CourtListener 10735074•People v. Love CA2/7
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Filed 11/12/25 P. v. Love CA2/7
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION SEVEN
THE PEOPLE, B337290
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. BA498866)
v.
THOMAS JAMES LOVE,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Craig Richman, Judge. Affirmed.
Joanna McKim, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Idan Ivri and David A. Wildman, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
__________________________
Thomas James Love appeals from the judgment of
conviction after a jury found him guilty of eight counts of rape of
his granddaughter D.L.,1 a person incapable of giving legal
consent because of a developmental disability, and four counts of
committing lewd or lascivious acts on his granddaughter A.L., a
child who was under 14 years of age. As to one of the counts
involving A.L., the jury found true a special circumstance that
Love kidnapped A.L. and the movement substantially increased
the risk of harm to A.L. over and above that level of risk
necessarily inherent in the underlying offense, within the
meaning of the “One Strike” law.
Love contends substantial evidence does not support the
jury’s finding that D.L. had a developmental disability that
prevented her from legally consenting to sexual intercourse with
Love. He also contends substantial evidence does not support the
jury’s true finding on the special circumstance with respect to the
charge concerning A.L. We affirm.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
A. Evidence At Trial Regarding Sexual Abuse of D.L.
1. D.L.’s intellectual disability
D.L. is intellectually disabled. She initially attended
Dubnoff Valley High School, which served only students with
“significant” disabilities. At 16 years old, D.L. moved to Vista Del
Mar, a group home for people with disabilities. From ages 18 to
21, D.L. lived at Lilly’s Open Arms, an adult residential facility
1 We refer to the victims by their first and last initials to
protect their privacy interests. (See Cal. Rules of Court, rule
8.90(b)(4).)
2
for “Regional Center clients,” meaning individuals with “some
type of intellectual or mental disability.”2 The staff at the facility
assisted the residents with “their everyday basic needs.” At age
18, because D.L. “was not prepared to enter the working world,”
D.L. was enrolled in Hawthorne Academy, a school for young
adults ages 18 to 21 who have “some type of mental or
development behavioral issues.” At Hawthorne Academy, D.L.
took job training classes and had a job “[h]elping little kids” with
their homework. D.L. helped with their English homework
because, as she stated, “I didn’t know how to do math.”
Dr. Karen Hastings, a psychologist who worked for two
Regional Centers, testified that in 2018, when D.L. was 17 years
old and in the 11th grade, Hastings tested D.L.’s cognitive ability.
To determine D.L.’s mental capacities, Hastings administered
several standardized tests, reviewed D.L.’s records, and reviewed
D.L.’s history. Hastings concluded that D.L. “was intellectually
disabled in the mild range,” which is generally a “lifelong”
condition.
D.L.’s I.Q. was 63, which “was quite low” and “only . . .
better than 1 percent of the whole population.” D.L.’s “grade
equivalent was very low.” Her sentence comprehension was at
the third-grade level and math computation was at the first to
second-grade level. D.L.’s communication score was in the mildly
delayed range, and her daily living and social skills were in the
borderline delayed range. Also, D.L.’s overall adaptive skills
capacity score, which refers to skills “we all [use] in life . . . like
conceptual, social[,] and practical,” was 71, which “was low.”
2 Regional Centers are nonprofit agencies that provide
“lifelong resources” to people with disabilities.
3
Hastings testified that D.L. was “substantially disabled” in
that she had impairment in several areas of functioning. D.L.
had difficulty in and needed support with conceptual skills,
including academic, reading, writing, math, and abstract
reasoning. She “require[d] support to apply what she knew
functionally.” Socially, she was “immature.” This meant she
could “converse but [her] language and communication [wa]s at a
simpler level.” She also had “difficulties with social judgment”
and could “clearly be taken advantage by others.”
D.L. could bathe, shower, and get dressed by herself but
needed help with more complex daily skills, such as grocery
shopping and preparing food. “[I]t [was] possible that [she could]
be trained to do a job but it would be a job that didn’t emphasize
conceptual skills,” such as “[s]tocking things in a grocery store . . .
[a]s opposed to working at the register.”
2. Sexual Abuse of D.L.
Beginning when D.L. was 14 years old to when she was 21
years old, Love sexually abused her. When D.L. was 14 years old,
she lived with her mother. Two to three times a week, Love came
over to D.L.’s home after school and had sex with her. They
would have sex in motels or at D.L.’s home when no one else was
there.
When D.L. moved into a group home at age 16, Love visited
her multiple times a month and had sex with her in his car
during each visit. Sometimes Love asked D.L. to perform oral sex
on him. D.L. did not want to, but she did it anyway because she
thought if she refused, Love would stop loving her and giving her
things, such as money and jewelry.
When D.L. moved into an adult facility at age 18, Lilly’s
Open Arms, Love came to the facility every day or weekend. He
4
would pick up D.L. and drive her to various places where they
would have sex.
When D.L. was 21 years old, D.L. went to the police station
with her direct care worker from Lilly’s Open Arms and met with
Los Angeles Police Detective Brandon Bourgeois. Bourgeois
testified that D.L. “noticeably [had] some sort of disability.”
According to Bourgeois, the way she spoke was “more child-like.”
D.L. told Bourgeois that she had sex with Love starting
when she was 14 or 15 years old and continuing while she lived
at Lilly’s Open Arms. D.L. described the sex as “contact between
. . . her vagina [and Love’s] penis” and stated it occurred “two to
three times a week.” In exchange for having sex with Love, Love
would give D.L. clothes, jewelry, and other gifts.
Bourgeois took D.L. to be interviewed at Stuart House, a
facility that specializes in forensic interviews of children who are
victims of sexual assault. He chose Stuart House because it was
clear to Bourgeois that D.L. “suffered from a developmental
disability and that her cognitive ability . . . [was] that of a child.”
During the interview, D.L. initially recanted a majority of what
she reported to Detective Bourgeois in August. However, at some
point, D.L. said, “ ‘I’m going to tell the truth.’ ” She stated, “ ‘The
truth is, we did have sexual intercourse but at the same time . . .
it wasn’t because we did it just to do it.’ ” D.L. referred to Love as
her boyfriend and said that “she was very much in love with
him.”
3. D.L.’s Understanding of Sex
At trial, D.L. testified regarding her understanding of sex.
When asked during direct examination what sex was, D.L.
answered, “I don’t know, having intercourse with somebody else.”
She described intercourse as “[h]aving . . . contact with
5
somebody” and “[i]nteracting with other people.” The prosecutor
stated, “Well, you and I are interacting[.] [A]re we having –
sexual intercourse?” D.L. replied, “No, no.” The prosecutor then
said, “So what does sexual intercourse mean to you?” D.L.
responded, “I do not know.” D.L. acknowledged that she had
previously testified at a hearing that sex meant “one person
putting their private part in another person.” But when asked to
elaborate on that definition, D.L. answered, “I do not know what
you’re talking about.”
The prosecutor also asked D.L. what it meant to have sex
with her grandfather. D.L. said, “Well it means two people
having a relationship with each other and making . . . contact
with people.” The prosecutor later asked D.L. “What did you do
[with your grandfather]? I need you to talk to me about
specifics.” D.L. said, “[H]e unzipped his pants and we had sex in
the car.” She said that she “lea[ned] over and . . . started sucking
on his penis and [they] had intercourse in the car.”
D.L. testified that she took a sex education class in sixth
grade where she learned what sex was and that sex could lead to
getting pregnant. She further testified that from 16 to 18 years
old, she had sex with four different people. There were times
when she did not want to have sex with the men, but she “was
scared to speak [her] mind.” At the time of trial, D.L. had two
children, ages six and three, and was pregnant with a third child.
Her mother had custody of her two children.
6
B. Evidence at Trial Regarding Sexual Abuse of A.L.3
Love sexually abused A.L. from when she was eight to 11
years old. During this time period, A.L. visited Love’s home
every weekend. A.L.’s grandmother and father also lived there.
During one visit, when she was eight years old, A.L. was in the
bathroom with Love and was getting ready to take a bath. Love
stuck his finger inside her vagina and told her “it was dirty.”
During another visit, when A.L. was eight or nine years
old, Love drove A.L. to a thrift store after A.L. accidentally
urinated on herself. They bought some new clothes from the
store and returned to Love’s car. Inside Love’s car, A.L.
undressed from the waist down. Love told her to open her legs
and “[h]e just looked at [her]” for several minutes.
On one occasion, Love drove A.L. to her mother’s house
after A.L. spent the weekend at Love’s home. While they were in
the car, Love told her to give him a kiss on the mouth, which she
did. He then asked her if she would be his girlfriend.
A couple of times a month, during A.L.’s visits to Love’s
home, Love drove A.L. to various places. Love would tell A.L.’s
father or grandmother that they were “going someplace” specific.
However, as A.L. testified, “that’s not what [they] would do.”
They went “nowhere. Just away from the home.” By “nowhere,”
A.L. meant that they “would [not] go to where . . . [Love] said
[they] were going to go.” Instead, Love “pull[ed] over and
park[ed] somewhere[,] not a specific location.” Because it became
3 The court deemed A.L. unavailable to testify, and the
People read her prior testimony from the preliminary hearing
into the record. Love does not challenge the court’s finding
regarding A.L.’s unavailability on appeal.
7
“a consistent thing,” A.L. did not really think they were going
someplace specific.
When they arrived at the various locations, Love sometimes
told A.L. to take her clothes off. Other times, A.L. took her
clothes off without Love’s prompting because “it was so frequent
that [she knew] that’s what [she was] supposed to do.” Once A.L.
was naked, Love looked between her legs. On one occasion, Love
used his hands to spread her legs apart. A.L. did not want to go
with Love on these outings. She was afraid, but she did not “feel
that [she] could say no” because he was “an adult and [she] was
always taught to do what an adult says.”
C. Verdict and Sentencing
The jury found Love guilty of eight counts of rape of D.L., a
person who was incapable of giving legal consent because of a
developmental disability (Pen. Code, § 261, subd. (a)(1); counts 1-
4, 9-12),4 and four counts of committing lewd or lascivious acts on
A.L., a child who was under 14 years old (§ 288, subd. (a); counts
13-16). The jury also found true a special circumstance that, as
to count 14, Love kidnapped A.L. and the movement
substantially increased the risk of harm to A.L. over and above
that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying offense.
(§ 667.61, subds. (a), (d)(2).)
As to count 14, the lewd act on A.L. with a special
circumstance, the trial court sentenced Love to an indeterminate
term of 25 years to life under the One Strike law. (§ 667.61,
4 Further statutory references are to the Penal Code. The
eight rape counts include both time periods when D.L. was a
minor and when she was over 18 years old.
8
subds. (a), (d)(2).) The court also sentenced Love to a consecutive
determinate term of 26 years for the remaining counts.
Love timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Love contends substantial evidence did not support the
jury’s finding that D.L.’s disability prevented her from consenting
to sexual intercourse with him. He also argues substantial
evidence did not support the jury’s true finding on the special
circumstance with respect to the kidnapping charge involving
A.L. We reject his contentions.
A. General Legal Principles
In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence,
we apply the substantial evidence standard. (People v. Ramirez
(2022) 13 Cal.5th 997, 1117.) “The same standard of review
applies to the sufficiency of the evidence supporting special
circumstance findings.” (People v. Edwards (2013) 57 Cal.4th
658, 715.) Under this standard, “ ‘ “we ‘examine the whole record
in the light most favorable to the judgment to determine whether
it discloses substantial evidence—evidence that is reasonable,
credible and of solid value—such that a reasonable trier of fact
could find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.’
[Citations.] We presume in support of the judgment the existence
of every fact the trier could reasonably deduce from the
evidence.” ’ ” (Ramirez, at pp. 1117-1118.)
“Substantial evidence also ‘ “includes circumstantial
evidence and any reasonable inferences drawn from that
evidence.” ’ ” (People v. Vargas (2022) 84 Cal.App.5th 943, 951.)
“ ‘ “ ‘[I]f the circumstances reasonably justify the jury’s findings,
9
the judgment may not be reversed simply because the
circumstances might also reasonably be reconciled with a
contrary finding.’ [Citation.] We do not reweigh evidence or
reevaluate a witness’s credibility.” ’ ” (People v. Ramirez, supra,
13 Cal.5th at p. 1118.)
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s Finding That
D.L. Lacked the Capacity To Consent
1. Applicable law
Section 261, subdivision (a), defines rape as “an act of
sexual intercourse accomplished under any of the following
circumstances: [¶] (1) If a person . . . is incapable, because of a
mental disorder or developmental or physical disability, of giving
legal consent, and this is known or reasonably should be known
to the person committing the act. . . . [T]he prosecuting attorney
shall prove, as an element of the crime, that a mental disorder or
developmental or physical disability rendered the alleged victim
incapable of giving consent.” A person is incapable of giving legal
consent if he or she is “ ‘unable to understand the act, its nature,
and possible consequences.’ ” (People v. Miranda (2011)
199 Cal.App.4th 1403, 1416 (Miranda); see People v. Lewis (1977)
75 Cal.App.3d 513, 519.)
“By itself, the existence of actual consent is not sufficient to
establish a defense to a charge of rape. That the supposed victim
actually consented to sexual intercourse disproves rape only if he
or she had ‘sufficient capacity’ to give that consent. [Citations.]
For example, if the victim is so unsound of mind that he or she is
incapable of giving legal consent, the fact that he or she may have
given actual consent does not prevent a conviction of rape.”
10
(People v. Giardino (2000) 82 Cal.App.4th 454, 460; see People v.
Thompson (2006) 142 Cal.App.4th 1426, 1429 (Thompson).)
“The existence of capacity to consent is a question of fact.”
(Miranda, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1413; see Thompson,
supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1435 [whether an individual
possesses “ ‘mental capacity sufficient to give legal consent must,
saving in exceptional cases, remain a question of fact for the
jury’ ”].) Determining lack of capacity to consent does not require
expert testimony (Thompson, at p. 1437) or “call for any
particular type of clinical diagnosis.” (People v. Lewis, supra,
75 Cal.App.3d at p. 519). Rather, “[a] lay juror is able to assess
the extent of a victim’s mental disability.” (Miranda, at p. 1413;
see Thompson, at p. 1439 [“ ‘The question whether a person
possesses sufficient resources—intellectual, emotional, social,
psychological—to determine whether to participate in sexual
contact with another is an assessment within the ken of the
average juror, who likely has made the same determination at
some point.’ ”].)
2. Analysis
Substantial evidence supports the jury’s finding that
because of D.L.’s intellectual disability, she was unable to
understand the sexual acts with Love, the nature of the acts, and
the possible consequences. At the time of the sexual acts, D.L.
had an intellectual disability that substantially impaired her
functioning. She attended schools and lived in group homes that
specifically served people with disabilities and received Regional
Center services. Her IQ of 63 was “quite low” and “only . . . better
than 1 percent of the whole population.” By 11th grade, her
actual grade performance was “very low”: she read at a third-
grade level and her math skills were at a first or second-grade
11
level. She was socially immature, lacked judgment, and
appeared “child-like.” Further, despite being 21 years old, police
interviewed D.L. at a forensic facility for children because of her
apparent developmental disability. Given the totality of this
evidence, the jury could reasonably infer that D.L. lacked the
capacity to consent. (See Miranda, supra, 199 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1416 [substantial evidence supported finding that victim was
incapable of giving consent due to her disability where victim
“had trouble walking and talking”; “attended special education
and needed assistance at night”; and had a condition that “caused
the investigating officer to have her interviewed at the Children’s
Advocacy Center instead of being interviewed by the detective or
prosecutor”]; Thompson, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1436 [same
where victim attended high school but “was not really qualified
for a diploma”; “could not hold down a real job, handle money, or
cast an independent vote”; and “conversed at the level of a 9 or 10
year old and read at the level of a 7 or 8 year old”]; People v.
Hillhouse (2003) 109 Cal.App.4th 1612, 1616, 1623 [evidence was
sufficient that 14-year-old victim’s disability rendered him
incapable of consenting to sexual acts where his I.Q. was under
70, he had always been in special education classes and was a
Regional Center client, he had math and reading skills of a third
grader and writing skills of a second grader, and he
communicated at the level of an elementary-school-aged child].)
D.L.’s difficulty at trial in answering questions about sex
further supports the conclusion that she lacked the capacity to
consent. Although D.L. testified that she took a sex education
class in sixth grade and her description of the sex acts with Love
demonstrated that she “had some idea of what sexual intercourse
was,” she struggled to formulate responses to general and basic
12
questions about sex. (Thompson, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1437 [jury could reasonably find victim was “unequipped to
consent” to sex even though she had some idea of what sexual
intercourse was].) She described intercourse as “[h]aving . . .
contact with somebody” and “[i]nteracting with other people.”
When pressed further on the definition, she replied, “I do not
know.” A reasonable jury could infer that D.L.’s inability to
articulate the meaning of sexual intercourse demonstrated that
she “was not capable of appreciating what took place or freely
and voluntarily participating in the acts.” (Miranda, supra,
199 Cal.App.4th at p. 1415 [victim gave “childlike description at
trial of the sexual assault”]; see Thompson, at pp. 1436-1437
[victim’s understanding of sexual intercourse “was on the same
level as the children’s rhyme, ‘First comes love, then comes
marriage, then comes a baby in a baby carriage’ ”].)
Love argues the evidence was insufficient to support the
jury’s finding that D.L. lacked the capacity to consent because
D.L. “had sex with four different men” and “gave birth twice.”
Evidence of D.L.’s past sexual acts with others does not
demonstrate that she had the capacity to consent to those past
acts. And in any event, “ ‘[i]t is important to distinguish between
a person’s general ability to understand the nature and
consequences of sexual intercourse and that person’s ability to
understand the nature and consequences at a given time and in a
given situation.’ ” (Thompson, supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1440.) The jury could have reasonably inferred that D.L.
lacked the capacity to consent when considering the grandparent-
grandchild relationship and significant age gap between D.L. and
Love. (See ibid. [“it is relevant that defendant was one of [the
victim’s] caretakers and that he exploited her vulnerability, the
13
very type of harm the statute seeks to guard against”]; People v.
Mobley (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 761, 789, disapproved on other
grounds in People v. Trujillo (2006) 40 Cal.4th 165, 181, fn. 3
[victims lacked capacity to consent to sexual “advances in a
threatening environment”].)
Love further argues that D.L. “made a conscious decision
. . . to have sex with [Love].” However, evidence that D.L. may
have assented to sexual intercourse is not evidence that she had
the capacity to give legal consent. (People v. Vukodinovich (2015)
238 Cal.App.4th 166, 176 [“While defendant points out that on
redirect examination L. said she wanted to have sex with
defendant, ‘[a] little bit, not a lot’ and that she wanted sex
because, ‘[i]t’s good,’ these facts do not prove capacity to give legal
consent. What appears to be consent from somebody who lacks
capacity to consent is, in effect, nothing at all.”]; Thompson,
supra, 142 Cal.App.4th at p. 1437 [“a developmentally disabled
person may give ‘assent’ to a sexual touching, so that it is not
against his or her will, yet be unable to give legal consent”].)
Love also points to evidence that he contends demonstrates
D.L.’s capacity to consent, including that D.L. was able to hold
down a job, understood and could follow instructions during her
psychological examination, and was able to name all the areas
where the sex acts occurred. “This is no more than a request that
we reweigh the evidence, which we will not do. As required, we
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the judgment,
drawing all inferences in support of the verdicts.” (Miranda,
supra, 199 Cal.Ap.4th at p. 1416 [defendant argued there was
evidence victim could communicate with brother and was a high
school sophomore, indicating she had mental capacity to
consent].) Based on our review of the whole record, we conclude
14
there is sufficient evidence that D.L. lacked the capacity to
consent.
B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Jury’s True Finding on
the Special Circumstance under Section 667.61
1. Applicable law
As to count 14 (a lewd act on A.L. committed between
September 14, 2002 and September 13, 2003), the jury found true
the special circumstance under section 667.61 that Love
kidnapped A.L. and the movement substantially increased the
risk of harm to A.L. over and above that level of risk necessarily
inherent in the underlying offense. During the specified time
period, A.L. was nine to 10 years old. The parties agree that
count 14 applies to any of the three incidents where Love abused
A.L. in his car.
Section 667.61, the so-called One Strike law, “sets forth an
alternative and harsher sentencing scheme for certain
enumerated sex crimes.” (People v. Mancebo (2002) 27 Cal.4th
735, 741.) “The statute is designed ‘to ensure serious sex
offenders receive lengthy prison sentences upon their first
conviction when their crimes are committed under circumstances
elevating their victim’s vulnerability.’ ” (People v. Waqa (2023)
92 Cal.App.5th 565, 577 (Waqa).) Under section 667.61,
subdivision (a), a person who is convicted of committing an
enumerated sex offense, which includes Love’s conviction for
committing a lewd or lascivious act on A.L. (§ 667.61, subd.
(c)(8)), “shall be punished by imprisonment in the state prison for
25 years to life” if “one or more of the circumstances specified in
subdivision (d)” are present (§ 667.61, subd. (a)). The jury found
true the presence of the circumstance specified in section 667.61,
15
subdivision (d)(2), which states, “The defendant kidnapped the
victim of the present offense and the movement of the victim
substantially increased the risk of harm to the victim over and
above that level of risk necessarily inherent in the underlying
offense.”
“The section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) qualifying
circumstance has two elements. The first element requires the
victim be kidnapped. The second element requires that the
victim’s movement substantially increase the risk of harm to him
or her above that level of danger necessarily inherent in the sex
offense. [Citation.] Section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2) contains an
element (substantial increase in the risk of harm) beyond that in
simple and aggravated kidnapping.” (People v. Adams (2018)
28 Cal.App.5th 170, 189.)
As to the first element that the defendant have kidnapped
the victim, the trial court here instructed the jury on aggravated
kidnapping for the purpose of child molestation in violation of
section 207, subdivision (b). Subdivision (b) provides: “Every
person, who for the purpose of committing any act defined in
section 288, hires, persuades, entices, decoys, or seduces by false
promises, misrepresentations, or the like, any child under the age
of 14 years to go out of this country, state, or county, or into
another part of the same county, is guilty of kidnapping.” (§ 207,
subd. (b).) Under section 207, subdivision (b), the People must
prove that (1) the defendant persuaded, hired, enticed, decoyed,
or seduced by false promises or misrepresentations a child under
the age of 14 years old to go somewhere; (2) when the defendant
did so, he or she intended to commit a lewd or lascivious act on
the child; and (3) as a result of the defendant’s conduct, the child
was moved a substantial distance. (§ 207, subd. (b); Waqa, supra,
16
92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 576-577; People v. Robertson (2012)
208 Cal.App.4th 965, 983 (Robertson).) A substantial distance
means the movement “ ‘must not be “merely incidental” ’ ” to the
underlying offense. (Robertson, at p. 983.) Also, the movement
must increase the risk of physical or psychological harm to the
victim over and above that necessarily present in the underlying
offense. (Ibid.)
To determine whether the movement is more than merely
incidental, “the jury considers the ‘scope and nature’ of the
movement.” (People v. Rayford (1994) 9 Cal.4th 1, 12.) “This
includes the actual distance a victim is moved,” but there is “no
minimum number of feet a defendant must move a victim in
order to satisfy” this requirement. (Ibid.) “ ‘[I]ncidental
movements are brief and insubstantial, and frequently consist of
movement around the premises where the incident began.
[Citations.] By contrast, relatively short distances have been
found not to be incidental where the movement results in a
substantial change in “the context of the environment.” ’ ”
(Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 578.)
“In determining whether a movement increased the risk of
harm to the victim, the jury considers ‘ “ ‘such factors as the
decreased likelihood of detection, the danger inherent in a
victim’s foreseeable attempts to escape, and the attacker’s
enhanced opportunity to commit additional crimes. [Citations.]
The fact that these dangers do not in fact materialize does not . . .
mean that the risk of harm was not increased.’ ” ’ ” (Waqa, supra,
92 Cal.App.5th at p. 580.)
To summarize, where the special circumstance under
section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2), incorporates aggravated
kidnapping under section 207, subdivision (b), the movement
17
element of the special circumstance “requires proof that ‘(1) the
movement was substantial in character, and not merely
incidental to the commission of the sex crime [citation], and
(2) “the movement of the victim substantially increased the risk
of harm to the victim over and above that level of risk necessarily
inherent in the underlying” sex offense.’ [Citations.] These two
prongs ‘are not distinct, but interrelated, because a trier of fact
cannot consider the significance of the victim’s changed
environment without also considering whether that change
resulted in an increase in the risk of harm to the victim.’ ”
(Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 579.)
2. Analysis
Love contends substantial evidence does not support the
jury’s true finding on the special circumstance under section
667.61, subdivision (d)(2), because “[t]here was no evidence of
force, fraud[,] or deception,” the movement in Love’s car “was
incidental to the crime,” and “[t]he movement also did not
increase the risk of harm beyond that for the underlying offense.”
We are not persuaded by any of his points.
Preliminarily, the special circumstance under section
667.61, subdivision (d)(2), does not require force. It applies to
any kind of kidnapping (§ 667.61, subd. (d)(2)), including
kidnapping by force or fear or by deception with the intent to
commit a lewd act on a child. (§ 207, subds. (a), (b).) Nor does
aggravated kidnapping for the purpose of child molestation
require force. (§ 207, subd. (b); People v. McCurdy (2014)
59 Cal.4th 1063, 1105, fn. 15.) As noted, a defendant is guilty of
such aggravated kidnapping if he “hires, persuades, entices,
decoys, or seduces by false promises, misrepresentations, or the
like, any child.” (§ 207, subd. (b).)
18
As to Love’s argument that Love employed no fraud or
deception on A.L., the record contains substantial evidence that
Love persuaded A.L. by “misrepresentations, or the like” to go
places with him, as section 207, subdivision (b), requires. (§ 207,
subd. (b).) There is evidence that when A.L. visited Love’s home
on the weekends, Love drove her to various places a couple of
times a month, and when they arrived, Love committed lewd or
lascivious acts on her. Love would say he was taking her
someplace specific, but as A.L. testified, “that’s not what [they]
would do.” They went “nowhere. Just away from the home.” By
providing false accounts of where he was taking her, Love
misrepresented his intentions. This conduct supports the jury’s
finding on the special circumstance. (See People v. DeHoyos
(2013) 57 Cal.4th 79, 86, 155 [defendant’s ruse to get child in his
car satisfied elements of section 207, subdivision (b), where he
“approached her in his car, told her he was a teacher, and asked
her for help moving some books,” but after getting her into his
car, he drove her to a motel to commit child molestation].)
Love contends he did not deceive A.L. because he provided
the false accounts to her family, not her. A.L. testified that Love
usually made the misrepresentations to her father. But A.L. was
only nine or 10 years old during the time period at issue, and
thus A.L. was not in charge of her own comings and goings.
Misrepresentations about where Love was taking A.L. made to
A.L.’s parent or other grownup in charge of her satisfy the
requirement under section 207, subdivision (b), that Love have
employed some kind of deception. In any event, A.L. overheard
those misrepresentations made to the grownups in charge of her.
Thus, the jury could have reasonably concluded that Love
indirectly misled A.L. And while Love asserts A.L. “knew what
19
would happen when going inside his car” and thus was not
personally deceived, A.L.’s testimony that she and Love were not
going to the places he said they were going implies Love tricked
her at some point and that A.L. only learned of his true
intentions after their outings became “a consistent thing.”
Turning to Love’s arguments regarding the movement of
A.L., there is sufficient evidence that the movement was not
merely incidental. First, the fact that the movement was
unnecessary to commit the lewd and lascivious acts supports the
jury’s finding that the movement was not merely incidental. A
sexual act “ ‘ “does not necessarily require movement to complete
the crime.” [Citation.] Where a defendant drags a victim to
another place, and then attempts a [sexual act], the jury may
reasonably infer that the movement was neither part of nor
necessary to the [act]’ such that the movement was not
incidental.” (Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at p. 584.) Love could
have committed the sex acts in his home. Thus, because Love
moved A.L. to a place away from his home and committed the
sexual acts there, there was substantial evidence that the
movement was not merely incidental to the crime. (See ibid;
People v. Salazar (1995) 33 Cal.App.4th 341, 347 [jury could
reasonably conclude movement of victim was not merely
incidental where defendant “could have raped [victim] on the
walkway outside the motel room door and avoided moving her at
all”].)
In addition, by moving A.L. away from his home and to
various random locations, Love substantially increased the risk of
harm to her. “Any determination of the increase in the risk of
harm involves a comparison of the victim’s physical location
before and after the asportation.” (People v. Salazar, supra,
20
33 Cal.App.4th at p. 348.) Here, the incident began in Love’s
home where A.L. spent every weekend and where her father and
grandmother lived. The jury could have reasonably inferred from
these facts that A.L. was comfortable at Love’s home and “was
potentially visible to, and within hearing distance of,” her close
family members. (Ibid. [victim was potentially visible to “motel
patrons, employees, and even the general public” before
defendant “dragged her into the privacy and seclusion of a motel
room”].) From this location, Love put her in his car and drove her
to various, random locations away from his home. Once inside
his car, the likelihood of anyone detecting his sexual abuse of A.L.
decreased. (See People v. Kelly (2016) 245 Cal.App.4th 1119,
1130 [defendant’s “movement of the victim—from the grassy area
near a relatively public setting into the isolation of his vehicle—
decreased the likelihood of his detection”].)
Further, moving A.L. to other locations involved a
significant change in environment for her. It separated her from
other close family members and took her to unfamiliar places.
For a young child of eight to 11 years old, such a change would
make A.L. particularly vulnerable. (See People v. Singh (2019)
42 Cal.App.5th 175, 188 [change in environment was “significant”
because defendant moved two-year-old away from mother to
another environment where no one knew child and child knew no
one].) The jury could infer that such vulnerability substantially
increased the risk of harm to A.L. because it enhanced Love’s
opportunity to gain control over her and commit additional
crimes. (Cf. Waqa, supra, 92 Cal.App.5th at pp. 580-583 [no
substantial evidence that movement substantially increased risk
of harm where defendant moved victim from one small stall in a
public restroom to an adjacent large stall because “the degree of
21
concealment each stall offered did not significantly differ”];
People v. Perkins (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 454, 470 [same where
defendant moved victim from a bathroom to a bedroom of a
“small private . . . apartment” because “[t]he movement was for a
short distance inside a private residence from one room to
another”].)
Substantial evidence supports the special circumstance
under section 667.61, subdivision (d)(2).
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
STONE, J.
We concur:
MARTINEZ, P. J.
FEUER, J.
22
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