CourtListener 10733282•People v. Strickland CA3
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Filed 11/7/25 P. v. Strickland CA3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
THIRD APPELLATE DISTRICT
(El Dorado)
----
THE PEOPLE, C101900
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Super. Ct. No. 23CR1135)
v.
CHRISTOPHER STRICKLAND,
Defendant and Appellant.
Defendant Christopher Strickland was convicted of possession of flammable
material, misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance, and misdemeanor
possession of controlled substance paraphernalia. On appeal, he contends that the trial
court erred in denying his motion to suppress evidence derived from a warrantless entry
into his apartment. He maintains that sheriff’s deputies unlawfully used a ruse to procure
his consent to enter. We disagree and affirm the judgment.
BACKGROUND
I.
In June 2023, Strickland filed a police report with the El Dorado County Sheriff’s
Department after he received a message claiming a woman with whom he had an online
relationship had been kidnapped. Strickland had not met the woman in person. El
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Dorado Sheriff’s Deputy Cade Miller called Strickland to follow up on the case. During
the phone call, Deputy Miller discussed with Strickland the possibility that his online
relationship was a catfishing scam. The alleged kidnappers had demanded a
$500 ransom, payable in online gift cards. Strickland explained that he paid the ransom
with gift cards, but the alleged kidnappers demanded more money and refused to release
the woman. After the phone call, Deputy Miller filed a report and was off work for the
next three to four days.
Upon his return, Deputy Miller found numerous text messages from Strickland on
his work phone. Strickland was upset and felt that Deputy Miller was not properly
investigating the alleged kidnapping. One text message said something like, “something
is going to burn tonight.” Another said, “whatever happens tonight is on you.”
The following day, Deputy Miller and his partner Deputy Steven Fulton went to a
local supermarket after one of the employees discovered a suspicious box in the parking
lot. The deputies found a cardboard box containing liquor bottles with liquid inside and
rags protruding from the top, which appeared to be Molotov cocktails. The deputies
dispatched the explosive ordinance disposal and hazardous material units to secure the
items for testing and disposal.
A supermarket employee showed the deputies video surveillance of the car
suspected to be involved in the incident. Based on the footage, the deputies were able to
identify the license plate and determined that the car was registered to Strickland. The
surveillance video also showed the individual who drove the car and left the box in the
parking lot. The individual was later identified as Strickland. Deputy Miller attempted to
contact Strickland but was unsuccessful.
The next day, Deputy Miller and Deputy Fulton went to Strickland’s apartment.
Strickland eventually invited the deputies inside, and as they passed through the kitchen,
they saw what appeared to be Molotov cocktails in a box on the floor. The deputies
placed Strickland under arrest.
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II.
The People filed an information charging Strickland with possession of ingredients
to make a destructive device (Pen. Code, § 18720); possession of flammable material
(Pen. Code, § 453, subd. (a)); misdemeanor possession of a controlled substance
(Health & Saf. Code, § 11377, subd. (a)); and misdemeanor possession of controlled
substance paraphernalia (Health & Saf. Code, § 11364, subd. (a)).
Strickland filed a motion to suppress pursuant to Penal Code section 1538.5,
seeking to exclude evidence of the observations of the sheriff’s deputies, Strickland’s
statements, and all evidence seized during the search of his apartment.
At the hearing on the motion, Deputy Miller and Deputy Fulton both testified.
They said that, on the day in question, they were both in uniform. They knocked on
Strickland’s door and identified themselves as sheriff’s deputies. Strickland opened the
door and spoke to the deputies as they stood outside. Deputy Miller testified that he told
Strickland that he was there to talk about the fraud and kidnapping case. Deputy Miller
also testified that he went to Strickland’s apartment to investigate the Molotov cocktails
placed at the supermarket. Deputy Fulton testified that he went to investigate both that
matter and the fraud and kidnapping case, noting that the kidnapping case “was my
investigation.”
After brief pleasantries and introductions, the deputies asked Strickland questions
about the alleged fraud and kidnapping. Strickland mentioned that he had the gift cards
in his apartment, and Deputy Fulton asked if they could go inside the apartment to see
them. Strickland invited the deputies inside.
The deputies entered the apartment, and Strickland led them through the kitchen
and into the living room. As the deputies passed through the kitchen, they both noticed,
in plain view, a box on the kitchen floor containing bottles filled with liquid and rags
sticking out of the top, which appeared to be Molotov cocktails.
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Once in the living room, Strickland sat down in a chair, and the deputies remained
standing. The deputies discussed the fraud and kidnapping case with Strickland, and at
one point he went into the kitchen to look for the gift cards in a trash can. Deputy Miller
testified that Strickland did not just answer questions but offered additional information.
While talking in the living room, the deputies noticed various knives and swords within
five feet of Strickland, but the three continued to have “a general conversation.” The
deputies also questioned Strickland about the Molotov cocktails found at the supermarket
and in his apartment.
The deputies placed Strickland under arrest. Deputy Miller contacted detectives,
who obtained a search warrant and seized items from Strickland’s apartment. The
deputies both testified that Strickland never asked them to leave his apartment. They
never demanded that he answer their questions or block any doorways.
The trial court denied Strickland’s motion to suppress. The court noted that
neither deputy testified that they intended to arrest Strickland when they went to his
apartment. “They indicated that they were there to investigate the incident at [the
supermarket] regarding the Molotov cocktails, but Deputy Fulton had also testified that
they were there to follow up on the report of fraud and kidnapping that had been
previously reported by Mr. Strickland.” The court recognized that law enforcement may
not use a subterfuge or ruse to gain an otherwise impermissible entry into a home. But
“[c]learly, to this Court, [that is] not what occurred in this case.” The deputies “had
consent to enter [the apartment] and once they were inside and they were speaking with
Mr. Strickland, they did in fact follow up on the investigation regarding the fraud and
also the Molotov cocktails. . . . [The deputies] had a reason to go to Mr. Strickland’s
home to speak with him and in fact did speak to him about those things.” Moreover, the
“evidence does not bear . . . out that there was an intent to arrest Mr. Strickland when the
deputies responded to his home, but rather to conduct further investigation as to two
matters. And once Mr. Strickland consented, invited them into his apartment or his
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home, [the deputies] observed evidence in plain view which ultimately led to his arrest.
As such, the Court finds that the actions of the deputies were lawful in this matter.” The
court denied Strickland’s motion to suppress the evidence viewed and statements
obtained on the date of the deputies’ entry.
Before the start of trial, Strickland pleaded no contest to the two drug counts
(Health & Saf. Code, §§ 11364, subd. (a), 11377, subd. (a)). The trial court later granted
Strickland’s motion to dismiss the charge for possession of ingredients to make a
destructive device. The jury found Strickland guilty of possession of flammable material.
The trial court suspended imposition of Strickland’s sentence and placed him on
formal probation for two years. It imposed 365 days for the misdemeanor possession of a
controlled substance count and 180 days for misdemeanor possession of controlled
substance paraphernalia.
Strickland filed a timely notice of appeal.
DISCUSSION
Strickland contends that the evidence derived from the deputies’ warrantless entry
into his apartment should have been suppressed because the deputies improperly gained
his consent to enter by falsely representing that they were there to investigate the fraud
and kidnapping case when in fact they intended to investigate Strickland’s involvement in
placing the Molotov cocktails at the supermarket.
Whether a defendant’s consent to a search or seizure “is voluntary depends on the
totality of the circumstances; no single factor is dispositive of this factually intensive
inquiry. [Citation.] Thus, while police deception as to the purpose of the search is
relevant in assessing a suspect’s consent, it cannot be analyzed in a vacuum without
reference to the surrounding circumstances.” (People v. Avalos (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th
1569, 1578.) In reviewing a ruling on a motion to suppress, we view the record in the
light most favorable to the trial court’s ruling. (People v. Miranda (1993) 17 Cal.App.4th
917, 922.) We defer to the trial court’s factual findings, whether express or implied,
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when supported by substantial evidence, and we independently determine whether the
facts of the challenged search violated a defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights.
(People v. Lomax (2010) 49 Cal.4th 530, 563; People v. Ferguson (2003)
109 Cal.App.4th 367, 372.)
In this case, the deputies arrived at Strickland’s apartment in uniform and
identified themselves as sheriff’s deputies. When, upon questioning about the fraud and
kidnapping case, Strickland mentioned that he had the gift cards in his apartment, Deputy
Fulton asked if they could enter the apartment to see them, and Strickland invited them
in. Strickland argues that the deputies engaged in a ruse because the true reason for their
request to enter was to investigate the Molotov cocktails and not the fraud and
kidnapping case, but the trial court specifically found that the deputies were there “to
conduct further investigation as to two matters.” (Italics added.) This finding was
supported by substantial evidence, including Deputy Fulton’s testimony that he went to
investigate both the Molotov cocktails and the fraud and kidnapping case.
People v. Superior Court for Los Angeles County (1969) 271 Cal.App.2d 524
(Mace) is instructive. In Mace, police officers responded to a report of people shooting a
BB gun at a nearby house. (Id. at p. 525.) One defendant gave police consent to search
his car, where one of the officers found a BB gun and items the police suspected were
stolen. (Id. at p. 526.) The officer then asked Mace “ ‘if it would be okay to go into his
house to see — for the neighbors would not have to know what we were discussing out in
the front yard.’ Mace said, ‘Yes.’ ” (Ibid.) Upon entering the house, officers observed
contraband and arrested three suspects. (Ibid.) Rejecting Mace’s argument that his
consent to the search of his home was involuntary, the Court of Appeal explained: “We
know of no rule of law which requires an investigating officer to make a detailed
disclosure of all his reasons, or even his primary reason, for seeking consent to enter a
house to the person from whom consent to enter is sought, if the reason he gives is a true
reason and one which entitles him to seek such consent to enter. Subterfuge is not borne
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of incomplete disclosure of intent so long as the incompleteness does not amount to
falseness.” (Id. at pp. 527-528.) Similarly here, the deputies’ statement that they were
there to investigate the fraud and kidnapping case was not untruthful, and they did in fact
further investigate that matter upon entry. Under these circumstances, the
incompleteness of the disclosure did not amount to a falsity that vitiated Strickland’s
consent.
Strickland’s reliance on People v. Reeves (1964) 61 Cal.2d 268 is unpersuasive.
In Reeves, police officers arranged for a hotel manager to call the defendant in his hotel
room and to falsely tell him that a letter was waiting for him at the front desk. (Id. at
p. 271.) When the defendant opened the door to go to the front desk, officers positioned
outside his room saw a marijuana cigarette inside. (Ibid.) The officers entered the
defendant’s hotel room without his consent, conducted a search, and arrested him. (Id. at
pp. 271-273.) Our state Supreme Court held that the evidence obtained from the room
should have been suppressed, explaining that “ ‘an entry obtained by trickery, stealth or
subterfuge renders a search and seizure invalid.’ ” (Id. at p. 273.) Here, there was no
similar trickery or subterfuge. Sheriff’s deputies, wearing uniforms, knocked on
Strickland’s door, identified themselves as law enforcement officers, and told him they
were there for investigatory purposes. The deputies’ failure to elaborate on all the
reasons for their visit before Strickland invited them inside is not like the affirmative
deception at issue in Reeves and did not render Strickland’s consent involuntary. (Mace,
supra, 271 Cal.App.2d at pp. 527-528; People v. Avalos, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at
pp. 1578-1579; People v. Shepherd (1973) 33 Cal.App.3d 866, 869; see also People v.
Hale (1968) 262 Cal.App.2d 780, 787 [defendant “knew that the persons he was inviting
in were policemen”].)
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DISPOSITION
The judgment is affirmed.
/s/
FEINBERG, J.
We concur:
/s/
EARL, P. J.
/s/
RENNER, J.
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