CourtListener 10739953•Pacific Carpets v. 2525 Main Apartment CA4/3
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Filed 11/20/25 Pacific Carpets v. 2525 Main Apartment CA4/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION THREE
PACIFIC CARPETS, LLC,
Plaintiff and Appellant, G064438
v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2022-
01245791)
2525 MAIN APARTMENT, LP, et al.,
OPINION
Defendants and Respondents.
Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
John C. Gastelum, and Richard J. Oberholzer (Retired judge of the Kern
Super. Ct. assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to art. VI, § 6 of the Cal.
Const.), Judges. Affirmed.
Lanak & Hanna and Mac W. Cabal for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Pierce Kavcioglu Espinosa & Cesar, Tyler J. Cesar, Armenak
Kavcioglu, and Aren Kavcioglu for Defendants and Respondents.
* * *
This appeal concerns the application of California’s strict
contractor licensing laws to a subcontractor that changed its business form
during a construction project. Pacific Carpets, Inc. (the Corporation), which is
not a party to the instant appeal, executed a subcontract for certain work and
was a licensed contractor at the time. Plaintiff Pacific Carpets, LLC (the
LLC) then performed the subcontracted work. Defendant 2525 Main
Apartment, LP (2525 Main) paid over $2 million to the LLC for its work.
After a payment dispute arose between the parties, the LLC filed
a complaint against 2525 Main; Panku, Inc.; ASD Capital Management, LP;
and Assured Management, LLC (collectively defendants) to recover
additional compensation. In response, 2525 Main filed a cross-complaint
seeking to disgorge the money it had paid to the LLC. Defendants also filed a
motion for summary judgment, arguing the complaint was barred under
Business and Professions Code section 7031, subdivision (a)1 because the LLC
did not hold a valid contractor’s license for the entire period of its work.
The court granted defendants’ summary judgment motion and
agreed the complaint was barred under section 7031, subdivision (a). The
court also found the LLC did not qualify for any statutory exception and
granted summary adjudication on the cross-complaint’s disgorgement cause
of action, requiring the LLC to return the compensation it had received.
The LLC appeals from a judgment entered after the court’s
summary judgment ruling and raises three arguments on appeal. First, the
LLC contends the license held by the Corporation automatically transferred
to the LLC. Second, assuming a lapse in licensure, the LLC argues there are
1
All further statutory references are to the Business and
Professions Code unless otherwise stated.
2
triable issues of material fact as to whether it satisfied the substantial
compliance exception under section 7031, subdivision (e). Finally, the LLC
claims there are triable issues of material fact as to whether it is protected by
the safe harbor rule under section 7141.5.
We find no merit in the LLC’s arguments and affirm the
judgment.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
I.
THE SUBCONTRACT AGREEMENT
In October 2019, the Corporation entered into a subcontract
agreement with 2525 Main to furnish and install flooring and countertops for
an apartment building (the Project). At the time, the Corporation held a
contractor’s license issued by the California Contractors State License Board
(CSLB).
II.
CORPORATE CONVERSION OF THE LLC’S PREDECESSOR
In December 2020, the Corporation began the process of
converting to a limited liability company by filing a conversion form with the
California Secretary of State. In January 2021, a Delaware limited liability
company was formed. A few days later, a California limited liability company
filed a “Certificate of Conversion” with the California Secretary of State. As a
result, the California limited liability company converted to a Delaware
limited liability company—the LLC in the instant action. The LLC retained
the same federal employer identification number as the Corporation, and
Clint Walker served as the responsible managing officer of both entities.
3
III.
THE LLC’S LICENSE
On February 1, 2021, the LLC began its work on the Project.
About a week later, the LLC’s controller prepared a request for the CSLB to
reissue the Corporation’s license to the LLC. The LLC submitted the request
and related application to the CSLB on March 4, 2021. The CSLB received
the application on March 19, 2021.
In April 2021, the CSLB returned the application for corrections
and informed the LLC that a license number reissuance could only be
approved if the personnel on the Corporation’s license matched those on the
LLC’s application, which was not the case. In May 2021, the CSLB
acknowledged receipt of a revised application and again returned it to the
LLC for further correction. A week later, the CSLB notified the Corporation
that its license would be cancelled in July 2021 because the Corporation had
converted to a different entity.
In June 2021, the CSLB notified the LLC that it might be eligible
for a contractor’s license and instructed the LLC to submit several items,
including a bond, insurance, and fingerprints for a background check. The
CSLB received the requested bond items a few weeks later along with the
insurance documentation and fingerprints in early July 2021.
On July 1, 2021, the Corporation’s license was suspended because
it had no valid worker’s compensation insurance. On July 24, 2021, the
Corporation’s license was cancelled.
On September 16, 2021, the LLC obtained a license from the
CSLB. The LLC continued working on the Project through October 2021.
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IV.
THE LLC’S MECHANIC’S LIEN AND BONDED STOP PAYMENT NOTICE
2525 Main paid over $2 million to the LLC for its work on the
Project. In November 2021, after a payment dispute arose between the
parties, the LLC recorded a mechanic’s lien against the property for
$512,982.04 and served a bonded stop payment notice on the construction
lender.
V.
THE COMPLAINT AND CROSS-COMPLAINT
In February 2022, the LLC filed a complaint against defendants
and the construction lender, which is not a party to the instant appeal,
seeking to be paid over $500,000 for work, labor, and materials it provided for
the Project. The complaint alleged causes of action for: (1) breach of contract;
(2) work, labor, and services/agreed price; (3) open book account; (4) account
stated; (5) foreclosure of mechanic’s lien; and (6) enforcement of bonded stop
payment notice.
In March 2022, 2525 Main filed a cross-complaint, asserting
causes of action for: (1) breach of contract; and (2) recovery of compensation
paid to an unlicensed contractor.
VI.
DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
In January 2023, defendants moved for summary judgment, or in
the alternative, summary adjudication on the complaint and on the cross-
complaint’s second cause of action for disgorgement. Among other things,
they argued the LLC’s complaint was barred under section 7031, subdivision
(a) because the LLC was not licensed at all times during the construction
5
work. They also argued the LLC did not qualify for the substantial
compliance exception under section 7031, subdivision (e).
In opposition, the LLC argued it was licensed at all times during
the Project because it was protected by the 90-day safe harbor rule under
section 7141.5. It alternatively claimed there were triable issues of material
fact as to whether it substantially complied with the licensing laws. Both
parties presented evidence consistent with the facts recited above.
VII.
2525 MAIN’S LAMBERT MOTION
In February 2023, 2525 Main filed a motion pursuant to Lambert
v. Superior Court (1991) 228 Cal.App.3d 383 (Lambert) to remove or reduce
the LLC’s mechanic’s lien and stop payment notice. 2525 Main argued, inter
alia, the mechanic’s lien and stop payment notice were overstated and that
the LLC engaged in bad faith tactics.
VIII.
THE COURT’S ORDERS AND JUDGMENT
In July 2023, the court granted defendants’ summary judgment
motion, holding the complaint was barred under section 7031, subdivision (a)
because the LLC was not properly licensed as a limited liability company
when the construction work began. According to the court, the LLC did not
qualify for protection under the safe harbor rules for license renewals or the
statutory substantial compliance doctrine. The court also granted summary
adjudication on the cross-complaint’s second cause of action for disgorgement
of over $2 million paid to the LLC.
In September 2023, the court granted 2525 Main’s Lambert
motion and released the mechanic’s lien as well as the stop payment notice.
The court explained it had already determined, on the summary judgment
6
motion, that the LLC was precluded from recovery under section 7031,
subdivision (a).
The court entered judgment for defendants in April 2024 and
awarded $2,344,868.53 to 2525 Main for disgorgement under section 7031,
subdivision (b). The LLC filed a timely notice of appeal from the judgment.
DISCUSSION
The LLC contends the court erred by granting summary
judgment because (1) the Corporation’s license automatically vested in the
LLC; (2) even if a lapse of licensure occurred, the LLC qualifies for the
substantial compliance exception under section 7031, subdivision (e); and
(3) the LLC is protected by the safe harbor rule under section 7141.5.2 We
disagree with the LLC’s contentions.
I.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
An appellate court reviews a grant of summary judgment de
novo, “considering all the evidence set forth in the moving and opposition
papers except that to which objections have been made and sustained.” (Guz
v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334.) “[W]e [accordingly]
assume the role of a trial court and apply the same rules and standards
which govern a trial court’s determination of a motion for summary
judgment.” (Zavala v. Arce (1997) 58 Cal.App.4th 915, 925.) The motion shall
be granted if “all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as
to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a
matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) “There is a triable issue of
2
The court’s ruling on the Lambert motion is the subject of a
separate appeal.
7
material fact if, and only if, the evidence would allow a reasonable trier of
fact to find the underlying fact in favor of the party opposing the motion in
accordance with the applicable standard of proof.” (Aguilar v. Atlantic
Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850.)
II.
APPLICABLE LAW
Section 7031 is part of the Contractors State License Law (CSLL;
§ 7000 et seq.) which “imposes strict and harsh penalties for a contractor’s
failure to maintain proper licensure.” (MW Erectors, Inc. v. Niederhauser
Ornamental & Metal Works Co., Inc. (2005) 36 Cal.4th 412, 418 (MW
Erectors).) Under section 7031, subdivision (a), a contractor who was not
“duly licensed . . . at all times during the performance of” its contracting work
cannot bring an action to collect compensation for any of its work, including
work performed while licensed. (Italics added; see also Judicial Council of
California v. Jacobs Facilities, Inc. (2015) 239 Cal.App.4th 882, 896 (Jacobs).)
A person using an unlicensed contractor’s services also may bring an action to
disgorge all compensation paid to the unlicensed contractor for the entire
project. (§ 7031, subd. (b).) If the fact of licensure is controverted, the burden
rests on the licensee to prove proper licensure by producing a verified
certificate of licensure from the CSLB establishing it was licensed at all times
during performance of the contract. (Id., subd. (d).)
In the event of a violation of the CSLL, a contractor can retain
compensation only if it complies with section 7031, subdivision (e)—the
substantial compliance exception. The exception requires proof of substantial
compliance with licensure requirements. (§ 7031, subd. (e).)
“The obvious statutory intent [of section 7031] is to discourage
persons who have failed to comply with the licensing law from offering or
8
providing their unlicensed services for pay.” (Hydrotech Systems, Ltd. v.
Oasis Waterpark (1991) 52 Cal.3d 988, 995.) “Because of the strength and
clarity of this policy, it is well settled that section 7031 applies despite
injustice to the unlicensed contractor. ‘Section 7031 represents a legislative
determination that the importance of deterring unlicensed persons from
engaging in the contracting business outweighs any harshness between the
parties . . . .’” (Ibid.) The result is “a stiff all-or-nothing penalty for unlicensed
work” (MW Erectors, supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 426), and the statute itself
specifies that it applies “regardless of the merits of the cause of action
brought by” the plaintiff (§ 7031, subd. (a)).
III.
LICENSURE DURING A BUSINESS CONVERSION
Here, the LLC worked on the Project from February 2021 to
October 2021, and it received a license from the CSLB in September 2021.
Despite the delay in licensure, the LLC argues it can rely on the license held
by the Corporation because the LLC and the Corporation are the same entity.
In the LLC’s view, the Corporation merely converted to a limited liability
company so it remained the same legal entity for licensure purposes. Citing
Corporations Code section 1158, which the LLC did not raise at summary
judgment, the LLC maintains all property, including any contractor’s
licenses, vested in the LLC when the California limited liability company
filed a certificate of conversion. (See Corp. Code, § 1158, subd. (b)(1) [upon
conversion, all rights and property of a converting entity vest in the
converted entity].) The LLC further relies on E.J. Franks Construction, Inc. v.
Sahota (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1123 (Franks) to argue that section 7031 does
not apply when an entity undergoes a business conversion.
9
Defendants disagree, asserting the Corporation’s license did not
carry over to the LLC. In their view, a CSLB license is not transferrable
property under Corporations Code section 1158, and the LLC was required to
obtain a new license. Even assuming a CSLB license is transferable,
defendants argue the LLC could not count on the Corporation’s license
because the LLC did not provide a $100,000 bond pursuant to section
7071.6.5. Relying on Jacobs, supra, 239 Cal.App.4th 882, which the trial
court found persuasive, defendants also contend an entity still has to comply
with the CSLL during a corporate reorganization.
We first turn to the two cases central to the parties’ arguments:
Franks, which the LLC contends is controlling, and Jacobs, which defendants
and the trial court referenced. In Franks, the court affirmed a judgment
awarding damages to a contractor whose business converted from a sole
proprietorship to a corporation during construction. (Franks, supra, 226
Cal.App.4th at pp. 1129, 1131.) The court held section 7031 did not bar
recovery because the contractor was properly licensed at all times—first as a
sole proprietor and later as a corporation after the same license was reissued
to the corporation. (Id. at pp. 1128–1129.) The licensed sole proprietor started
the work, and the corporation “merely continued the work” once it was
licensed. (Id. at p. 1130.) The court distinguished cases involving unlicensed
contractors or lapses in licensure, emphasizing that section 7031 is not
intended to deter licensed contractors from lawfully changing their business
structures. (Id. at p. 1129.)
In Jacobs, a licensed corporate subsidiary began work on a
project, but during the work, its parent company transferred employees to a
different subsidiary without the counterparty’s consent. (Jacobs, 239
Cal.App.4th at pp. 889, 902.) The parent company allowed the original
10
subsidiary’s license to lapse while the new subsidiary obtained its own
contractor’s license. (Id. at p. 889.) Despite the lapse of license, the original
(now unlicensed) subsidiary remained the contracting party. (Ibid.) Given
these facts, the court held the original subsidiary violated the CSLL and
remanded for a substantial compliance hearing pursuant to section 7031,
subdivision (e). (Ibid.) In reaching this conclusion, the court distinguished
Franks: “Unlike the hand off of both license and business form that occurred
in Franks, Jacobs maintained two separate business entities and two licenses
for a significant period of time. The continuity of license and business entity
that was central to the rationale of Franks was not present here.” (Id. at
p. 899.) The court acknowledged section 7031 likely was not intended to
penalize business form changes, but it found no statutory basis to excuse
violations of the CSLL arising from such changes. (Id. at p. 898.)
Here, the instant action does not fall squarely within the factual
frameworks of either Franks or Jacobs. Unlike Jacobs, two distinct entities
did not work on the Project. And unlike Franks, there was no seamless
transfer of the contractor’s license from one entity to another. Instead, the
LLC alone worked on the Project from the start and received its contractor’s
license near the end of that work in September 2021. The Corporation’s
license was never reissued to the LLC. Indeed, the CLSB informed the LLC
that a license number reissuance was not possible because the personnel on
the Corporation’s license did not match the personnel on the LLC’s
application.
Even assuming, arguendo, a transfer of license occurred under
the logic in Franks or under Corporations Code section 1158, the undisputed
evidence shows neither the LLC nor the Corporation held a valid contractor’s
license between July 1, 2021, and September 16, 2021. This lapse, though
11
temporary, is dispositive. Even a brief interruption in licensure bars a
contractor from recovering compensation for his or her work. (MW Erectors,
supra, 36 Cal.4th at p. 426 [noting the “Legislature’s obvious intent to impose
a stiff all-or-nothing penalty” barring “all recovery . . . if unlicensed at any
time”]; Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs, Inc. (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 656,
667–672.)
Because the LLC worked on the Project during an unlicensed
period, it violated the CSLL. (§ 7028, subd. (a)(1).) To avoid the mandatory
forfeiture of its compensation, the LLC must satisfy the terms of section
7031, subdivision (e) as discussed below.
IV.
SUBSTANTIAL COMPLIANCE EXCEPTION
Despite the time gap between the expiration of the Corporation’s
license in July 2021 and the issuance of the LLC’s license in September 2021,
the LLC argues it qualifies for the substantial compliance exception. To the
contrary, there are no triable issues concerning substantial compliance.
A. Applicable Law
As noted ante, section 7031, subdivision (e) permits a contractor
to retain compensation if there is substantial compliance with the licensure
requirements. The statute provides: “[T]he court may determine that there
has been substantial compliance with licensure requirements under this
section if it is shown at an evidentiary hearing that the person who engaged
in the business or acted in the capacity of a contractor (1) had been duly
licensed as a contractor in this state prior to the performance of the act or
contract, (2) acted reasonably and in good faith to maintain proper licensure,
12
and (3) acted promptly and in good faith to remedy the failure to comply with
the licensure requirements upon learning of the failure.” (§ 7031, subd. (e).)
B. Analysis
The trial court focused on the first element of the substantial
compliance exception, but we may affirm on any ground asserted in the trial
court. (Grebing v. 24 Hour Fitness USA, Inc. (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 631,
637.) Assuming, without deciding, the LLC was licensed at the start of the
Project via the Corporation’s license, there is no triable issue of material fact
on the second element: whether the LLC “acted reasonably and in good faith
to maintain proper licensure.” (§ 7031, subd. (e).) The substantial compliance
exception “is ‘extremely narrow’ and applies ‘only where a contractor was
without a license owing to circumstances truly beyond his control.’” (Pacific
Caisson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros., Inc. (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 1246,
1257.) Here, the exception does not apply because the evidence establishes
that delays in submitting a license application and maintaining continuous
licensure were within the LLC’s control.
It is undisputed the business conversion process began in
December 2020, but the CSLB did not receive the LLC’s license application
until March 19, 2021. The LLC claims it initiated the licensing process in
February 2021 when it prepared a request for license number reissuance.
Even so, the LLC waited nearly a month after its January 11, 2021 formation
to submit a request for license number reissuance. There also is no evidence
that the LLC contacted the CSLB to ensure a proper transition of licensure or
that it sought pre-approval or advice from the CSLB to preserve licensure
continuity.
Relying on statutory “grace periods” afforded to contractors in
other contexts, the LLC emphasizes it submitted its application for licensure
13
within 90 days of conversion and thereafter worked with the CSLB to correct
its application. But those 90-day provisions address different circumstances,
not the loss of licensure resulting from a business conversion. (§§ 7076 [notice
or request for license continuance required within 90 days after a death,
disassociation, dissolution, or merger], 7083 [licensee must notify registrar of
changes in recorded information, including business address, personnel, or
business name, within 90 days], 7141.5 [retroactive renewal of license if
licensee submits renewal application and pays required fees within 90 days of
license expiration].)
Broader licensing issues also undercut any claim of good faith or
diligence. Section 7071.6.5, subdivision (a) provides: “[A]s a condition
precedent to the issuance, reissuance, reinstatement, reactivation, renewal,
or continued valid use of a limited liability company license, . . . the applicant
or licensee [must] file or have on file a surety bond in the sum of one hundred
thousand dollars ($100,000).” The CSLB received the LLC’s bond in June
2021, over four months after the LLC commenced work on the Project. The
Corporation’s license also was suspended on July 1, 2021 for failure to
maintain valid worker’s compensation insurance, but the LLC continued to
work on the Project without any license in effect.3 These facts demonstrate
the Corporation and the LLC’s failure to appreciate the consequences of a
change in business forms. The resulting missteps were not “‘truly beyond [the
LLC’s] control.’” (Pacific Caisson & Shoring, Inc. v. Bernards Bros., Inc.,
supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 1257.)
3
The LLC’s worker’s compensation insurance was effective
December 2020.
14
The LLC attributes the delay in receiving its own license to the
COVID-19 pandemic. The record does not support that contention. A CSLB
representative generally agreed the COVID-19 pandemic impacted the
CSLB’s processing of applications, but he had no specific knowledge about the
processing of the LLC’s application. He also did not dispute the processing of
the LLC’s license was unaffected by general staffing shortages. The
representative further testified each application was unique and could take a
few weeks to a few months to process. The CSLB’s handling of the LLC’s
application fell within that range. It received the LLC’s application around
two weeks after it was submitted, returned the initial submission for
correction about a month after receipt, acknowledged a revised version in
May 2021, requested additional materials by June 2021, received the
requested materials by July 2021, and issued the LLC’s license in September
2021. These ordinary response times undercut any claim that COVID-related
delays were responsible for the gap in licensure.
The CSLB representative also noted fingerprint processing at the
Department of Justice (DOJ) was sometimes delayed. But he did not testify
that such delays affected the LLC’s application, and there is no evidence that
COVID-related DOJ processing times contributed to the gap in licensure. The
LLC relies on the declaration of its controller who lacked personal knowledge
to testify about DOJ processing times or their causes. (Bozzi v. Nordstrom,
Inc. (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 755, 761 [declarations in summary judgment
must be based on personal knowledge].)
C. Writ of Attachment Ruling
The LLC next contends the trial court should not have ruled on
the summary judgment motion because it already had determined the LLC
substantially complied with licensure requirements when it denied 2525
15
Main’s prior application for a writ of attachment. Not so. A ruling on a
prejudgment attachment is a provisional determination based on “probable
validity,” not a final adjudication on the merits. (Code Civ. Proc., § 484.090,
subd. (a)(2).) And Code of Civil Procedure section 484.100 makes clear that
determinations under the writ of attachment chapter “shall have no effect on
the determination of any issues in the action other than issues relevant to
proceedings under this chapter” and “shall not be given in evidence nor
referred to at the trial of any such action.” In other words, the court’s prior
ruling did not establish substantial compliance as a matter of law or preclude
the court from reaching a different conclusion on a more complete summary
judgment record.
D. Evidentiary Hearing
The LLC further notes it requested an evidentiary hearing at the
summary judgment hearing and argues the court erred by not granting its
request before issuing the summary judgment ruling. (§ 7031, subd. (e) [a
“court may determine . . . there has been substantial compliance . . . if it is
shown at an evidentiary hearing . . . .”].) We are not persuaded. The statute
does not guarantee an evidentiary hearing where, as here, the undisputed
facts show the substantial compliance exception cannot be met. (Code Civ.
Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); see Opp v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. (2007) 154
Cal.App.4th 71, 76–79 [substantial compliance decided in summary judgment
context]; Alatriste v. Cesar’s Exterior Designs, Inc., supra, 183 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 669–672 [substantial compliance decided in summary adjudication
context].)
For the foregoing reasons, the LLC cannot establish the
substantial compliance exception. While we recognize the result may appear
harsh given the LLC’s work on the Project, courts may not resort to equitable
16
considerations to soften the statute’s effect. (Panterra GP, Inc. v. Superior
Court of Kern County (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 707 [“equitable theories
cannot overcome a failure to have a proper license”]; MW Erectors, supra, 36
Cal.4th at p. 424 [“[s]ection 7031[, subdivision ](a) will be applied, regardless
of equitable considerations, even when the person for whom the work was
performed has taken calculated advantage of the contractor’s lack of
licensure”].) The trial court therefore correctly concluded the exception did
not apply.
V.
SAFE HARBOR
The LLC alternatively argues there are triable issues of material
fact as to whether it is protected by the safe harbor rule under section 7141.5.
We disagree.
Section 7141.5 provides: “The registrar shall grant the retroactive
renewal of a license if, within 90 days of the expiration of the license, the
otherwise eligible licensee submits a completed application for renewal on a
form prescribed by the registrar, and pays the appropriate renewal fee and
delinquency fee prescribed by this chapter. For the purposes of this section,
an application shall be deemed submitted if it is delivered to the board’s
headquarters or postmarked within 90 days of the expiration of the license.”
By its plain terms, the statute applies only when a contractor
seeks to renew an existing license that has expired. It does not authorize the
issuance of a new license or excuse a lapse in licensure due to a change in
business form. Here, the LLC did not submit an application for renewal or
seek to renew an expired license. Instead, the LLC requested the
Corporation’s license be reissued to it and subsequently requested its own
17
license based on feedback from the CSLB. Section 7141.5 therefore has no
application to the instant matter.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. Defendants shall recover their costs
incurred on appeal.
SANCHEZ, J.
WE CONCUR:
MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.
MOORE, J.
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