Reiser v. Reiser CA1/2

CourtListener 10742285CalctappNov 25, 2025

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Filed 11/25/25 Reiser v. Reiser CA1/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

RORY REISER et al.,
Plaintiffs and Respondents,
A136653
v.
HANS REISER, (Alameda County
Super. Ct. No. RG08406864)
Defendant and Appellant.

Appellant Hans Reiser was convicted of first degree murder for the
2006 killing of his wife and the mother of his children, Nina Reiser. He was
the last to see her alive and was charged with her murder though law
enforcement had not recovered her body or a murder weapon. Before
sentencing Reiser pled guilty to a reduced charge of second degree murder as
part of a plea agreement pursuant to which he disclosed the location of her
body. He is currently serving a 15-year-to-life sentence.
His two children, Rory and Nioline, who were six years old and five
years old respectively when their mother disappeared, through a guardian ad
litem filed this wrongful death suit against him and secured a $60 million
jury verdict, including $10 million in punitive damages. Reiser, who is self-

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represented, now appeals the civil judgment entered against him. No
respondent’s brief has been filed.
We affirm the judgment.
DISCUSSION
I.
On appeal, Reiser does not deny that he killed his wife and was
convicted of her murder or that his children were very young when he
committed the murder. Nonetheless, he raises many issues as to why the
children’s civil trial against him for damages was unfair.
He contends he was denied a fair trial in violation of his constitutional
due process rights based on trial court error in failing to appoint him counsel
below; failing to appoint him a defense investigator; and denying him the
right to subpoena or call witnesses, resulting in what he says was a one-sided
trial. He also complains that he was denied an “audio record” of the trial
proceedings. He also raises issues concerning the jury, contending the court
wrongfully excluded a potential juror who had worked with abused children,
and that some of the jurors who served were exposed to news accounts and
information not in evidence.
He challenges the award of punitive damages on several grounds. He
argues that the punitive damages award was unsupported by sufficient
evidence of his ability to pay (see generally Adams v. Murakami (1991)
54 Cal.3d 105); the jury instructions on punitive damages were inadequate;
and his closing argument on punitive damages was improperly curtailed.
Reiser raises many other issues touching on a variety of subjects. He
contends his request for DNA testing to prove his deceased wife had suffered
from Munchhausen by Proxy was improperly denied; the trial court
“misapplied the doctrine of collateral estoppel” to bar a defense that would

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have been insufficient against murder and was not litigated in the underlying
murder case, apparently alluding to an effort to prove his murdered wife was
a compulsive child abuser; the court improperly restricted press access to
hearings; it is unethical to sue an indigent defendant; the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (C.D.C.R.) should be ordered to
pay the judgment against him; the trial court improperly denied a motion to
join the C.D.C.R. as a party; and maintenance of this suit is “contrary to the
law and legislative intent” because the record lacks evidence his children ever
consented to it being filed on their behalf.
There are many difficulties with these arguments that are apparent on
the face of Reiser’s briefing. The trial was not reported, and so we have only
a limited record of what took place. Most of his arguments are undeveloped
and unsupported by a discussion of applicable legal authority.1 And wholly
absent from his claims of error is a discussion and analysis of the

1 One such issue is his reference in a single sentence to “[t]he lack of a
transcript” at trial as “compound[ing]” the error he claims the trial court
made in excluding press from one hearing. We conducted an independent
review of portions of the clerk’s transcript in an effort to provide accurate
context about the trial of this case, we reviewed a new trial motion he filed in
the trial court, in which, among other things, he claimed he “was not allowed
a Court Reporter or transcripts.” However, he made no such direct argument
in his appellate brief; nor provided the court with any detail about whether or
when he requested a court reporter or the trial court denied such a request.
Our own review of portions of the clerk’s transcript reflects that early in the
case, Reiser requested and the court granted a waiver of court fees and costs,
including court reporter fees and that minutes of the trial days state, “No
court reporter is present.” But Reiser has not argued on appeal and we
cannot say whether he ever requested that the court provide a court reporter
or audio recording for any hearing or for the trial. In short, Reiser has not
properly raised this issue in his appellate brief and thus has forfeited it.

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constitutional requirement of prejudice.2 (See generally Cal. Const., art. VI,
§ 13; see also Evid. Code, §§ 353, 354; Code Civ. Proc., § 475.)
Ordinarily, we would summarily affirm the judgment on the basis of
these deficiencies. “Among the most basic principles of appellate review are
that a trial court’s decision is presumed correct.” (Osborne v. Pleasanton
Automotive Co., LP (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 361, 380-381 (Osborne).) This
means that it is the appellant’s burden to “affirmatively show error by an
adequate record” and “[w]e cannot presume error from an incomplete record.”
(Gonzalez v. Rebollo (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 969, 976-977; see, e.g., Foust v.
San Jose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181, 187 [failure to
show error without reporter’s transcript of trial]; Calhoun v. Hildebrandt
(1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 70, 71-72 [failure to show error without record of
closing argument to jury].) Here, the absence of a record of the trial
precludes meaningful review of most, if not all, of Reiser’s claims.
But the absence of an adequate record is not the only problem. Another
facet of our presumption the court did not err is that “the appellant bears the
burden of presenting argument and legal authority to demonstrate error
thereby overcoming the presumption.” (Osborne, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at
p. 381.) To do this, “ ‘an appellant must supply the reviewing court with
some cogent argument supported by legal analysis and citation to the
record.’ ” (United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019)
36 Cal.App.5th 142, 164.) It is not our job to research and analyze the law on
our own, nor scour the clerk’s transcript to see if it supports any of Reiser’s

2 Even when there is error (in the jury instructions, in the court’s
evidentiary rulings, or in “any matter of procedure”), we are constitutionally
prohibited from disturbing a judgment unless the error has “has resulted in a
miscarriage of justice.” (Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13.)

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claims of error. “The reviewing court is not required to develop the parties’
arguments” for them. (Meridian Financial Services, Inc. v. Phan (2021)
67 Cal.App.5th 657, 684.) “Mere suggestions of error without supporting
argument or authority other than general abstract principles do not properly
present grounds for appellate review.” (Department of Alcoholic Beverage
Control v. Alcoholic Beverage Control Appeals Bd. (2002) 100 Cal.App.4th
1066, 1078.) When an appellant fails to “convince us, by developing his
arguments, stating the law, and calling out relevant portions of the record,
that the trial court committed reversible error,” the appellant has not
demonstrated error. (See Bishop v. The Bishop’s School (2022)
86 Cal.App.5th 893, 910.) These rules apply equally to pro per litigants.
(See, e.g., Dilbert v. Newsom (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 317, 323 [on appeal,
“ ‘self-represented parties are “ ‘held to the same restrictive procedural rules
as an attorney’ ” ’ ”].) Reiser’s briefing fails in these respects too.
As said, ordinarily we would summarily affirm the judgment in these
circumstances and stop there. Here, however, Reiser has asked this court to
appoint him a lawyer on appeal. He asserts that he is constitutionally
entitled to this because he is indigent and incarcerated and has been unable
to effectively represent his own interests in the appellate court due to the
constraints of imprisonment. (See generally Yarbrough v. Superior Court
(1985) 39 Cal.3d 197 (Yarbrough); Payne v. Superior Court (1976) 17 Cal.3d
908 (Payne).) We solicited supplemental briefing from the parties concerning
this subject and now set out our reasons for denying his request.
II.
An incarcerated indigent civil defendant who is threatened with the
deprivation of his property rights has a federal and state constitutional right
of access to the courts. (Yarbrough, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 200.) This is both

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a due process right and one based on equal protection of the law under both
the federal and state constitutions. (See Payne, supra, 17 Cal.3d at pp. 914 &
fn. 3, 919, 927.) Appointment of counsel may be the only way to protect such
a defendant’s right of access to the courts but only as a “last alternative.”
(Yarbrough, at p. 200.) Ultimately, how to protect such a prisoner’s right of
access to the courts is a matter left to the court’s discretion. (See Payne, at
p. 927.)
Although no case has considered an indigent prisoner’s access to the
appellate courts in a civil case, Reiser has demonstrated, as a factual matter,
that his ability to pursue this appeal has been abridged by reason of his
incarceration. His filings in this court have repeatedly referenced difficulties
he has had (i) obtaining and accessing the existing appellate record (he has
been unable to procure the record, or even check court websites for
information about the case); (ii) communicating with opposing counsel in an
effort to prepare an agreed statement of proceedings; (iii) conducting legal
research, due to crowded conditions in his prison law library and limited
access to it; (iv) and accessing his own legal files from the trial of the case,
due to restrictions on his possession of property. Regardless of whether any
one of these circumstances alone has significantly impeded his ability to
prosecute an effective appeal, all of them combined appear to have done so.
(See Smith v. Ogbuehi (2019) 38 Cal.App.5th 453, 470 [courts “must examine
the totality of the circumstances when making the discretionary
determination of whether an inmate’s access is being impeded”].)
But to assess, legally, whether these abridgements are of constitutional
significance depends on whether Reiser, who is indigent, “is threatened with
a judicially sanctioned deprivation of his property.” (Payne, supra, 17 Cal.3d
at p. 927.) Only if he is does he have a constitutional right of access to the

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courts grounded in due process of law and equal protection. (See id. at p. 914
[explaining that both analyses are similar]; id. at p. 916 [“a defendant in a
civil case seeks . . . the protection of property he already owns or may own in
the future,” which is a fundamental right]; id. at p. 919 [“to be heard in court
to defend one’s property is a right of fundamental constitutional dimension;
in order to justify granting the right to one group while denying it to another,
the state must show a compelling state interest”].) That is, the adverse
judgment with which he is threatened must be one that will affect his
property rights. (Yarbrough, supra, 39 Cal.3d at p. 204; see also Payne, at
p. 924 [court must “ascertain whether the prisoner’s interests are actually at
stake in the suit”].)
To decide if it does, courts must independently “assess[] . . . whether or
how [the prisoner’s] future economic fortunes would be affected by a
judgment against him,” and the potential deprivation of property must not be
“wholly ephemeral.” (Yarbrough, supra, 39 Cal.3d. at p. 205.) “If the
indigent presently has no property—and by definition he is not likely to have
much—some assessment must be made as to the indigent’s assertion that his
interests are ‘actually at stake.’ ” (Id. at p. 204.) The standard does not
“encompass an incarcerated indigent no matter how remote his expectation of
‘future property interests,’ . . . for every incarcerated defendant, viewing his
world through rose-colored glasses, can anticipate release or commutation in
time to return to the job market.” (Id. at pp. 204-205.) Therefore, “[t]he court
itself should evaluate the potential for loss to the prisoner, weighing such
factors as age, term of incarceration, employment history, education, skills,
family background and the likelihood of inheriting or otherwise obtaining
property. The court may also consider the prisoner’s prospects for earning
money while in prison and accumulating sums to satisfy a civil judgment—

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royalties from books and songs come to mind. Undoubtedly there are other
sources that might prove fruitful.” (Id. at p. 205.)
We solicited briefing from the parties concerning this issue. Having
reviewed the parties’ supplemental letter briefs, we conclude that,
notwithstanding a $60 million judgment entered against him, Reiser has no
current or future property interest actually at stake in this appeal.
In the declaration he filed in support of his supplemental brief, Reiser
states that he is 61 years old and serving a sentence of 15 years to life. Before
going to prison, he had decades of experience in the technology industry
including, at one point, developing file system software that generated a fee
as large as $500,000. He states that he incurred $89,000 in credit card debt
in connection with a technology company he founded, indebtedness that,
today, he estimates has “probably [grown to] over $10 million.”
He states that his likelihood of inheriting or otherwise obtaining
property is “poor,” because his father is no longer alive, his mother wants no
contact with him and he knows of no other potential source of inheritance.
He states he has “no nonspeculative prospects for earning money while in
prison from any source” and only a “speculative hope of making money if[] I
parole.” He states that he has osteoarthritis that requires him to use a
wheelchair for “non-trivial distances,” causes pain when he walks, and
sometimes causes back spasms that can require five minutes just to put on
shoes or even 20 minutes just to get out of bed. He states that “[i]t is possible
that I will parole, and after paroling make money” but expresses pessimism
regarding his chances of parole for a variety of reasons3 and offers no concrete

3 At oral argument, he informed us that in October 2024 his most
recent effort to obtain parole was denied for three years.

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details about earning income if he is paroled other than reciting his technical
and educational background and explaining the “elevator pitch” he would use
to seek venture capital for a new company or a job. He identifies no specific
job prospects, leads or networking contacts who might be willing to assist him
finding gainful employment in the technology industry if paroled. He is
unaware of any efforts to collect the judgment against him, and respondents
state there have been none because Reiser has argued throughout the case
his assets were depleted by his criminal defense costs, and respondents are
unaware of any assets or any friends or family members who have identified
Reiser as the recipient of any assets.
On the basis of this showing, we conclude that Reiser’s threatened
deprivation of property is remote, speculative and wholly ephemeral. In
terms of his prospects of earning future income, he has demonstrated no
nonspeculative basis to think he is likely to get paroled in the near future or
at all. And even if he were to be paroled, his ability to earn a significant
income is speculative, at best. He left the technology sector nearly 20 years
ago (when he was arrested) and he is now age 61. Despite an impressive
educational background and professional experience, his long absence from
the technology sector, combined with his age, physical disability and criminal
background, are likely to pose significant challenges to securing meaningful
employment or investment opportunities that would provide significant
income. In short, his prospects of earning future income are remote, at best.
For these reasons, Reiser lacks a stake in the appeal and for that
reason is not entitled to the appointment of an attorney to represent him in
the appellate court or any other relief.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Respondents shall recover their costs.

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STEWART, P. J.

We concur.

MILLER, J.

DESAUTELS, J.

Reiser v. Reiser (A136653)

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