People v. Wilson CA2/1

CourtListener 10739069CalctappNov 19, 2025

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Filed 11/19/25 P. v. Wilson CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

THE PEOPLE, B340500

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 24SFCF00421)
v.

ADRIAN DESHAWN WILSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Hilleri G. Merritt, Judge. Appeal dismissed.
Teresa Biagini, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
No appearance for Plaintiff and Respondent.
_______________________________
Adrian Deshawn Wilson appeals from a judgment entered
after he pled no contest to one count of attempted second degree
robbery under Penal Code sections 211 and 664. Pursuant to
Wilson’s plea deal, the trial court sentenced him to time served.
Wilson’s appointed counsel filed a brief pursuant to People
v. Wende (1979) 25 Cal.3d 436 (Wende), raising no arguable issue
and requesting that this court independently review the record.
Counsel and this court sent written notice of Wilson’s right to file
a supplemental brief to his address of record. Our notice was
returned as undeliverable with no forwarding address. The clerk
of this court requested that counsel file notice of Wilson’s current
address, but counsel was unable to locate him. Because Wilson
failed to provide his current contact information as the Rules of
Court require, we conclude that the notice sent to his address of
record was adequate. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.32(a)-
(b)(1).)
We have reviewed the entire record and discerned no
arguable issue. Because Wilson pled no contest to his offense of
conviction and did not obtain a certificate of probable cause, we
dismiss the appeal. (See Pen. Code, § 1237.5; People v. Shelton
(2006) 37 Cal.4th 759, 769.)

BACKGROUND
In August 2024, by information, the Los Angeles County
District Attorney charged Wilson with two counts of attempted
second degree robbery. (Pen. Code, §§ 211, 664.) The People
alleged as to both counts that Wilson had served a prior prison
term and prior county jail term (id., § 1170, subd. (h); Cal. Rules
of Court, rule 4.421(b)(3)); that he had previously performed
unsatisfactorily on probation (Cal. Rules of Court, rule

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4.421(b)(5)); that in committing the charged offenses he engaged
in violent conduct that indicated a serious danger to society (id.,
rule 4.421(b)(1)); and that he was on probation at the time of the
charged offenses (id., rule 4.421(b)(4)). It was further alleged
that he had been convicted of a strike offense.

A. Wilson attempted to steal products from a grocery
store and struck two managers who intervened.
We summarize the facts of Wilson’s offense as described in
the probation report, which supplied the factual basis for his no-
contest plea to count 1 (attempted second degree robbery against
Kelly Lee Jacoby).
On March 22, 2024, Los Angeles County Sheriff’s
Department deputies responded to a silent alarm call at a Stater
Bros. grocery store. Upon arrival, the deputies observed Wilson
seated on the ground near Jacoby (a store manager) and Matthew
Norris (Jacoby’s supervisor). Store personnel supplied the
deputies with surveillance video recorded inside the store that
day, which showed the following: Jacoby and Norris confronted
Wilson near the store’s sushi bar and attempted to retrieve a
gray duffle bag he was carrying, which was filled with items.
Wilson hugged the bag to his chest, and a struggle over the bag
ensued, during which grocery items fell out of the bag. Wilson
punched the top of Norris’s hand and pushed both Norris and
Jacoby several times.
Wilson exited the store. Jacoby and Norris ran after him
and detained him until the deputies arrived. The deputies
arrested Wilson for attempted robbery.

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B. The trial court granted Wilson’s first Faretta motion,
but revoked his self-represented status due to his
disruptive behavior.
On March 28, 2024, Wilson was arraigned on a complaint
charging two counts of attempted robbery (the complaint was
later superseded by the information described above). He made a
Faretta motion to represent himself.1 The trial court granted the
motion. During the court’s colloquy with Wilson regarding his
Faretta waiver, the court admonished him that misconduct,
including interrupting the court, might constitute good cause to
revoke his self-represented status. The court noted on the record
that Wilson had interrupted the court multiple times and
exhibited disrespect to the court.
Wilson pled not guilty to both counts and denied all
allegations. The court granted the prosecution’s motion to
remand Wilson to custody on bail, and denied his request to be
released on his own recognizance. During the court’s explanation
of its ruling, Wilson repeatedly interrupted the court, criticized
the court for “dragging [its] feet,” and directed profanity at the
court and its bailiff. The court revoked Wilson’s self-represented
status due to his disruptive behavior.
Wilson continued engaging in similar behavior. The court
ordered him removed from the courtroom and noted that defense
counsel was present to represent him. Through counsel, Wilson
again pled not guilty to both counts and denied all allegations.
On the date initially set for the preliminary hearing,
Wilson’s counsel raised a doubt as to his competency to stand
trial. The trial court suspended criminal proceedings and
transferred the matter to the mental health court.

1 Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806.

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The mental health court appointed an expert to evaluate
Wilson’s competency. On July 10, 2024, the mental health court
admitted the expert’s report into evidence, found Wilson
competent to stand trial, and reinstated criminal proceedings.

C. The trial court denied additional Faretta and
Marsden motions and held Wilson to answer.
On July 11, 2024, Wilson made a second Faretta motion.
The trial court denied the motion based on reports from the
sheriff’s department regarding Wilson’s disruptive behavior in
custody.
Wilson then made a Marsden motion to replace his
appointed counsel.2 He made several complaints about his
defense attorney and maintained that he wanted to represent
himself. The court denied the motion.
On July 23, 2024, at the preliminary hearing, Wilson made
a third Faretta motion, which the trial court denied for the
reasons it had denied his prior Faretta motion. He also made a
second Marsden motion, which the court denied. The prosecution
then called its sole witness, victim Jacoby. After Jacoby entered
the courtroom but before she took the witness stand, Wilson
addressed the trial judge as a “female chauvinist pig” and
demanded that she recuse herself or rule in his favor on his
Faretta or Marsden motion. The court noted for the record that
Wilson was screaming and cursing at the court. To prevent
further delay of the preliminary hearing, the court ordered
Wilson removed from the courtroom due to his disruptive
behavior.

2 People v. Marsden (1970) 2 Cal.3d 118.

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Jacoby testified that on the day of the charged robberies,
inside the grocery store where she worked as a manager, she saw
Wilson place sushi and chicken down his pants and potato salad
in a personal bag. She saw him attempt to exit the store without
paying. She stopped him at the door and told him he could not
leave with the store’s products; he insisted he would. She and
Norris, her supervisor, grabbed Wilson’s bag. Wilson threw the
items out of the bag and started kicking the items. He scratched
Jacoby’s arms and punched Norris twice.
The court denied defense counsel’s motion to dismiss the
charges for insufficient evidence and held Wilson to answer on
both counts.

D. The trial court granted Wilson’s fourth Faretta
motion. He pled no contest to count 1 and was
sentenced to time served.
On August 6, 2024, at the arraignment on the information,
Wilson pled not guilty to both counts and denied all allegations.
He made a fourth Faretta motion. After Wilson reviewed and
signed a Faretta waiver, the trial court accepted his waiver and
granted the motion. The court appointed standby counsel.
On August 19, 2024, Wilson pled no contest to count 1
(attempted second degree robbery against Jacoby). Pursuant to
Wilson’s plea deal, the trial court dismissed count 2 and all
enhancements, and sentenced Wilson to 304 days in county jail,
with 304 days of credit.
On August 21, 2024, from the county jail where Wilson
then remained in custody, he mailed to the trial court an in pro.
per. notice of appeal, in which he provided his mailing address at

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the jail. He provided no other contact information.3 On August
29, 2024, the trial court received and filed the notice of appeal.
Wilson did not request a certificate of probable cause.

DISCUSSION
We appointed counsel to represent Wilson on appeal. After
examining the record, counsel filed a Wende brief raising no
arguable issue and requesting that we independently review the
record. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 440-441.) Counsel
declared that she mailed copies of the Wende brief and the
appellate record, along with a letter explaining Wilson’s right to
file a supplemental brief, to Wilson’s last known address, i.e., the
address that he provided in his notice of appeal. In September
2025, we also sent Wilson a letter to the same address, explaining
he could, within 30 days, “submit a supplemental brief or letter
stating any grounds for an appeal, or contentions, or arguments
which [he] wishes this court to consider.”
Our letter was returned as undeliverable with no
forwarding address. In October 2025, the clerk of this court
requested that counsel file notice of Wilson’s current address.
Counsel responded that she was unable to locate Wilson despite
her best efforts. Because Wilson failed to provide his current
contact information as the Rules of Court require, we conclude
that the written notice sent to his address of record was
adequate. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.32(a)-(b)(1).)
We have examined the entire record and are satisfied that
counsel has complied with counsel’s responsibilities and that no

3 The probation report stated, in the space provided for

Wilson’s “present/release address,” that he was “transient” in Los
Angeles.

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arguable issue exists. (Wende, supra, 25 Cal.3d at pp. 440-441;
People v. Kelly (2006) 40 Cal.4th 106, 119.) Because Wilson pled
no contest to his offense of conviction and did not obtain a
certificate of probable cause, we dismiss the appeal. (See People
v. Shelton, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 769, citing People v. Mendez
(1999) 19 Cal.4th 1084, 1096-1099.)

DISPOSITION
The appeal is dismissed.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

M. KIM, J.

We concur:

ROTHSCHILD, P. J.

WEINGART, J.

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