CourtListener 10739948•People v. Noyes CA3
Full text
Filed 11/20/25 P. v. Noyes CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication
or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(Shasta)
----
THE PEOPLE,
Plaintiff and Respondent, C101672
v. (Super. Ct. No. 20F6557)
JAMES JOSHUA NOYES,
Defendant and Appellant.
A jury convicted defendant James Joshua Noyes of first degree murder and
evading a pursuing officer. Defendant admitted a prior strike conviction. The trial court
found that defendant discharged a firearm causing death, and that he committed each
offense while released on bail or his own recognizance in two other cases. Defendant
previously had pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm and ammunition.
The trial court sentenced defendant to state prison for an indeterminate term of 75 years
to life consecutive to a determinate term of 17 years.1
1 A portion of the determinate term was imposed in connection with two other cases that
are not part of this appeal.
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Defendant claims his murder conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor
misstated the law during closing argument. The claim is forfeited because defendant did
not object to the challenged comments or request a curative admonition from the trial
court. Anticipating this conclusion, defendant asserts his trial counsel provided
ineffective assistance. Because defendant has not carried his appellate burden of
demonstrating ineffective assistance of counsel, we will affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
On October 4, 2020, sometime between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., V.T. and T.J. pulled
into a Redding parking lot in V.T.’s RV. V.T. lived in the vehicle and parked it there for
weeks at a time. T.J. lacked permanent housing and often drove the RV for V.T. A few
minutes after their arrival, Emmanuel Vega and another man rode their bicycles to the
parking lot and started talking with V.T. and J.T. Other unhoused individuals were at the
parking lot that night.
Defendant came to the parking lot with another man in a distinctive car that
defendant owned. He walked over to the RV and asked the group “who was in charge”
or “who was running the show.” When no one else answered, Vega responded: “Well,
I guess that’s me.” Apparently referring to California’s prison classification system,
defendant referred to himself as a “Level 4.” Vega responded: “Oh, you beat me by one
because I’m a Level 3.” After arguing about who was tougher, defendant started to walk
away, at which point Vega called him a “290,” meaning a sex offender. Vega said
something like “you ain’t tough” or “I’ll kick your ass.” Defendant lifted his shirt to
show a handgun in his waistband.
Vega approached defendant while holding a small aluminum T-ball bat; he referred
to defendant’s handgun as a “little BB gun” and told defendant to go ahead and shoot
him. Defendant backed away and pointed his gun at Vega. Vega told defendant he would
“kick his ass.” Defendant responded: “Fuck you, I’ll just shoot you.” Vega again dared
defendant to shoot. Defendant fired two rounds. The first bullet missed, but the second
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bullet hit Vega after he turned to the side, penetrating his heart and both lungs. Defendant
ran back to his car, which sped away. Vega died.
About nine hours after the shooting, defendant led police officers on a high speed
chase through Redding, ultimately crashing his car. The murder weapon was never
recovered, but defendant’s girlfriend testified that defendant had carried a handgun with
him.
DISCUSSION
Defendant claims his murder conviction must be reversed because the prosecutor
misstated the law during closing argument.
“It is considered misconduct to misstate the law to the jury, and bad faith is not
required. [Citation.] But a prosecutor is allowed to vigorously argue the case and is
afforded ‘significant leeway’ in discussing the facts and the law in closing argument.
[Citations.]” (People v. Azcona (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 504, 516.)
Defendant takes issue with the prosecutor’s description of the level of provocation
required to reduce a first degree murder to second degree murder. The prosecutor told the
jury that if it found that defendant was “legally provoked,” that fact could reduce “the
murder from a first degree to a second degree . . . or from second degree to voluntary
manslaughter.” The prosecutor reiterated that if defendant “was legally
provoked, . . . that can make it drop down a level,” i.e., “[f]irst degree, then second
degree, then manslaughter.” After saying that being “legally provoked” was “very
different than just being provoked,” the prosecutor went on to describe the elements of
heat of passion voluntary manslaughter, including the “legal provocation” requirement:
“The law says to qualify for this, the defendant had to have been provoked and he had to
act rashly or under the influence of intense emotion that obscured his judgment as a result
of that provocation. And that the same provocation . . . whatever that provocation was, it
would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without
deliberation.”
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Defense counsel did not object to those comments. “As a general rule, ‘ “[a]
defendant may not complain on appeal of prosecutorial misconduct unless in a timely
fashion, and on the same ground, the defendant objected to the action and also requested
that the jury be admonished to disregard the perceived impropriety.” ’ [Citation.] The
defendant’s failure to object will be excused if an objection would have been futile or if
an admonition would not have cured the harm caused by the misconduct.” (People v.
Centeno (2014) 60 Cal.4th 659, 674 (Centeno); see People v. Hoyt (2020) 8 Cal.5th 892,
942-943.)
Defendant does not argue that an objection would have been futile or that an
admonition would not have cured any harm arising from the prosecutor’s statements.
Indeed, “[a] prosecutor’s misstatements of law are generally curable by an admonition
from the court.” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 674.) And, as in Centeno, “[n]othing
in this record indicates that an objection would have been futile” or “that a prompt
objection and admonition would not have cured the harm.” (Ibid.) The claim is therefore
forfeited.
Anticipating our conclusion, defendant argues his counsel’s failure to object
constituted ineffective assistance. “ ‘A defendant whose counsel did not object at trial to
alleged prosecutorial misconduct can argue on appeal that counsel’s inaction violated the
defendant’s constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel.’ [Citation.]”
(Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 674.) Such a defendant “bears the burden of showing
by a preponderance of the evidence that (1) counsel’s performance was deficient because
it fell below an objective standard of reasonableness under prevailing professional norms,
and (2) counsel’s deficiencies resulted in prejudice.” (Ibid.) Moreover, “ ‘[u]nless a
defendant establishes the contrary, we shall presume that “counsel’s performance fell
within the wide range of professional competence and that counsel’s actions and inactions
can be explained as a matter of sound trial strategy.” ’ [Citation.] When the record on
direct appeal sheds no light on why counsel failed to act in the manner challenged,
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defendant must show that there was ‘ “ ‘no conceivable tactical purpose’ ” for counsel’s
act or omission. [Citations.]’ [Citation.]” (Id. at pp. 674-675.)
Here, the prosecutor’s comments could be construed as suggesting that the same
standard of “legal provocation” could be applied to reduce first degree murder to second
degree murder, and could also be applied to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter.
That is not the law. An objective standard applies to the level of provocation necessary to
reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter: “the provocation must be so great that . . . it
‘would have caused a person of average disposition to act rashly and without due
deliberation, that is, from passion rather than from judgment.’ ” (People v. Jones (2014)
223 Cal.App.4th 995, 1000-1001 (Jones), quoting CALCRIM No. 570.) However,
“a subjective test applies to provocation as a basis to reduce malice murder from the first
to the second degree: it inquires whether the defendant in fact committed the act because
he was provoked. The rationale is that provocation may negate the elements of
premeditation, deliberateness and willfulness that are required for that degree of the
crime.” (Id. at p. 1000.)
But even if the prosecutor misstated the law, our present inquiry is whether
defense counsel’s failure to object fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
“ ‘[T]he decision facing counsel in the midst of trial over whether to object to comments
made by the prosecutor in closing argument is a highly tactical one . . . .’ [citation], and
‘a mere failure to object to . . . argument seldom establishes counsel’s incompetence’
[citation].” (Centeno, supra, 60 Cal.4th at p. 675.) Even where an objection would have
been successful, competent counsel “could have preferred not to draw the jurors’
attention to particular comments by the prosecutor by objecting to them.” (People v.
Huggins (2006) 38 Cal.4th 175, 206.) We perceive such a conceivable tactical purpose
here. Defense counsel’s strategy in his own closing argument was to focus exclusively
on self-defense: “this case is about whether it was self-defense or not.” Although the
prosecutor suggested that an objective test applied to the provocation required to reduce
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the degree of murder, defense counsel might have decided to allow the brief comments
to pass without objection because objecting would risk causing the jury to focus on the
degree of murder rather than on whether the killing was committed in self-defense.
Defense counsel could have had a legitimate tactical reason for not objecting to the
prosecutor’s comments.
Defendant also fails to demonstrate prejudice. The jury was instructed to ignore
the argument of counsel where it conflicted with the jury instructions; it was instructed
on the prosecution’s burden of proving the charges beyond a reasonable doubt; and it
was instructed with CALCRIM Nos. 521, 522, and 570. Those instructions properly
conveyed the level of provocation required to reduce murder from first to second degree,
and to reduce murder to voluntary manslaughter. (Jones, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1000-1001.) Specifically, CALCRIM No. 521 correctly informed the jury that
defendant must have “acted willfully, deliberately, and with premeditation” in order to
be found guilty of first degree murder. And CALCRIM No. 522 informed the jury:
“Provocation may reduce a murder from first degree to second degree and may reduce
a murder to manslaughter. The weight and significance of the provocation, if any, are for
you to decide.” Read together, the instructions accurately informed the jury that the
provocation necessary to reduce murder from first to second degree was simply that
which raised a reasonable doubt as to whether defendant acted willfully, deliberately, and
with premeditation. (Jones, at p. 1001.)
CALCRIM No. 570 then informed the jury that in order to reduce murder to
voluntary manslaughter on a heat of passion theory, “[i]t is not enough that the defendant
simply was provoked,” but rather the provocation must have caused him to act rashly due
to an intense emotional reaction that obscured his reasoning or judgment, and that the
provocation would have caused a person of average disposition to have acted rashly and
without due deliberation. “It is here, and only here, that the jury is instructed that
provocation alone is not enough for the reduction; the provocation must be sufficient
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to cause a person of average disposition in the same situation, knowing the same facts,
to have reacted from passion rather than judgment.” (Jones, supra, 223 Cal.App.4th
at p. 1001.)
We presume “that jurors are able to correlate, follow, and understand the court’s
instructions.” (People v. Ibarra (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 1174, 1183.) Read together, the
instructions accurately described the law. And with that correct understanding of the law,
the jury was more than justified in concluding that defendant acted willfully, deliberately,
and with premeditation when he shot Vega to death in the parking lot. Indeed, before
pulling the trigger, defendant told Vega: “Fuck you, I’ll just shoot you.”
Defendant has not established ineffective assistance of counsel.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/S/
MAURO, J.
We concur:
/S/
ROBIE, Acting P. J.
/S/
KRAUSE, J.
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