CourtListener 10741456•People v. Ramosmaldonado CA3
Full text
Filed 11/24/25 P. v. Ramosmaldonado CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C102130
v. (Super. Ct. No. 24F2659)
JESUS RAMOSMALDONADO,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Jesus Ramosmaldonado pleaded guilty to committing a lewd act on a
child and felony false imprisonment. The trial court sentenced him to two years eight
months in prison.
Defendant now contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request
for probation. Finding no abuse of discretion, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
A 16-year-old female informed law enforcement that while she was working at a
restaurant, her boss, defendant, “had been grabbing her from behind, touching her waist,
her buttocks, kissing her neck, and grabbing her breasts for a two-month period between
June 2023 and July 2023.” She said that on August 8, 2023, he placed “his left hand on
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her right breast while simultaneously placing his right hand on her stomach and rubbing
under her pants along the waistband of her pants.” She told law enforcement that “every
time [defendant] touched her, she could feel that he had an erect penis.”
After the victim spoke to police, she made a pretext call to defendant, during
which he admitted touching her and knowing that she was between 15 and 16 years old at
the time and that she was scared. He repeatedly apologized for his actions during the
call. Defendant later agreed to speak with police. Among other things, defendant said
the victim had been coming to work in clothes that were too revealing. He hugged her
from behind and touched and grabbed her breast, but she did not do anything in response
and could have left. He denied being aroused.
Pursuant to the parties’ agreement, defendant pleaded guilty to two counts of
committing a lewd act on a child (Pen. Code,1 § 288, subd. (c)(1)) -- counts 1 and 2)
and one count of felony false imprisonment (§ 236 -- count 11).
After the plea, the probation department interviewed defendant. As recounted by
the probation report, defendant denied touching the victim’s breasts and other allegations
such as touching her beneath her clothing. He admitted to hugging the victim on three or
four occasions, including kissing her on her clothed shoulder, but denied any sexual
intent, and explained that one of the incidents was an attempt to redirect her focus toward
work when she was on her phone. He said he did not realize there was a problem until he
was contacted by law enforcement.
The probation report also addressed defendant’s risk of reoffending. According to
one risk assessment, defendant had a below-average risk of reoffending within five years
after being released on probation. The probation report determined that defendant was
presumptively ineligible for probation under section 1203 subdivision (e)(4), but
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
concluded the presumption was overcome under rule 4.413(c)(1)(A) of the California
Rules of Court2 because defendant had only two prior felony convictions related to
controlled substances from an adjudication more than 30 years ago, he had no recent
record of similar crimes or crimes of violence, and the current offenses, according to the
probation report, were less serious than the prior felony convictions based on the
respective sentencing triads. The probation report suggested defendant’s touching of the
victim “might constitute something less serious than the typical examples” of felony
violations of section 288, subdivision (c)(1). In addition, the report noted defendant’s
lack of criminal sophistication, his cooperation with law enforcement, his
acknowledgement that the touching of the victim was inappropriate, his largely “law-
abiding and productive life” over the past 30 years, his lack of substance abuse or mental
health issues, and the potential impact of incarceration on his family.
The probation report acknowledged that defendant took advantage of his position
of authority as the victim’s employer, the victim experienced emotional harm that would
likely be on-going, and defendant could not be considered truly remorseful because he
did not admit acting with sexual intent. Nevertheless, the probation report recommended
probation for defendant as follows: that he be sentenced to an aggregate term of two
years eight months, with imposition of sentence suspended for two years, and that he be
placed on formal probation with various conditions, including that he serve 364 days in
jail with 204 days of credit for good conduct and days actually served. The probation
report attached various letters, including a letter from the victim.
A forensic psychologist evaluated defendant under section 288.1 after the
probation report was submitted to the court. The psychologist concluded defendant had
an intellectual disability and a “low moderate” risk of reoffending, his behavior was
2 Undesignated rule references are to the California Rules of Court.
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“more situational than predatory,” but he had “a clear understanding of the gravity of his
actions” such that his psychological issues could be addressed through treatment
programs. The psychologist recommended probation with mandated treatment. Upon
receipt of the forensic psychologist evaluation, the probation department submitted a
supplemental probation report again recommending probation.
At sentencing, the trial court said it had reviewed the original and supplemental
probation reports, the attachments, defendant’s psychological evaluation, and defendant’s
sentencing brief. The trial court heard statements from the victim’s family members and
a statement from the victim read by the victim’s father. The family members and the
victim discussed the harm she had experienced. The trial court then announced its
tentative sentence and reasoning in support. It noted its discretion to grant probation,
including up to a year in jail, or to impose a state prison term. The trial court explained
that because defendant had two prior felony convictions from the same case in 1992, he
was presumptively ineligible for probation. It said defendant had no prior record of
violence, but under rule 4.413, the current offenses must be less serious than the prior
felony convictions that are the cause of the presumptive ineligibility for probation.
The trial court disagreed with the probation report’s conclusion that the current offenses
were less serious than defendant’s prior felonies relating to controlled substances, saying
the current offenses represented a greater danger to the public and were more serious.
The trial court concluded the presumption against probation was not overcome.
The trial court next examined defendant’s suitability for probation, noting:
(1) defendant denied having any sexual intent and several times minimized his actions;
(2) defendant’s conduct happened over a lengthy period of time, with time in between
the acts allowing defendant time to reflect; (3) defendant photographed the victim, which
the trial court considered troubling; (4) defendant took advantage of a position of trust as
an employer, especially considering the age of the victim and the fact it was her first job;
(5) the likely long-term effect of defendant’s conduct on the victim; and (6) the
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psychologist’s determination regarding defendant’s risk to society. Weighing these
factors, the trial court concluded defendant was not suitable for probation even if the
presumption against probation had been overcome. The trial court stated its inclination
to impose an aggregate term of two years eight months in prison.
Defense counsel argued for probation, noting that the prior convictions were
decades earlier, there were character witness statements in support of defendant, he had
shown remorse, he cooperated with law enforcement, the psychologist report and risk
assessments were consistent with probation, a sex-offender treatment program and
probation department supervision were available, and defendant had family support and
an offer of employment.
The trial court denied probation and imposed a two year eight month sentence.
DISCUSSION
Defendant contends the trial court abused its discretion in denying his request
for probation.
A trial judge’s discretion in determining whether to grant or deny probation is
broad and will not be disturbed on appeal unless its decision is so irrational or arbitrary
that no reasonable person could agree with it. (People v. Stuart (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th
165, 178-179.) Defendant’s primary argument is that the trial court did not give proper
weight to the probation report recommendation and the section 288.1 report and their
determination that he had a low risk of reoffending. However, nothing indicates that
the trial court misunderstood its discretion or failed to consider all the relevant factors.
The trial court considered the probation report, the psychological evaluation, the victim
impact statements and testimony, the letters in support of defendant, and the parties’
sentencing briefs and oral argument. The trial court acknowledged the favorable
probation report, the fact that the case resolved at any early stage, and the lack of any
prior record of violence. But it disagreed with the probation report’s characterization of
the seriousness of the current offenses as compared to his prior offenses. Accordingly,
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the trial court found the presumption against probation had not been overcome. The trial
court also considered defendant’s minimization of his conduct, the period of time over
which the conduct occurred, defendant’s violation of a position of trust as the victim’s
first employer, and the vulnerability of the victim. Based on those factors, the trial court
concluded defendant was not suitable for probation even if the presumption against
probation had been overcome.
On this record, we find no abuse of discretion.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
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