O'Hill Capital v. Phillips CA4/3

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Filed 11/10/25 O’Hill Capital v. Phillips CA4/3

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS

California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

O’HILL CAPITAL,

Plaintiff and Appellant, G063268, G064007

v. (Super. Ct. No. 30-2023-01314224)

JOHN BENEDICT PHILLIPS et al., OPINION

Defendants and Appellants.

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court of Orange County,
David A. Hoffer, Judge. Affirmed.
Clinton Bailey and Mark C. Clinton; Law Office of Kathryn M.
Davis and Kathryn M. Davis; Morris & Stone and Aaron P. Morris for
Plaintiff and Appellant.
Kaufman Dolowich and Jeremiah Harvey for Defendants and
Respondents.
No appearance for Respondent Andrea Rea O’Hill.
* * *
INTRODUCTION AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
This is an appeal from an order granting an anti-SLAPP motion.
This case is an offshoot of the long-running divorce proceeding between Robert
O’Hill (Robert) and Andrea O’Hill (Andi). As we discuss in detail in a
concurrently filed opinion in O’Hill v. O’Hill, Nov. 10, 2025,G063223) [nonpub.
opn.], the family law court has issued orders requiring Robert to pay Andi’s
attorney fees, which Robert has largely failed to comply with.1 The record in
that appeal reveals that he is over $1 million in arrears on payments in fees
and costs. In an effort to enforce its orders, the family law court issued a
charging order against Robert’s interest in appellant O’Hill Capital and joined
O’Hill Capital in the family law proceeding.
After O’Hill Capital was joined in the family law proceeding, Andi
filed what amounted to a civil complaint directly against O’Hill Capital,
asserting ten causes of action. She included claims for declaratory relief,
tortious interference with contract/economic advantage, fraud, and breach of
fiduciary duty. This complaint was filed in the family law proceeding. O’Hill
Capital demurred, asserting various grounds, including that the complaint
failed to state a cause of action, and that the complaint exceeded the
jurisdiction of the family law court. The family law court sustained the
demurrer “with prejudice” but “with the following reservations: a. Andi is not
precluded from per[su]ing [sic] tort and contractual claims against [O’Hill
Capital] in any civil proceeding,” and O’Hill Capital remained joined to the
family law proceeding for purposes of enforcing the attorney fee orders.

1 This opinion assumes the reader is familiar with our opinion

filed concurrently in Case No. G063223.

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Afterwards, O’Hill Capital filed the lawsuit at issue here: a
malicious prosecution action against Andi and her attorneys (the attorney
defendants) arising from the family law complaint. O’Hill Capital alleged,
among other things, that the underlying complaint had been “outside the
scope of the family law court” and exceeded its jurisdiction. In response, the
attorney defendants filed an anti-SLAPP motion in which Andi joined.
The trial court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, concluding that
the malicious prosecution action arose from protected activity (the filing of a
complaint), and O’Hill Capital had failed to make a prima facie case on the
merits. In particular, the court found O’Hill Capital had failed to establish the
first element of a malicious prosecution claim: termination of the underlying
complaint in its favor. Case law has interpreted that element as requiring a
ruling on the substantive merits of the claim, as opposed to a ruling based on
procedural flaws. The court interpreted the family court’s ruling as being
procedural, rather than substantive. The court also concluded O’Hill Capital
had failed to establish the third element of malicious prosecution: malice.
O’Hill Capital appealed.
Meanwhile, the attorney defendants filed a motion for attorney
fees. The court granted the motion in part, awarding $47,590 in fees. O’Hill
capital appealed from that order as well. We consolidated both appeals into
the present appeal.
DISCUSSION
I.
O HILL CAPITAL FAILED TO ESTABLISH A PRIMA FACIE CASE ON THE MERITS
We review a court’s order granting an anti-SLAPP motion de
novo. (Soukup v. Law Offices of Herbert Hafif (2006) 39 Cal.4th 260, 269, fn.
3.) We conclude the trial court was correct as to the second prong of the anti-

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SLAPP analysis: O’Hill Capital failed to make a prima facie case that the
underlying complaint was terminated in O’Hill Capital’s favor, as that
element of malicious prosecution has been interpreted by caselaw. Because
O’Hill Capital failed to establish the second prong of the anti-SLAPP analysis,
the trial court correctly granted the anti-SLAPP motion.
The anti-SLAPP statute provides: “A cause of action against a
person arising from any act of that person in furtherance of the person’s right
of petition or free speech under the United States Constitution or the
California Constitution in connection with a public issue shall be subject to a
special motion to strike, unless the court determines that the plaintiff has
established that there is a probability that the plaintiff will prevail on the
claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).) “Section 425.16, subdivision (b)(1) requires the
court to engage in a two-step process. First, the court decides whether the
defendant has made a threshold showing that the challenged cause of action is
one arising from protected activity . . . . If the court finds such a showing has
been made, it then determines whether the plaintiff has demonstrated a
probability of prevailing on the claim.” (Equilon Enterprises v. Consumer
Cause, Inc. (2002) 29 Cal.4th 53, 67.)
Here, there is no dispute that O’Hill Capital’s malicious
prosecution action arises out of protected activity: it sued defendants for
having sued it. We thus proceed to the second phase, which is whether O’Hill
Capital has established a probability of prevailing on its claims.
In the second phase of the anti-SLAPP analysis, “the burden
shifts to the plaintiff . . . to establish a probability it will prevail on the claim.
[Citation.] The plaintiff need only state and substantiate a legally sufficient
claim. [Citation.] The plaintiff’s evidence is accepted as true; the defendant’s
evidence is evaluated to determine if it defeats the plaintiff’s showing as a

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matter of law. [Citation.] The procedure is meant to prevent abusive SLAPP
suits, while allowing ‘claims with the requisite minimal merit [to] proceed.’“
(City of Montebello v. Vasquez (2016) 1 Cal.5th 409, 420.) “Put another way,
the plaintiff ‘must demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient
and supported by a sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a
favorable judgment if the evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’“
(Wilson v. Parker, Covert & Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.)
“To prevail on a malicious prosecution claim, the plaintiff must
show that the prior action (1) was commenced by or at the direction of the
defendant and was pursued to a legal termination favorable to the plaintiff;
(2) was brought without probable cause; and (3) was initiated with malice.”
(Soukup, supra, 39 Cal.4th at p. 292.)
The first element has been interpreted as requiring a resolution,
either express or implied, on the substantive merits of the claim, as opposed to
procedural or technical resolutions. The “termination must reflect on the
merits of the underlying action.” (Lackner v. LaCroix (1979) 25 Cal.3d 747,
750.) “It is apparent ‘favorable’ termination does not occur merely because a
party complained against has prevailed in an underlying action. While the
fact he has prevailed is an ingredient of a favorable termination, such
termination must further reflect on his innocence of the alleged wrongful
conduct. If the termination does not relate to the merits—reflecting on neither
innocence of nor responsibility for the alleged misconduct—the termination is
not favorable in the sense it would support a subsequent action for malicious
prosecution.” (Id. at p. 751.) “The key is whether the termination reflects on
the underlying defendant’s innocence.” (Eells v. Rosenblum (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 1848, 1855 (Eells).) “The test is whether or not the termination
tends to indicate the innocence of the defendant or simply involves technical,

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procedural or other reasons that are not inconsistent with the defendant’s
guilt.” (Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 881.)
“Examples of technical or procedural reasons for terminating an action
include abandonment of ‘the proceeding because of the defects in the
complaint, or doubts as to the jurisdiction of the offense, with the intention of
bringing a new proceeding in proper form or before a proper court.’” (Eells,
supra, 36 Cal.App.4th at p. 1855.)
The family law court’s resolution of the complaint against O’Hill
Capital does not satisfy this requirement. Although the court dismissed the
complaint “with prejudice,” the court’s “reservation” allowing Andi to pursue
her claims in civil court leaves no doubt about what it meant: Andi’s
complaint exceeded what she could pursue in family law court, but by
permitting Andi to pursue those claims in another court, the family law court
plainly did not pass on the substantive merits of Andi’s claims. No reasonable
court would send her to another court to pursue her claims if it had already
ruled that the claims lacked substantive merit. Indeed, a few weeks later, the
trial court reflected on its ruling, stating it was “without prejudice for Andi to
file in another forum, and my order does not become the law of any other case
filed or pending. My order is limited to these family law proceedings only.”
These comments reinforce our conclusion that the family court’s ruling was
purely procedural: the claims were not appropriate in a family law court but
could be pursued in a proper forum. This is a procedural resolution, not a
substantive one. Accordingly, O’Hill Capital has not shown that the
underlying lawsuit was terminated in its favor, and, therefore, has not
established a prima facie case of malicious prosecution. There was, therefore,
no error in granting the anti-SLAPP motion.

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II.
THE ATTORNEY FEE AWARD WAS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE
After the court granted the anti-SLAPP motion, the attorney
defendants moved for their attorney fees in the amount of $83,825. This
amount was calculated based on the work of two attorneys, Vincent Green and
Laura Birnbaum. Green sought compensation for 57.5 hours at $650 per hour.
Birnbaum sought compensation for 92.9 hours at $500 per hour. They were
hired by an insurance company and their billing statements reflected that
they actually billed the insurance company $245 and $215 per hour,
respectively. The court found that the lodestar billing rate for each attorney
was $345 and $315 per hour, respectively. After deducting a small amount
from the number of hours reasonably spent, the court found the total lodestar
fee to be $47,442.
O’Hill Capital contends the court erred both in its calculation of
the hourly rate and the number of hours reasonably spent.
“‘California courts have long held that trial courts have broad
discretion in determining the amount of a reasonable attorney’s fee award.’”
(Pasadena Police Officers Assn. v. City of Pasadena (2018) 22 Cal.App.5th 147,
167.) “A fee award ‘“will not be overturned in the absence of a manifest abuse
of discretion, a prejudicial error of law, or necessary findings not supported by
substantial evidence.’”” (Ibid.) “The abuse of discretion standard includes a
substantial evidence component: ‘We defer to the trial court’s factual findings
so long as they are supported by substantial evidence, and determine whether,
under those facts, the court abused its discretion. If there is no evidence to
support the court’s findings, then an abuse of discretion has occurred.’” (Ibid.)
We conclude the court’s findings were supported by substantial evidence, and
the overall award was a sound exercise of discretion.

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O’Hill Capital’s principal argument is that the court awarded the
attorney defendants a windfall by applying an hourly rate that was $100/hour
higher than what they actually charged their client. O’Hill Capital contends
the purpose of a fee award is compensation for costs incurred, not to punish
the opposing party.
While we are sympathetic to the idea that a trial court should give
serious consideration to the rate actually charged, the court’s analysis is
properly grounded in determining the “prevailing hourly rates as a basis for
the lodestar” (Ketchum v. Moses (2001) 24 Cal.4th 1122, 1132 (italics added)),
and there is no law precluding a court from awarding more than the actual
billing rate if the prevailing rate is higher. To the contrary, as O’Hill Capital
is forced to concede, multiple courts have approved fee awards higher than the
actual billing rate.
For example, in Nemecek & Cole v. Horn (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th
641 (Nemecek) the defendant, who prevailed, was represented by counsel
supplied by an insurer. In the defendant’s motion for attorney fees, counsel
sought a lodestar rate of $419.43 per hour, which was based on a pay table for
attorneys put out by the Department of Justice (the Laffey Matrix). Counsel
did not disclose the firm’s actual rate billed to the client. (Id. at pp. 650-651.)
In opposition, the plaintiff presented expert testimony that insurance counsel
of this nature would have billed the client between $100 and $215 per hour.
(Id. at p. 651.) The trial court adopted approximately the $419.43 rate sought,
and the plaintiff appealed. On appeal, the court held that the trial court was
free to adopt the higher rate, even if that represented “an award of attorney
fees that were not ‘actually incurred.’ “ (Id. at p. 651.) The court concluded the
actual billing rate did not set a maximum on what the court could award. (Id.
at p. 652.)

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And in Syers Properties III, Inc. v. Rankin (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th
691, 701, the court stated it explicitly: “There is no requirement that the
reasonable market rate mirror the actual rate billed.” There, the trial court
likewise relied on the Laffey Matrix, and the reviewing court upheld that
reliance as a proper exercise of discretion, noting that the range of the court’s
discretion would have encompassed the actual rate billed or the higher Laffey
Matrix rate. (Id. at pp. 701-702.)
Here, the attorney defendants attested that, based on their
experience in the industry (one of whom had over 40 years of experience), the
rates they sought were reasonable. The rates they sought were below what
was listed in the Laffey Matrix for attorneys of similar experience.
Nevertheless, the court exercised its discretion to make a significant reduction
to the amount the attorney defendants sought. This was supported by
conflicting evidence: on the one hand, O’Hill Capital’s expert attested that the
actual billing rate ($215 and $245 per hour) was the market rate; the attorney
defendants attested the market rate was between $500–$650 per hour.
Cumulatively, this evidence, combined with the trial court’s own inherent
understanding of the legal market, permitted a reasonable inference that $315
and $345 per hour were reasonable prevailing rates for similar work. And as a
matter of our own inherent expertise in these matters, those are quite
reasonable rates well within the range of the trial court’s discretion.
O’Hill Capital next contends that the evidence failed to establish
that the hours spent by the attorney defendants—145.6—were reasonably
spent. However, Birnbaum’s declaration attached contemporaneous time
records with descriptions of activities for both attorneys, and Green described
by category the work that they performed. Both declared that their time

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spent was reasonably necessary. The court was entitled to rely on that
evidence. Accordingly, the court did not err in its award of attorney fees.2
DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed. The attorney defendants shall recover
their costs incurred on appeal.

SANCHEZ, J.

WE CONCUR:

MOTOIKE, ACTING P. J.

GOODING, J.

2 O’Hill Capital also contends the trial court misapplied the law

when it stated: “The court had an option regarding the fees or the amount of
time that was spent at those high rates, and the court was concerned about
the requested amount.” O’Hill Capital interprets this to mean that the court
chose to analyze the reasonable rate or the hours spent, but not both. In the
broader context, we do not interpret the court’s statement as making such a
basic mistake. Rather, we interpret the court’s passing comment as describing
its initial reaction to what it viewed as a high demand—something must be off
with the rate or the hours—not that it could address one and ignore the other.
The court’s comments elsewhere in the hearing indicate it properly applied
the lodestar calculation.

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