CourtListener 10736500•People v. Arredondo CA2/7
Full text
Filed 11/13/25 P. v. Arredondo CA2/7
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B336153
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. KA102751)
v.
NORBERTO ARREDONDO, JR.,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Joan M. Chrostek, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Justin Behravesh, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Senior
Assistant Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, Supervising Attorney
General, Lauren N. Guber, Deputy Attorney General, for Plaintiff
and Respondent.
INTRODUCTION
In 2015 a jury found Norberto Arredondo, Jr. guilty of
arson, assault, dissuading a witness, and other crimes. The trial
court found that Arredondo had a prior felony conviction that was
both a serious or violent felony within the meaning of the three
strikes law and a serious felony within the meaning of Penal
Code section 667, subdivision (a)(1),1 and that he had served two
prior prison terms, within the meaning of section 667.5, former
subdivision (b). The court ultimately sentenced Arredondo as a
second strike offender to a prison term of 26 years six months,
which included a five-year enhancement for the prior serious
felony conviction and a one-year enhancement for having served
a prior prison term.
In 2023 the superior court held a resentencing hearing
under section 1172.75. The court struck the prior prison term
enhancement and resentenced Arredondo to a prison term of
25 years six months. Arredondo argues the superior court abused
its discretion in denying his requests under section 1385 to strike
his prior serious or violent felony conviction and to dismiss his
five-year serious felony enhancement. Because the superior court
applied an incorrect legal standard in deciding whether to
dismiss the five-year enhancement, we reverse the judgment and
direct the court to exercise its discretion whether to strike that
enhancement and to resentence Arredondo.
1 Statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. A Jury Convicts Arredondo on 11 Counts, and the
Trial Court Sentences Him
On July 5, 2013 Arredondo and his girlfriend, Elia D., were
at his mother’s house when Arredondo accused Elia of sleeping
with someone else. When Elia tried to leave, Arredondo pushed
her to the ground, pulled her hair, dragged her, hit her, and
threw a stool at her, leaving bruises on her arms, leg, and head.
After Elia got home, she heard Arredondo knocking on her
window and saying, “Come out. I know you’re in there.” Elia did
not respond.
In the following days Arredondo called Elia and her
relatives and went to their homes. He sent Elia a text message
saying that he was sorry and that they were “going to be together
forever.” He also sent Elia text messages threatening to kill her
and her family. He wrote, “I don’t care if you call the cops
tonight, you fuckin’ rat. I’m going to kill you.”
A few weeks later Elia went to the home of Arredondo’s
mother to help clean the carpet. Arredondo became angry, and
Elia ran into the bathroom. She tried to close the door, but
Arredondo pushed it open. He threw her on the ground, pulled
her hair, hit her, and choked her. Arredondo told Elia he would
“chop [her] up into little pieces and take [her] to the desert and
bury [her].” When she ran outside, he chased her with a knife.
The police arrived and took Elia away, but she did not tell them
what happened because Arredondo told her that he was “from the
mafia” and that he and his “homies” would get her entire family.
On July 25, 2013 Arredondo sent Elia a text message
stating, “When you get [home], you are going to see all the
3
firemen all over the place, bitch. . . . You fucked with the wrong
homeboy.” Arredondo drove up and down the street honking his
horn. Elia left and spent the night at her cousin’s house. On the
night of July 26, 2013 Arrendondo sent Elia a text message
saying, “Your daughter and you are going to be burned.” Early
the next morning Elia’s daughter awoke and found her car was
on fire. A neighbor saw Arredondo running from Elia’s home
with a red gas can. Police later found a red gas can nozzle on the
passenger seat of Arredondo’s car.
After Arredondo was arrested, he called Elia several times
from jail. On August 8, 2013 the trial court issued a protective
order prohibiting Arredondo from contacting Elia or her
daughter. On September 20, 2013, while Elia was in the
courthouse waiting to testify at Arredondo’s preliminary hearing,
Arredondo called her from jail and said he was going to “kill [her]
whole family because [she] came to court.” After the preliminary
hearing, Arredondo continued to call Elia and threaten her. He
said that she and her daughter were “next” and that her house
was a “target.” He stopped calling her in December 2013, but
began calling her again in January 2014, calling her as many as
50 times a day.
In 2015 a jury convicted Arredondo of arson (§ 451,
subd. (d); count 1), making a criminal threat (§ 422, subd. (a);
counts 2, 7, 11), simple assault (§ 240; count 4), assault by means
of force likely to produce great bodily injury (§ 245, subd. (a)(4);
count 5), dissuading a witness from reporting a crime (§ 136.1,
subd. (b)(1); count 6), dissuading a witness from testifying
(§ 136.1, subd. (a)(2); count 8), dissuading a witness by force or
threat from reporting a crime (§ 136.1, subd. (c)(1); count 9),
4
stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (b); count 10), and willful disobedience of
a court order (§ 166, subd. (a)(4); count 12).2
Arredondo admitted he had a prior conviction for a felony
that was a serious or violent felony, within the meaning of the
three strikes law (§§ 667, subds. (b)-(i), 1170.12, subds. (a)-(d)),
and a serious felony, within the meaning of section 667,
subdivision (a)(1). Arredondo also admitted he had served two
prior prison terms, within the meaning of section 667.5, former
subdivision (b).
The trial court sentenced Arredondo on his conviction for
dissuading a witness by force or threat from reporting a crime
(count 9) to a prison term of 15 years, consisting of the upper
term of four years, doubled under the three strikes law, plus
five years for the serious felony enhancement and two years for
the two prior prison term enhancements. The court sentenced
Arredondo to one year four months on each of his convictions for
arson, making a criminal threat, and dissuading a witness
(counts 1, 2, 6, 7, 8 and 11) (one-third of the middle term of
two years, doubled) and two years on each of his convictions for
assault by means of force likely to produce great bodily injury
and stalking (counts 5 and 10) (one-third the middle term of
three years, doubled), for a total of 12 years. The court also
sentenced Arredondo to six months in county jail on his
conviction for simple assault (count 4) and one year in county jail
on his conviction for willful disobedience of a court order (count
12), for a total sentence of 28 years six months.
Arredondo appealed. We struck one of the prior prison
term enhancements, instructed the trial court to stay (under
2 The trial court dismissed count 3 during trial.
5
section 654) execution of the sentence on Arredondo’s conviction
for violating a court order, and otherwise affirmed the judgment.
(People v. Arredondo (Feb. 15, 2017, B263217) [nonpub. opn.].)
On remand the trial court imposed a modified sentence of
26 years six months.
B. The Superior Court Resentences Arredondo Under
Section 1172.75
In 2021 the Legislature declared legally invalid prior prison
term enhancements imposed under section 667.5, former
subdivision (b), before January 1, 2020, except those arising from
convictions for sexually violent offenses. The Legislature enacted
section 1172.75, which provided a procedure for resentencing
inmates serving terms that included the now-invalid
enhancements. (§ 1172.75, subd. (a).)
In 2022 the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
notified the superior court that Arredondo was potentially
eligible for resentencing under section 1172.75. Arredondo filed a
brief asking the court to strike the prior prison term
enhancement, strike his prior serious or violent felony conviction
under People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996) 13 Cal.4th 497,
dismiss his serious felony enhancement under section 1385,
subdivision (c), and reduce his sentence on count 9 from the
upper term to the middle term. Arredondo argued he had
“completely changed his life and his behavior while in custody.”
He stated he had “disavowed any gang association”; completed
self-improvement programs, including criminal and gang
members anonymous and anger management; and consistently
attended school. Arredondo submitted positive evaluations from
his work supervisors in prison and post-release employment
6
offers. He stated he had reduced his prison classification score
from 68 to 22. Arredondo also stated that he was 60 years old
and that he suffered from depression and physical ailments. The
People agreed the court should strike the prior prison term
enhancement, but opposed any further reduction in Arredondo’s
sentence. The People argued Arredondo had a history of
convictions for “assaultive behavior,” committed crimes while on
probation and parole, had three serious rules violations in prison,
and was denied parole three times.
The superior court struck the now-invalid prior prison term
enhancement, but found it was “not in the interest of justice to
reduce the sentence further.” The court stated that Arredondo
“had a criminal history of increasing seriousness,” that he
“terrorized the victim,” that the parole board found he posed “an
unreasonable risk of significant criminal activity,” and that in
2017 he threatened to murder a person’s family if that person did
not return money to Arredondo’s mother. The court resentenced
Arredondo to a prison term of 25 years six months. Arredondo
timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
A. Section 1172.75
Section 1172.75, subdivision (a), states: “Any sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense . . . is legally invalid.” (See People v. Rhodius (2025)
17 Cal.5th 1050, 1054; People v. Grajeda (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th
829, 835-836.) Section 1172.75, subdivision (b), requires the
7
Department to identify individuals serving terms that include
no-longer-valid enhancements.
After the superior court verifies a judgment includes an
invalid enhancement, the court must “recall the sentence and
resentence the defendant.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (c).)
Section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(2), provides the court must
“apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and apply any
other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences and to
promote uniformity of sentencing.” ““‘By its plain terms,
section 1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the
trial court strike the newly ‘invalid’ enhancements.’”” (People v.
Dixon (2025) 112 Cal.App.5th 236, 243, review granted Oct. 22,
2025, S292223.) “The court may consider postconviction factors,
including, but not limited to, the disciplinary record and record of
rehabilitation of the defendant while incarcerated, evidence that
reflects whether age, time served, and diminished physical
condition, if any, have reduced the defendant’s risk for future
violence, and evidence that reflects that circumstances have
changed since the original sentencing so that continued
incarceration is no longer in the interest of justice.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(3).)
We review a trial court’s sentencing decisions in a
section 1172.75 resentencing proceeding for abuse of discretion.
(People v. Moseley (2024) 105 Cal.App.5th 870, 874; People v.
Garcia (2024) 101 Cal.App.5th 848, 855-856.) But in “reviewing
matters of statutory interpretation . . . we review the trial court’s
decision de novo.” (People v. Gonzalez (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th
312, 323; see People v. Braden (2023) 14 Cal.5th 791, 804 [“‘The
8
interpretation of a statute presents a question of law that this
court reviews de novo.’”].)
B. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion in
Denying Arredondo’s Request To Dismiss His Serious
or Violent Felony Conviction
Arredondo argues the superior court abused its discretion
in denying his request to dismiss his prior serious or violent
felony conviction. The court did not abuse its discretion.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
The trial court has discretion under section 1385,
subdivision (a), to dismiss in furtherance of justice “allegations or
findings that a defendant has previously been convicted of a
serious and/or violent felony that would otherwise count as a
‘strike’ under the ‘Three Strikes’ law.” (People v. Dain (2025)
18 Cal.5th 246, 252; see People v. Superior Court (Romero),
supra, 13 Cal.4th at pp. 529-530.) “In deciding whether to
exercise its discretion to dismiss a prior strike conviction in the
interests of justice, a trial court ‘must consider whether, in light
of the nature and circumstances of his present felonies and prior
serious and/or violent felony convictions, and the particulars of
his background, character, and prospects, the defendant may be
deemed outside the [sentencing] scheme’s spirit, in whole or in
part, and hence should be treated as though he had not
previously been convicted of one or more serious and/or violent
felonies.’” (People v. Nunez (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 362, 370-371;
see People v. Rogers (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 340, 358; People v.
Williams (1998) 17 Cal.4th 148, 161.)
9
“[T]he three strikes law not only establishes a sentencing
norm, it carefully circumscribes the trial court’s power to depart
from this norm and requires the court to explicitly justify its
decision to do so. In doing so, the law creates a strong
presumption that any sentence that conforms to these sentencing
norms is both rational and proper.” (People v. Carmony (2004)
33 Cal.4th 367, 378; see People v. Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th
at p. 358; People v. Avila (2020) 57 Cal.App.5th 1134, 1140.) “We
review a trial court’s ruling on a Romero motion under the
deferential abuse of discretion standard, which requires the
defendant to show that the sentencing decision was irrational or
arbitrary.” (Avila, at p. 1140; see Carmony, at p. 375.)
2. The Superior Court Did Not Abuse Its
Discretion
Arredondo fell well within the spirit of the three strikes
law. His current convictions included felonies that were both
serious (arson, intimidating a witness, and making a criminal
threat; see § 1192.7, subd. (c)(14), (37) & (38)) and violent (arson;
see § 667.5, subd. (c)(10)). And his current crimes were only the
latest in a pattern of domestic-violence-related offenses over the
previous two decades. In 1994 Arredondo was charged with
domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and pleaded guilty to
misdemeanor battery (§ 242). In 1995 he was convicted of
misdemeanor domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)). In 1996 he
was convicted of domestic violence (§ 273.5, subd. (a)) and
stalking (§ 646.9, subd. (b)), initially placed on probation for three
years, but in 1998 had his probation revoked and was sentenced
to three years in prison after a new domestic violence conviction
(§ 273.5, subd. (a)). In January 2000 Arredondo was released on
10
parole and remained out of custody until 2004, when he was
arrested for assault with a deadly weapon (§ 245, subd. (a)(1)). In
2005 he was convicted of assault with a deadly weapon (the
serious or violent felony conviction) and sentenced to eight years
in prison. In February 2011 Arredondo was released on parole
and in July 2013 he committed the current crimes.
Arredondo’s lengthy history of committing similar
offenses—including while on probation or parole—“‘reveals that
[he] had been taught, through the application of formal sanction,
that [such] criminal conduct was unacceptable—but had failed or
refused to learn his lesson.’” (People v. Williams, supra,
17 Cal.4th at p. 163; see People v. Mendoza (2022) 74 Cal.App.5th
843, 857 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding
“a career criminal who is unable to remain out of prison for more
than a few years at a time” fell within the spirit of the three
strikes law]; People v. Eribarne (2004) 124 Cal.App.4th 1463,
1469 [trial court did not abuse its discretion in concluding a
defendant who “in the preceding 20 years . . . had been
continuously in trouble with the law except for a brief period of
about three years” was within the spirit of the three strikes law];
People v. Philpot (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 893, 906, 907 [trial court
did not abuse its discretion in concluding a “flagrant recidivist”
who “consistently committed criminal offenses for the past
20 years” was “not outside the spirit of the three strikes law”].)
The three strikes law was made for defendants like Arredondo.
Arredondo argues his 2005 serious or violent felony
conviction was “remote” because it occurred 18 years before his
resentencing hearing. However, the “remoteness of a prior
conviction, ‘by itself, cannot be a basis for dismissing a prior
strike conviction.’” (People v. Dowdy (2024) 107 Cal.App.5th 1,
11
12; see § 667, subd. (c)(3) [“the length of time between the prior
serious or violent felony conviction and the current felony
conviction shall not affect the imposition of sentence”].)
Moreover, Arredondo spent all but two and a half of those
18 years in prison, with little opportunity to commit new crimes
(outside of prison). (See People v. Beasley (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th
495, 501 [“‘In analyzing whether a defendant’s prior criminal
conduct was “remote,” a trial court should consider whether the
defendant “was incarcerated a substantial part of the intervening
time and thus had little or no opportunity to commit” additional
crimes.’”]; People v. Vasquez (2021) 72 Cal.App.5th 374, 390
[same].) And though Arredondo was not convicted of any crimes
while incarcerated, he had three rules violations, including one in
2017 for threatening to murder the family of a person who
allegedly swindled Arredondo’s mother out of money.
Arredondo also argues his age (now 62), depression, and
physical ailments “diminish his ability for future violence.” But
advancing “age, considered alone, does not remove a defendant
from the spirit of the Three Strikes law.” (People v. Vasquez,
supra, 72 Cal.App.5th at p. 391; see People v. Strong (2001)
87 Cal.App.4th 328, 345, disapproved on another ground in
People v. Dain, supra, 18 Cal.5th 246 at p. 265, fn. 5.)
Arredondo also argues that he “has taken significant steps
toward rehabilitation while in prison,” that he “is not the same
person who was convicted back in 2015,” and that he “has
numerous job opportunities if he were to be released.”
Arredondo’s disavowal of gang ties, completion of classes,
favorable reviews from supervisors, and possibility of future
employment were relevant factors in the superior court’s
assessment of Arredondo’s “background, character, and
12
prospects.” (People v. Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 358.)
Arredondo, however, does not argue the superior court failed to
consider these factors. (See People v. Giminez (1975) 14 Cal.3d
68, 72 [“a trial court should be presumed to have acted to achieve
legitimate sentencing objectives,” and its discretionary
sentencing determinations “ought not be set aside on review”];
People v. Brugman (2021) 62 Cal.App.5th 608, 637 [sentencing
court “is presumed to have considered all of the relevant factors
in the absence of an affirmative record to the contrary”].) In light
of Arredondo’s extensive criminal history and his rules violations
in prison, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding Arredondo was within the spirit of the three strikes
law. (See Brugman, at p. 637 [“Only in ‘an extraordinary case—
where the relevant factors . . . manifestly support the striking of
a prior conviction and no reasonable minds could differ’[—]would
‘the failure to strike . . . constitute an abuse of discretion.’”].)
C. The Superior Court Erred in Denying Arredondo’s
Request To Dismiss His Serious Felony Enhancement
Arredondo argues the superior court abused its discretion
in refusing to dismiss his prior serious felony enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1). He contends that the prior
conviction was remote and that he has made “sustained and good
faith efforts toward rehabilitation” while in prison. We conclude
the superior court erred by applying an incorrect legal standard
in denying Arredondo’s request to dismiss the enhancement.
1. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
Section 1385, subdivision (c)(1), provides “the court shall
dismiss an enhancement if it is in the furtherance of justice to do
13
so.” Section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), provides that, in exercising
its discretion under subdivision (c), the court must consider and
“afford great weight to evidence offered by the defendant to
prove” any of nine listed mitigating factors (see § 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(A)-(I)), “unless the court finds that dismissal of the
enhancement would endanger public safety” (§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)).
Those mitigating factors include that the “enhancement is based
on a prior conviction that is over five years old.” (§ 1385,
subd. (c)(2)(H).)
In deciding whether to dismiss an enhancement under
section 1385, subdivision (c), the superior court must first
consider whether dismissing an enhancement “would endanger
public safety.” (People v. Walker (2024) 16 Cal.5th 1024, 1038;
see § 1385, subd. (c)(2).) If so, the court may deny a request to
dismiss an enhancement. (Walker, at p. 1033.) If the court does
not find dismissing an enhancement would endanger public
safety, the court must consider whether the defendant has
presented evidence of one or more of the mitigating factors listed
in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2). (Walker, at p. 1038.) If so, the
court must engage “‘in a holistic balancing with special emphasis
on the [nine] enumerated mitigating factors’” and must dismiss
the enhancement unless the court finds “substantial, credible
evidence of countervailing factors that ‘may nonetheless
neutralize even the great weight of the mitigating circumstance,
such that dismissal of the enhancement is not in furtherance of
justice.’” (Id. at p. 1036.) “Stated simply, if the court does not
conclude that dismissal would endanger public safety, then
mitigating circumstances strongly favor dismissing the
enhancement.” (Ibid.)
14
We review the superior court’s order denying a request to
dismiss an enhancement under section 1385 for abuse of
discretion. (People v. Mendoza (2023) 88 Cal.App.5th 287, 298.)
The superior court abuses its discretion if it considers
impermissible factors or applies an incorrect legal standard.
(People v. Gonzalez (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 215, 225; see People v.
Knoller (2007) 41 Cal.4th 139, 156.) Because a defendant is
“entitled to sentencing decisions made through the exercise of
informed discretion,” a “court acting while unaware of the full
scope of its discretion is deemed to have abused it.” (People v.
McDavid (2024) 15 Cal.5th 1015, 1023; see People v. Salazar
(2023) 15 Cal.5th 416, 424.)
2. The Superior Court Applied an Incorrect Legal
Standard
Without the benefit of the Supreme Court’s opinion in
People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th 1024, which was decided
eight months after the superior court resentenced Arredondo, the
superior court did not apply the correct legal standard. The
superior court did not find dismissing the enhancement—which
would reduce Arredondo’s sentence by five years—would
endanger public safety. Nor did the court mention the
enumerated mitigating circumstance Arredondo raised in his
resentencing brief—that the enhancement was based on a prior
conviction that was more than five years old—much less give it
“great weight” in deciding whether to dismiss the enhancement.
(See § 1385, subd. (c)(2)(H).) After the superior court stated it
would strike the one-year enhancement under section 667.5,
former subdivision (b), but not reduce the sentence further,
counsel for Arredondo asked the court whether it would strike the
15
“five-year prior” (i.e., the five-year enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1)) or the “strike prior” (i.e., the
serious or violent felony conviction under the three strikes law).3
The court responded: “No. The court is going to leave those
intact. The lower court found them to be true and this court
defers to the trial court.”
Section 1172.75 required the superior court to conduct a
full resentencing, not simply to defer to the trial court’s
2015 sentencing decision. By deferring to the trial court on
whether to strike the serious felony conviction enhancement, the
superior court ignored section 1172.75’s mandate to apply
“changes in law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial
3 Counsel for Arredondo argued the court should dismiss an
enhancement because there were “two or more alleged.” (See
§ 1385, subd. (c)(2)(B) [“all enhancements beyond a single
enhancement shall be dismissed”].) But after the court struck
the invalid prior prison term enhancement, only a single
enhancement remained: the five-year enhancement for the prior
serious felony conviction under section 667, subdivision (a)(1).
The prior serious or violent felony conviction (the “strike prior”)
was not an enhancement. (See People v. Burke (2023)
89 Cal.App.5th 237, 243 [“the Three Strikes law is not an
enhancement; it is an alternative sentencing scheme for the
current offense”].) “Section 1385(c) does not apply to a decision
whether to dismiss a strike because the subdivision ‘applies only
to an “enhancement,” and the Three Strikes law is not an
enhancement.’” (People v. Dain (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 235, 247;
see People v. Dowdy, supra, 107 Cal.App.5th at p. 9
[“section 1385, subdivision (c) applies by its terms to a sentence
‘enhancement,’ but not to a sentence derived from the alternative
sentencing scheme of the Three Strikes law”]; People v. Olay
(2023) 98 Cal.App.5th 60, 62 [“[T]he term ‘enhancement’ in
section 1385, subdivision (c) does not include prior strikes.”].)
16
discretion.” (§ 1172.75, subd. (d)(2).) In 2015 the trial court had
to impose the five-year prior serious felony enhancement under
section 667, subdivision (a)(1), but effective 2019, Senate Bill
No. 1393 (2017-2018 Reg. Sess.) (Stats. 2018, ch. 1013, § 1), gave
trial courts discretion to strike that enhancement under
section 1385. (See People v. Morelos (2022) 13 Cal.5th 722, 769;
People v. Rogers, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 349.) By deferring
to the trial court’s imposition of the enhancement, the superior
court deprived Arredondo of the benefit of a change in law. (See
People v. Carter (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 960, 968 [“simply striking
the one-year enhancement imposed under the repealed portion of
former section 667.5, subdivision (b),” deprived the defendant “of
his right to full resentencing under the changes in the law”];
People v. Coddington (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 562, 567 [court erred
by failing “to provide [the defendant] with a full resentencing
hearing, meaning a hearing in which he could have sought
further sentencing relief under at least two other statutes that
were enacted after his conviction”].) In addition, section 1172.75,
subdivision (d)(3), authorized the superior court to consider
postconviction factors, such as Arredondo’s disciplinary record
and rehabilitation while in prison, his age, and his physical
condition—factors not available to the trial court in 2015. (See
Rogers, at p. 361 [section 1172.75, subdivision (d)(3), “promotes
an examination of information and circumstances that did not
exist at the time of the original sentencing which, in turn, evinces
an intent that the resentencing court must sentence anew under
present circumstances”].)
The People do not contend that the superior court found
dismissing the enhancement would endanger public safety or
that the court gave great weight to the fact the enhancement was
17
based on a conviction more than five years old, a mitigating
circumstance the People concede applies here. Instead, the
People argue “the record here is replete with ‘substantial,
credible evidence’ justifying the lower court’s finding that
dismissal of the enhancement would not be in the interests of
justice.” Perhaps, but the record does not show that, after
engaging in “holistic balancing,” the superior court found that
evidence neutralized the great weight of the mitigating
circumstance. (See People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th at
p. 1036.) Thus, the superior court applied an incorrect legal
standard in denying Arredondo’s request to dismiss the
enhancement.
Finally, the superior court’s error was prejudicial because
the record does not “clearly indicate” the court would have
reached the same conclusion had it applied the correct legal
standard. (See People v. Salazar, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 424
[where the trial court fails to exercise “‘“‘informed discretion,’”’”
the “‘“appropriate remedy is to remand for resentencing unless
the record “clearly indicate[s]” that the trial court would have
reached the same conclusion “even if it had been aware that it
had such discretion”’”]; People v. Gutierrez (2014) 58 Cal.4th
1354, 1391 [same]; People v. Monroe (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 393,
402 [remand was required where the defendant “was entitled to,
but did not receive, a full resentencing under the terms of
section 1172.75, including the application of ‘any other changes in
law that reduce sentences or provide for judicial discretion’”].)
Therefore, on remand, the superior court should consider
whether dismissing the prior serious felony enhancement and
reducing Arredondo’s sentence from 25 years six months to
20 years six months would endanger public safety. (See People v.
18
Gonzalez, supra, 103 Cal.App.5th at pp. 230-231 [in assessing
whether dismissing an enhancement “would ‘endanger public
safety,’” the trial court should have considered “the date on which
[the defendant] could be released if the . . . enhancement was
dismissed,” not only whether the defendant “currently posed a
danger to the public”].) If the court does not make that finding, it
should dismiss the enhancement, unless it finds substantial,
credible evidence of countervailing factors that neutralize the
great weight of any applicable mitigating circumstance
enumerated in section 1385, subdivision (c)(2), including that the
enhancement was based on a prior conviction that was more than
five years old.
DISPOSITION
The judgment is reversed. The sentence is vacated and the
superior court is directed to resentence Arredondo in accordance
with section 1172.75 and People v. Walker, supra, 16 Cal.5th
1024.
SEGAL, Acting P. J.
We concur:
FEUER, J. STONE, J.
19
Wondering how this text applies to your situation?
Free consultation, no commitment
Describe your situation. Our team will contact you by email about your consultation.
Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude
Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.