
Gutierrez asked the court reporter to prepare a transcript of the
portion of the current hearing relating to the Act.
Judge Connie R. Quinones heard Matthews’s motion under
the Act. Judge Quinones noted that she had received a written
motion from Matthews as well as a partial transcript from the
previous hearing before Judge Gutierrez. Matthews requested
several categories of discovery and a continuance, which Judge
Quinones denied. Judge Quinones asked Matthews for the basis
of his motion. Matthews responded that he had no specifics to
provide because he did not have any transcripts or discovery.
Matthews denied he was arguing the court’s rulings against him
were evidence of its discrimination, but then described the court’s
rulings and embroilment as the reason he believed the court
discriminated against him. He pointed to no specific words or
conduct by the court that showed racial bias or animus. Judge
Quinones denied Matthews’s motion because there was “no
specificity,” and he had not stated the “how, why, when, and in
what way” of how Judge Gutierrez or Judge Magno discriminated
against him.
F
The matter returned to Judge Gutierrez’s court for
judgment and sentencing. The court allowed both sides to
address the Romero motion. Matthews noted his young age and
issues such as homelessness and parental drug use. He also
noted the 1995 convictions were remote in time. He argued that
he should not be found within the spirit of the Three Strikes
8
Law. The court went through Matthews’s extensive criminal
history on the record and found he was not outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes Law because he had suffered “serious and
violent felonies” and multiple prison terms. Judge Gutierrez
stated he understood he had discretion, but in “this particular
case for the court to exercise its discretion and strike the strikes
would be contrary to the intent and the spirit of the Three-
Strikes Law.” The court noted it could be looked at as an abuse
of discretion not to impose the three strikes law given Matthews’s
history and prior convictions and the court’s concern for the
safety of the community. The court sentenced Matthews to 25
years to life under the Three Strikes Law.
Matthew appealed. This court appointed counsel. That
counsel filed a Wende brief stating she had reviewed the record
and found no colorable arguments. Counsel told Matthews he
had the right to file his own brief. Matthews did so, filing a 40-
page brief raising several issues.
At our request, counsel provided briefing about Matthews’s
Sumstine claim.
II
None of the arguments Matthews raises is valid. We
address each below.
A
Matthews argues the trial court erred in allowing the
prosecutor to use Matthews’s statement to police because it was
the result of an illegal arrest. Judge Gutierrez held a motion in
limine hearing on this issue during trial. Matthews argues the
Miranda warning was insufficient because police told him it was
still to be determined whether he would be arrested before
reading him his rights. (See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.
9
436.) Matthews cites no authority for this proposition. As Judge
Gutierrez stated, the pertinent issue in determining whether
Miranda warnings are appropriate is whether Matthews was in
custody. Judge Gutierrez correctly found Matthews was in
custody: he had been detained hours earlier, handcuffed, and
taken to the police station. Officers did not tell him he was free
to go, subjected him to a field show-up, and then questioned him
in an interrogation room. (See People v. Bejasa (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 26, 36 [court looks at totality of circumstances in
determining if defendant is in custody].) The police correctly read
Matthews his Miranda warnings. There was no requirement
they tell him the charge or confirm whether he was under arrest.
Matthews also argues his arrest was illegal because the
officers did not obtain a warrant before arresting him. This
argument is incorrect. Under Section 836(a)(3), a peace officer
may arrest a person without a warrant where there is probable
cause to believe the person committed a felony. (See also People
v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 57 [probable cause exists where
the facts known to a police officer would convince a reasonable
person that the arrestee had committed a crime].) The officers
had probable cause to believe Matthews had committed a
felony. The cases Matthews cites about arrests without probable
cause or in a person’s home are inapposite to his situation. (See
Kaupp v. Texas (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 633; Brown v. Illinois (1975)
422 U.S. 590, 591; People v. Poole (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1004,
1015-1016.)
B
Matthews argues the trial court erred in denying him the
right to present Jenkin’s body worn video footage and in doing so
violated his constitutional rights.
10
We first note that Matthews’s difficulty in presenting this
evidence arose from Matthews’s failure to follow proper
procedure. The court repeatedly warned him, and Matthews
acknowledged, that although he was representing himself he
would be held to the same standard as an attorney. (People v.
Smith (1985) 38 Cal.3d 945, 951–952 (Smith) [the self-
represented are held to the same standard as attorneys].)
Matthews did not take the steps necessary to subpoena Jenkins
so he could authenticate the video. This fact moots the court’s
ruling that the video would constitute inadmissible hearsay, for
an unauthenticated video is inadmissible whether or not it is
hearsay.
C
Matthews makes a general assertion that the court erred in
denying him the right to an investigator and investigative
services. He argues this hindered his ability to prepare for trial.
The record shows the courts granted Matthews an
investigator and funds. When Matthews reported issues
accessing the funds and contacting the investigator, the court did
what it could to help, including calling the sheriff’s department
and investigator and ordering the prosecutor to contact the
investigator. It ordered the investigator to court to clarify his
role.
Matthews declared ready for trial. There is no reason to
believe that, if he had asked the court for more time to connect
with his investigator, the court would have denied this
request. The court denied continuance requests only after trial
began and for particular issues for which Matthews showed no
due diligence. The court acted properly.
D
11
Matthews claims the court denied him the right to compel
the attendance of witnesses at trial. This is inaccurate.
Matthews’s argument appears to be based on his
misunderstanding of certain of the court’s statements. Just
before voir dire, the court asked Matthews what witnesses he
intended to call so they could be added to the list to be read to the
jurors. Matthews stated he would call Officer Jesse Cota, Officer
Mamrot, and Abraham. The court noted the officers were already
on the witness list because the prosecutor had also identified
them as potential witnesses. Matthews apparently took the
court’s statement to mean he did not need to do anything to
ensure these officers would appear for trial.
As noted, courts expect people representing themselves to
follow rules of court as an attorney would. (Smith, supra, 38
Cal.3d at pp. 951–952.) It was incumbent on Matthews to inform
himself of what he needed to do to make sure a witness was
available for trial. He failed to take those steps. The court did
not deny Matthews the right to compel the attendance of
witnesses at trial.
Likewise, the court’s denial of a continuance to rectify
Matthews’s error was not erroneous. Matthews presented no
good cause for a continuance. (See Jensen v. Superior Court
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 266, 271 [absence of unsubpoenaed
witness is not good cause for continuance].) Matthews’s failure to
follow rules did not constitute good cause. The court’s decision
did not deprive him of a fair trial.
Matthews argues the prosecutor deliberately misled the
judge about material information favorable to Matthews and
insinuates witness Jenkins had this information. However,
Matthews fails to identify what this material information was.
12
He offers no basis for believing Jenkins had it, whatever it
was. This contention fails.
E
Matthews repeatedly accused the court of embroilment,
generally after the court denied one of his motions.
“Embroilment is the process by which a judge surrenders
impartiality. In doing so, the judge becomes a party to the
quarrel, involved rather than impartial and losing professional
distance. Once a judge becomes embroiled in a matter, fairness,
impartiality, and the integrity of decisions leave the courtroom.”
(Rothman et al., California Judicial Conduct Handbook (4th ed.
2017) § 2:1, p. 58.)
Judge Gutierrez and Judge Magno displayed no
embroilment, favoritism, or bias.
During a hearing, Matthews argued Judge Gutierrez
showed embroilment by doing his own research. Independent
legal research by courts is laudable. (See Giraldo v. Dep’t of
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 251.)
Courts must apply the law accurately. This duty can require
independent legal research.
Matthews’s other examples do not show embroilment.
Judge Gutierrez permitted the prosecutor to argue without filing
a written brief. The court also ruled without asking for
opposition from the prosecutor. This conduct was not evidence of
embroilment. Matthews frequently cited California Rule of Court
4.111 for the proposition that the prosecutor should not be
allowed to oppose a motion orally, but that rule imposes no such
restriction. Moreover, Judge Gutierrez’s understanding of the
law allowed him to rule on Matthews’s argument without input
from the prosecutor. The court acted properly.
13
F
Matthews attempted to foreclose mention of a gun
throughout the proceedings, claiming the dismissal of the
possession charge at the preliminary hearing meant res judicata
applied. This argument was in error. As Judge Gutierrez
explained, the law required the prosecutor to prove fear of force
as an element of the robbery charge. Nothing prevented the
prosecutor from doing so with testimony from the victim, who
had not testified at the preliminary hearing. As the court
explained to Matthews, res judicata did not prevent the
prosecutor from asking Delorean to testify truthfully.
G
Matthews incorrectly argues the trial court erred in
denying his Sumstine motion.
A Sumstine motion allows a defendant to launch a
collateral attack on a previous conviction that is being used to
enhance a sentence. (Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 918–919.)
The defendant alleges the previous conviction is invalid because
of a constitutional failing in that proceeding. (Id. at pp. 923–
924.) Here, Matthews alleges his 2019 conviction was invalid
because the court misadvised him about how credits would be
calculated pursuant to a proposed plea agreement. Matthews
claims the court told him he would be able to receive fifty percent
credit. In fact, Matthews says, the Department of Corrections
required him to serve eighty percent of his sentence, and he had
to file a habeas claim to fix the error.
The problem with this argument is that the court did not
misadvise Matthews, as his counsel concedes in the supplemental
briefing on this issue. The trial court was correct, counsel
admits, that Matthews was eligible to earn credits to reduce his
14
sentence by fifty percent. Rather, it was the Department that
made the error. Though Matthews argues he was wrongly
deprived of his credits, that is not the standard for Sumstine
relief. To support his claim that his plea was not intelligent and
voluntary, Matthews must point to a misadvisement by the court.
(In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 350–352 [court’s
misadvisement about length of parole term could invalidate plea
agreement if prejudice shown].) His failure to do so is fatal to his
claim.
H
Matthews argues Judge Quinones imposed the wrong
standard in denying his claim under the Racial Justice Act.
There was no error.
When a defendant alleges a violation of the Act, the court
determines whether the defendant has made a prima facie
showing. (§ 745, subd. (c).) In making this determination, the
court takes the defendant’s allegations as true and then considers
if there is a substantial likelihood that a violation in fact
occurred; in other words, more than a mere possibility but less
than a standard of more likely than not. (Id., subd. (h)(2).)
Courts have described the plausible justification standard as
“minimal.” (People v. Garcia (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 290, 296–
297.)
Matthews incorrectly argues the court improperly imposed
a “heavy” burden on him. Matthews did not provide facts
sufficient to meet the lenient standard. (Garcia, supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at pp. 296–297.) Matthews’s claim amounted to: (1)
I am Black, and (2) the judge ruled against me. This is
insufficient.
15
Matthews argues the court made impermissible credibility
findings in ruling against him, and also erred in denying him
discovery. These arguments are unavailing. Matthews failed to
provide any facts requiring a credibility determination or
justifying discovery. (People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
990, 1002 [defendant’s “ordinary evidentiary rulings” were not a
prima facie showing of a violation of the Act].)
I
Matthews argues the trial court erred in declining to strike
some of his prior convictions because his case is not within the
spirit of the Three Strikes Law. He contends the court’s
assertion—that striking some of his convictions would be an
abuse of discretion—means it did not understand its
discretion. This contention is mistaken. As described above, the
court considered the appropriate factors, explicitly noted it had
discretion, and found the circumstances of Matthews’s particular
case required a finding that he was within the spirit of the Three
Strikes Law.
Matthews argues the court should have stricken some of
his strikes because they related to the same conduct, but cites
inapposite rules about sentencing rather than authority about
convictions constituting strikes.
Matthews faults the court for failing to consider factors
such as his mental health or the amount of time he spent in
prison, but he provides no cites to show he put evidence of this
kind before the court.
Finally, Matthews complains the court did not explain its
rationale but identifies no authority requiring the court to do so.
16
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
UZCATEGUI, J.*1
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
17
Filed 12/1/25 P. v. Matthews CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B333927
Plaintiff and Respondent, Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. TA158270
v.
LANCE MATTHEWS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order and judgment of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Connie Quinones and Hector E.
Gutierrez, Judges. Affirmed.
Lise M. Breakey, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Steven D. Matthews and Rama R. Maline,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
A jury convicted Lance Matthews of second degree
robbery. The court sentenced him to 25 years to life under the
Three Strikes Law. Matthews appeals. His court-appointed
counsel filed a brief under People v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436,
441-442. Matthews submitted his own brief raising a number of
issues. We requested and received additional briefing about one
issue. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Undesignated
statutory citations are to the Penal Code.
I
We begin with a summary of the facts and pertinent
procedural background.
A
Delorean W. worked as a security guard at a 7-11 store
with a Shell gas station. We follow the parties’ and trial court’s
lead in including only the initial of this individual’s surname and
refer to him by his first name. One evening, Delorean arrived
early to work and sat in his car with the driver’s side door open,
smoking a blunt, waiting for his 7:00 p.m. shift to begin.
At about 6:45 p.m., a black BMW sedan backed into a spot
by the air pump near Delorean. Delorean saw Matthews get out
of the car. As Matthews passed the rear of the BMW, Delorean
saw him get a gun from the trunk and put it in the front pocket of
his hoodie. Matthews approached Delorean with the driver’s door
between them. He kept his right hand in his hoodie pocket.
Matthews asked Delorean, “Where you from?” Delorean replied
that he did not gang bang. Matthews then said, “You know what
2
it is. I need all of that,” and pointed at Delorean’s jewelry.
Delorean could see the outline of the gun in Matthews’s pocket.
Because he was afraid of being shot, Delorean handed Matthews
all of the jewelry he was wearing: three gold necklaces and ten
rings, including his wedding rings. He also gave Matthews the
$20 that was in his wallet, which was sitting in his lap.
Matthews said, “I should really pop you.” He then returned to
the BMW walking backwards, watching Delorean the whole time.
Once in the car, Matthews drove away.
Delorean sat in shock for a few minutes, then tried to follow
Matthews, but got caught in traffic. He did get a picture of the
BMW’s license plate. Delorean returned to his workplace and
told his coworkers what happened. He then went home and
contemplated bringing his gun to work, but decided against
it. He returned to work.
At around 11:45 p.m., “Abraham,” the owner of the 7-11
called the police and reported the robbery. Officers came to the
store and spoke with Delorean. He told the officers he did not
want to testify but eventually told them what had happened.
Delorean gave police the BMW’s license plate number.
About a week later, Detective Daniel Pearce took over the
investigation. He watched surveillance video at the 7-11.
Technical difficulties prevented him from downloading the video,
but he recorded it on his cell phone. The BMW belonged to one
Sharon Palmer. Pearce found a photograph of Matthews
matching Delorean’s description. Matthews’s neck tattoo was
unique.
Police watched Palmer’s residence and eventually took
Matthews and Palmer into custody. Delorean identified
Matthews as the robber.
3
Pearce and his partner spoke to Matthews after the field
identification. Matthews was in an interrogation room in
handcuffs. Matthews asked if he was under arrest, and Pearce
said that had yet to be determined. Pearce then read Matthews
his Miranda rights. Matthews did not refuse to speak to the
officers or ask for an attorney.
Pearce asked Matthews about the night of the robbery.
Matthews claimed when he pulled into the gas station, Delorean
had called out to him. When Matthews approached, Delorean
tried to sell him drugs. Matthews said he was not interested, and
Delorean appeared agitated. Matthews said the way Delorean
was sitting and appeared to be clutching something made
Matthews believe Delorean had a gun. Because of this,
Matthews simulated a gun in his pocket with his hand.
Matthews claimed Delorean gave him the jewelry voluntarily.
Matthews told officers he could probably get it back if they
released him. He said it had been pawned. At the end of the
interview, the officers told Matthews he was under arrest.
B
An information charged Matthews with robbery and
possession of a firearm as a felon and alleged four prior
convictions for robbery in 1995 and two 2019 convictions for
criminal threats and assault with a deadly weapon.
Matthews elected to represent himself and signed a Faretta
waiver.
After a preliminary hearing at which Pearce, but not
Delorean, testified, Judge Julian C. Recana held Matthews to
answer on the robbery charge but dismissed the gun possession
charge due to insufficient evidence. The prosecutor filed an
amended information dropping the possession charge.
4
Judge Teresa P. Magno presided over the pre-trial
proceedings. The court appointed stand-by counsel for Matthews.
C
After the parties announced ready for trial, the court
assigned them to Judge Hector E. Gutierrez’s court for trial.
Judge Gutierrez ruled on various motions. Matthews asked
Judge Gutierrez to rule that the prosecutor could not mention
that Matthews had a gun during the robbery. Judge Gutierrez
ruled that it would be proper for the prosecutor to argue Delorean
believed Matthews was armed because the prosecutor needed to
prove “fear of force” to meet the elements of robbery.
While testifying, Delorean became emotional. When
Matthews asked the record to reflect that Delorean was glaring
at him during direct examination, Delorean responded, “For the
record, I’m finally looking at the man that robbed me.” Delorean
became increasingly agitated when Matthews questioned
him. At one point, Delorean told Matthews to “shut up” and that
he was not very smart, for which he apologized to the court. The
court noted Matthews’s questioning seemed to be egging
Delorean on at times.
Near the end of the prosecutor’s case, the court asked
Matthews what witnesses he would be calling. Matthews stated
he wanted to call his investigator and one of the officers who
came to the 7-11 the night of the robbery, Andrew Jenkins or
Jesse Cota. The court asked Matthews whether he had served
subpoenas on the officers. Matthews said he had not. The court
asked the prosecutor whether he had them under subpoena, and
he said he did not. The court explained to Matthews that it did
not have the power to compel the officers to attend if he had not
5
served them with subpoenas. Matthews asked for a continuance
to do so, which the court denied.
Matthews explained to the court he wanted one of the
officers to testify to authenticate footage from their body worn
cameras. He suggested having his investigator authenticate the
footage. The prosecutor objected the investigator had no personal
knowledge of the footage and that, in any event, the footage
would be hearsay not subject to an exception. The court reviewed
a transcript of the footage and agreed. Although Matthews
wanted the footage to show that Delorean had not wanted to
speak to the officers, none of his statements were inconsistent
with his testimony in court.
The jury convicted Matthews of second degree robbery.
Matthews requested a bench trial on his priors and aggravating
circumstances. The court allowed him a short continuance to
prepare.
D
At the next hearing, Matthews argued the court should
strike some of his prior strikes. He asserted three of the four
1995 convictions should be stricken because they all arose from a
single event or omission. He argued his 2019 convictions should
be stricken because he had been misled by that court about how
long he would need to remain in prison before he accepted the
plea deal.
The trial court found beyond a reasonable doubt that
Matthews had suffered each of the six prior convictions alleged
by the prosecutor.
The court considered the alleged aggravating factors and
found true that Matthews had been armed, he had engaged in
violent conduct, he had suffered prior convictions as an adult and
6
sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings that are
numerous and of increasing seriousness, he had served a prior
term in prison and county jail, he had committed the offense
while on parole, and he had previously performed unsatisfactorily
on parole. (California Rule of Court, Rule 4.421(a)(2), (b)(1),
(b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(4), (b)(5).)
The court found the crime did not show a high degree of
cruelty, viciousness, or callousness. (California Rule of Court,
Rule 4.421(a)(1).)
Matthews then informed the court he intended to move for
a new trial, and the court continued the matter.
At the following hearing, the court heard and denied a
motion for a trial transcript. The court then turned to
Matthews’s motion to strike a prior conviction and his motion
under People v. Sumstine (1984) 36 Cal.3d 909, 923–924.
The court denied the Sumstine motion, rejecting
Matthews’s arguments that a conviction under section 245 did
not constitute a strike and that the 2019 conviction was invalid
because of the court’s alleged misadvisement about Matthews’s
credit calculation at the time of his plea. The court denied
Matthews’s motion for a new trial. The court then turned to
Matthews’s People v. Romero (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1418
motion. The court noted Matthews was young at the time of the
1995 convictions.
E
Before Judge Gutierrez could pronounce judgment,
Matthews gave oral notice that he intended to file a motion under
the Racial Justice Act (Stats. 2020, ch. 317, § 1). Matthews
agreed with the court’s characterization that Matthews “fe[lt]
7
that the court ruling against you is in and of itself evidence of
discrimination,” as well as the court’s “embroilment.”
At the prosecutor’s suggestion, the court paused the
proceedings and transferred the matter to another court. Judge
Gutierrez asked the court reporter to prepare a transcript of the
portion of the current hearing relating to the Act.
Judge Connie R. Quinones heard Matthews’s motion under
the Act. Judge Quinones noted that she had received a written
motion from Matthews as well as a partial transcript from the
previous hearing before Judge Gutierrez. Matthews requested
several categories of discovery and a continuance, which Judge
Quinones denied. Judge Quinones asked Matthews for the basis
of his motion. Matthews responded that he had no specifics to
provide because he did not have any transcripts or discovery.
Matthews denied he was arguing the court’s rulings against him
were evidence of its discrimination, but then described the court’s
rulings and embroilment as the reason he believed the court
discriminated against him. He pointed to no specific words or
conduct by the court that showed racial bias or animus. Judge
Quinones denied Matthews’s motion because there was “no
specificity,” and he had not stated the “how, why, when, and in
what way” of how Judge Gutierrez or Judge Magno discriminated
against him.
F
The matter returned to Judge Gutierrez’s court for
judgment and sentencing. The court allowed both sides to
address the Romero motion. Matthews noted his young age and
issues such as homelessness and parental drug use. He also
noted the 1995 convictions were remote in time. He argued that
he should not be found within the spirit of the Three Strikes
8
Law. The court went through Matthews’s extensive criminal
history on the record and found he was not outside the spirit of
the Three Strikes Law because he had suffered “serious and
violent felonies” and multiple prison terms. Judge Gutierrez
stated he understood he had discretion, but in “this particular
case for the court to exercise its discretion and strike the strikes
would be contrary to the intent and the spirit of the Three-
Strikes Law.” The court noted it could be looked at as an abuse
of discretion not to impose the three strikes law given Matthews’s
history and prior convictions and the court’s concern for the
safety of the community. The court sentenced Matthews to 25
years to life under the Three Strikes Law.
Matthew appealed. This court appointed counsel. That
counsel filed a Wende brief stating she had reviewed the record
and found no colorable arguments. Counsel told Matthews he
had the right to file his own brief. Matthews did so, filing a 40-
page brief raising several issues.
At our request, counsel provided briefing about Matthews’s
Sumstine claim.
II
None of the arguments Matthews raises is valid. We
address each below.
A
Matthews argues the trial court erred in allowing the
prosecutor to use Matthews’s statement to police because it was
the result of an illegal arrest. Judge Gutierrez held a motion in
limine hearing on this issue during trial. Matthews argues the
Miranda warning was insufficient because police told him it was
still to be determined whether he would be arrested before
reading him his rights. (See Miranda v. Arizona (1966) 384 U.S.
9
436.) Matthews cites no authority for this proposition. As Judge
Gutierrez stated, the pertinent issue in determining whether
Miranda warnings are appropriate is whether Matthews was in
custody. Judge Gutierrez correctly found Matthews was in
custody: he had been detained hours earlier, handcuffed, and
taken to the police station. Officers did not tell him he was free
to go, subjected him to a field show-up, and then questioned him
in an interrogation room. (See People v. Bejasa (2012) 205
Cal.App.4th 26, 36 [court looks at totality of circumstances in
determining if defendant is in custody].) The police correctly read
Matthews his Miranda warnings. There was no requirement
they tell him the charge or confirm whether he was under arrest.
Matthews also argues his arrest was illegal because the
officers did not obtain a warrant before arresting him. This
argument is incorrect. Under Section 836(a)(3), a peace officer
may arrest a person without a warrant where there is probable
cause to believe the person committed a felony. (See also People
v. Zaragoza (2016) 1 Cal.5th 21, 57 [probable cause exists where
the facts known to a police officer would convince a reasonable
person that the arrestee had committed a crime].) The officers
had probable cause to believe Matthews had committed a
felony. The cases Matthews cites about arrests without probable
cause or in a person’s home are inapposite to his situation. (See
Kaupp v. Texas (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 633; Brown v. Illinois (1975)
422 U.S. 590, 591; People v. Poole (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 1004,
1015-1016.)
B
Matthews argues the trial court erred in denying him the
right to present Jenkin’s body worn video footage and in doing so
violated his constitutional rights.
10
We first note that Matthews’s difficulty in presenting this
evidence arose from Matthews’s failure to follow proper
procedure. The court repeatedly warned him, and Matthews
acknowledged, that although he was representing himself he
would be held to the same standard as an attorney. (People v.
Smith (1985) 38 Cal.3d 945, 951–952 (Smith) [the self-
represented are held to the same standard as attorneys].)
Matthews did not take the steps necessary to subpoena Jenkins
so he could authenticate the video. This fact moots the court’s
ruling that the video would constitute inadmissible hearsay, for
an unauthenticated video is inadmissible whether or not it is
hearsay.
C
Matthews makes a general assertion that the court erred in
denying him the right to an investigator and investigative
services. He argues this hindered his ability to prepare for trial.
The record shows the courts granted Matthews an
investigator and funds. When Matthews reported issues
accessing the funds and contacting the investigator, the court did
what it could to help, including calling the sheriff’s department
and investigator and ordering the prosecutor to contact the
investigator. It ordered the investigator to court to clarify his
role.
Matthews declared ready for trial. There is no reason to
believe that, if he had asked the court for more time to connect
with his investigator, the court would have denied this
request. The court denied continuance requests only after trial
began and for particular issues for which Matthews showed no
due diligence. The court acted properly.
D
11
Matthews claims the court denied him the right to compel
the attendance of witnesses at trial. This is inaccurate.
Matthews’s argument appears to be based on his
misunderstanding of certain of the court’s statements. Just
before voir dire, the court asked Matthews what witnesses he
intended to call so they could be added to the list to be read to the
jurors. Matthews stated he would call Officer Jesse Cota, Officer
Mamrot, and Abraham. The court noted the officers were already
on the witness list because the prosecutor had also identified
them as potential witnesses. Matthews apparently took the
court’s statement to mean he did not need to do anything to
ensure these officers would appear for trial.
As noted, courts expect people representing themselves to
follow rules of court as an attorney would. (Smith, supra, 38
Cal.3d at pp. 951–952.) It was incumbent on Matthews to inform
himself of what he needed to do to make sure a witness was
available for trial. He failed to take those steps. The court did
not deny Matthews the right to compel the attendance of
witnesses at trial.
Likewise, the court’s denial of a continuance to rectify
Matthews’s error was not erroneous. Matthews presented no
good cause for a continuance. (See Jensen v. Superior Court
(2008) 160 Cal.App.4th 266, 271 [absence of unsubpoenaed
witness is not good cause for continuance].) Matthews’s failure to
follow rules did not constitute good cause. The court’s decision
did not deprive him of a fair trial.
Matthews argues the prosecutor deliberately misled the
judge about material information favorable to Matthews and
insinuates witness Jenkins had this information. However,
Matthews fails to identify what this material information was.
12
He offers no basis for believing Jenkins had it, whatever it
was. This contention fails.
E
Matthews repeatedly accused the court of embroilment,
generally after the court denied one of his motions.
“Embroilment is the process by which a judge surrenders
impartiality. In doing so, the judge becomes a party to the
quarrel, involved rather than impartial and losing professional
distance. Once a judge becomes embroiled in a matter, fairness,
impartiality, and the integrity of decisions leave the courtroom.”
(Rothman et al., California Judicial Conduct Handbook (4th ed.
2017) § 2:1, p. 58.)
Judge Gutierrez and Judge Magno displayed no
embroilment, favoritism, or bias.
During a hearing, Matthews argued Judge Gutierrez
showed embroilment by doing his own research. Independent
legal research by courts is laudable. (See Giraldo v. Dep’t of
Corrections & Rehabilitation (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 231, 251.)
Courts must apply the law accurately. This duty can require
independent legal research.
Matthews’s other examples do not show embroilment.
Judge Gutierrez permitted the prosecutor to argue without filing
a written brief. The court also ruled without asking for
opposition from the prosecutor. This conduct was not evidence of
embroilment. Matthews frequently cited California Rule of Court
4.111 for the proposition that the prosecutor should not be
allowed to oppose a motion orally, but that rule imposes no such
restriction. Moreover, Judge Gutierrez’s understanding of the
law allowed him to rule on Matthews’s argument without input
from the prosecutor. The court acted properly.
13
F
Matthews attempted to foreclose mention of a gun
throughout the proceedings, claiming the dismissal of the
possession charge at the preliminary hearing meant res judicata
applied. This argument was in error. As Judge Gutierrez
explained, the law required the prosecutor to prove fear of force
as an element of the robbery charge. Nothing prevented the
prosecutor from doing so with testimony from the victim, who
had not testified at the preliminary hearing. As the court
explained to Matthews, res judicata did not prevent the
prosecutor from asking Delorean to testify truthfully.
G
Matthews incorrectly argues the trial court erred in
denying his Sumstine motion.
A Sumstine motion allows a defendant to launch a
collateral attack on a previous conviction that is being used to
enhance a sentence. (Sumstine, supra, 36 Cal.3d at pp. 918–919.)
The defendant alleges the previous conviction is invalid because
of a constitutional failing in that proceeding. (Id. at pp. 923–
924.) Here, Matthews alleges his 2019 conviction was invalid
because the court misadvised him about how credits would be
calculated pursuant to a proposed plea agreement. Matthews
claims the court told him he would be able to receive fifty percent
credit. In fact, Matthews says, the Department of Corrections
required him to serve eighty percent of his sentence, and he had
to file a habeas claim to fix the error.
The problem with this argument is that the court did not
misadvise Matthews, as his counsel concedes in the supplemental
briefing on this issue. The trial court was correct, counsel
admits, that Matthews was eligible to earn credits to reduce his
14
sentence by fifty percent. Rather, it was the Department that
made the error. Though Matthews argues he was wrongly
deprived of his credits, that is not the standard for Sumstine
relief. To support his claim that his plea was not intelligent and
voluntary, Matthews must point to a misadvisement by the court.
(In re Moser (1993) 6 Cal.4th 342, 350–352 [court’s
misadvisement about length of parole term could invalidate plea
agreement if prejudice shown].) His failure to do so is fatal to his
claim.
H
Matthews argues Judge Quinones imposed the wrong
standard in denying his claim under the Racial Justice Act.
There was no error.
When a defendant alleges a violation of the Act, the court
determines whether the defendant has made a prima facie
showing. (§ 745, subd. (c).) In making this determination, the
court takes the defendant’s allegations as true and then considers
if there is a substantial likelihood that a violation in fact
occurred; in other words, more than a mere possibility but less
than a standard of more likely than not. (Id., subd. (h)(2).)
Courts have described the plausible justification standard as
“minimal.” (People v. Garcia (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 290, 296–
297.)
Matthews incorrectly argues the court improperly imposed
a “heavy” burden on him. Matthews did not provide facts
sufficient to meet the lenient standard. (Garcia, supra, 85
Cal.App.5th at pp. 296–297.) Matthews’s claim amounted to: (1)
I am Black, and (2) the judge ruled against me. This is
insufficient.
15
Matthews argues the court made impermissible credibility
findings in ruling against him, and also erred in denying him
discovery. These arguments are unavailing. Matthews failed to
provide any facts requiring a credibility determination or
justifying discovery. (People v. Lawson (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th
990, 1002 [defendant’s “ordinary evidentiary rulings” were not a
prima facie showing of a violation of the Act].)
I
Matthews argues the trial court erred in declining to strike
some of his prior convictions because his case is not within the
spirit of the Three Strikes Law. He contends the court’s
assertion—that striking some of his convictions would be an
abuse of discretion—means it did not understand its
discretion. This contention is mistaken. As described above, the
court considered the appropriate factors, explicitly noted it had
discretion, and found the circumstances of Matthews’s particular
case required a finding that he was within the spirit of the Three
Strikes Law.
Matthews argues the court should have stricken some of
his strikes because they related to the same conduct, but cites
inapposite rules about sentencing rather than authority about
convictions constituting strikes.
Matthews faults the court for failing to consider factors
such as his mental health or the amount of time he spent in
prison, but he provides no cites to show he put evidence of this
kind before the court.
Finally, Matthews complains the court did not explain its
rationale but identifies no authority requiring the court to do so.
16
DISPOSITION
We affirm.
WILEY, J.
We concur:
STRATTON, P. J.
UZCATEGUI, J.*1
* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the Chief
Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.
17
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