People v. Padhol CA2/8

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Filed 11/18/25 P. v. Padhol CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION EIGHT

THE PEOPLE, B336248

Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. GA114193-01)
v.

SIARHEI PADHOL,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Karen Joynt, Commissioner. Reversed.

Ryan Peabody, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.

Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Kim Aarons and Herbert S. Tetef, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.

——————————
Siarhei Padhol appeals his conviction of violating Penal
Code1 section 422. We reverse the judgment because there was
no substantial evidence that the victim of the crime experienced
sustained fear.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Padhol was charged with making a criminal threat against
Krikor Avdoiansimonian, a funeral counselor who works for a
mortuary. On March 18, 2023, Avdoiansimonian’s work for the
mortuary took him to a church where a funeral service was
taking place.
While Avdoiansimonian waited outside the church for the
funeral to conclude, he saw Padhol speaking loudly to and
following a man who worked for the church, Hagop.
Avdoiansimonian had never seen Padhol before but he knew
Hagop. Hagop had limited comprehension ability and did not
speak English.
Avdoiansimonian tried to find out from Padhol what had
happened, but Padhol responded only, “He knows. He knows. He
knows what he did.” Avdoiansimonian decided to look for Azat
Voskanyan, who was in charge of church security. He was unable
to locate Voskanyan upstairs in the church, but when he went
down to the church hallway, Avdoiansimonian saw Voskanyan
and another man there with Padhol and Hagop. Padhol was
yelling at Hagop in Russian. Voskanyan, who spoke Russian,
told Padhol Hagop could not understand him.
The men were concerned that Padhol’s yelling would
disrupt the funeral services, so they left the building. Outside,

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.

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they continued to ask Padhol why he was yelling at and following
Hagop and what had happened.
Padhol asked the men, in English, “You have family?”
Padhol then showed Avdoiansimonian his phone, which displayed
a photograph of a gun and a bullet. He told Avdoiansimonian, “I
will bring this.”
Padhol left immediately after showing Avdoiansimonian
the photograph. Avdoiansimonian testified, “[E]verything went
fast when he showed [the photograph]. He left. We left.”
Avdoiansimonian did not call 911. He and Voskanyan went
to the church administration to report what had happened.
Avdoiansimonian explained that he went to the church
administration because “it’s not my property; it’s the church. So
in my opinion, they have to know what happened. So we explain
everything, and they decide what they decide.”
Reporting the event to the administration took
approximately five minutes, after which Avdoiansimonian
returned to work. Avdoiansimonian remained at the church until
the funeral finished, then left to provide transport from the
church to the cemetery. He estimated that he remained at the
church for “[m]aybe 20 minutes” after he resumed work.
Avdoiansimonian testified he felt “nothing” when Padhol
asked him if he had a family. When Padhol showed him the
photograph of a gun, Avdoiansimonian felt “a little bit” of fear.
He was not terrified. He testified he felt fear upon seeing the
photograph because he did not know why Padhol was showing it
to them—was it to scare them or would he bring the gun?
Avdoiansimonian understood Padhol to be threatening him, but
when asked who he was afraid for, Avdoiansimonian answered,
“[F]or the church, for the people that were there.”

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Avdoiansimonian was unable to state precisely when his
fear stopped, but he testified that once he made his report to the
administration, “I went to my job. If I was in fear, I would call
911 by myself.”2 While he was working at the church after
making the report, he was not afraid that Padhol would return.
During the approximately 25 minutes between the threat and
Avdoiansimonian’s departure from the church, he was not afraid
Padhol would come back. He was not afraid of Padhol when he
saw him 12 days later after the preliminary hearing, nor did he
experience fear upon seeing Padhol in the courtroom at trial.
On redirect, the prosecutor again attempted to elicit
testimony of sustained fear from Avdoiansimonian. After
confirming that Avdoiansimonian had been at the church for
approximately 25 minutes from when the threat was made until
he left, the prosecutor asked, “With regard to fear, how did you
feel within that 25 minutes?”
“Yeah, honestly, when this happened, I went to my job, and
I didn’t think about nothing, honestly,” answered
Avdoiansimonian. “I continue with my job, and that’s it.”
“Did you feel fear once you left the church?” the prosecutor
inquired.

2 When Avdoiansimonian gave this testimony, the prosecutor
asked, “Oh, so now you’re saying that you didn’t feel fear?” as
though Avdoiansimonian’s testimony that he was not feeling fear
when he went back to work after reporting the incident was a
denial of his previous testimony that he experienced fear when
the threat was issued. Avdoiansimonian responded by
reiterating his prior testimony: “No, I say I feel fear, but not
terrified.”

4
Avdoiansimonian said, “Kind of, maybe, but no.” He said
he did not think about it further.
The prosecutor asked, “Did your fear decrease or increase
after you left the church?”
“Decrease,” answered Avdoiansimonian. When asked why,
he responded, “Because I think this has happened and finished. I
don’t know.” The prosecutor asked Avdoiansimonian if he had
believed Padhol would follow him when he left the church, and
Avdoiansimonian answered, “Honestly, I didn’t think about it,
no.” At this, the prosecutor concluded the examination.
Padhol was convicted of making a criminal threat and
placed on formal probation for two years with various conditions,
including serving 180 days in county jail and undergoing a drug
rehabilitation program. He appeals.
DISCUSSION
Padhol contends the evidence was insufficient to support
his conviction for making a criminal threat against
Avdoiansimonian. Specifically, he argues that the evidence was
insufficient to establish that Avdoiansimonian experienced
sustained fear. We agree.
“In considering a sufficiency of the evidence claim, we
review ‘the whole record in the light most favorable to the
judgment below to determine whether it discloses substantial
evidence—that is, evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of
solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (People v. Collins
(2025) 17 Cal.5th 293, 307 (Collins).) “In deciding the sufficiency
of the evidence, a reviewing court resolves neither credibility
issues nor evidentiary conflicts. [Citation.] Resolution of
conflicts and inconsistencies in the testimony is the exclusive

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province of the trier of fact.” (People v. Young (2005) 34 Cal.4th
1149, 1181 (Young).) However, “ ‘[t]he substantial evidence rule
mandates consideration of the weight of the evidence before
deferring to the conclusions drawn from the evidence by the trier
of fact. “[I]n determining whether the record is sufficient . . . the
appellate court can give credit only to ‘substantial[’] evidence, i.e.,
evidence that reasonably inspires confidence and is ‘of solid
value.’ ” ’ ” (Collins, at p. 307.) “[R]easonableness [i]s the
ultimate standard under the substantial evidence rule.” (People
v. Kunkin (1973) 9 Cal.3d 245, 250.)
To prove a defendant made a criminal threat, “the
prosecution must establish all of the following: (1) that the
defendant ‘willfully threaten[ed] to commit a crime which will
result in death or great bodily injury to another person,’ (2) that
the defendant made the threat ‘with the specific intent that the
statement . . . is to be taken as a threat, even if there is no intent
of actually carrying it out,’ (3) that the threat—which may be
‘made verbally, in writing, or by means of an electronic
communication device’—was ‘on its face and under the
circumstances in which it [was] made, . . . so unequivocal,
unconditional, immediate, and specific as to convey to the person
threatened, a gravity of purpose and an immediate prospect of
execution of the threat,’ (4) that the threat actually caused the
person threatened ‘to be in sustained fear for his or her own
safety or for his or her immediate family’s safety,’ and (5) that the
threatened person’s fear was ‘reasonabl[e]’ under the
circumstances.” (People v. Toledo (2001) 26 Cal.4th 221, 227–228;
§ 422, subd. (a).)

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The sole element Padhol claims was not supported by
substantial evidence was the element of sustained fear, so we
consider only that element here. “Sustained fear must occur over
‘a period of time that extends beyond what is momentary,
fleeting, or transitory.’ ” (People v. Roles (2020) 44 Cal.App.5th
935, 942.) Ordinarily, sustained fear lasts “beyond the moments
of the encounter.” (In re Ricky T. (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1132,
1140 (Ricky T.).) Courts have held that 15 minutes satisfies the
sustained fear requirement (Roles, at p. 942; see, e.g., People v.
Wilson (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 193, 201; People v. Allen (1995)
33 Cal.App.4th 1149, 1156), although, as will be discussed below,
under circumstances not applicable here a shorter duration of
fear, or fear confined to the length of the encounter, may be
sufficient.
Here, Avdoiansimonian testified he experienced “a little
bit” of fear but was not terrified when Padhol showed him the
photograph of a gun and threatened to bring it, but Padhol
departed directly after making that statement. During the
25 minutes that passed between the threat and his departure
from the church to transport people to the cemetery,
Avdoiansimonian did not experience fear, or even concern: when
asked about his fear during this time period, he responded,
“[W]hen this happened, I went to my job, and I didn’t think about
nothing, honestly.” He denied being afraid Padhol would return
while he was working at the church, and explained that if he had
been in fear, he would have called 911 himself—but he did not do
so.
This evidence was insufficient to demonstrate
Avdoiansimonian experienced sustained fear. In fact, it
established the opposite, that Avdoiansimonian’s fear was

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momentary, fleeting, and transitory: he was a little bit afraid
when he was threatened, the interaction promptly ended, and
once he reported it to the property owner,3 he went back to his
work without fear that Padhol would return to make good on his
threat. On this record, “[w]hatever emotion—fear, intimidation,
or apprehension—[the victim] felt during the moment of the
verbal encounter, there was nothing to indicate that the fear was
more than fleeting or transitory.” (Ricky T., supra,
87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140.)
The People, however, argue Avdoiansimonian’s response,
“Decrease,” when asked if his fear decreased or increased once he
left the church, was on its own “sufficient to establish that he had
been in sustained fear.” The People reason that “[i]n order for
Avdoiansimonian’s fear to have decreased, he must have been
experiencing fear prior to that point.” The problem with this
argument, though, is that the prosecutor’s question was
counterfactual. Despite Avdoiansimonian repeatedly testifying
he did not experience ongoing fear, the prosecutor asked him an
either-or question that assumed he did. We cannot endorse the
People’s view that a one-word response to a question that took as
its premise a state of mind that Avdoiansimonian had already
denied is “ ‘evidence which is reasonable, credible, and of solid
value—such that a reasonable trier of fact could find the

3 Avdoiansimonian’s report to the administration was an
appropriate response calling the church’s attention to an incident
that had occurred on their property so the church could decide
how to handle the situation; it does not evince sustained fear.
(See, e.g., Ricky T., supra, 87 Cal.App.4th at p. 1140 [teacher
sending student to the school office after he threatened her was
not indicative of sustained fear but was instead “an appropriate,
necessary response to a disruptive classroom incident”].)

8
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’ ” (Collins, supra,
17 Cal.5th at p. 307.) While we are mindful that it is not our role
to resolve evidentiary conflicts (Young, supra, 34 Cal.4th at
p. 1181), here we are not resolving a conflict in the evidence. We
are “ ‘consider[ing] the weight of the evidence before deferring to
the conclusions drawn from the evidence by the trier of fact,’ ”
and upon doing so, we conclude that an inference based on the
answer to a question that assumed facts not in evidence and
offered the witness only two options, neither of which was
consistent with what he had already testified repeatedly, is not
“ ‘ “ ‘substantial[’] evidence, i.e., evidence that reasonably inspires
confidence and is ‘of solid value.’ ” ’ ” (Collins, at p. 307.) On
appellate review, we may only give credit to substantial evidence.
(Ibid.)
As the People note, it has been held that a victim may
experience sustained fear even though the fear exists only during
the incident itself. (People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th
608, 634.) The People, however, neglect to acknowledge that
Brugman involved a protracted incident during which the victim
was repeatedly terrorized. In Brugman, “[t]he incident was a
drawn-out ordeal, during which . . . Brugman put the gun to
[victim C.’s] head and threatened to kill her over and over again.
‘It’s like he went in and out of . . . himself and, like, for a second,
like, cried, and then the next second he was, like, no, no, no, like
fighting with himself. And he was, like, “No, no, I’m going to kill
you.” And he’d put it back up to my head, and then he'd put it
down.’ ” (Ibid.) Under such circumstances, the Brugman court
held that a “reasonable juror could conclude that while enduring
this extended scenario, C. did not merely experience fear that

9
was ‘momentary, fleeting, or transitory’ [citation], but instead
experienced sustained fear.” (Ibid.)
Similarly, if the circumstances are extreme enough—such
as when a person believes they will be killed imminently—even
one minute can be enough time for fear to be sustained. (People
v. Fierro (2010) 180 Cal.App.4th 1342, 1349.) In Fierro, the
defendant displayed a weapon and said he would kill the victim
“ ‘right now.’ ” (Ibid.) Finding sufficient evidence of sustained
fear, the court observed, “When one believes he is about to die, a
minute is longer than ‘momentary, fleeting, or transitory.’ ”
(Ibid.) Neither of those circumstances was present here, where
Avdoiansimonian experienced “a little bit” of fear but not terror
when the single threat was made, and the rapidly concluded
encounter with Padhol was in no way an extended ordeal of
prolonged terrorization.
As there was insufficient evidence of the element of
sustained fear from which a rational trier of fact could find
Padhol guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, Padhol’s conviction for
making a criminal threat must be reversed.4

4 Our conclusion that the conviction must be reversed due to
insufficient evidence makes it unnecessary to address Padhol’s
remaining arguments concerning prosecutorial misconduct.

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DISPOSITION
The judgment of conviction is reversed.

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

STRATTON, P. J.

We concur:

WILEY, J.

VIRAMONTES, J.

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