In re Noah M. CA2/1

CourtListener 10736868CalctappNov 14, 2025

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Filed 11/14/25 In re Noah M. CA2/1
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

In re NOAH M., a Person Coming B343080
Under the Juvenile Court Law. (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 23CCJP03936)

LOS ANGELES COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN
AND FAMILY SERVICES,

Plaintiff,

v.

PATRICIA G.,

Defendant and Appellant;

CARLOS M.,

Defendant and Respondent.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Jean M. Nelson, Judge. Affirmed.
Liana Serobian, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Mark L. Tseselsky for Defendant and Respondent.
____________________

Defendant and appellant Patricia G. (mother) and
defendant and respondent Carlos M. (father) have one child
together, Noah M. (born in 2017). The juvenile court asserted
dependency jurisdiction over Noah because father had assaulted
mother in Noah’s presence on multiple occasions. Approximately
nine months after the combined jurisdiction and disposition
hearing, the court terminated dependency jurisdiction with an
order awarding the parents joint legal and physical custody of
Noah. The order permits each parent to have physical custody of
the child for alternating seven-day periods. Prior to issuance of
the custody order, father was entitled to unsupervised visitation
with Noah every first and third weekend of the month from
Thursday through Monday.
On appeal, mother contests the award of joint physical
custody to the parents on two grounds: (1) The juvenile court
violated mother’s free speech and due process rights by directing
the parties to select from among three potential physical custody
arrangements, thereby preventing mother from making “her own
determination and arguments to the court” on that issue; and
(2) the court abused its discretion in finding joint physical
custody was in Noah’s best interest because Noah expressed his
desire to continue to live with mother and visit father, father
indicated he was not ready for joint physical custody, and mother
ably cared for Noah.

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First, mother’s claims of constitutional error fail because
the court allowed her to present her arguments as to the proper
physical custody arrangement for Noah. The court directed the
parties to address three alternative physical custody orders only
after mother had an opportunity to advocate for her position on
physical custody. Second, mother fails to demonstrate error
under the deferential abuse of discretion standard that governs
our review of the custody order. We thus affirm.

PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
We summarize only those facts relevant to our disposition
of this appeal.
On November 16, 2023, the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS or the
agency) filed a dependency petition asserting jurisdiction over
then six-year-old Noah M. pursuant to Welfare and Institutions
Code2 section 300.3 As later sustained by the juvenile court, the
dependency petition alleged a single count under section 300,

1 We derive our Procedural Background in part from
admissions made by the parties in their filings and assertions
advanced by the respondent (father) that the appellant (mother)
does not dispute in her reply. (See Association for Los Angeles
Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th
764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774 (Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs) [utilizing this approach].)
2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and
Institutions Code.
3 DCFS also sought dependency jurisdiction over
Noah M.’s older maternal half sibling, Sophia G. The juvenile
court’s orders concerning Sophia G. are not at issue in this
appeal.

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subdivision (b)(1), which averred: “The children, Sophia G[.]’s
and Noah M[.]’s mother . . . and the mother’s male companion . . .
[father] . . . , have a history of engaging in violent physical
altercations in the presence of the children. On multiple
occasions[,] . . . father struck . . . mother resulting in . . . mother
sustaining bruises. On 08/25/2023, . . . father was arrested
for . . . father’s conduct.[4] The violent conduct by . . . father . . .
against . . . mother[ ] endangers the children’s physical health
and safety, creates a detrimental home environment, and places
the children at risk of serious physical harm, damage, danger,
and failure to protect.” The juvenile court clarified in a minute
order that mother is “nonoffending in the petition.”
According to the detention report filed on
November 16, 2023, mother and father reported to DCFS that
prior to the filing of the dependency petition, a trial court had
granted father unsupervised visits with Noah every first and
third weekend of the month from Thursday through Monday. At
the initial hearing held on December 4, 2023, the juvenile court
ordered the parents to continue to adhere to that visitation
schedule.
In March 2024, the juvenile court (1) sustained the
jurisdictional count concerning father’s perpetration of violent
acts against mother; (2) declared Noah a dependent of the court;
(3) released Noah to his parents’ custody “on the condition that
they don’t live together and cooperate[ ] with the [agency]”;
(4) ordered father to participate in certain services, including
parenting and domestic violence programs; (5) declared “[a]ll

4The criminal court ultimately granted father diversion
and ordered him to complete a domestic violence treatment
program and individual counseling.

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prior orders not in conflict shall remain in full force and effect”;
and (6) scheduled a section 364 review hearing for
September 5, 2024.
At that section 364 review hearing, the juvenile court found
by a preponderance of the evidence that conditions still existed
justifying assumption of dependency jurisdiction over Noah,
scheduled another section 364 review hearing for
December 5, 2024, and declared, “All prior orders not in conflict
shall remain in full force and effect.”5 On September 9, 2024, the
juvenile court issued a restraining order protecting mother from
father; the order expires in 2027 and does not bar father from
communicating with mother about custody exchanges.
The juvenile court held the next section 364 review hearing
on December 5 and 12, 2024, which proceeding we describe in
greater detail in our Discussion, parts A–B, post. On
December 12, 2024, the court awarded mother and father joint
legal and physical custody of Noah, with each parent having
physical custody for alternating seven-day periods subject to a
specified schedule for holidays. The court thereafter issued a
juvenile custody order memorializing its rulings and terminated
dependency jurisdiction.
Mother timely appealed from the juvenile custody order.

5 “At a section 364 review hearing, ‘[t]he court shall
terminate its jurisdiction unless the social worker or his or her
department establishes by a preponderance of evidence that the
conditions still exist which would justify initial assumption of
jurisdiction under Section 300, or that those conditions are likely
to exist if supervision is withdrawn.’ [Citation.]” (In re
D.N. (2020) 56 Cal.App.5th 741, 755, fn. 10.)

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APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
“When ‘the juvenile court terminates its jurisdiction over a
minor who has been adjudged a dependent child . . . the juvenile
court on its own motion[ ] may issue . . . an order determining the
custody of, or visitation with, the child.’ [Citation.]” (In re
N.M. (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 1090, 1094 (N.M.), quoting § 362.4,
subd. (a).) This custody/visitation order, which is “commonly
referred to as an ‘exit order[,]’[ ] . . . will become part of the
relevant family law file and remain in effect in the family law
action ‘until modified or terminated by a subsequent order.’ ”
(See In re T.S. (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 503, 513, fn. omitted.)
“ ‘When making a custody determination in any dependency case,
the court’s focus and primary consideration must always be the
best interests of the child.’ [Citations.]” (N.M., at p. 1094.)
“We review a custody (or ‘exit’) order pursuant to
section 362.4 for abuse of discretion . . . .” (N.M., supra,
88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094.) “ ‘ “ ‘ “The appropriate test for abuse
of discretion is whether the trial court exceeded the bounds of
reason.” ’ ” ’ [Citation.]” (In re Juan A. (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th
1204, 1208 (Juan A.).)

DISCUSSION

A. Mother Fails To Demonstrate the Juvenile Court
Violated Her Free Speech and Due Process Rights By
Directing the Parties To Address Three Alternative
Custody Arrangements for Noah
Mother argues: “[A]t the contested section 364 [proceeding
held in December 2024], the juvenile court violated mother’s
freedom of speech under the First Amendment and substantive
and procedural due process rights under the Fourteenth

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Amendment of the US Constitution when it limited her . . . to
only select one of three physical custody arrangements the court
offered at the contested section 364 [proceeding], completely
ignoring the actual arguments mother and other parties made
with regard to their desired custody orders when terminating
jurisdiction over Noah.” Mother contends the juvenile court
“thereby violat[ed] . . . [her] . . . freedom of speech to make her
own determination and arguments to the court, and fair and
meaningful access to the courts as the court became a quasi-
litigator, selecting the arguments the parties could make.” The
record does not support these arguments.
As a preliminary matter, mother maintains we should
review her claims of constitutional error de novo. We assume
solely for the purpose of this appeal that mother identifies the
correct appellate standard. “[R]egardless of the applicable
standard of review,” “[t]he appellant bears th[e] burden of
rebutting the presumption of correctness accorded to the [lower]
court’s decision . . . .” (See Association for Los Angeles Deputy
Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at p. 777.) To discharge this
burden, the appellant must support the positions taken with
“ ‘ “reasoned argument and citations to authority . . . .” ’
[Citation.]” (See In re J.F. (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 70, 79–80 &
fn. 5.)
The record belies mother’s assertion the juvenile court
acted as a “quasi-litigator” by preventing her from “mak[ing] her
own . . . arguments to the court . . . .” The reporter’s transcript
from the proceedings held on December 5, 2024 shows the
juvenile court directed the parties to consider three alternative
physical custody arrangements for Noah after the court had
admitted the parties’ exhibits into evidence and heard each

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party’s views as to the appropriate physical custody order.6 The
three alternatives identified by the court were: (1) Each parent
has custody of Noah for “alternate weeks all year long” with
“some little adjustments for Mother’s day or birthdays”;
(2) father’s parenting time would alternate between father having
Noah from Wednesday afternoon through Monday morning one
week and Wednesday to Thursday the following week; and
(3) father would have Noah on Wednesday and drop him off at
school on Thursday morning, and each parent would have Noah
on alternating weekends starting on Friday afternoon, with the
court “split[ting] up the . . . . school holidays[ and] summer
holidays, starting with 50/50 but trying to give father a bit more
time.” The reporter’s transcript for the proceedings held on
December 12, 2024 reveals the court allowed the parties to
present argument on which of the three physical custody
arrangements they preferred.

6 At the outset of the December 5, 2024 hearing, the
juvenile court admitted into evidence certain agency reports,
mother’s co-parenting certificate and a letter accompanying the
certificate, and father’s exhibit number 1. DCFS, Noah’s counsel,
and mother’s counsel thereafter presented their views on the
proper physical custody arrangement for Noah. Shortly
thereafter, father’s counsel clarified that his client was seeking a
“50/50” custody arrangement. Mother’s counsel subsequently
presented argument in support of her request for sole physical
custody, and father’s counsel likewise presented argument
supporting his request for a “50/50” custody arrangement. Later
on during the December 5, 2024 proceeding, the juvenile court
identified three alternative physical custody plans and instructed
the parties to consider these alternatives.

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Accordingly, the juvenile court did not hinder mother’s
ability to present her case. The court allowed the parties to
present their respective recommended custody arrangements.
The court then informed mother and the other parties that it was
inclined to select one of three potential physical custody
arrangements and afforded them an opportunity to address those
options. Because we reject the factual underpinnings of mother’s
free speech and due process claims, her arguments fail.
In an apparent attempt to resuscitate these claims of error,
mother argues in her reply brief that our decision in In re Cole Y.
(2015) 233 Cal.App.4th 1444 (Cole Y.) supports her position the
juvenile court violated her constitutional rights. In Cole Y., a
juvenile court issued an exit order that awarded a child’s mother
sole physical custody and granted his father monitored visitation.
(See Cole Y., at p. 1446.) We reversed the exit order insofar as it
purported to bar the family court from modifying the custody and
visitation provisions unless the father completed certain
programs. (See ibid.) We reasoned, “Under section 302,
subdivision (d), the decision to modify an exit order was, and is,
within the province of the family court, and then only upon a
finding of ‘significant change of circumstances’ and that the
modification is in ‘the best interests of the child.’ ” (See Cole Y.,
at p. 1456, quoting § 302, subd. (d).)
We did not address any free speech, due process, or other
constitutional claims in Cole Y. (See, e.g., Cole Y., supra,
233 Cal.App.4th at p. 1446 [noting the father had contested
(1) the evidentiary sufficiency of the juvenile court’s jurisdictional
findings, and (2) the provision of the exit order conditioning
modification thereof on the father’s completion of certain
programs].) Nevertheless, mother argues that Cole Y. is

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“instructive” because, “if the juvenile court cannot instruct the
family court how to rule, it certainly cannot instruct parties how
to argue their case or limit their arguments to three pre-selected
arguments.” (Boldface & capitalization omitted from second
quotation.) As set forth above, the juvenile court permitted
mother to advocate for her position on physical custody and
thereafter allowed her to address three alternative potential
custody orders.
For these reasons, we conclude that mother has not shown
the juvenile court infringed on her free speech and due process
rights.

B. Mother Does Not Show the Juvenile Court Abused
Its Discretion In Awarding Joint Physical Custody of
Noah to Mother and Father
Mother contends the juvenile court abused its discretion in
awarding joint physical custody. She claims, “[T]he joint physical
custody order was . . . not in Noah’s best interests[ because] it
was vehemently objected to by mother, even father did not want
such responsibility, and Noah clearly wanted to continue living
with mother and visiting father as” was provided “in [the] then
active family law order.” These arguments fail under the
deferential appellate standard that governs our review.
To support her assertion that father did not want joint
physical custody, mother claims, “[F]ather wrote to the social
worker [that he sought] . . . to keep the status quo with only an
addition of one overnight on his weeks, Wednesday to Monday,
and one Wednesday overnight during the weeks he did not have
custody.” She also claims that at the December 12, 2024 hearing,
“father’s counsel informed the court that ‘[o]ption 2 [is]
honestly . . . the best option given the three alternatives

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[identified by the juvenile court],’ ” which option “offered [father]
less custody time[ than a] 50/50 split . . . .”7
Notwithstanding mother’s argument to the contrary, the
e-mail from father to the social worker that mother cites does not
show father felt unready for an order awarding him joint physical
custody. In the correspondence, father stated his “strong
preference [was] for a 50/50 parenting plan.” Father stated he
was “offering [a] compromise” short of a 50/50 parenting plan “as
a good faith effort” to “[f]ocus on Noah’s needs and at the same
time be patient with and help create a new normal with” mother.
That father’s counsel requested the juvenile court’s second
physical custody option likewise does not show his client was
unprepared for joint physical custody. Indeed, shortly before the
December 12, 2024 hearing, father submitted a declaration in
which he expressed his concern that awarding each parent
custody of Noah for alternating seven-day periods “would reduce
the frequency of [father’s] meaningful interactions” with Noah.
Father stated he believed the court’s second option would provide
more “continuity and stability” for Noah than a “7-on/7-off
schedule,” even though the former would provide father with less
parenting time.
As for Noah’s wishes, mother directs us to an excerpt from
the section 364 status review report filed on November 22, 2024
in which the agency remarked, “Noah continues to state that he

7 As we noted in our Discussion, part A, ante, the second
potential physical custody arrangement identified by the juvenile
court would have alternated on a weekly basis between
permitting father to have parenting time with Noah from
Wednesday afternoon through Monday morning one week and
Wednesday to Thursday the next week.

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likes his visits with his father and living with his mom.” The
juvenile court interpreted this passage from the report as follows:
“It is merely stating he likes his visits with father and living with
mom, but it is not clear he is stating a preference for that
arrangement.” We defer to the juvenile court’s finding on this
point. (See N.M., supra, 88 Cal.App.5th at p. 1094 [“ ‘ “ ‘When
two or more inferences can reasonably be deduced from the facts,
the reviewing court has no authority [under the abuse of
discretion standard] to substitute its decision for that of the trial
court.’ ” ’ ”].)8
Mother also claims DCFS’s reports show mother was “ ‘very
affectionate and loving toward her son[,]’ ” and “Noah did well in
mother’s care[,] . . . was healthy and happy, . . . attend[ed] weekly
counseling,” and “ ‘appear[ed] to be . . . content living with his
mother.’ ” Assuming arguendo mother is correct that Noah was
thriving in her care, that fact does not undermine the juvenile
court’s decision to award mother and father joint physical
custody.
Lastly, the juvenile court stated its rationale for awarding
the parents joint physical custody of Noah with each parent
having the child on alternating weeks. The court explained this

8 Mother also cites part of the section 364 status review
report DCFS filed on August 20, 2024 and an attachment to the
section 364 status review report filed on November 22, 2024 for
the proposition that “Noah repeatedly and consistently stated to
the social worker and his own counsel that he wanted to live with
mother and visit father as is, which was 1st and 3rd weekend of
the month, from Thursday at 4 pm [to] Monday [at] 8 am.” These
excerpts, however, do not show that Noah had expressed a desire
to live with mother and continue visiting father in accordance
with the then-operative visitation schedule.

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joint custody arrangement “gives father the advantage of being
able to stay involved with the school and [Noah’s] midweek
activities,” affords father “plenty of time to interact [with Noah]
during the school year,” and is a “straightforward . . . clear 50/50
arrangement.” The court further noted the “complexity” of the
other potential custody arrangements would “be confusing to
Noah” and could “be used by one or other party to try and get
something more . . . .” In addition, the court explained it had
rejected mother’s request for sole physical custody because
“father has been having overnight . . . and unmonitored visits,”
“father has done the services [ordered by the court] and . . .
shown a change,” “[Noah] has a good relationship with father[,]
and . . . father has been safe with the child . . . .” Mother does not
challenge these findings. In light of these uncontested findings,
we conclude the juvenile court did not “ ‘ “ ‘exceed[ ] the bounds of
reason’ ” ’ ” in ruling that an award of joint physical custody was
in Noah’s best interest. (See Juan A., supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1208 [describing the abuse of discretion standard].)

DISPOSITION
We affirm the juvenile court’s order awarding joint physical
custody of Noah M. to defendant and appellant Patricia G. and
defendant and respondent Carlos M.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.

BENDIX, Acting P. J.
We concur:

WEINGART, J. M. KIM, J.

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