People v. Ruiz CA2/1

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Filed 11/21/25 P. v. Ruiz CA2/1
Opinion following transfer from Supreme Court
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B323988

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA501067)
v.

MIGUEL ALBERTO RUIZ,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, H. Clay Jacke II, Judge. Sentence vacated and
remanded for resentencing.
Aaron J. Schechter, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters and
Charles C. Ragland, Chief Assistant Attorneys General, Susan
Sullivan Pithey, Assistant Attorney General, Roberta L. Davis
and David A. Wildman, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
_______________________________
Miguel Alberto Ruiz appeals from a judgment entered after
a jury found him guilty of one count of stalking a victim and one
count of violating a protective order pertaining to a different
victim. Ruiz admitted two prior strike convictions, the trial court
found five aggravating factors relating to Ruiz’s prior convictions
to be true, and the jury found five other aggravating factors to be
true. The trial court sentenced Ruiz to six years in prison: the
upper term of three years on the stalking count, doubled based on
one of the prior strikes. He contends the court prejudicially erred
in relying on some of the aggravating factors in imposing the
upper term sentence. He also challenges a restitution fine and
some assessments the court imposed.
In an opinion filed on March 25, 2024, we affirmed the
judgment. We concluded the trial court erred in relying on three
of the 10 aggravating factors, and we held the error was
harmless. We also rejected Ruiz’s challenge to the fine and
assessments.
The Supreme Court granted Ruiz’s petition for review and
transferred the matter back to this court with directions to vacate
our opinion and reconsider the matter in light of People v. Lynch
(2024) 16 Cal.5th 730, 742-743 (Lynch), in which the Supreme
Court announced the applicable test for determining prejudice,
and People v. Wiley (2025) 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076 (Wiley), in which
the Supreme Court held that a defendant is entitled to a jury
trial on two of the aggravating factors the trial court found to be
true in the present case. Applying the standards set forth in
Lynch and Wiley, we conclude Ruiz is entitled to resentencing due
to prejudicial error, and we remand the matter for that purpose.

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BACKGROUND
A. Trial and Sentencing
A jury found Ruiz guilty of one count of stalking A.R., a
felony (Pen. Code,1 § 646.9, subd. (a); count 1), and one count of
violating protective orders pertaining to A.S., a misdemeanor
(§ 166, subd. (c)(1); count 2).2 The jury found five aggravating
factors to be true: (1) the “crime involved a threat of great bodily
injury”; (2) “defendant was armed with or used a weapon, to wit:
a knife or bricks, at the time of the commission of the crime”;
(3) “defendant showed lack of remorse with respect to count 1 or
count 2”; (4) “defendant committed the crimes in and around
[v]ictim [A.R.’s] and [v]ictim [A.S.’s] homes”; and (5) “defendant
made statements indicating an intent to kidnap [v]ictim [A.R.].”
The jury’s verdict form does not indicate that any true finding
relates to a particular count.
Ruiz waived his right to jury trial on allegations that he
had two prior strike convictions within the meaning of the “Three
Strikes” law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)). He
admitted a February 2020 strike conviction for battery causing
serious bodily injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) and a February 2021 strike
conviction for attempted first degree residential burglary (§§ 459
& 664).
The parties agreed that the trial court could decide whether
aggravating factors relating to Ruiz’s prior convictions and
performance on probation or parole were true. The court found

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

2 We do not include a summary of the facts and

744circumstances of the offenses because our resolution of this
appeal is not dependent upon the application of such facts.

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the following five factors to be true: (1) Ruiz has engaged in
violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society (Cal.
Rules of Court,3 rule 4.421(b)(1)); (2) Ruiz’s prior convictions as
an adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency
proceedings are numerous or of increasing seriousness (rule
4.421(b)(2)); (3) Ruiz has served a prior term in prison or county
jail (rule 4.421(b)(3)); (4) Ruiz was on probation, mandatory
supervision, post release community supervision, or parole when
the crime was committed (rule 4.421(b)(4)); and (5) Ruiz’s prior
performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory (rule
4.421(b)(5)).
At a sentencing hearing on September 27, 2022, after
considering the above-referenced factors in aggravation, as well
as factors in mitigation advanced by Ruiz, the trial court
sentenced Ruiz to six years in prison: the upper term of three
years on count 1 (stalking), doubled based on one of the two prior
strike convictions. The court imposed a concurrent one-year term
for count 2 (violation of a protective order).

B. Proceedings on Appeal
Ruiz appealed from the judgment of his convictions,
contending the trial court prejudicially erred when it relied on
certain aggravating factors in imposing an upper term sentence
on the stalking count. He challenged the trial court’s true
findings on the following three aggravating factors, arguing they
could not be established by a certified record of conviction and
should have been submitted to the jury: (1) Ruiz has engaged in

3 Undesignated rules references are to the California Rules

of Court.

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violent conduct that indicates a serious danger to society;
(2) Ruiz’s prior convictions as an adult or sustained petitions in
juvenile delinquency proceedings are numerous or of increasing
seriousness; and (3) Ruiz’s prior performance on probation or
parole was unsatisfactory. He also challenged the court’s reliance
on the following aggravating factors found true by the jury,
arguing the jury did not specifically find them to be true as to the
felony stalking count, as opposed to the misdemeanor count for
violation of a protective order: (1) the “crime involved a threat of
great bodily injury”; (2) “defendant showed lack of remorse with
respect to count 1 or count 2”; and (3) “defendant committed the
crimes in and around [v]ictim [A.R.’s] and [v]ictim [A.S.’s]
homes.” Finally, he argued “lack of remorse is not a valid
aggravating factor,” and the court erred in relying on it in
imposing the upper term. He did not challenge the sufficiency of
the evidence supporting any of the aggravating factors. He also
challenged a restitution fine and some assessments the court
imposed, asserting his inability to pay.4
On March 25, 2024, we issued an opinion affirming the
judgment. We agreed with Ruiz’s contention that the trial court
could not properly determine, based on his record of convictions,
the subjective aggravating factor that he engaged in violent
conduct that indicates a serious danger to society, and the factor
should have been submitted to the jury. We also agreed with his
contention that in imposing the upper term on the stalking count,
the court could not rely on the aggravating factors that the crime

4 In connection with our legal analysis regarding the fines

and assessments, post, we discuss the related trial court
proceedings and describe the fines and assessments at issue.

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involved threat of great bodily injury or lack of remorse because
it was not clear from the record whether the jury found these
factors to be true as to the stalking count. We rejected his
challenge of the other factors. We held that any error was
harmless based on our conclusion the trial court would not have
imposed a lower or middle term sentence in the absence of three
out of the 10 aggravating factors. We acknowledged that the
applicable harmless error standard was not settled and that the
issue was pending in our Supreme Court. We also rejected Ruiz’s
challenge to the fine and assessments.
Ruiz filed a petition for review, and the Supreme Court
granted it. Thereafter, the Supreme Court decided Lynch, supra,
16 Cal.5th 730, 742-743, in which it announced the test for
determining prejudice, and Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th 1069, 1076,
in which it held that a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on two
of the aggravating factors found to be true by the trial court in
the present case—the increasing seriousness of prior convictions
and unsatisfactory performance on probation or parole. The
Supreme Court transferred Ruiz’s case back to this court with
directions to vacate our opinion and reconsider the matter in
light of Lynch and Wiley. We have vacated our prior opinion
affirming the judgment of Ruiz’s convictions.

DISCUSSION

A. Selection of a Term Under Section 1170, Subdivision
(b)
Section 1170, subdivision (b) provides, in pertinent part:
“(b)(1) When a judgment of imprisonment is to be imposed and
the statute specifies three possible terms, the court shall, in its

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sound discretion, order imposition of a sentence not to exceed the
middle term, except as otherwise provided in paragraph (2). [¶]
(2) The court may impose a sentence exceeding the middle term
only when there are circumstances in aggravation of the crime
that justify the imposition of a term of imprisonment exceeding
the middle term and the facts underlying those circumstances
have been stipulated to by the defendant or have been found true
beyond a reasonable doubt at trial by the jury or by the judge in a
court trial. . . .”

B. Lynch and Wiley
In Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at page 768, the Supreme
Court stated: “We hold that under the current [version of section
1170, subdivision (b)] a Sixth Amendment [right to jury trial]
violation occurs when the trial court relies on unproven
aggravating facts to impose an upper term sentence, even if some
other aggravating facts relied on have been properly established.
The violation is prejudicial unless an appellate court can conclude
beyond a reasonable doubt that a jury would have found true all
of the aggravating facts relied upon by the trial court to justify an
upper term sentence, or that those facts were otherwise proved
true in compliance with the current statutory requirements. If
the reviewing court cannot so determine, applying the Chapman
[v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 18] standard of review, the
defendant is entitled to a remand for resentencing.” (Italics
added.)
In Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at page 1086, the Supreme
Court concluded that “a defendant is entitled to a jury trial on all
aggravating facts, other than the bare fact of a prior conviction
and its elements, that expose the defendant to imposition of a

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sentence more serious than the statutorily provided midterm.”
(Fn. omitted.) Accordingly, the Court held that the right to jury
trial extends to the aggravating factors that a defendant’s prior
convictions were of “increasing seriousness” and that a
defendant’s prior performance on probation or parole was
“unsatisfactory.” (Id. at pp. 1082-1083.) Absent the defendant’s
waiver of the right to jury trial or stipulation to the facts, a trial
court may not rely on these factors in imposing the upper term
unless a jury finds the facts to be true. (Id. at p. 1085.)

C. Application of Wiley and Lynch
Applying Wiley, we agree with Ruiz’s contention that in
imposing the upper term on the stalking count, the trial court
improperly relied on the following three aggravating factors that
were not submitted to the jury: (1) Ruiz’s prior convictions as an
adult or sustained petitions in juvenile delinquency proceedings
are numerous or of increasing seriousness; (2) Ruiz’s prior
performance on probation or parole was unsatisfactory; and
(3) Ruiz has engaged in violent conduct that indicates a serious
danger to society. Each of these factors requires a determination
of more “than the bare fact of a prior conviction and its elements.”
(Wiley, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 1086.)
We also agree with Ruiz’s contention that in imposing the
upper term on the stalking count, the trial court could not rely on
the aggravating factors that the “crime involved a threat of great
bodily injury” or “defendant showed lack of remorse with respect
to count 1 or count 2” because it is not clear from the verdict form
(or otherwise from the record) whether the jury found these
factors to be true as to the stalking count. To impose an upper
term sentence for a felony based on circumstances in aggravation,

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the circumstances in aggravation must relate to that particular
crime. (§ 1170, subd. (b)(2).) The trial court did not instruct the
jury that these aggravating factors applied only to the felony
stalking count and not to the misdemeanor count for violation of
a protective order; nor did the prosecutor make that clear to the
jury.5
We conclude the error was prejudicial. As explained in
Lynch, if we cannot conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that a
jury would have found to be true even one of the aggravating
factors the trial court relied upon in imposing the upper term, we
must remand for resentencing. (Lynch, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p.
768.) We cannot reach that conclusion with respect to the
aggravating factor that Ruiz’s prior convictions are numerous or
of increasing seriousness.
During trial and for purposes of sentencing, Ruiz admitted
a February 2020 conviction for battery causing serious bodily
injury (§ 243, subd. (d)) and a February 2021 conviction for
attempted first degree residential burglary (§§ 459 & 664).
Certified records established these two convictions. The record
does not show any other prior convictions.

5 We disagree with Ruiz’s contention that in imposing the

upper term on the stalking count, the trial court improperly
relied on the jury’s finding that he “committed the crimes in and
around [v]ictim [A.R.’s] and [v]ictim [A.S.’s] homes.” (Italics
added.) While Ruiz is correct that the verdict form does not
specify to which count this finding pertains, it is clear that the
jury made this finding as to both counts. If Ruiz committed a
crime in and around A.R.’s home, as the jury clearly found, that
crime could only have been the stalking count involving A.R. The
record contains no evidence indicating that Ruiz violated a
protective order pertaining to A.S. in or around A.R.’s home.

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Based on the record before us, we cannot conclude beyond a
reasonable doubt that a jury would have found Ruiz’s two prior
convictions to be numerous. (See, e.g., People v. Berry (1981) 117
Cal.App.3d 184, 191 [two prior convictions “cannot be
‘numerous’ ”].) Nor can we conclude beyond a reasonable doubt
that a jury would have found Ruiz’s 2021 conviction for first
degree attempted residential burglary was more serious than his
2020 conviction for battery causing serious bodily injury.6 As
Ruiz points out, the potential punishment for the 2021 crime is
one, two, or three years (§§ 461, subd. (a) & 664, subd. (a)), less
than the potential punishment for the earlier 2020 crime, which
is two, three, or four years (§ 243, subd. (d)). (See Wiley, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 1089 [“As for Wiley’s felony offenses, none is
strikingly more serious than the others, either by reference to the
nature of the offense or the punishment”].) Moreover, a rational
jury could conclude that a crime resulting in serious bodily injury
is more serious than an attempt to enter a residence with the
intent to commit an unidentified felony. The Attorney General
argues that the completed crime of first degree residential
burglary is more serious than battery causing serious bodily
injury. This argument is beside the point as Ruiz was not
convicted of the completed crime.
We need not evaluate prejudice based on any of the other
aggravating factors on which the trial court improperly relied.

6 In his appellate briefing, Ruiz did not ask us to review the

sufficiency of the evidence supporting this aggravating factor.
Rather, he contended that only a jury, and not the trial court,
was permitted to make the factual finding on this factor. In our
now vacated opinion, we rejected the contention based on cases
that the Supreme Court later disapproved in Wiley.

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Under Lynch, one is enough, and we are required to remand the
matter for resentencing.7

D. Fines and Assessments
In his supplemental brief after remand, Ruiz does not ask
us to reconsider our analysis regarding the trial court’s
imposition of fines and assessments, and we conclude we have no
cause to do so. Accordingly, we incorporate herein the discussion
from our now vacated opinion in this appeal.
1. Proceedings below
Regarding fines and assessments, the trial court asked
defense counsel, “Are there any financial issues regarding -- for
the defendant regarding payment of the restitution fine, parole,
and . . . the court security fee, criminal conviction facilities
assessment[?]” The following exchange occurred between defense
counsel and the court:
“[Defense counsel]: . . . I will just make the record, Your
Honor, that my impression -- Mr. Ruiz has been borderline or
actually homeless in the last few years. I know he held out that
he worked, but I’ve never seen any confirmation of that. He’s
represented by the Office of the Public Defender which means
he’s presumptively indigent.
“The Court: Well, that doesn’t mean the defendant couldn’t
earn or have earnings such that he couldn’t pay for a restitution
fine or court security fee or criminal conviction facilities
assessment just because he’s represented by your office.

7 Ruiz requests that we decide whether lack of remorse is a

valid aggravating factor and advise the trial court. We decline,
as it is not clear the prosecution will proceed on this factor at
resentencing.

11
“[Defense counsel]: True. But I also have nothing -- so my
representation to the court would be as I’ve already made it and
that the court has discretion to waive those fines and fees as it
deems appropriate subject to an ability to pay hearing. I’m not
really prepared to go forward on an ability to pay hearing, Your
Honor, but if the court wants to calendar one, happy to do it.”
The trial court proceeded and imposed the following fines
and assessments: the minimum restitution fine of $300 (§ 1202.4,
subd. (b)), which the court stayed;8 a $300 parole revocation fine,
which was stayed unless parole was revoked (§ 1202.45); a $30
court facilities assessment for each of the two convictions, for a
total of $60 (Gov. Code, § 70373); and a $40 court operations
assessment for each of the two convictions, for a total of $80
(§ 1465.8). Accordingly, the total amount due was $140. The
court further commented, “I do think he would have the ability to
pay based upon any earnings he would accrue in state prison.”
2. Analysis
Citing People v. Dueñas (2019) 30 Cal.App.5th 1157
(Dueñas), Ruiz contends in his opening appellate brief that the
trial court “abused its discretion by arbitrarily and irrationally
determining that [he] is able to pay” the fines and assessments
imposed. He states that the court ordered him to pay a $300
restitution fine, plus $140 in assessments. As discussed above,

8 The trial court stated on the record at the sentencing

hearing: “As to the restitution fine, the court’s going to impose
the minimum of $300 -- as to count 1. And I’m going to either
stay or strike it as the law permits.” The court’s September 27,
2022 minute order from the sentencing hearing states that the
court stayed the restitution fine imposed under section 1202.4,
subdivision (b).

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the reporter’s transcript and minute order from the sentencing
hearing reflect that the court stayed the $300 restitution fine.
Regardless, even if the court had ordered him to pay a total of
$440 in fines and assessment, there would be no error here.
In Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th 1157, the Court of Appeal
held “due process of law requires the trial court to conduct an
ability to pay hearing and ascertain a defendant’s present ability
to pay before it imposes court facilities and court operations
assessments under Penal Code section 1465.8 and Government
Code section 70373.” (Id. at p. 1164.) The Dueñas court further
held “the execution of any restitution fine imposed under [Penal
Code section 1202.4] must be stayed unless and until the trial
court holds an ability to pay hearing and concludes that the
defendant has the present ability to pay the restitution fine.”
(Ibid.) We have previously disagreed with Dueñas (People v.
Kingston (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 272, 279-281), and the issue is
currently pending in our Supreme Court. (People v. Kopp (2019)
38 Cal.App.5th 47, review granted Nov. 13, 2019, S257844.)
The facts in Dueñas were unique. The defendant was an
unemployed, homeless mother with cerebral palsy, who lost her
driver’s license because she was unable to pay more than $1,000
assessed against her for three juvenile citations. Thereafter, she
sustained multiple misdemeanor convictions related to driving
with a suspended license, each time receiving a jail term and
having additional fees she could not afford to pay imposed.
(Dueñas, supra, 30 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1160-1162.) Ultimately,
she requested a hearing on her ability to pay the fees, and the
trial court imposed an additional fine and assessments—the
same fine and assessments at issue here. (Id. at pp. 1162-1163.)
In reversing the trial court’s imposition of the assessments and

13
ordering the trial court to stay execution of the restitution fine,
the Court of Appeal pointed out that Dueñas’s current situation
“ ‘doesn’t stem from one case for which she’s not capable of paying
the fines and fees,’ but from a series of criminal proceedings
driven by, and contributing to, Dueñas’s poverty.” (Id. at p.
1164.) The appellate court in Dueñas referenced “the
counterproductive nature of this system and its tendency to
enmesh indigent defendants in a cycle of repeated violations and
escalating debt.” (Id. at p. 1164, fn. 1.)
Even assuming Dueñas was correctly decided and
applicable to the facts of this case, we would reject Ruiz’s
challenge to the minimum restitution fine and assessments. Ruiz
was 26 years old when he was sentenced to prison. A
psychological report he submitted to the trial court with his
sentencing memorandum indicates that as an adult, he worked in
construction, gardening, remodeling hotels, and in a restaurant.
He reported to the psychologist that he last worked in
construction around March 2021, about a year and a half before
he was sentenced. In assessing a defendant’s ability to pay, a
court may consider a defendant’s “past income-earning capacity.”
(See People v. Johnson (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 134, 139.)
Moreover, a court may consider whether a defendant has the
ability to satisfy the fine and assessments through prison wages
and future earnings after release from custody. (People v. Aviles
(2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 1055, 1076.) Given Ruiz’s age and self-
reported work history, there is no reason to believe he will be
unable to earn money at some point in the future to pay the
amount he owes.

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DISPOSITION
The sentence is vacated and the matter is remanded for a
full resentencing consistent with this opinion. In all other
respects, the judgment is affirmed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

BENDIX, Acting P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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