In re E.L. CA5

CourtListener 10732074CalctappNov 6, 2025

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Filed 11/6/25 In re E.L. CA5

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

In re E.L., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile
Court Law.

TULARE COUNTY HEALTH AND HUMAN F089675
SERVICES AGENCY,
(Super. Ct. No. JJV075481A)
Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. OPINION
M.L.,

Defendant;

J.P.,

Objector and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Tulare County. Sara Bratsch,
Judge.
Sarah Vaona, under appointment by the Court of Appeal, for Objector and
Appellant.
Jennifer M. Flores, County Counsel, John A. Rozum and Marit Erickson, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
-ooOoo-
J.P. (“father”), the father of female minor E.L., appeals from the juvenile court’s
order denying his Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 388 modification petition
seeking sole custody of E.L. and termination of the court’s jurisdiction. He contends the
court should have evaluated his petition under section 361.2, subdivision (a), which
governs placement of a child who has been removed from a custodial parent and requires
placement with the noncustodial parent unless such placement would be detrimental to
the child. We reject the contention and affirm.
BACKGROUND
E.L. was born prematurely in January 2024,2 and placed in the neonatal intensive
care unit. On January 29, while E.L. remained hospitalized, a referral was made to the
Tulare County Health and Human Services Agency (“Agency”) due to concerns about
M.L.’s (“mother”) inability to care for E.L. because of untreated mental health issues.
Mother was visiting E.L. four times a week but was observed falling asleep during visits
and handling E.L. in an unsafe manner.
Social workers contacted mother at her home on January 31. On that date, mother
still did not know who E.L.’s father was. She reported living with E.L.’s maternal
grandmother, but the grandmother reported that mother lives alone. Mother said she
experienced postpartum depression with all four of her children and takes psychotropic
medication. She disclosed having been diagnosed with anxiety and depression. During
the visit with social workers, she displayed a flat affect and appeared disoriented.
Mother’s other three children lived with their father (not J.P.), who has full
custody of all three. The father filed for an emergency protective order in 2022 after
mother was placed on an involuntary psychiatric hold.

g1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 Subsequent references to dates are to dates in 2024 unless otherwise stated.

2.
The juvenile court issued a protective custody warrant on February 2, removing
E.L. from mother’s custody. Three days later, the Agency filed a petition under
section 300, subdivision (b)(1), alleging mother’s mental illness rendered her unable to
care for E.L., which placed E.L. at substantial risk of harm.
The court held a detention hearing on February 6. Father was identified, by first
name only, as E.L.’s father. The court found that a prima face showing had been made
that E.L. is a person described by section 300 and ordered her “detained from Mother.”
The court ordered visitation for mother with E.L.
E.L. was placed with a maternal great aunt when she was released from the
hospital on March 11.
By March 2024, the Agency had identified and contacted father. Father told the
social worker that he had been intimate with mother but did not know whether he was
E.L.’s father. He said he was going to request a paternity test at the combined
jurisdiction and disposition hearing. He claimed not knowing mother was pregnant until
after E.L. was born. Father lives in Georgia but met mother while working in Fresno
from April 2023 to October 2023. They became friends after meeting at the gym and
developed a romantic relationship.
Father told the Agency that if E.L. is his child, he would “prefer” that she be in his
care, “especially if mom can’t take care of her.” He said he communicated with mother
by phone about E.L.
After a combined jurisdiction and disposition hearing on March 28, the court
sustained the section 300 petition, ordered paternity testing, and set a further hearing on
disposition. In May 2024, the Agency submitted paternity test results showing a 99.99
percent probability that father was E.L.’s biological parent. Father told the agency he
wanted “to take an active parenting role” and requested his paternity status be elevated
from biological to presumed. E.L. was still living with her maternal great aunt.

3.
A May 2024 Agency report stated that father was married and lived with his wife
and their one child in Georgia. Father began Facetime visits with E.L. four days a week
for fifteen minutes at a time, beginning May 2. E.L.’s maternal great aunt supervised the
visits and reported that father appeared very loving towards E.L. Father traveled to
Tulare in mid-April and visited E.L. on each of the three days he was there. The visits
went well, with father attending to E.L.’s needs and acting lovingly towards her.
Ahead of the disposition hearing, the Agency recommended that mother receive
six months of Family Reunification Services, with discretion to the Agency to return E.L.
to mother’s care under Family Maintenance Services before the review hearing. The
Agency further recommended that father’s paternity status be elevated from alleged to
biological.
At the disposition hearing on May 23, the court elevated father’s paternity status to
biological father. It also ordered E.L. removed from mother’s custody, and it vested in
the Agency the responsibility for E.L.’s placement and care. The court ordered six
months of reunification services to mother and supervised visitation for both parents.
In August 2024, E.L.’s attorney agreed to father having unsupervised visits with
E.L. Those visits went well, and in September 2024 the Agency approved father for
overnight visits with E.L. In November 2024, the Agency approved mother for
unsupervised visits with E.L. The Agency also reported that mother was complying with
her case plan, had safe housing for E.L., and was attending parenting classes. The
Agency thus requested discretion to allow mother overnight visits. After a November 14
review hearing, the court found that both parents had made “substantial progress”
towards alleviating the causes necessitating E.L.’s placement in foster care.
On December 12, the court elevated father’s paternity status to presumed father
and made an interim custody order: father was to have placement of E.L. “on Family
Maintenance” from December 12 until January 10, 2025, and then mother was to have
placement “on Family Maintenance” until February 6, 2025. The parent who did not

4.
have custody was to have video visitation four times a week. The court also ordered
Family Maintenance services for both parents to begin that day. Also on December 12,
mother completed her SafeCare Parenting program. The Agency reported mother was
complying with her mental health treatment plan.
On January 10, 2025, father filed a section 388 request to change the December 12
shared custody and visitation order. He requested that the court grant him sole legal and
physical custody of E.L. and terminate its jurisdiction over E.L. He submitted two
declarations of his own and a declaration from his wife in support of his request.
In his first declaration, father asserted that mother was unable to safely care for
E.L. He said that since mother has had E.L. in her care, mother has “cut off” father’s
court-ordered video visits. Mother was late to or missed nearly every scheduled video
call. She also had E.L. vaccinated despite father telling her that he already had her
vaccinated. He reported that mother mocked him on phone calls that the social worker
was on “her side,” and he asserted that the social worker actually was on mother’s side,
as the social worker had shown a “true lack of objectivity.”
A hearing on father’s section 388 request was set for February 6, 2025, the same
date already set for a review hearing. The Agency filed an interim report ahead of the
hearing which stated that mother and father had difficulty communicating and scheduling
video visits for each other. The Agency wanted the parents to continue receiving Family
Maintenance services and working on their communication with each other. It also
recommended that the parents continue sharing custody of E.L., with each having E.L.
for a month at a time with video visits for the noncustodial parent. As to father’s
section 388 request, the Agency stated that both parents are learning to coparent and that
it would not be in E.L.’s best interest to grant father sole custody because E.L. was
bonded to both parents.

5.
The section 388 request was continued once to March 6, 2025, and then again to
April 2, 2025. At the March 6, 2025, hearing, father was ordered to return E.L. to mother
on March 10, and mother was to have placement of E.L. until the April 2, 2025 hearing.
At the April 2, 2025 hearing, father’s counsel clarified father’s section 388
request. Counsel asserted that once father’s paternity status was elevated to presumed,
the court “should have exercised its discretion under section 361.2 and dismissed
dependency because a presumed parent has a constitutional right to parentage.” Counsel
later clarified father’s position: when father was elevated to presumed father, since the
court had not ever made a finding that it would be detrimental to place E.L. with father,
the court should have granted father full custody and terminated its jurisdiction over the
matter under section 361.2.
The Agency asserted that only presumed fathers can request custody under
section 361.2, and by the time father attained presumed status he already had shared
custody of E.L. Section 361.2 thus did not apply to him., the Agency argued. The court
agreed with the Agency that section 361.2 did not apply, but it allowed father to present
evidence on other grounds as to why the court should grant him sole custody and
terminate its jurisdiction.
Father testified that E.L. was thriving in his care in Georgia, beginning in
December 2024. Her energy and personality “blossom[ed].” Communicating with
mother was challenging; they had been struggling to establish courtesy in their
communications. After returning E.L. to mother in January 2025, many times he was
unable to have his court-ordered video visits because mother would not answer her phone
or return his calls. Father also recounted how he learned that E.L. had been double
vaccinated.
The court heard argument from the parties after father’s testimony. Father argued
it was not in E.L.’s best interest to have a relationship with mother. He said the problem
was not “coparenting,” but rather mother’s inability to provide for E.L.’s needs. E.L.’s

6.
attorney claimed that granting father sole custody would be “extremely detrimental” to
E.L. “because she loves her mother, and she also loves her father.” E.L.’s counsel also
asserted that there had not been a change in circumstances to support granting a section
388 request. The Agency argued that mother had completed all of her services, that she
and father are both doing the “best they can” for E.L., that father had not shown a change
in circumstances, and that it is in E.L.’s best interest to have both her parents in her life.
Mother also argued that granting father’s request would not be in E.L.’s best interests and
that father had not shown a change in circumstances. She asserted that she had
completed her services, had cared for E.L. for about the same amount of time as father,
there had not been any new detentions, and E.L. deserved to have both her parents in her
life.
In denying father’s request, the court stated it was considering father’s testimony,
the declarations and recommendations it had received, and argument from the parties.
The court found that father had not shown a change in circumstances to justify removing
E.L. from mother’s care, granting sole custody to father, and terminating its jurisdiction.
The court also found this would not be in E.L.’s best interests. The court stated, “The
progression of this case has gone very well for mother.” The court noted that mother had
“engaged in her services” and stated that it “does agree wholeheartedly that [E.L.] needs
both parents.” Although the parents have experienced a “significant breakdown in
communication and coparenting,” the court did not cast blame on either parent. Instead,
the court ascribed the problem to the parents’ “strong difficulty in deciding what is in the
best interest of [E.L.].” To that point, the court found that both parents are “coparenting
and working in the best interest of [E.L.]” and commended the parents for “working and
trying baby steps to get to the place where they can coparent in the best interest of the
child.” The court concluded that it is in E.L.’s best interests to have both parents in her
life and that E.L. would be “significantly affect[ed]” if she lost her relationship with her
mother. The court thus stated that it would not make “such a severe order at this time.”

7.
DISCUSSION
Father claims the juvenile court abused its discretion in denying his section 388
request to modify the December 12, 2024, shared custody and visitation order.
Specifically, he argues the court should have removed E.L. from mother’s care, granted
him sole custody, and terminated its jurisdiction. He asserts the court was required to do
so under section 361.2. However, in our view, section 361.2 did not apply here. Instead,
the normal section 388 framework governed, and the court did not abuse its discretion in
finding no changed circumstances and determining that it was not in E.L.’s best interests
to grant father’s request.
In general, a section 388 petition to modify a prior juvenile court order requires
the petitioner to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, both (1) a change in
circumstances or new evidence, and (2) that the requested order is in the child’s best
interests. (§ 388, subd. (a)(1); In re J.M. (2020) 50 Cal.App.5th 833, 845.)
The issue here involves the interplay between section 388 and 361.2; section 361.2
applies at disposition. After a juvenile court assumes jurisdiction over a child under
section 300, it must determine the appropriate disposition for that child. (§§ 360,
subd. (d), 361, 362; In re N.M. (2011) 197 Cal.App.4th 159, 169.) If, at the dispositional
hearing, the court removes the child from the care of the custodial parent under
section 361, section 361.2 requires it to place the child with the noncustodial parent
unless doing so would be detrimental to the child.3 (§ 361.2, subd. (a).) The statute
further provides several options if the child is so placed, including termination of

3 Section 361.2, subdivision (a) provides: “If a court orders removal of a child
pursuant to Section 361, the court shall first determine whether there is a parent of the
child, with whom the child was not residing at the time that the events or conditions arose
that brought the child within the provisions of Section 300, who desires to assume
custody of the child. If that parent requests custody, the court shall place the child with
the parent unless it finds that placement with that parent would be detrimental to the
safety, protection, or physical or emotional well-being of the child.”

8.
jurisdiction. (Id., subds. (b) & (c).) The detriment finding must be made by clear and
convincing evidence. (In re C.M. (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 1394, 1401.)
By its terms, section 361.2 generally applies only at the disposition stage, after the
court removes the child from a custodial parent. (In re Zacharia D. (1993) 6 Cal.4th 435,
453.) To qualify as a noncustodial parent for these purposes, an alleged or biological
father must also attain presumed-father status. (Id. at p. 454.; In re Liam L. (2015)
240 Cal.App.4th 1068, 1080, fn. 5 (Liam L.).) That said, several courts have applied
section 361.2 to noncustodial parents’ requests for custody made after disposition.
(Liam L., at p. 1073, 1085; see also In re Jonathan P. (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1240,
1255–1256 (Jonathan P.); In re Suhey G. (2013) 221 Cal.App.4th 732, 744–745.)
Father relies on Liam L., which involved a noncustodial father’s postdisposition
section 388 petition seeking placement of the child. (Liam L., supra, 240 Cal.App.4th
1068, 1083.) The appellate court there explained that after a disposition order, a
noncustodial parent may seek a change in placement through a section 388 petition. (Id.
at pp. 1083–1084.) For example, if a noncustodial parent has only recently become
involved in the dependency case and developed a relationship with the child, he or she
may allege changed circumstances or new facts supporting placement with them. (Id. at
p. 1084.) In such cases, the general two-part section 388 test does not strictly apply. (Id.
at pp. 1073–1074, 1085–1086.) Because California’s dependency scheme presumes
placement with a noncustodial parent absent a finding of detriment, such placement is
presumed to be in the child’s best interests. (Id. at p. 1073, fn. omitted.) Accordingly, a
noncustodial parent makes a prima facie showing of best interests under section 388
when requesting custody postdisposition; the child must be placed with that parent unless
the opposing party establishes detriment to the child’s safety or well-being. (Id. at
pp. 1085–1086.)
Father applies this section 361.2 framework to argue both changed circumstances
and best interests. He contends his elevation to presumed-father status constituted the

9.
required change in circumstances, since only a presumed father may seek placement
under section 361.2. As to best interests, he argues that because the court never found
that placement with him would be detrimental, it was obligated to grant him custody and
terminate jurisdiction. He thus claims the court abused its discretion by finding neither
changed circumstances nor best interests sufficient to support his petition.
Whether section 361.2 applies to a noncustodial parent’s custody request is a
question of law we review independently. (See Jonathan P., supra, 226 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1252.)
Liam L. does not hold, and no case we have found holds, that section 361.2 applies
to a custodial parent’s request for placement by means of a section 388 petition. When
father filed his section 388 petition in January 2025, he and mother already shared
custody of E.L. Although E.L. was initially removed from mother’s care in February
2024, by January 2025 E.L. was living with both parents on a rotating basis. Because
father was a custodial parent when he filed his petition, section 361.2 did not govern the
court’s determination of his petition. Most significantly, that means the court was not
required to grant father sole custody absent a showing of detriment. Instead, the ordinary
section 388 standard applied: father bore the burden of showing that granting his request
was in E.L.’s best interests.
The determination of a section 388 petition is reviewed for abuse of discretion.
(In re Marcos G. (2010) 182 Cal.App.4th 369, 382.) “We must uphold the juvenile
court’s denial of appellant’s section 388 petition unless we can determine from the record
that its decisions ‘ “exceeded the bounds of reason. When two or more inferences can
reasonably be deduced from the facts, the reviewing court has no authority to substitute
its decision for that of the trial court.” ’ ” (In re Brittany K. (2005) 127 Cal.App.4th
1497, 1505). “ ‘The denial of a section 388 motion rarely merits reversal as an abuse of
discretion.’ ” (In re Daniel C. (2006) 141 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1445.)

10.
We conclude the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that father’s
request for sole custody was not in E.L.’s best interests. The Agency reported that E.L.
was bonded to both parents and opined that severing her relationship with mother would
not serve her interests. Mother had also engaged in her reunification services, and no
new grounds for removal from mother’s care arose after E.L. was returned to her care.
Father argues that it is “not sustainable” for E.L. to continue traveling between California
and Georgia and points to his and mother’s communication problems and mother’s
decision to revaccinate E.L. The court heard these concerns and determined they did not
justify the “severe” step of granting father sole custody. On this record—showing that
E.L. was bonded to both parents and that mother had made sustained progress—the
court’s conclusion was well within the bounds of reason. Because the court did not err in
denying father sole custody, it necessarily did not err in declining to terminate
jurisdiction.
DISPOSITION
The trial court’s April 2, 2025, order denying father’s section 388 petition is
affirmed.

SNAUFFER, J.
WE CONCUR:

HILL, P. J.

GUERRA, J.*

* Judge of the Fresno Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.

11.

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