People v. Isaac CA2/2

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Filed 11/24/25 P. v. Isaac CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION TWO

THE PEOPLE, B340750

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA099542)
v.

ZOELEE ISAAC,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Eleanor J. Hunter, Judge. Affirmed.

Brad Kaiserman, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kenneth C. Byrne and Allison H. Chung,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
This is defendant and appellant Zoelee Isaac’s third appeal
from a postjudgment order denying his petition for resentencing
under Penal Code1 section 1172.6. We have twice before affirmed
the trial court’s orders denying defendant’s resentencing
petitions. Finding defendant has not demonstrated grounds
warranting a new evidentiary hearing, we affirm.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Underlying facts2
In 1994, defendant participated with several codefendants
in a series of violent armed bank robberies. During the first
robbery at Home Bank, codefendant Sonja Key shot and killed
security guard Juan Corona. Defendant was convicted of first
degree murder with a robbery-murder special circumstance and
sentenced to life without parole.
The first resentencing petition and subsequent appeal
On January 2, 2019, defendant filed a petition for
resentencing. (Isaac I, supra, B305378.) The trial court
appointed counsel. (Ibid.) After briefing by both parties, the trial
court issued an order to show cause and set the matter for an
evidentiary hearing pursuant to section 1172.6, subdivision (d).
(Isaac I, supra, B305378.) “The parties submitted on their briefs

1 All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
otherwise indicated.
2 The factual background of this case has been detailed in
our two prior nonpublished opinions in People v. Isaac (Aug. 12,
2021, B305378) (Isaac I) and People v. Isaac (Jan. 30, 2024,
B326883) (Isaac II). Therefore, we summarize the underlying
facts.

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and whatever materials had been submitted by the parties to the
trial court.” (Ibid.)
In February 2020, “[a]fter entertaining oral argument, the
trial court denied defendant’s section [1172.6] petition.” (Isaac I,
supra, B305378.) The trial court recited a list of evidence
supporting its conclusion that “defendant was ‘a major
participant’ who acted with ‘reckless indifference of life’” and “a
direct aider and abettor who acted with intent to kill.” (Ibid.) It
noted that “‘this was an armed takedown robbery of a bank’
[with] [‘]no effort to minimize violence. They robbed it in the
middle of the day. They had to know there was an armed
security guard.’ And, defendant had to have been aware ‘of the
dangers of robbing a bank during working hours with an armed
guard.’ [¶] Furthermore, defendant ‘was there, and he was
present, and he was not outside as the getaway driver. . . . He
was there in the bank. He was part of this well-orchestrated and
planned robbery.’ [¶] The trial court also pointed to the evidence
that the robbery was well planned: the robbers stole a car in the
morning and then, after they left the bank, ‘within a short
distance they switch[ed] cars.’ ‘Not only do they do all those
things, but they wear disguises. . . . [T]hey have buckets of water
in the van. That’s to deal with the dye that might be on the
packets of money that they steal. They have wigs on. There are
just all kinds of things that show that this [was] highly
sophisticated.’” (Ibid.)
On appeal, we affirmed, holding “the trial court’s findings
that defendant acted either as a direct aider and abettor with
intent or a major participant with reckless indifference to human
life are supported by substantial evidence.” (Isaac I, supra,
B305378.) Specifically, we agreed defendant was an aider and
abettor based upon “[r]easonable inferences . . . that Key

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intended to not just shoot, but kill Corona, and that defendant
knew that she intended to do so. Therefore, the trial court’s
finding that defendant was ineligible for resentencing because he
had the intent to kill was proper.” (Ibid.)
The second resentencing petition and subsequent appeal
In July 2022, defendant filed a second resentencing petition
under section 1172.6. (Isaac II, supra, B326883).) The trial court
again appointed counsel.
The People opposed, arguing the second petition should be
denied because it “‘[wa]s duplicative’” of a petition that the trial
court “‘already denied . . . in 2020 and the Court of Appeal
affirmed.’” (Isaac II, supra, B326883.)
Defendant filed a response, contending that the enactment
of Senate Bill No. 775 (2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Senate Bill 775)
was a “‘significant change in the law’” entitling him to a new
evidentiary hearing under section 1172.6. Defendant argued
because the record is “‘extremely unclear’” on the question of
“‘what SPECIFIC evidence the [c]ourt relied upon and what
standard the court used in denying defendant’s [first] petition,’”
“‘[t]here is no way to ascertain if the court relied upon evidence
that would no longer be permissible under the changes in
1172.6 . . . procedures as they have been amended through
Senate Bill 775.’” (Isaac II, supra, B326883.)
In December 2022, the matter proceeded to a hearing.
After hearing argument from both sides, the trial court said that
it had “‘painstakingly [gone] through the facts of this case’” when
evaluating defendant’s first resentencing petition and “‘made a
ruling in which I indicated that . . . defendant . . . was a major
participant who acted with reckless indifference to life. . . . [¶]
. . . [A]nd I further stated that there may have been some
evidence to support that he aided and abetted the crime with

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specific intent to kill. [¶] [I]n any case, I just don’t see a reason
to give him a second chance. He had his opportunity. He
appealed my decision. He lost that appeal.’” As a result, the trial
court summarily denied defendant’s second resentencing petition
“‘based on . . . “law of the case.”’” (Isaac II, supra, B326883.)
On appeal, we affirmed, holding the “trial court properly
applied the law of the case doctrine to summarily deny
defendant’s resentencing petition.” (Isaac II, supra, B326883.)
We rejected defendant’s arguments that three purported changes
in law—Senate Bill 775’s evidentiary provisions, cases addressing
preclusive effects of prior jury findings, and cases requiring
consideration of youth in reckless indifference determinations—
warranted a new evidentiary hearing because none of the
changes affected defendant’s liability as a direct aider and
abettor with intent to kill.
The third3 (current) resentencing petition
On August 16, 2024, defendant, through counsel, filed a
motion for appointment of counsel pursuant to section 1172.6,
and on August 27, 2024, defendant filed a new petition for
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.6.4

3 This is technically defendant’s fifth petition, however, the
third, filed March 8, 2023, “could not be processed because of lack
of sufficient information,” and the fourth, filed May 26, 2023, was
denied after the appointment of counsel, because defendant’s
appeal in petition No. 2 was still pending. For clarity, we refer to
the instant petition as the third petition.
4 According to a declaration of counsel, the petition, dated
July 7, 2024, was sent to their office by defendant. As a result, it
seems, counsel filed the motion for appointment of counsel, along
with defendant’s petition.

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Counsel acknowledged defendant had “previously filed two
[section] 1172.6 [p]etitions,” but averred, “in light of recent
changes to the law [defendant] is entitled to file a new petition
and consideration as to whether he was a major participant
acting with reckless indifference to human life.” Specifically,
counsel cited People v. Reyes (2023) 14 Cal.5th 981 (Reyes), which
deals with implied malice murder based on aiding and abetting
theory, and People v. Jimenez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 994
(Jimenez), which deals with the consideration of youthfulness in
petitions stemming from convictions involving implied malice
murder.
On August 27, 2024, in a written order, the trial court
denied defendant’s request for appointment of counsel and
summarily denied his petition. The court reasoned Jimenez and
Reyes did not apply to defendant because they “addressed the
issue of culpability of a youthful offender as a direct aider and
abettor under an implied malice theory.” The court reiterated its
prior ruling where defendant was found “guilty of murder beyond
a reasonable doubt based on both a felony murder theory wherein
[defendant] was a major participant who acted with reckless
disregard to human life and as a direct aider and abettor with the
specific intent to kill.” Furthermore, the trial court noted Reyes
had already been decided when this court affirmed denial of his
second petition in Isaac II and this court also discussed the need
(or not) “to consider [a] defendant’s youth when assessing his
capacity to be recklessly indifferent within the meaning of section
1172.6. . . . But [Isaac I] affirmed that defendant is ineligible for
resentencing relief as a direct aider and abettor, and we have
rejected all of defendant’s arguments targeting that finding.”
Defendant timely appealed.

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DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law
A. Section 1172.6
“Section 1172.6 provides a mechanism whereby people ‘who
believe they were convicted of murder for an act that no longer
qualifies as murder following the crime’s redefinition in 2019 . . .
may seek vacatur of their murder conviction and resentencing by
filing a petition in the trial court.’” (People v. Arnold (2023) 93
Cal.App.5th 376, 382 (Arnold).)
As is relevant here, in order to obtain resentencing relief,
the petitioner must allege (1) an information was filed against
him allowing the prosecution to proceed under a theory of felony
murder, the natural and probable consequences doctrine, or any
“other theory under which malice is imputed to a person based
solely on that person’s participation in a crime” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(1)); (2) the petitioner was convicted of murder (§ 1172.6, subd.
(a)(2)); and (3) he could not now be convicted of murder as
presently defined (§ 1172.6, subd. (a)(3)). Upon receiving a
facially sufficient petition, which contains all the required
information, or such required information is readily
ascertainable, the “court shall appoint counsel.” (§ 1172.6, subd.
(b)(3).)
If the trial court determines the petitioner has made a
prima facie showing of entitlement to relief, it must issue an
order to show cause and hold an evidentiary hearing. (§ 1172.6,
subd. (c).) At the evidentiary hearing, the prosecution bears the
burden of proving, “beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
petitioner is ineligible for resentencing.” (§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
If the prosecution cannot meet its burden, the petitioner is
entitled to vacatur of the murder conviction and resentencing as
set forth in section 1172.6, subdivision (e).

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Effective January 1, 2022, section 1172.6 was amended by
Senate Bill 775. Among other things, these amendments provide
that, at the evidentiary hearing stage, the trial court “may
consider evidence previously admitted at any prior hearing”
except for “hearsay evidence that was admitted in a preliminary
hearing pursuant to subdivision (b) of [s]ection 872,” which “shall
be excluded from the hearing as hearsay, unless the evidence is
admissible pursuant to another exception to the hearsay rule.”
(§ 1172.6, subd. (d)(3).)
The statute as amended also specifies that the trial court
may “‘consider the procedural history of the case recited in any
prior appellate opinion.’ The specificity of this provision
‘indicates the Legislature has decided trial judges should not rely
on the factual summaries contained in prior appellate decisions
when a section [1172.6] petition reaches the stage of a full-
fledged evidentiary hearing.’” (Arnold, supra, 93 Cal.App.5th at
p. 392.)
B. Standard of review
When a trial court denies a section 1172.6 petition at the
prima facie stage based on a question of law, our review is de
novo. (People v. Harrison (2021) 73 Cal.App.5th 429, 437.)
II. Analysis
A. Additional relevant law
The law of the case doctrine provides “‘when, in deciding an
appeal, an appellate court “states in its opinion a principle or rule
of law necessary to the decision, that principle or rule becomes
the law of the case and must be adhered to throughout its
subsequent progress, both in the lower court and upon
subsequent appeal[s].”’” (People v. Bryant, Smith and Wheeler
(2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 374, fn. 6.) However, the doctrine “will not
be adhered to where its application will result in an unjust

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decision, e.g., where . . . the controlling rules of law have been
altered or clarified by a decision intervening between the first
and second appellate determinations . . . .” (People v. Stanley
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 764, 787, citations omitted; see People v. Lee
(2023) 95 Cal.App.5th 1164, 1186.)
“‘In general, whether a prior finding will be given
conclusive effect in a later proceeding is governed by the doctrine
of issue preclusion, also known as collateral estoppel.’” (People v.
Curiel (2023) 15 Cal.5th 433, 451.) The doctrine of collateral
estoppel applies in criminal proceedings. (People v. Strong (2022)
13 Cal.5th 698, 716.) “‘As traditionally understood and applied,
issue preclusion bars relitigation of issues earlier decided “only if
several threshold requirements are fulfilled. First, the issue
sought to be precluded from relitigation must be identical to that
decided in a former proceeding. Second, this issue must have
been actually litigated in the former proceeding. Third, it must
have been necessarily decided in the former proceeding. Fourth,
the decision in the former proceeding must be final and on the
merits. Finally, the party against whom preclusion is sought
must be the same as, or in privity with, the party to the former
proceeding.”’” (People v. Curiel, supra, at pp. 451–452.) “Even
when the threshold requirements for issue preclusion are met,
one well-settled equitable exception to the general rule holds that
preclusion does not apply when there has been a significant
change in the law since the factual findings were rendered that
warrants reexamination of the issue.” (People v. Strong, supra, at
p. 716.)
B. The third petition is barred by the law of the
case doctrine and issue preclusion
The People argue defendant’s third petition is “identical in
all relevant respects” to his first and second petitions and should

9
be barred by issue preclusion and the law of the case.
Furthermore, the People argue this court’s prior decisions in
Isaac I and Isaac II, including our finding “the trial court
properly applied the law of the case to summarily deny
defendant’s [second] resentencing petition,” along with no
relevant intervening changes in the law surrounding section
1172.6, further require affirmance of the trial court’s ruling. We
agree with the People’s second point. (People v. Barragan (2004)
32 Cal.4th 236, 246 [“[B]ecause an appellate court’s
determination ‘that the evidence is []sufficient to justify a finding
or a judgment is necessarily a decision upon a question of law[,]’
[s]uch a determination ‘establishe[s] as the law of the case that
all the evidence adduced at the previous [proceeding] was
[]sufficient as a matter of law to establish’ the finding or
judgment.” (Citation omitted.)].)
Defendant contends, however, his third petition should not
be procedurally barred as successive “based on changes in the
law.” (People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942 (Farfan).) In
Farfan, a panel of this court held, where an otherwise successive
petition is “based on new authority which challenged the primary
ground for the superior court’s summary denial . . . , [it] was not
procedurally barred as a successive petition.” (Id. at p. 951.)
Defendant claims, since denial of his first petition, the law
surrounding section 1172.6 has changed in three ways: (1)
preclusive effects of prior jury findings, (2) consideration of youth
in reckless indifference, and (3) clarification on the law on
implied malice. Because we addressed the first two changes in
our Isaac II opinion, we turn to the last change—that the
Supreme Court “has clarified the law on implied malice” in People
v. Collins (2025) 17 Cal.5th 293 (Collins) and Reyes, supra, 14

10
Cal.5th 981—first.5 Specifically, defendant argues Collins, which
“elaborated on Reyes,” makes clear the “life-endangering act” for
implied malice murder must be the specific act proximately
causing death (here, the shooting), not preliminary dangerous
conduct (here, the robbery planning). This change in the law is
irrelevant to defendant’s petition and, thus, does not overcome
the law of the case or collateral estoppel principles.
First, our decision in Isaac I was not dependent on any
single theory of liability but found substantial evidence
supporting defendant’s ineligibility under at least two distinct
grounds: (1) direct aiding and abetting with intent to kill (express
malice), and (2) major participant with reckless indifference to
human life. While Isaac I also referenced implied malice as an
alternative theory, this discussion was not necessary to our
holding.
Second, Isaac II specifically addressed this issue, holding
“Isaac [I] affirmed that defendant is ineligible for resentencing
relief as a direct aider and abettor, and we have rejected all of
defendant’s arguments targeting that finding. Therefore, it is
irrelevant whether defendant could now be found ineligible on
the alternate ground that he was a major participant who acted
with reckless indifference to human life.” (Isaac II, supra,
B326883.) The same reasoning applies here: Reyes and Collins’s
changes to the viability of implied malice theories
notwithstanding, defendant remains ineligible based on his
liability as a direct aider and abettor with intent to kill.
Third, as discussed, the Reyes/Collins line of cases
primarily clarifies the requirements for implied malice murder.

5 We address the first two changes briefly in part II.C., post.

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Defendant’s liability as established in Isaac I, however, was
based on express malice—specifically, our finding that
“reasonable inferences could be drawn that Key intended to not
just shoot, but kill Corona, and that defendant knew that she
intended to do so.” (Isaac I, supra, B305378.) This express
malice finding remains valid under current law and provides an
independent basis for defendant’s ineligibility for resentencing
relief.
C. Defendant’s “cumulative impact” theory lacks
merit
Defendant argues even previously considered issues or
changes to the law surrounding section 1172.6 should be
reconsidered as part of a “cumulative impact” analysis alongside
the Reyes/Collins developments. This argument essentially asks
us to relitigate issues we have already decided. We decline
defendant’s invitation.
In Isaac II, we considered whether changes in law
regarding (1) evidentiary exclusions under Senate Bill 775, (2)
preclusive effects of prior jury findings, and (3) consideration of
youth in reckless indifference determinations warranted
reconsideration. Finding defendant remained ineligible based on
his liability as a direct aider and abettor with intent to kill, we
concluded they did not.
The fact defendant now packages these previously rejected
arguments with a new argument regarding implied malice does
not transform them into viable grounds for relief. (People v.
Curiel, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 453 [“‘The rule that collateral
estoppel applies only to those issues that were actually or fully
litigated in the prior proceeding does not refer to the quality or
quantity of argument or evidence addressed to an issue. . . .
Issue preclusion because of a prior adjudication results from the

12
resolution of a question in issue, not from the litigation of specific
arguments directed to the issue.’”].) Here, defendant’s liability
for murder is based on express malice. Thus, any changes
regarding implied malice murder do not aid defendant.
D. Defendant’s preclusive effect argument fails on
its own terms
Defendant attempts to distinguish his current argument
about the preclusive effect of prior jury findings from the
argument he presented in Isaac II, citing our statement he “does
not make such claims” in that appeal. Defendant argues the
court’s language demonstrates the issue was not actually decided
and therefore cannot be subject to issue preclusion. We are not
persuaded.
In Isaac II, we specifically addressed defendant’s
contention “the trial court’s dismissal of the personal firearm use
allegation with respect to the murder charge functions as an
acquittal on the finding that defendant personally fired the
murder weapon.” (Isaac II, supra, B326883.) We concluded,
“[e]ven if we agreed with that contention, a prior finding that
defendant did not personally use a firearm does not preclude the
trial court from finding that he is ineligible for resentencing relief
as a direct aider and abettor.” (Ibid.)
More fundamentally, in Isaac II we expressly noted our
ruling in Isaac I, stating “the record of conviction contains
sufficient evidence to support a finding that defendant directly
aided and abetted first-degree murder regardless of ‘whether [he]
himself was armed.’” (Isaac II, supra, B326883.) This finding
necessarily encompasses and resolves any claim that the
dismissal of personal firearm use allegations undermines
defendant’s liability as a direct aider and abettor and therefore is
subject to issue preclusion.

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III. Any error in denying counsel was harmless
Defendant argues the trial court erred by denying his
request for counsel and failing to conduct a prima facie hearing
on his facially sufficient petition. Even assuming, arguendo, the
trial court erred in denying counsel, any such error was harmless
under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818, 836 (Watson).
Under Watson, we assess whether it is reasonably probable
defendant would have obtained a more favorable result absent
the alleged error. (People v. Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952, 973–
974.) Here, as demonstrated above, defendant is ineligible for
resentencing relief as a matter of law based on his liability as a
direct aider and abettor with intent to kill. This theory of
liability (1) was established by substantial evidence in Isaac I, (2)
remains valid under current law, and (3) provides an
independent basis for denying relief regardless of any changes to
other theories of liability.
While the trial court denied defendant’s motion to appoint
counsel, which was made through counsel, he was able to
advance his arguments regarding why the new petition should
not be procedurally barred as successive. Accordingly, as
discussed, the court was able to consider—and did so in its
written denial—whether defendant had overcome the arguments
in favor of summary denial.
Had the trial court appointed counsel and conducted a full
prima facie hearing, counsel could not have overcome the law of
the case established in Isaac I and Isaac II. The express malice
finding—defendant knew Key intended to kill Corona and shared
that intent—is unaffected by Reyes and Collins, which address
implied malice theories. Similarly, the personal firearm
dismissal issue was already considered and found not relevant in
Isaac II, which specifically noted defendant’s liability as a direct

14
aider and abettor exists “regardless of ‘whether [he] himself was
armed.’” (Isaac II, supra, B326883.) Given defendant remains
ineligible for relief as a matter of law, there is no reasonable
probability the appointment of counsel or additional proceedings
would have led to a different outcome. Any error was therefore
harmless.

DISPOSITION
The trial court’s order is affirmed.

CHAVEZ, Acting P. J.

We concur:

RICHARDSON, J.

GOORVITCH, J.*

* Judge of the Los Angeles Superior Court, assigned by the
Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section 6 of the California
Constitution.

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