CourtListener 10743271•Singh v. Reedy Mechanical CA3
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Filed 11/26/25 Singh v. Reedy Mechanical CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(San Joaquin)
----
JASPREET SINGH, C100084
(Super. Ct. No. STK-CV-
UCC-2021-0011339)
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
REEDY MECHANICAL INC.,
Defendant and Appellant.
In December 2018, plaintiff Jaspreet Singh made an offer to purchase real property
from Jefferey and Dorinda Reedy (collectively, the Reedys). The Reedys made a
counteroffer, which was accepted, and the transaction proceeded to escrow. The Reedys,
however, refused to close, belatedly asserting there was an existing 2015 commercial
lease on the property between themselves, as landlord, and defendant Reedy Mechanical
Inc., as tenant, that ran with the land. They argued plaintiff would have to assume that
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lease upon acquiring the property. Plaintiff maintained that the Reedys never disclosed
the existence of the purported lease.
In 2019, plaintiff sought specific performance of the purchase agreement. The
matter was referred to an arbitrator, who found in favor of plaintiff on the specific
performance cause of action. The trial court confirmed the award. The Reedys still
refused to consummate the sale, so plaintiff filed this action against defendant Reedy
Mechanical, Inc., which led to another arbitrator’s award declaring the 2015 commercial
lease void and invalid. The trial court denied defendant’s petition to vacate the
arbitrator’s decision and confirmed the second award.
On appeal, defendant argues that we are required to review the matter de novo,
and that the trial court erred in denying its petition to vacate the arbitrator’s award
because (1) the arbitrator was biased; (2) the arbitrator exceeded her powers in declaring
the lease void and invalid because (a) plaintiff was not a party to the lease and lacked
standing to bring this action, and (b) the Reedys were indispensable parties but were not
joined in the action; and (3) there was no agreement to arbitrate and thus the action was
not properly before the arbitrator. Finding no merit in these contentions, we will affirm.
BACKGROUND
Complaint
Plaintiff commenced this action by filing a complaint seeking declaratory relief
and ejectment. Plaintiff alleged that, in a prior action against the Reedys, he had sought
specific performance of a written contract to purchase real property on Frewert Road in
Lathrop, California. Plaintiff demanded arbitration, and the arbitrator’s award ordered
the Reedys to close escrow and sell the property to plaintiff. The trial court confirmed
the arbitrator’s interim and final awards.
According to plaintiff, during the earlier arbitration proceedings, he learned for the
first time of an alleged 2015 commercial lease on the subject property. The Reedys were
identified as the landlords, and defendant was the tenant. Plaintiff alleged that the interim
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arbitration award in the prior action confirmed that the Reedys acknowledged their failure
to disclose the existence of the 2015 lease. But the arbitrator made no express findings
regarding the validity of that lease. Plaintiff notified the Reedys that he intended to close
escrow and pursue this action.
In the first cause of action, plaintiff sought a judicial determination as to the
validity of the 2015 commercial lease and a declaration that the lease was void and
invalid. In the second cause of action, plaintiff sought a judgment ejecting defendant
from the property.
Arbitration
First Action and Prior Arbitration Awards
In the prior action, plaintiff filed a complaint seeking specific performance,
declaratory relief, and damages. The matter was referred to the same arbitrator who
presided over the present matter. The arbitrator found in favor of plaintiff on his claim
for specific performance. In the interim award, the arbitrator noted that the Reedys
acknowledged that their Transfer Disclosure Statement did not disclose the existence of
the 2015 commercial lease. The arbitrator rejected the Reedys’ argument that the real
estate sale agreement was unenforceable based on this omission, observing that it was the
Reedys who failed to make the disclosure, and they could not use that failure to defeat a
specific performance claim. In the final arbitration award, the arbitrator denied plaintiff’s
request that she make an express finding that the 2015 lease was invalid because
defendant was not a party to the arbitration, and the issue was beyond the scope of
plaintiff’s complaint. After both arbitration awards were issued in the prior action, the
Reedys recorded a memorandum of lease on December 31, 2020, creating a cloud on
title.
The trial court in the prior action confirmed the arbitrator’s interim and final
awards and entered judgment in plaintiff’s favor. When plaintiff attempted to
consummate the sale and close escrow, however, the Reedys refused to sign the necessary
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documents, and plaintiff filed a motion seeking appointment of an elisor. The trial court
granted the motion, the Reedys appealed, and, while the appeal was pending, the trial
court granted the Reedy’s motion for a stay.
The Arbitration Hearing
In the present arbitration, the arbitrator limited the issue for consideration to the
declaratory relief cause of action. At the arbitration hearing, plaintiff attempted to call
both of the Reedys as witnesses, but counsel for defendant stated they would not appear.
The arbitrator noted that it was previously understood that, although the Reedys were out
of state, they would appear remotely. Defendant’s counsel stated that the Reedys had no
intention of appearing or participating in the proceedings. Defendant’s attorney
acknowledged that defendant was solely owned by Jefferey Reedy.
Shella Dewhurst, a licensed real estate agent, testified that she represented both
plaintiff and the Reedys in the sale and purchase of the subject property. In entertaining
an earlier offer on the property, the Reedys did not inform the potential buyers that there
was an existing lease on the property, and did not object to a proposed term that would
have required them to vacate the property in 15 days if they did not reach a separate
agreement. They also did not disclose any tenant in possession of the subject property
when they tendered a counteroffer. No lease agreement was disclosed in the documents
prepared by the Reedys. Ultimately, the potential buyers did not proceed with the
transaction.
According to Dewhurst, before that unsuccessful offer on the property, a 2018 title
report revealed an option agreement that was clouding title to the property. The option,
dated June 2, 2005, was between the Reedys and Lathrop Land, LLC. This cloud on title
was removed during escrow in the sale of the property to plaintiff.
Dewhurst further testified that plaintiff tendered a purchase offer for the property
dated December 20, 2018. The Reedys made a counteroffer. These two documents
together formed the purchase agreement. According to Dewhurst, if there had been a
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tenant on the property at that time, the Reedys were required to disclose this fact in their
counteroffer, and they did not do so. Instead, the Reedys agreed to vacate the property
within two weeks after closing. The Reedys never mentioned defendant having a lease
on the property.
A seller property questionnaire, signed December 23, 2018, was part of the
Reedys’ disclosure package. One portion of the questionnaire was titled, “Title,
Ownership liens, and legal claims.” A checked box indicated that the seller was aware of
“Leases, options, or claims affecting or relating to title or use of the property.” A
handwritten explanation elaborated, “Title company working to resolve.” According to
Dewhurst, this was not meant to refer to any lease of the property to defendant. Rather,
Dewhurst wrote this entry in reference to the 2005 option held by Lathrop Land, LLC.
The arbitrator received in evidence the 2015 commercial lease agreement between
the Reedys and defendant. Dewhurst testified that the commercial lease form lacked
certain broker/realtor identifying information that should appear at the bottom of such
forms, and lacked the HUD logo which also appears on such forms. According to
Dewhurst, these forms are only accessible to licensed realtors and brokers. It appeared to
Dewhurst that the missing information had been redacted. An addendum was attached to
the commercial lease agreement, dated and signed December 28, 2015. However, on the
bottom, the form indicated it had been revised or updated in November 2016, after the
date it purportedly was signed by the Reedys.
Plaintiff testified that he entered into the agreement to purchase the property from
the Reedys. He first learned of the 2015 commercial lease during mediation in the prior
specific performance action. Plaintiff acknowledged that he was not a party to the
commercial lease, and he did not yet have title to the subject property because escrow had
not closed. According to plaintiff, no lease was disclosed in his meetings with Dewhurst.
When he entered into the purchase agreement, the 2015 commercial lease was not
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mentioned on title, and nothing was recorded pertaining to that lease. The memorandum
of lease was only recorded after plaintiff prevailed in the first arbitration proceeding.
Validity of the Lease
The arbitrator determined there was an actual controversy between plaintiff and
defendant concerning their rights to real property insofar as plaintiff claimed that the
2015 commercial lease was invalid, not disclosed by the Reedys during the sale, and thus
whether plaintiff’s purchase of the property was subject to the lease. The arbitrator found
the issue properly to be the subject of declaratory relief.
The arbitrator concluded that plaintiff met his burden to establish that it was more
likely true than not that the commercial lease was not created, executed, or in existence as
of December 28, 2015, and therefore found the lease to be void and invalid. The
arbitrator further found the lease had not been disclosed to plaintiff during the
negotiations as required, and that the evidence contradicted defendant’s claim that the
lease was duly executed and in effect as of December 28, 2015.
Arbitration Award
The arbitrator found in favor of plaintiff on his cause of action for declaratory
relief, stating: “The Commercial Lease Agreement dated December 28, 2015, between
Reedy Mechanical, Inc. as Tenant and Jeff and Dorinda Reedy as Landlords is void and
invalid.”
Trial Court’s Confirmation of the Arbitration Award
Plaintiff then filed a petition to confirm the arbitration award. Defendant filed a
petition to vacate the award on the ground that the arbitrator exceeded her powers and the
award could not be fairly corrected.
In a tentative ruling, the trial court granted plaintiff’s petition to confirm the
arbitration award and denied defendant’s petition to vacate it. In oral argument before the
trial court, defendant argued that the arbitrator was biased, and, therefore, the trial court
should overturn the arbitration award.
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On November 7, 2023, following oral argument, the trial court affirmed its
tentative ruling. It found that the arbitrator did not exceed her powers in declaring the
lease void and invalid, found that an actual controversy over the validity of the lease was
properly before her, and that defendant failed to carry its burden of establishing that the
arbitrator exceeded her powers.
The trial court further rejected defendant’s claim that the Reedys were
indispensable parties to the action, noting that, in the prior action, the Reedys claimed the
arbitrator could not make a finding as to the validity of the lease because defendant was
not a party to that action. Now, defendant was arguing that the arbitrator exceeded her
powers in determining the lease was invalid because the Reedys were not parties. The
court stated that the Reedys and defendant “seek to avoid liability by pointing the finger
at each other. The law does not allow this type of subterfuge.” The court stated that the
arbitrator “appropriately decided the issue of whether she could grant declaratory relief
about the validity of the lease, and whether the appropriate parties were present in front
of her.” Further, the court noted that, even if the arbitrator’s determination was
erroneous, a trial court may not vacate an arbitration award merely because the arbitrator
made a factual or legal error, as such matters are insufficient bases for challenging an
arbitration award.
The trial court then turned to defendant’s argument that the arbitrator exceeded her
powers in deciding the dispute because the parties had not agreed to arbitrate. The court
concluded that the validity of the 2015 commercial lease arose out of the purchase
agreement, which contained a provision calling for arbitration of any dispute arising from
it. Therefore, plaintiff’s claims about the validity of the lease fell within the express
terms of the arbitration provision, as they were intertwined with and arose out of the
purchase agreement, and defendant was equitably estopped from refusing to arbitrate.
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The trial court next stated that defendant failed to identify any arbitrator
misconduct or bias. The court found that defendant’s bare accusations were insufficient
to establish bias or misconduct.
Having concluded that defendant failed to meet its burden as to all of its
challenges to the arbitrator’s award, the trial court denied defendant’s petition to vacate
the award and granted plaintiff’s petition to confirm the award.
Notice of Appeal, Judgment, and Appealability
Defendant filed its notice of appeal on December 13, 2023, purporting to appeal
from an order after judgment under Code of Civil Procedure1 section 904.1, subdivision
(a)(2). The notice of appeal stated that defendant appealed from a judgment or order
entered on November 7, 2023, a copy of which was attached to the notice. One day after
the notice of appeal was filed, the trial court filed its judgment in favor of plaintiff
declaring that the 2015 commercial lease void and invalid.
Section 1294 lists the appealable orders and judgments associated with arbitration.
Insofar as relevant here, a party may appeal from “[a]n order dismissing a petition to
confirm, correct or vacate an award” (§ 1294, subd. (b), italics added); “[a] judgment
entered pursuant to this title” (Id., subd. (d)); and “[a] special order after final judgment”
(Id., subd. (e)). “An order denying a petition is not the same as an order dismissing such
a petition.” (Sunnyvale Unified School Dist. v. Jacobs (2009) 171 Cal.App.4th 168, 174,
italics added.) “No appeal . . . will lie from an order denying vacation or correction of an
arbitration award.” (Mid-Wilshire Associates v. O’Leary (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 1450,
1454.) “Such an order may be reviewed upon an appeal from the judgment of
confirmation.” (Ibid.)
1 Undesignated section references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.
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To the extent defendant appeals from the order denying its petition to vacate the
arbitration award and granting plaintiff’s petition to confirm the award, defendant appeals
from a nonappealable order. Under the circumstances of this case, however, we will
deem defendant’s premature notice to be an appeal from the judgment and to have been
filed immediately after the entry of judgment. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.104(d);
Mukthar v. Latin American Security Service (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 284, 288 [when a
nonappealable order is followed by a judgment, “the appellate court may deem the
premature notice of appeal to have been filed after the entry of judgment”].)
DISCUSSION
I
Arbitration Awards—Standard of Review and Scope of Review
Defendant argues that whether an arbitrator has exceeded his or her power is a
question that we must review de novo. Defendant argues the arbitrator invalidated the
lease and granted plaintiff’s request for declaratory relief “through misconduct, bias, and
exceeding her powers.” Accordingly, defendant contends that the de novo review
standard applies.
As a general matter, where the facts are undisputed, we review de novo a trial
court’s order denying a petition to vacate an arbitrator’s award. (Anaheim Union High
School Dist. v. American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, Local
3112, AFL-CIO (2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 887, 890; SWAB Financial, LLC v. E*Trade
Securities, LLC (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 1181, 1198.) More specifically, “ ‘[t]he question
whether the arbitrator exceeded [the arbitrator’s] powers and thus whether the [appellate
court] should vacate [the] award on that basis is generally reviewed on appeal de novo.’ ”
(Castelo v. Xceed Financial Credit Union (2023) 91 Cal.App.5th 777, 787.)
As for the scope of review, “arbitration awards are subject to very limited trial
court review[.] [Citations.] ‘Courts may not review either the merits of the controversy
or the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the award. [Citation.]’ [Citation.] ‘[W]ith
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limited exceptions, “ . . . an arbitrator’s decision is not generally reviewable for errors of
fact or law, whether or not such error appears on the face of the award and causes
substantial injustice to the parties.” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Even an error of law causing
substantial injustice is not a ground for vacation or correction of an award. [Citation.]
This limited review of arbitration awards ‘vindicates the intentions of the parties that the
award be final.’ ” (American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees,
Local 1902, AFL-CIO v. Metropolitan Water Dist. of Southern California (2005)
126 Cal.App.4th 247, 259.)
“The exclusive grounds for vacating an arbitration award are provided in
. . . section 1286.2.” (Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc. (2019) 42 Cal.App.5th 1071, 1085, fn.
omitted.) We will discuss specific provisions of section 1286.2, post.
II
Bias
Defendant first argues the trial court erred in denying its petition to vacate the
arbitration award because the arbitrator was “[b]latantly [b]iased.” (Boldface omitted.)
According to defendant, the arbitrator failed to maintain the appearance of impartiality
during the hearing. We conclude defendant has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating
reversible error.
One statutory ground that may warrant vacating an arbitrator’s award is where the
“rights of the party were substantially prejudiced by misconduct of a neutral arbitrator.”
(§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(3); see also id., subd. (a)(1), (2) & (6).) “ ‘Misconduct’ in this
context includes actions that create a reasonable impression of possible bias.” (FCM
Investments, LLC v. Grove Pham, LLC (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 545, 553.) “While
arbitration awards are ‘nearly immune’ from attack, ‘one of the limited grounds for
challenge is bias on the part of the arbitrator.’ . . . Given inherent challenges of proving
bias and the importance of maintaining public confidence in our justice system, a
showing of actual bias is not required. [Citations.] Instead, the test is whether a
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hypothetical reasonable person . . . would form an impression of possible bias on the part
of the arbitrator.” (Id. at p. 555.) As the party seeking to vacate the arbitration award,
defendant bears the burden of establishing a reasonable impression of possible bias.
(Ibid.)
Over three pages of its opening brief, defendant identifies instances in which the
arbitrator purportedly made remarks revealing or suggesting her bias. Defendant quotes a
number of these alleged remarks. Defendant argues that certain remarks demonstrated
preconceived judgment. It claims the arbitrator improperly subjected its attorney to a
subpoena duces tecum compelling him to appear as a witness, which would cause him to
violate rule 3.7(a) of the Rules of Professional Conduct. Defendant further claims that
the arbitrator subjected defendant’s counsel to improper questioning and assumed an
inquisitorial role, but does not elaborate. Defendant also refers to “off-the-record
comments,” “rude behavior,” and suggests the arbitrator was improperly influenced by
her participation in the prior arbitration between plaintiff and the Reedys. Defendant
concludes: “These actions and statements collectively illustrate a significant deviation
from the standard of impartiality required of arbitrators. The Arbitrator’s bias was
evident, compromising the fairness of the arbitration process and undermining the
integrity of the decision rendered. Such conduct is impermissible and warrants the
vacating of the arbitration award . . . .”
Defendant, however, fails to cite to the record to support any of its contentions or
factual representations. In fact, the entire section of its opening brief in which defendant
argues bias does not contain a single record citation.
“ ‘A judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All intendments
and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the record is silent,
and error must be affirmatively shown. This is not only a general principle of appellate
practice but an ingredient of the constitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ ” (Denham v.
Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) “It is the appellant’s burden to demonstrate
11
the existence of reversible error.” (Del Real v. City of Riverside (2002) 95 Cal.App.4th
761, 766.) Appellate briefs must “provide a citation to the record for a factual assertion.”
(County of Sacramento v. Singh (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 858, 861; Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) “ ‘[W]e may disregard factual contentions that are not supported by
citations to the record [citation] or are based on information that is outside the record.’ ”
(County of Sacramento, at p. 861.)
Defendant has failed to satisfy its obligation to cite to the record to support its
factual representations. (See County of Sacramento v. Singh, supra, 65 Cal.App.5th at
p. 861; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(C).) “We are not required to scour the
record in search of support for a party’s factual statements and may disregard such
unsupported statements.” (Harshad & Nasir Corp. v. Global Sign Systems, Inc. (2017)
14 Cal.App.5th 523, 527, fn. 3.) Because defendant does not support any of its claims
with record citations, and relies on matter outside of the record, we disregard these
unsupported contentions. Defendant has not satisfied its burden of demonstrating
reversible error based on arbitrator bias.
III
Arbitrators Exceeding Their Powers
Another statutory ground for vacating an arbitrator’s award is where the
“arbitrators exceeded their powers and the award cannot be corrected without affecting
the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted.” (§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).)
Defendant argues the arbitrator exceeded her powers in two ways.
A. Plaintiff Was Not a Party to the Lease
Defendant first argues the arbitrator erroneously declared the lease invalid despite
the fact that plaintiff was not a party. Because plaintiff was not a party to the lease,
defendant argues he lacked standing and, as such, was precluded from seeking
declaratory relief concerning the validity of the lease. We disagree.
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Plaintiff was not a party to the purported lease. The commercial lease agreement
listed the Reedys as landlords and defendant as the tenant. Contrary to defendant’s
contention, however, plaintiff is not a stranger to the lease and is, in fact, an “interested”
person as to the lease agreement involved in an actual controversy centered on that lease.
“Any person interested under a written instrument, excluding a will or a trust, or
under a contract, or who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to
another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property, . . . may, in cases of actual controversy
relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties, bring an original action or
cross-complaint in the superior court for a declaration of his or her rights and duties in the
premises, including a determination of any question of construction or validity arising
under the instrument or contract.” (§ 1060.) “The language of . . . section 1060 appears
to allow for an extremely broad scope of an action for declaratory relief . . . .” (Otay
Land Co. v. Royal Indemnity Co. (2008) 169 Cal.App.4th 556, 562.)
“ ‘The fundamental basis of declaratory relief is the existence of an actual, present
controversy over a proper subject.’ ” (City of Cotati v. Cashman (2002) 29 Cal.4th 69,
79.) Additionally, the “ ‘actual controversy’ language in . . . section 1060 encompasses a
probable future controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the parties.
[Citation.] For a probable future controversy to constitute an ‘actual controversy,’
however, the probable future controversy must be ripe. [Citations.] A ‘controversy is
“ripe” when it has reached, but has not passed, the point that the facts have sufficiently
congealed to permit an intelligent and useful decision to be made.’ ” (Environmental
Defense Project of Sierra County v. County of Sierra (2008) 158 Cal.App.4th 877, 885.)
Plaintiff agreed to purchase, and the Reedys agreed to sell, the subject property.
However, the Reedys refused to consummate the sale and close escrow. Plaintiff then
sought and was granted specific performance of the purchase agreement. Yet the Reedys
continued to impede plaintiff in his efforts to close on the property, maintaining that the
2015 commercial lease was valid and ran with the land. Plaintiff moved for, and was
13
granted, the appointment of an elisor to sign the necessary documentation in the Reedys’
place. Plaintiff, who believed the lease to be a sham, then commenced this separate
action for a judgment declaring the validity or invalidity of the lease.
Plainly, there is an actual, present controversy concerning the validity of the lease.
(City of Cotati v. Cashman, supra, 29 Cal.4th at p. 79.) As plaintiff argues, as a party
alleged to be subject to the lease based on his purchase of the property, which has yet to
be consummated, plaintiff is a “person interested under a written instrument . . . or under
a contract . . . who desires a declaration of his or her rights or duties with respect to
another, or in respect to, in, over or upon property,” and this is a “case[] of actual
controversy relating to the legal rights and duties of the respective parties . . . .” (§ 1060.)
Plaintiff also has standing to sue. “A party lacks standing if it does not have an
actual and substantial interest in, or would not be benefited or harmed by, the ultimate
outcome of an action.” (City of Santa Monica v. Stewart (2005) 126 Cal.App.4th 43, 59.)
“ ‘Every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest, except as
otherwise provided by statute.’ [Citation.] The real party in interest has ‘ “an actual and
substantial interest in the subject matter of the action,” and stands to be “benefited or
injured” by a judgment in the action.’ [Citation.] ‘Plaintiffs have standing to sue if they
or someone they represent have either suffered or are threatened with an injury of
sufficient magnitude to reasonably assure the relevant facts and issues will be adequately
presented.’ ” (Fladeboe v. American Isuzu Motors Inc. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 42, 54-
55.)
It is clear that plaintiff is a real party in interest with an actual and substantial stake
in the validity of what the arbitrator agreed was a previously undisclosed 2015
commercial lease that purportedly ran with the real property plaintiff is purchasing, and
plaintiff will be benefitted or injured by a judgment in the action. (Fladeboe v. American
Isuzu Motors Inc., supra, 150 Cal.App.4th at p. 55.) He is “ ‘threatened with an injury of
14
sufficient magnitude to reasonably assure the relevant facts and issues will be adequately
presented.’ ” (Ibid.)
Plaintiff does not lack standing to bring this action merely because he is not a
party to the alleged 2015 commercial lease.
B. The Reedys as Indispensable Parties
Defendant next argues that the arbitrator exceeded her powers by declaring the
lease void because the Reedys were indispensable parties but were not joined in this
action. Defendant argues the lease was executed between it and the Reedys, and
excluding them from a challenge to the lease’s validity was a fundamental procedural
oversight. We conclude the arbitrator did not act in excess of her powers, whether or not
the Reedys were indispensable parties.
“[S]ection 389 governs the joinder of necessary and indispensable parties.”
(Verizon California Inc. v. Board of Equalization et al. (2014) 230 Cal.App.4th 666, 679.)
Subdivision (a) of section 389 describes necessary parties, and subdivision (b) describes
indispensable parties. However, we need not determine whether the Reedys were
necessary or indispensable parties.
The “ ‘failure to join “indispensable” parties does not deprive a court of the power
to make a legally binding adjudication between the parties properly before it.’ [Citation.]
To be sure, ‘ “[a]n indispensable party is not bound by a judgment in an action in which
he was not joined.” ’ [Citation.] But failing to join an indispensable party ‘ “ ‘is not “a
jurisdictional defect” in the fundamental sense.’ ” ’ ” (Doe v. Regents of University of
California (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 282, 305.) Therefore, the failure to join the Reedys did
not deprive the arbitrator or the trial court of jurisdiction, and it is not a basis to vacate
the arbitrator’s award as exceeding her powers. (See § 1286.2, subd. (a)(4).)
15
IV
Whether the Dispute Was Properly Before the Arbitrator
Finally, defendant argues there was no agreement to arbitrate this action, and it did
not voluntarily submit to arbitration. Therefore, the arbitration proceedings and the
resulting award are invalid and nonbinding. Defendant has not established reversible
error.
A “court must dismiss the proceeding as to [a person] if the court determines the
person ‘was not bound by the arbitration award and was not a party to the arbitration.’ ”
(Soni v. SimpleLayers, Inc., supra, 42 Cal.App.5th at p. 1086, citing § 1287.2; see also
§ 1286.2, subd. (a)(4) [vacating arbitration award required where arbitrators exceeded
their powers].) “Arbitration ‘is . . . a matter of contract between the parties’ [citation],
and, as such, whether particular disputes are subject to arbitration ‘ “is strictly ‘a matter
of [the parties’] consent.’ ” ’ ” (Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc. (2018) 20 Cal.App.5th
376, 386.) Parties may expressly agree to arbitrate in an arbitration provision in a written
contract or in a binding stipulation. (Id. at p. 387.) Here, the purchase and sale
agreement containing the arbitration provision was between plaintiff and the Reedys.
Defendant was not a party to that agreement.
However, as an alternative to expressly contracting to arbitrate, a party may be
bound by an arbitrator’s award by operation of a form of equitable estoppel. (See, e.g.,
Douglass v. Serenivision, Inc., supra, 20 Cal.App.5th at p. 387 [“parties may enter into an
implied in fact agreement to arbitrate through their conduct (which may additionally be
deemed to estop them from denying such an agreement)”]; id. at p. 388 [“consent to
arbitration . . . will be inferred from a party’s conduct of litigating an issue up to the point
of submitting it for decision in the arbitral forum, at least if the party does so without
objection”]; Cabrera v. Plager (1987) 195 Cal.App.3d 606, 613, fn. 8 [a party’s
“appearance at the arbitration hearing and participation therein without raising any
16
objection to the jurisdiction of the arbitrator estops [that party] from challenging it
afterwards”].)
The trial court here did not rely on the premise that defendant was a signatory to
the purchase agreement containing the arbitration provision. Rather, in concluding that
defendant could be compelled to arbitrate and could be bound by the arbitration award,
the trial court relied on a variety of equitable estoppel. Relatedly, plaintiff argues in his
respondent’s brief that defendant’s objection to the arbitrator’s jurisdiction to hear the
matter was waived by its participation in the process.
Defendant in its opening brief argues only that it “did not voluntarily submit to
arbitration, . . . there was no valid arbitration agreement,” and the “absence of a binding
arbitration agreement invalidates the arbitration proceedings, and the resulting award is
non-binding on” defendant. Again, however, defendant does not cite to any portion of the
record in support of its arguments. (See County of Sacramento v. Singh, supra,
65 Cal.App.5th at p. 861 [“ ‘[w]e may disregard factual contentions that are not
supported by citations to the record [citation] or are based on information that is outside
the record’ ”].)
Defendant also does not analyze equitable estoppel or waiver, let alone with an
argument supported by citation to authority. In fact, defendant in its opening brief does
not mention equitable estoppel and declined to file a reply brief, thus failing to respond to
plaintiff’s waiver argument.
As stated, a “ ‘judgment or order of the lower court is presumed correct. All
intendments and presumptions are indulged to support it on matters as to which the
record is silent, and error must be affirmatively shown.’ ” (Denham v. Superior Court,
supra, 2 Cal.3d at p. 564.) Defendant does not support its arguments with citations to the
record, and has failed to address the trial court’s rationale for determining that it was
bound by the arbitration award. Defendant therefore, has not satisfied its burden of
17
showing reversible error. (See Del Real v. City of Riverside, supra, 95 Cal.App.4th at
p. 766.)
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Plaintiff shall recover his costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).
\s\ ,
Krause, J.
We concur:
\s\ ,
Robie, Acting P. J.
\s\ ,
Mauro, J.
18
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