People v. Eagan CA2/7

CourtListener 10739952CalctappNov 20, 2025

Full text

Filed 11/20/25 P. v. Eagan CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has
not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION SEVEN

THE PEOPLE, B338715

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA338308)
v.

ANTHONY EAGAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a postjudgment order of the Superior Court
of Los Angeles County, Renee F. Korn, Judge. Affirmed.
A. William Bartz, Jr., under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Colleen M. Tiedemann and Stacy S.
Schwartz, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and
Respondent.
INTRODUCTION

Anthony Eagan was convicted of first degree murder under
a provocative act theory in 2012. He appeals the summary denial
of his second resentencing petition under Penal Code
section 1172.6,1 and he argues the superior court erred by failing
to consider the record of conviction or follow the statutory
procedures of section 1172.6. We affirm because the record of
conviction demonstrates Eagan is ineligible for relief as a matter
of law.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

A. Conviction and Sentence
In 2006, Eagan, Tyrone McDougal, and an unidentified
third man attempted to rob Sharon Cole at gunpoint in her
home.2 Cole called out for her son, Ajani Campbell, who was in
the home, and Campbell brought his firearm to defend Cole.
Eagan fired his gun at Campbell, and Campbell fired back,
hitting McDougal, who died from his wounds.
In 2010, Eagan was charged with murder (§ 187, subd. (a);
count 1), attempted home invasion robbery (§§ 664, 211; count 2),

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2 We provide factual context from the prior appellate opinion
affirming Eagan’s convictions on direct appeal. (See People v.
Eagan (Dec. 30, 2013, B240663) [nonpub. opn.].) “These facts are
‘for background purposes and to provide context for the parties’
arguments.’ [Citation.] We do not rely on these facts to review
the trial court’s determination for [Eagan’s] prima facie showing.”
(People v. Rushing (2025) 109 Cal.App.5th 1025, 1028, fn. 2.)

2
first degree burglary (§ 459; count 3), two counts of assault with a
semiautomatic firearm (§ 245, subd. (b); counts 4 and 5), and
possession of a firearm by a felon (§ 12021, subd. (a)(1); count 6).
The information alleged that Eagan committed the murder
during an attempted robbery and burglary (§ 190.2, subd. (a)(17),
as to count 1); that he personally used a firearm (§ 12022.53,
subds. (b), (c), as to counts 1 and 2; §§ 1203.06, subd. (a)(1),
12022.5, subd. (a), as to count 3; §§ 667.5, subd. (c), 1192.7,
subd. (c), 12022.5, as to counts 4 and 5); that he personally and
intentionally discharged a firearm (§§ 12022.53, subd. (c), as to
counts 1 and 2); that a person, other than an accomplice, was
present in the residence during the burglary (§ 667.5, subd. (c), as
to count 3); and that Eagan voluntarily acted in concert in
committing the attempted robbery (§ 213, subd. (a)(1)(A)), as to
count 2).
As relevant here, the jury was instructed on the
provocative act doctrine of murder as follows:3

To prove that the defendant is guilty of murder under
the provocative act doctrine, the People must prove
that:
1. In committing residential burglary, the defendant
intentionally did a provocative act;
2. The defendant knew that the natural and probable
consequences of the provocative act were dangerous
to human life and then acted with conscious
disregard for life;

3 We previously granted the People’s request for judicial
notice of the appellate record in Eagan’s direct appeal, which
contains the jury instructions from Eagan’s trial.

3
3. In response to the defendant’s provocative act,
Campbell killed McDougal AND
4. McDougal’s death was the natural and probable
consequence of the defendant’s provocative act.

The jury convicted Eagan on all counts, found counts 1
through 3 to be offenses in the first degree, and found all special
allegations true. Eagan received an aggregate sentence of life in
prison without the possibility of parole, plus 115 years six
months. This court affirmed Eagan’s conviction and sentence on
direct appeal. (People v. Eagan, supra, B240663.)

B. Section 1172.6 Resentencing Petitions
In 2019, Eagan filed a petition through counsel for
resentencing under former section 1170.95, now section 1172.6,
alleging he could not presently be convicted of murder because of
changes to the Penal Code made by Senate Bill No. 1437.4 After
briefing and a hearing, the superior court denied the petition
without issuing an order to show cause, reasoning that Eagan
was not “convicted on a felony murder theory or murder under a
natural and probable consequences theory” and therefore his
“murder conviction does not fall within the classifications
designated as eligible in . . . section 1170.95(a).” This court
affirmed the denial of Eagan’s petition. (People v. Eagan (Oct. 21,
2021, B306104) [nonpub. opn.].)
In 2024, Eagan filed a second section 1172.6 petition in
propria persona. The superior court summarily denied this

4 We also granted the People’s request for judicial notice of
the appellate record in Eagan’s appeal from the denial of his first
section 1172.6 petition.

4
petition without appointing counsel or holding a hearing. The
court reviewed its finding on Eagan’s first petition that Eagan
“was convicted of murder under the Provocative Act Doctrine” for
shooting at Campbell during the burglary and causing Campbell
to kill McDougal. The court also stated that Eagan’s conviction
was previously affirmed on direct appeal on the grounds that “the
evidence was sufficient to support the jury’s finding that Eagan’s
shooting at Campbell was a provocative act ‘evidencing malice’
that caused Campbell to respond with lethal force.”
The court noted that, through Senate Bill No. 775, the
Legislature amended section 1172.6 in 2022 to allow resentencing
relief for those convicted of murder under “any theory under
which malice is imputed to a person based solely on that person’s
participation in a crime.” But it observed that “[b]oth before and
after [Senate Bill No.] 775, the law of provocative act murder
required that the defendant personally harbor malice.” The court
also identified “a split in authority as to whether [Senate Bill
No.] 775 includes provocative act murder,” and this issue was
pending review in the California Supreme Court. Given that
Eagan had “previously litigated” a section 1172.6 petition, and
the subsequent petition “raise[d] no new issues for this court to
consider,” the court denied the petition.
Eagan timely appealed.

DISCUSSION

A. Section 1172.6 Resentencing and Standard of Review
In 2018, the Legislature amended the law of murder
through Senate Bill No. 1437 to provide that “malice . . . may no
longer be imputed to a defendant solely because the defendant

5
participated in another crime.” (People v. Patton (2025)
17 Cal.5th 549, 558 (Patton).) To this end, Senate Bill No. 1437
“eliminate[d] the natural and probable consequences doctrine for
first degree and second degree murder” and “heighten[ed] the
requirements for felony murder.” (People v. Hin (2025)
17 Cal.5th 401, 440.) Senate Bill No. 1437 also added former
section 1170.95, now section 1172.6, to the Penal Code, “creating
a procedural mechanism for those previously convicted of murder
under a theory amended in the bill to petition for resentencing.”
(People v. Emanuel (2025) 17 Cal.5th 867, 880 (Emanuel).) In
2021, as relevant here, Senate Bill No. 775 expanded
section 1172.6 resentencing relief “to persons convicted of murder
pursuant to a ‘theory under which malice is imputed to a person
based solely on that person’s participation in a crime.’” (People v.
Antonelli (2025) 17 Cal.5th 719, 724 (Antonelli).)
Under section 1172.6, “[t]he process begins with the filing
of a petition that declares, among other things, that ‘[t]he
petitioner could not presently be convicted of murder . . . because
of changes to [s]ection 188 or 189 made effective January 1, 2019,’
the effective date of Senate Bill No. 1437.” (Emanuel, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 880.) The petition should also indicate whether
the petitioner requests appointment of counsel. (See Patton,
supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 559.) A facially sufficient petition entitles
the petitioner to counsel, and it “triggers the People’s duty to
submit a response and the petitioner’s right to submit a reply on
the question of whether a prima facie case for relief exists.”
(Ibid.; see § 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c).)
“‘When the trial court receives a petition containing the
necessary declaration and other required information,’” the court
must evaluate the petition and hold a hearing ““to determine

6
whether the petitioner has made a prima facie case for relief.”’”
(People v. Arellano (2024) 16 Cal.5th 457, 468; see § 1172.6,
subd. (c).) This prima facie inquiry is “‘limited’” and aimed at
“‘distinguish[ing] petitions with potential merit from those that
are clearly meritless.’” (Patton, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 562-563.)
At the prima facie stage, the court may consult “‘[t]he record of
conviction’” but must not “‘engage in “factfinding involving the
weighing of evidence or the exercise of discretion.”’” (Id. at
p. 563.) Rather, the court should take “‘“‘petitioner’s factual
allegations as true and make[] a preliminary assessment
regarding whether the petitioner would be entitled to relief if
[those] factual allegations were proved.’”’” (Ibid.) The court also
“‘“should not reject the petitioner’s factual allegations on
credibility grounds without first conducting an evidentiary
hearing,”’” unless “‘“the record, including the court’s own
documents, ‘contain[s] facts refuting the allegations made in the
petition[;]’”’” if so, “‘“‘the court is justified in making a credibility
determination adverse to the petitioner.’”’” (Ibid.)
“If the trial court determines that the petitioner has made a
prima facie case for relief, it ‘shall issue an order to show cause.’
(§ 1172.6, subd. (c).) At the evidentiary hearing that follows, ‘the
burden of proof shall be on the prosecution to prove, beyond a
reasonable doubt, that the petitioner is guilty of murder’ under
state law as amended by [Senate Bill No. 1437.] (§ 1172.6,
subd. (d)(3).) ‘If the prosecution fails to sustain its burden of
proof, the prior conviction, and any allegations and
enhancements attached to the conviction, shall be vacated and
the petitioner shall be resentenced on the remaining charges.’”
(Emanuel, supra, 17 Cal.5th at p. 880.)

7
The denial of a section 1172.6 petition without an
evidentiary hearing is proper “‘only if “the petition and record in
the case establish conclusively that the defendant is ineligible for
relief” as a matter of law.’” (People v. Hickman (2025)
110 Cal.App.5th 1262, 1268.) We review such a denial de novo.
(See People v. Love (2025) 107 Cal.App.5th 1280, 1287; accord,
Hickman, at p. 1268.)

B. Provocative Act Doctrine of Murder
“A conviction for murder requires the commission of an act
that causes death, done with the mental state of malice
aforethought (malice).” (People v. Gonzalez (2012) 54 Cal.4th
643, 653 (Gonzalez), superseded by statute on other grounds as
stated in People v. Wilson (2023) 14 Cal.5th 839, 868-869.) “To
satisfy the actus reus element of murder, an act of either the
defendant or an accomplice must be the proximate cause of
death” (People v. Concha (2009) 47 Cal.4th 653, 660 (Concha)),
“set[ting] in motion a chain of events that produces as a direct,
natural and probable consequence of the act . . . the death of [the
decedent] and without which the death would not occur”
(People v. Cervantes (2001) 26 Cal.4th 860, 866-867 (Cervantes)).
“To satisfy the mens rea element of murder, the defendant must
personally act with malice aforethought” (Concha, at p. 660), i.e.,
intending to kill (express malice) or performing an act dangerous
to human life, “‘know[ing] that his conduct endangers the life of
another and . . . act[ing] with conscious disregard for life’”
(implied malice). (People v. Soto (2018) 4 Cal.5th 968, 974.)
The provocative act doctrine permits liability for murder
where a defendant or an accomplice does not personally kill, but
they “cause a third party to kill in response to their life-

8
threatening provocative acts.” (Cervantes, supra, 26 Cal.4th at
p. 867.) “The provocative act murder doctrine has traditionally
been invoked in cases in which the perpetrator of the underlying
crime instigates a gun battle, either by firing first or by otherwise
engaging in severe, life-threatening, and usually gun-wielding
conduct, and the police, or a victim of the underlying crime,
responds with privileged lethal force by shooting back and killing
the perpetrator’s accomplice or an innocent bystander.” (Ibid.)
“Under the provocative act doctrine, when the perpetrator of a
crime maliciously commits an act that is likely to result in death,
and the victim kills in reasonable response to that act, the
perpetrator is guilty of murder.” (Gonzalez, supra, 54 Cal.4th at
p. 655.) “Malice will be implied if the defendant commits a
provocative act knowing that this conduct endangers human life
and acts with conscious disregard of the danger.” (Ibid.)

C. Eagan Is Ineligible for Section 1172.6 Relief as a Matter of
Law, and Any Procedural Error Was Harmless
Eagan does not argue that he made a prima facie showing
under section 1172.6. Instead, he contends the superior court
procedurally erred by failing to appoint counsel, hold a hearing,
or consider the jury instructions. While we agree the superior
court procedurally erred, any error was harmless because the
record conclusively demonstrates Eagan is ineligible for relief as
a matter of law.
After the superior court denied Eagan’s second
resentencing petition, the California Supreme Court decided
Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th 719. Antonelli concluded that a
petitioner convicted of murder under the provocative act doctrine
may be eligible for section 1172.6 relief if he was convicted before

9
November 2009, when the high court decided Concha, supra,
47 Cal.4th 653. (See Antonelli, at p. 731.) Antonelli participated
in a home invasion robbery with two accomplices; Antonelli’s first
accomplice assaulted and threatened the victims, causing a
victim to fight back and kill the second accomplice. (See id. at
p. 723.) The California Supreme Court held that “under the
governing law at the time of defendant’s murder conviction in
1991, the provocative act murder doctrine did not require proof
that defendant personally harbored malice. In other words, ‘[t]he
defendant could be a non-provocateur who did not personally act
with malice, so long as a provocateur accomplice did.’” (Id. at
p. 728.) At that time, the “case law on provocative act murder
‘imposed culpability on all perpetrators of the underlying crime
so long as the provocateur acted with malice, and did so in
furtherance of the common criminal design.’” (Id. at p. 730.)
Antonelli noted “it was not until our November 2009
decision in Concha, supra, 47 Cal.4th 653 . . . that we ‘separated
out the mens rea of individual defendants in provocative act
murder cases’ and made clear that a defendant must personally
harbor malice to be convicted of provocative act murder.”
(Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 728-729.) “Because, under
previous precedent, a jury could have imputed malice to a
nonprovocateur defendant” like Antonelli, Antonelli was not
barred from seeking section 1172.6 relief. (Id. at p. 731.)
As stated, under Antonelli, a petitioner convicted of
provocative act murder may be eligible for section 1172.6 relief
only if convicted before the November 2009 Concha decision.
(Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 728-729.) Eagan is ineligible
for resentencing relief as a matter of law because he was tried
and convicted for provocative act murder in 2012, after Concha

10
established the personal malice requirement. “Thus, the theory
under which he was convicted—post-Concha provocative act
murder—remains valid. Therefore, [Eagan] is ineligible for relief
under section 1172.6 as a matter of law, and he was not entitled
to an evidentiary hearing.” (People v. Venancio (2025)
114 Cal.App.5th 593, 611.)
The jury instructions given at Eagan’s trial further confirm
he was convicted on the basis of his personal malice, not imputed
malice. As described, the jury was instructed that to find Eagan
guilty of murder, it must determine that “the defendant
intentionally did a provocative act” and “[t]he defendant knew
that the natural and probable consequences of the provocative act
were dangerous to human life and then acted with conscious
disregard for life.” These instructions required the jury to find
that Eagan personally acted with implied malice. (See Gonzalez,
supra, 54 Cal.4th at p. 655 [“Malice will be implied if the
defendant commits a provocative act knowing that this conduct
endangers human life and acts with conscious disregard of the
danger.”].)
Eagan argues that, in denying his petition, the superior
court erroneously failed to consider the jury instructions from his
trial “to determine whether there was any theory of liability
affected by [Senate Bill No.] 1437.” (See Antonelli, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 731 [“In assessing section 1172.6 petitions from
individuals convicted following jury trials, the jury instructions
will be critical.”].) Eagan asserts there is “no indication in the
record that the trial court reviewed any documents in the ‘record
of conviction.’” Citing People v. Gallardo (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th
296 (Gallardo), Eagan argues that this court should not review
the record of conviction, including the jury instructions, in the

11
first instance and should instead remand to the superior court.
(See id. at pp. 302-303 [concluding the superior court “failed to
adequately conduct the proceedings required by section 1172.6,”
and declining to take judicial notice of the record of conviction or
“determine [petitioner’s] eligibility for relief in the first
instance”].)
Gallardo is distinguishable from this case. Here, the same
superior court judge considered the record of conviction
(including the jury instructions) pursuant to Eagan’s first
section 1172.6 petition. When Eagan filed a subsequent
section 1172.6 petition, the superior court reviewed the earlier
resentencing proceedings, including its determination that
“[p]etitioner was convicted of murder under the Provocative Act
Doctrine.” The court noted a change in the law under Senate Bill
No. 775 and a “split in authority as to whether [Senate Bill
No.] 775 includes provocative act murder,” but the court
concluded “the law of provocative act murder require[s] that the
defendant personally harbor malice.” The court denied the
petition, determining that Eagan’s subsequent petition “raise[d]
no new issues for this court to consider” that were not “previously
litigated.” Because the superior court previously reviewed the
record of conviction and incorporated its findings into the denial
of the present petition, our review of the record of conviction in
this appeal does not “‘substitute our judgment for the judgment of
the trial court’” (Gallardo, supra, 105 Cal.App.5th at p. 303), and
we decline to remand under these circumstances.
Eagan further contends that the summary denial of his
petition without appointment of counsel, briefing, or a hearing
violated his state and federal rights to due process. In People v.
Lewis (2021) 11 Cal.5th 952 (Lewis), however, the California

12
Supreme Court explained that at the prima facie stage of
resentencing, there is no constitutional right to counsel. (Id. at
pp. 972-973.) Instead, the failure to appoint counsel at the prima
facie stage is “state law error only” and reviewable for harmless
error under People v. Watson (1956) 46 Cal.2d 818 (Watson). (See
Lewis, at p. 973.) Similarly, the failure to order briefing or hold a
prima facie review hearing does not violate the state or federal
constitutions. (See People v. Hurtado (2023) 89 Cal.App.5th 887,
891-892 (Hurtado); People v. Farfan (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 942,
956 (Farfan).)
Here, while we agree with Eagan that the superior court
erred under state law by failing to appoint counsel, set a briefing
schedule, or hold a prima facie review hearing as required by
section 1172.6 (see § 1172.6, subds. (b)(3), (c)), Eagan has not met
his burden under Watson to demonstrate “‘a reasonable
probability that in the absence of the error[s] he . . . would have
obtained a more favorable result,’” i.e., that his “‘“petition would
not have been summarily denied without an evidentiary
hearing.”’” (Lewis, supra, 11 Cal.5th at p. 974.) As stated, Eagan
is ineligible for relief as a matter of law because he was convicted
of provocative act murder after the 2009 Concha decision. (See
Antonelli, supra, 17 Cal.5th at pp. 730-731.) For this reason, any
procedural errors were harmless under Watson. (See Hurtado,
supra, 89 Cal.App.5th at p. 893 [because petitioner was ineligible
for relief as a matter of law, “‘there is no reasonable probability
[petitioner] would have obtained a more favorable result if
counsel had been appointed and given the opportunity to file a
memorandum supporting the petition’”]; accord, People v.
Beaudreaux (2024) 100 Cal.App.5th 1227, 1239; Farfan, supra,
71 Cal.App.5th at p. 956.)

13
DISPOSITION

The superior court’s order denying the section 1172.6
petition is affirmed.

MARTINEZ, P. J.

We concur:

SEGAL, J.

STONE, J.

14

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.