CourtListener 10743277•People v. Robertson CA3
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Filed 11/26/25 P. v. Robertson CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Sacramento)
----
THE PEOPLE, C102205
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 21FE011421)
v.
ARVIEL ROBERTSON,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury found defendant Arviel Robertson guilty of voluntary manslaughter. (Pen.
Code,1 § 192, subd. (a)). On appeal she argues there is insufficient evidence to support
her conviction. Alternatively, she contends the evidence warrants a reduction to
involuntary manslaughter. We find no merit to defendant’s claims, and we decline to
reduce her conviction. We therefore will affirm the judgment.
We do, however, agree with the parties that the abstract of judgment must be
corrected to reflect the correct conviction—voluntary manslaughter, not murder.
Accordingly, we will direct the trial court clerk to correct this error.
1 Further undesignated section references are to the Penal Code.
1
BACKGROUND
Both defendant and R.W.2 had a prior romantic relationship with J.C. R.W. and
J.C. met in 2009 or 2010, and shared several children together. They co-parented their
children after the romantic relationship ended.
Defendant met R.W. for the first time between February and October 2010, when
R.W. was outside defendant’s apartment; R.W. was “raisin’ a fuss” with J.C. and waving
a knife around. As she swung the knife around, R.W. said to defendant, “ ‘Bitch, I’ll ‘F’
you up.’ ” Eventually R.W. left the apartment complex and said, “ ‘Good luck.’ ”
J.C. dated defendant in approximately 2011. R.W. was pregnant with J.C.’s child
around the time J.C. dated defendant. R.W. did not know J.C. was dating defendant
while she was pregnant; she found out after their relationship ended. R.W. and defendant
communicated back and forth on text and cellphone calls to “mess” with each other about
J.C. In 2011 or 2012, R.W. hit defendant, giving her a black eye.
Defendant and J.C. stopped dating in 2012, although defendant made some prank
calls to J.C.’s cellphone for a while afterwards. Defendant and J.C. did not maintain any
type of relationship after 2012.
In the late afternoon of July 2, 2021, R.W. gave J.C. a ride to a casino. J.C. saw
defendant at the casino, though they did not speak to one another.
A few hours later, J.C. called R.W. to get picked up. R.W. agreed to get J.C., and
she decided to order food from the casino to pick up while she was there. R.W. arrived in
her car and pulled up to the curb in front of the casino entrance; J.C. got into the
2 To protect their privacy, we will refer to the victim and witnesses by their initials.
(Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(4), (10), (11).)
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passenger side of R.W.’s car.3 R.W. saw defendant and J.C. and assumed they had been
talking, which upset her.
Since her takeout food was not yet ready, R.W. drove away from the curb and
parked in the parking lot next to the casino. Approximately 20 minutes later, R.W. pulled
out of the parking spot and started to drive back toward the casino when she saw
defendant and K.R.4 walking in the parking lot. As she drove by them, R.W. quickly
veered her car toward defendant and K.R. and told J.C. she “don’t care about them.” J.C.
heard K.R. say to defendant, “Bitch, go get my shit.” Defendant did not realize that R.W.
was driving the car that veered toward her and K.R.; defendant let the incident “roll off
[her] shoulder.”
R.W. then pulled back up to the curb in front of the casino and parked her car. She
was still upset about defendant, and J.C. R.W. exited her vehicle and went inside the
casino to get her takeout food.
K.R. approached J.C. on the passenger side of R.W.’s car, and they exchanged
some words. Defendant pulled up to the curb in front of the casino and parked behind
R.W.’s car. Defendant rolled her windows down halfway so she could hear the
conversation between J.C. and K.R. K.R. came over to defendant’s car, saying they
should leave, but he first needed to cash in his chips from the casino.
Shortly thereafter, R.W. and K.R. walked out of the casino at the same time; R.W.
was carrying her takeout food, and K.R. was “talkin[g] real aggressively” toward her.
R.W. and defendant were also exchanging “profanities and obscenities” toward each
other.
3 On the court’s own motion, the record on appeal is augmented to include People’s
Exhibit 7. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.155.)
4 K.R. is the father of defendant’s youngest son.
3
R.W. put her takeout food on the trunk of her car, advanced toward K.R., and
clapped her hands together. A security guard got in between R.W. and K.R., so R.W.
turned away and started walking toward the driver’s side window of defendant’s parked
car; when R.W. reached the car, she punched her arm through the partly open driver’s
side window where defendant was sitting. Neither of the two nearby security officers
saw R.W.’s fist make contact with defendant. However, defendant said that R.W. hit her
cheek, and that it “stung” and “hurt” and later became swollen.
R.W. retracted her arm from the car window and stepped backward from the
vehicle as one security officer came and stood between the window of the car and R.W.
The security officer physically directed R.W. back toward her own car. R.W. did not
resist and moved back to her car, where she picked up her takeout food from on top of the
trunk and headed toward the driver’s side of her car. Defendant thought the incident was
over.
However, R.W. opened her car door but then shut it, put her takeout food back
down on the trunk of her car, and then hurried back over to defendant’s car. R.W. told
defendant to get out of the car, but defendant refused. Defendant did not see a weapon on
R.W.; she believed R.W. was going to “hit on [her] some more,” and defendant feared
that she would get hurt “real bad.”
R.W. pulled her arm back as she approached defendant’s car window again; as she
did so, defendant shot R.W. through the car window and then sped away. Defendant
showed no emotion as she left.
R.W. died of a gunshot wound to her chin. At the time of the shooting, R.W. was
five feet seven inches tall and 240 pounds, and defendant was 97 pounds.
4
DISCUSSION
I
Voluntary Manslaughter
Defendant contends there is insufficient evidence to support the voluntary
manslaughter conviction because she actually and reasonably believed that she was in
imminent danger of great bodily injury or death when she shot R.W. Defendant also
argues that the force she used was reasonable under the circumstances. Alternatively,
defendant asks this court to reduce her sentence to involuntary manslaughter if this court
concludes that the evidence is sufficient to demonstrate that she acted in imperfect self-
defense.
The People argue the evidence establishes that defendant acted with an actual but
unreasonable belief that she was in imminent danger of death or great bodily injury, and
she used force exceeding that which was reasonably necessary to repel the attack from
R.W. The People also contend the facts do not support a reduction to involuntary
manslaughter, and, in any event, the jury was not presented with this theory at trial;
therefore, this court cannot consider it for the first time on review.
The People have the better argument on the sufficiency claim. We also agree with
the People that we should not reduce defendant’s conviction, albeit for a different reason.
A. Legal Principles and Standard of Review
“Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice aforethought.”
(People v. Thomas (2023) 14 Cal.5th 327, 385, citing § 187, subd. (a).) “A killing in
perfect self-defense is justifiable homicide,” not a crime. (Thomas, at pp. 385-386.)
“Perfect self-defense requires that ‘one must actually and reasonably believe in the
necessity of defending oneself from imminent danger of death or great bodily injury.’ ”
(Id. at p. 386.) “Imperfect self-defense, on the other hand, ‘occurs when a defendant acts
in the actual but unreasonable belief that he or she is in imminent danger of great bodily
injury or death.’ ” (Ibid.) “[R]easonableness is determined from the point of view of a
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reasonable person in the defendant’s position. The jury must consider all the facts and
circumstances it might expect to operate on the defendant’s mind.” (People v. Randle
(2005) 35 Cal.4th 987, 997, overruled on another point in People v. Chun (2009) 45 Cal.
1172, 1201.)
“The principles of self-defense are founded in the doctrine of necessity. This
foundation gives rise to two closely related rules. . . . First, only that force which is
necessary to repel an attack may be used in self-defense; force which exceeds the
necessity is not justified. [Citation.] Second, deadly force or force likely to cause great
bodily injury may be used only to repel an attack which is in itself deadly or likely to
cause great bodily injury. . . . Under these two principles a person may be found guilty of
unlawful homicide even where the evidence establishes the right of self-defense if the
jury finds that the nature of the attack did not justify the resort to deadly force or that the
force used exceeded that which was reasonably necessary to repel the attack.
[Citations.]” (People v. Clark (1982) 130 Cal.App.3d 371, 380.)
In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal conviction, we
review the record in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether it
contains substantial evidence—that is, evidence that is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—from which a reasonable trier of fact could find the defendant guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt. (People v. Lindberg (2008) 45 Cal.4th 1, 27.) We do not reweigh the
evidence or reevaluate the credibility of witnesses, but rather presume in support of the
judgment the existence of every fact that could reasonably be deduced from the evidence.
(Ibid.)
A judgment will be reversed only if no rational trier of fact could have found the
essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (People v. Campbell (2020)
51 Cal.App.5th 463, 484.) Under this standard, the defendant bears an “enormous
burden” in demonstrating that the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction.
(People v. Sanchez (2003) 113 Cal.App.4th 325, 330.)
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B. Analysis
Even assuming defendant was actually afraid that she was in imminent danger of
great bodily injury, her fear was not reasonable under the circumstances. Defendant sat
inside her car with the window rolled halfway down when R.W. approached the first
time. Defendant knew R.W. did not have a weapon, and R.W. did not try to open the car
door. Instead, R.W. punched defendant through the car window. There is conflicting
evidence as to whether R.W. hit defendant’s face, but even if we assume she did, it did
not result in a significant injury. When R.W. returned a second time, defendant was still
sitting in her car with the door closed and the window partly rolled down. As before,
R.W. had no weapon and did not try to open the car door. Under these circumstances, a
reasonable person in defendant’s position may fear getting hit through the car window
again, but they would not reasonably believe they were in imminent danger of great
bodily injury or death.
We also reject defendant’s claim that the deadly force used was reasonable here.
R.W. punched through the car window and, assuming she hit defendant, caused only a
minor injury. R.W. approached defendant’s car again without a weapon, and she did not
try to open the car door. Defendant was afraid that R.W. would hit her again and hurt her
“real bad.” These circumstances do not justify the use of deadly force.
In an effort to establish that her fear was objectively reasonable, defendant asks
this court to consider the history of prior violence, the size disparity between her and
R.W., her inability to retreat, R.W.’s “persistent aggression” at the casino, and the
“[c]ontext of the [s]hooting.” Essentially, defendant asks this court to reevaluate the
evidence in a light most favorable to her and to draw contrary inferences from the
evidence. Given the deferential standard of review, we cannot do so. (People v. Myles
(2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 711, 740 [“for purposes of substantial evidence review, we are not
permitted to draw inferences contrary to the verdict”].)
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II
Involuntary Manslaughter
Defendant asks this court to reduce her conviction from voluntary manslaughter to
involuntary manslaughter because she lacked both an intent to kill and a conscious
disregard for human life. We decline to do so. This court has the authority to reduce a
conviction only to a lesser included offense, not a lesser related offense. (People v.
Lagunas (1994) 8 Cal.4th 1030, 1034, 1040.) Involuntary manslaughter is not a lesser
included offense of voluntary manslaughter; rather, “[t]hey are merely siblings who have
a common parent.” (People v. Orr (1994) 22 Cal.App.4th 780, 784-785.)
III
Abstract of Judgment
Defendant identifies, and the People concede, a clerical error in the abstract of
judgment. Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)), but the
abstract reflects a conviction for murder (§ 187, subd. (a)).
We have the “ ‘inherent power to correct clerical errors’ ” to make the records
“reflect the true facts.” (People v. Baker (2021) 10 Cal.5th 1044, 1109.) Since the
abstract erroneously reflects that defendant was convicted of murder (§ 187, subd. (a)),
we will order the trial court clerk to correct the abstract of judgment to reflect the
conviction for voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)).
8
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The trial court clerk is directed to correct the abstract of
judgment to reflect the verdict for voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)) and deliver a
copy of the corrected abstract of judgment to the Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation.
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Robie, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Mauro, J.
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