People v. Hasan CA4/1

CourtListener 10738166CalctappNov 18, 2025

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Filed 11/18/25 P. v. Hasan CA4/1
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D085434

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v.
(Super. Ct. No. SCD302522)
JAWWAAD XAVIER HASAN,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Kristopher S. Young, Judge. Affirmed.
John L. Staley, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for
Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Assistant Attorney
General, Collette C. Cavalier and Nora S. Weyl, Deputy Attorneys General
for Plaintiff and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
Jawwaad Xavier Hasan appeals from a final judgment following a jury
trial. He contends (1) the trial court failed to obtain a valid waiver of his
right to counsel and (2) the case should be remanded to determine whether
Hasan was competent to waive his right to counsel and to stand trial under
Indiana v. Edwards (2008) 554 U.S. 164 (Edwards). Finding no error, we
affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The People charged Hasan with one count of resisting an executive

officer (Pen. Code,1 § 69) and one count of misdemeanor trespassing (§ 602,
subd. (o)(1)). The complaint included 11 prior strike allegations under
sections 667, subd. (b)–(1); 1170.12; and 668, and an allegation that Hasan
was ineligible for probation under section 1203, subdivision (e)(4). We omit
the facts underlying these offenses because they are not challenged on appeal
or relevant to our resolution of the issues presented.
In February 2024, the court held a hearing regarding Hasan’s decision
to represent himself. The deputy public defender representing Hasan
provided him with a Faretta/Lopez waiver and counsel provided Hasan’s
signed waiver to the court. On the form, Hasan listed his charges, provided
his educational and work background, and wrote the maximum punishments
upon conviction for each count. On the form’s second page, Hasan initialed
several paragraphs describing the dangers and disadvantages of self-
representation, including that self-representation “is almost always unwise,”
he would get no “special treatment or favors,” he may “be unaware of . . .
potential defenses,” and “that being incarcerated will make it difficult . . . to
contact witnesses and investigate” his case. On the third page, Hasan signed
the form acknowledging he was requesting to represent himself “freely and
voluntarily.”
At the hearing, the court questioned Hasan about his understanding of
his constitutional right to counsel and the nature of the charges against him.
Hasan explained he understood and had represented himself in the past

1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
when facing similar charges and received an acquittal. The court asked
Hasan whether he had signed the waiver and whether he had any questions
about the form. Hasan responded that he had signed the form, had no
questions, and was “fully aware of the form and what rights [he had].” The
court further explained that there are “dangers and disadvantages” to
representing oneself, that Hasan would not be given any special treatment by
the court, that failure to comply with the rules could result in a conviction,
and that he would be facing a prosecutor with a “full legal education.” Hasan
responded that he understood. The court questioned Hasan about his
education. Hasan explained he had a high school diploma and a “creative
writing degree from UCLA.” Hasan also explained he had represented
himself a “a couple years ago” when he was charged with “trespassing and
assault with a deadly weapon” and he prevailed. The court then asked why
Hasan was requesting to represent himself and Hasan responded by saying,
“[b]ecause these are false charges.” The court explained it did not
recommend that Hasan waive his right to an attorney and Hasan stated he
understood and persisted in his request. The court granted Hasan’s request
for self-representation and excused the appointed attorney.
The trial court proceeded with the arraignment during which Hasan
requested a signed copy of the complaint and that his true name, “William
Archibald,” be used instead of the AKA. Hasan then pleaded not guilty to the
charges in the complaint.
The court asked Hasan whether he wished to address the issue of bail
which was set at $100,000. Hasan responded that bail should be set lower
and requested release on his own recognizance, stating that he works and
owns property in the community, and is connected to Father Joe’s charity.
The prosecutor opposed a reduction explaining Hasan has a history of

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trespassing, does not own the building he claims to own, and has an
“extensive drug history” and “some mental health struggles.” The court
reduced bail to $30,000 and ordered Hasan to stay 100 yards away from the
building in question.
At the preliminary hearing, Hasan explained his true name is “William
Xavier Archibald” and he does not know why “Jawwaad Hasan” is the name
on the complaint. The court noted the correction for the record and the
People agreed to “create a clean copy [of the pleadings] with the correct
name.”
Hasan then expressed his intention to file a “[section] 995 motion.” The
court explained it was premature to file a section 995 motion. Hasan
responded by saying the complaint itself was defective and it “should have
never proceeded to arraignment.” Specifically, Hasan alleged he was not
timely arraigned, in violation of the 48-hour rule. The People argued that
pursuant to his speedy trial rights under section 1328, “the defendant needs
to be arraigned within three court days of his arrest.” The court then
explained the 48-hour rule in section 825 “excludes Sundays and holidays”
and because Hasan was arrested on a Saturday “it’s as if he was arrested on
[Monday] and then needed to be arraigned within 48 hours of that date.”
Accordingly, the court denied Hasan’s motion to dismiss.
Hasan then moved to dismiss on the ground that his copy of the
complaint was not signed. The court explained that the copy of the complaint
in the court’s file was signed and the court could provide Hasan with a copy of
the signed complaint. Hasan argued the copy of the complaint with the
signature was fraudulent. The court denied Hasan’s motion to dismiss
because the complaint “in the file does have a signature.”

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Hasan then requested a copy of the police report and the People noted
Hasan had not received discovery. Hasan stated he was not waiving time
and “would trail to [the] afternoon” as he just needed an “hour or two to look
over” the reports. After a recess, the People provided all of the physical
discovery to Hasan. Hasan agreed that he would view the bodyworn camera
footage “later on.”
In the afternoon, the court continued with the preliminary hearing
during which the People presented two police officers. Hasan conducted
cross-examinations of the witnesses. Hasan also testified himself on direct
examination, posing questions and then answering them. He then gave a
closing argument alleging the People had not “met their burden of probable
cause.” The court concluded, “Based on the evidence presented during this
preliminary hearing, it appears to the Court that there’s probable cause to
believe that the offenses charged in counts 1 and 2 have been committed and
that the defendant is guilty thereof.”
On May 3, 2024, the People filed an amended information amending
count 1 to resisting an executive officer under section 69. Count 2 and the
allegations remained unchanged.
In early May 2024, the morning of the jury trial, Hasan requested
counsel and the court appointed a public defender to represent Hasan. The
trial was continued to a later date. In late May, the court held a Marsden
hearing to address Hasan’s concerns over the public defender representing
him. Hasan then requested to continue representing himself and the court
granted his request.
On June 20, 2024, Hasan proceeded to trial without an attorney.
Hasan participated in jury selection and questioned prospective jurors.
During the trial, Hasan gave an opening statement, conducted cross-

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examinations, testified, and gave a closing argument. The jury found Hasan
guilty of both counts and found true the prior strike allegations.
On June 26, 2024, Hasan requested an attorney to represent him
during sentencing. The court reappointed a public defender to represent
Hasan.
On August 2, 2024, upon Hasan’s request, the court held a Marsden
hearing and denied his request to dismiss the public defender. The court
then ordered Hasan removed from the courtroom due to an outburst. Defense
counsel requested that proceedings be suspended pursuant to section 1368
because of concerns about Hasan’s ability “currently to understand the
nature of the proceedings and to assist counsel.” The court suspended
proceedings and ordered a mental health evaluation on Hasan.
On November 7, 2024, the court received into evidence two reports on
Hasan’s mental competency to stand trial and two reports on “involuntary
medication to restore competency.” The court then found Hasan “not
mentally competent.” The court also authorized the involuntary
administration of antipsychotic medication to Hasan.
On December 4, 2024, the court received an additional medical report
and again found Hasan not mentally competent and ordered him committed
to Patton State Hospital for a maximum term of two years.
On January 13, 2025, Hasan filed a notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
On appeal, Hasan contends “the case should be conditionally remanded
to the trial court for a retrospective determination of [his] competence to
stand trial and to waive his right to counsel.” He argues Edwards, supra,
554 U.S. 164, in which the United States Supreme Court upheld a state’s
denial of the right to self-representation to a severely mentally ill defendant,

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should be extended to apply in this case.2 Finding no error, we affirm the
judgment.
A. Legal Principles
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides
criminal defendants both the right to assistance of counsel and the right to
self-representation. (U.S. Const., 6th Amend.)
In Faretta v. California (1975) 422 U.S. 806, the court determined the
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, included the right of a criminal defendant
to self-representation, provided the defendant makes a knowing, voluntary,
and intelligent waiver of the right to counsel. The fact that a trial judge may
have doubts as to the defendant’s understanding of the law and the person’s
ability to conduct a criminal trial does not permit a court to deny a defendant
the constitutional right to self-representation. (Id. at p. 835.)
Subsequently, in Godinez v. Moran (1993) 509 U.S. 389, 396, 400–401
(Godinez), the court clarified that the standard for competence to waive
counsel is identical to the standard for competence to stand trial announced
in Dusky v. United States (1960) 362 U.S. 402. Under Dusky, “the standard
for competence to stand trial is whether the defendant has ‘sufficient present
ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding’ and has ‘a rational as well as factual understanding of the
proceedings against him.’ ” (Godinez, at p. 396.)
Later, in Edwards, the United States Supreme Court faced the
question of “whether the Constitution required the trial court to allow
Edwards to represent himself at trial.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 169,
italics added.) The Edwards court departed somewhat from Faretta’s strict

2 Hasan initially alleged the court failed to obtain a valid waiver of his
right to counsel, but now agrees he was properly advised and concedes this
point. We agree and accept the concession.
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waiver standard and held that where a defendant, although competent to
assist counsel, suffers from mental disability such that the person cannot
competently represent him or herself, the state may deny self-representation.
(Id. at p. 171.)
As the language of Edwards makes clear and the California Supreme
Court has confirmed, Edwards allows states to adopt a higher standard for
competency to conduct trial than the Dusky standard for competency to stand
trial, only when the defendant’s severe mental illness inhibits the defendant’s
competency to conduct the trial proceedings alone. (Edwards, supra, 554
U.S. at pp. 177–178; People v. Taylor (2009) 47 Cal.4th 850, 877–878.)
However, Edwards “ ‘does not mandate the application of such a dual
standard of competency for mentally ill defendants.’ ” (Taylor, at p. 878.) As
long as the defendant is competent to stand trial and makes a knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent waiver of counsel, there can be no federal
constitutional error in permitting the defendant to represent himself or
herself. (Ibid.)
In People v. Johnson (2012) 53 Cal.4th 519, 530 (Johnson), the
California Supreme Court announced a standard for denying self-
representation in line with what Edwards permitted: “[W]e believe the
standard that trial courts considering exercising their discretion to deny self-
representation should apply is simply whether the defendant suffers from a
severe mental illness to the point where he or she cannot carry out the basic
tasks needed to present the defense without the help of counsel.” The
Johnson court explained that “[a] trial court need not routinely inquire into
the mental competence of a defendant seeking self-representation. It needs
to do so only if it is considering denying self-representation due to doubts
about the defendant’s mental competence.” (Ibid.) The Johnson court further

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clarified that “[s]elf-representation by defendants who wish it and validly
waive counsel remains the norm and may not be denied lightly. A court may
not deny self-representation merely because it believes the matter could be
tried more efficiently, or even more fairly, with attorneys on both sides.
Rather, it may deny self-representation only in those situations where
Edwards permits it.” (Id. at p. 531.)
We review the trial court’s determination of the defendant’s competence
for substantial evidence, and we review de novo whether the waiver was
voluntary, knowing, and intelligent. (People v. Orosco (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th
348, 358.)
B. Analysis
Hasan contends the medical reports submitted to the court before
sentencing suggest he was not competent to stand trial and that the trial
court erred by allowing him to represent himself. We disagree. We begin by
addressing whether his initial decision to forego representation was
knowingly and intelligently made, then we address whether substantial
evidence supports the finding that Hasan was mentally competent to
represent himself throughout the proceedings.
1. Faretta Waiver
Hasan contends the medical reports finding him not competent at the
sentencing stage “leave doubts about [his] competence when he waived his
right to counsel.” To the extent Hasan is arguing his waiver was not
knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently made, we are not persuaded.
The record here shows Hasan was able to complete the Faretta waiver
form and adequately understood its contents. His attorney stated he “had
[Hasan] fill out the Faretta-Lopez form” and the court confirmed Hasan was
aware of the disadvantages of self-representation. Hasan acknowledged he

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understood the significance and consequences of his decision, he was able to
express himself rationally, and he described the prior case in which he
represented himself and won. Notably, he successfully argued for a reduction
in bail. Hasan’s statements to the court and his answers in the Faretta form
thus communicated an informed desire to represent himself “consistent with
a voluntary and intelligent waiver.” (People v. Miranda (2015) 236
Cal.App.4th 978, 986–987; see also Faretta, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 835–836
[defendant’s waiver was voluntary where the record affirmatively showed he
“was literate, competent, and understanding” and trial judge had “warned
[him] that he thought it was a mistake not to accept the assistance of counsel,
and that [he] would be required to follow all the ‘ground rules’ of trial
procedure”].)
2. Mental Competence for Self-Representation
Having concluded Hasan’s initial waiver was valid, we analyze next
whether substantial evidence supports the court’s determination that he was
competent to represent himself. (Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531.)
Applying Edwards and Johnson, we conclude substantial evidence
supports the trial court’s determination that Hasan was sufficiently mentally
competent to represent himself. To begin, Edwards and Johnson both
require that the defendant’s incompetence to represent himself derive from a
“severe mental illness.” (Edwards, supra, 554 U.S. at p. 178; Johnson, supra,
53 Cal.4th at p. 530.) At no point in the proceedings did the record before the
trial court compel a finding that Hasan suffered from a severe mental illness.
There was no expert testimony and no medical documentation on the subject,
and although the record indicates Hasan suffers to some extent from mental
health issues, substantial evidence supports the court’s determination he

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could perform “the basic tasks needed” to present a defense without the help
of counsel. (Johnson, at p. 530.)
For example, Hasan reasonably questioned the length of time between
his arrest and his arraignment, prompting the court to ask the prosecution
for authority supporting its position that there was no delay. He questioned
potential jurors, gave an opening statement, cross-examined the People’s
witnesses, elicited relevant testimony, testified in his own defense, and gave
a closing argument. He showed he had done legal research to support his
arguments at various points in the proceedings and used the exhibits to
assist in his cross-examinations. Although the trial court frequently had to
instruct Hasan to rephrase his questions, he was responsive enough to the
court’s directives to present evidence in support of his various defense
theories.
This is not to say Hasan’s self-representation was skillful. He
submitted unsuccessful or inapplicable motions and filings, procured no
expert testimony or documentation regarding mental illness, and presented
contradictory and unpersuasive versions of events in his testimony. But the
quality of Hasan’s legal acumen was not such that the court was compelled to
hold a competency hearing, especially given that courts are to be “cautious” in
deciding whether to inquire into a self-represented defendant’s competence.
(Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at pp. 530–531.)
Hasan now contends the case should be remanded for a “retrospective
determination” of whether he was competent to stand trial and represent
himself. He points to his “grandiose testimony about running businesses—
despite being homeless” as evidence that “his mental problems were
operative at the trial.” While some of Hasan’s claims were unusual, such as
his testimony that he “contact[ed] the Pentagon and state department” when

11
the officers kicked in his door, nothing suggested he had a severe mental
illness that prevented him from performing the tasks necessary for a defense.
(See People v. Ghobrial (2018) 5 Cal.5th 250, 271 [“[E]vidence of mental
illness alone is not sufficient to raise a doubt about a defendant’s competence
to stand trial.”]; People v. Johnson (2018) 6 Cal.5th 541, 552, 578 [expert
testimony that the “defendant suffered some from psychosis with ‘some kind
of a thinking disorder’ ” did not obligate the trial court to conduct a
competency hearing].) In fact, the trial court commented, on multiple
occasions, that Hasan was “doing very well” and “did a good job” conducting
his own direct examination, and that his questioning on the prior strike
conviction allegations was “well done”
Once Hasan’s attorney voiced concerns about his mental health, the
trial court explained, “I never felt he was [section] 1368, nor did I feel he was
insane. I did feel that he was somewhat arrogant, paranoid, eccentric [. . . .]
He was, I think, reasonably good at trial.” Thus, the trial court made it clear
there was no evidence during the proceedings that warranted an inquiry into
Hasan’s competency. (See Johnson, supra, 53 Cal.4th at p. 531 [deference to
a trial court’s competence determination “is especially appropriate when . . .
the same judge has observed the defendant on numerous occasions”].) The
strict standard imposed by Edwards and Johnson requires the existence of a
severe mental illness that prevents a defendant from performing the basic
tasks necessary for presenting a defense. (Id. at p. 530.) In the absence of
sufficient evidence showing Hasan had such an illness or could not perform
these tasks, we conclude substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
determination that a psychological evaluation was not necessary, and that
Hasan was mentally competent to represent himself.

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Moreover, while Hasan contends the “record leaves doubts about [his]
competence when he waived his right to counsel and when the trial occurred,”
he also acknowledges “the record does not reflect any concern by the trial
court and the attorneys regarding [his] competence to represent himself
during pretrial proceedings and the trial.” Thus, “[i]n the absence of evidence
sufficient to find incompetency as a matter of law, or a retroactive finding of
incompetency by the trial court, we cannot find the later incompetency
finding . . . reaches back to some unknown and unidentified point in earlier
proceedings.” (People v. Smith (2003) 110 Cal.App.4th 492, 505.)
DISPOSITION
We affirm the judgment.

KELETY, J.

WE CONCUR:

DATO, Acting P. J.

DO, J.

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