CourtListener 10731399•In re I.M. CA2/2
Full text
Filed 11/5/25 In re I.M. CA2/2
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION TWO
In re I.M., a Person Coming Under B344029
the Juvenile Court Law.
LOS ANGELES COUNTY Los Angeles County
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN Super. Ct. No. 22CCJP03018B
AND FAMILY SERVICES,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
v.
S.C., a Minor, etc.,
Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County. Cathy J. Ostiller, Judge. Affirmed.
Janette Freeman Cochran, under appointment by the Court
of Appeal, for Appellant.
Dawyn R. Harrison, County Counsel, Kim Nemoy,
Assistant County Counsel, and Jessica S. Mitchell, Deputy
County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
____________________
This is an appeal from the juvenile court’s order
terminating Mother Janet M.’s parental rights to minor I.M. at a
Welfare and Institutions Code1 section 366.26 hearing, clearing
the way for I.M. to be adopted by his longtime caretaker, Ms. K.
In a separate appeal by Mother, we affirmed the juvenile
court’s determination that the beneficial parental relationship
exception to adoption (§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)) did not apply.
(In re I.M. (Oct. 2, 2025, B343804) [nonpub. opn.].)
In this appeal by half sister S.C.,2 we affirm the juvenile
court’s determination that the sibling relationship exception
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v)) is inapplicable.
BACKGROUND
I.M. is a boy born in December 2019. His father is
unknown. I.M. has significant special needs. Through the date of
the order appealed, he remained largely nonverbal.
S.C. is I.M.’s half sister. She was born in 2010. S.C. is over
nine years older than I.M. In connection with the events
described herein, the juvenile court also exercised jurisdiction
over S.C. However, her case terminated in October 2024 when
1 All further undesignated statutory references are to the
Welfare and Institutions Code.
2 S.C. also purports to join, pursuant to California Rules of
Court, rule 8.200(a)(5), Mother’s argument in her appeal “that
the [juvenile] court erred in finding the beneficial parental-child
relationship exception to adoption inapplicable.” Even assuming
the standards of such joinder have been met (see People v.
Bryant, Smith and Wheeler (2014) 60 Cal.4th 335, 363
[rule 8.200(a)(5) not satisfied by “cursory and unfocused
statements”]), we have already rejected Mother’s argument and
reject it again here for the same reasons.
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the court determined the circumstances no longer justified its
supervision.
I.M. came to the attention of the Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS) in
May 2022, when he was just two and half years old. At the time,
he was living in a home with Mother, then 12-year-old S.C., and
several other extended family members.
I.M. had recently presented to the hospital with a femur
fracture. He was also malnourished and diagnosed with failure to
thrive.
The juvenile court initially allowed I.M. to remain in
Mother’s care with S.C. However, it ordered him detained in
October 2022, returned him to mother’s care the following month,
and ordered him detained again in January 2023. He was placed
in foster care and never lived with Mother and S.C. again.
In April 2023, the juvenile court sustained an amended
petition against Mother based on allegations she neglected I.M.
I.M. was placed with Ms. K. later in 2023. Ms. K. is an
excellent caregiver who provides I.M. stability and love and
otherwise meets his needs. She expressed willingness to adopt
I.M. if Mother failed to reunify with him.
Mother failed to reunify with I.M. and the juvenile court
terminated reunification services.
At the section 366.26 hearing, the evidence showed I.M.
was adoptable. However, S.C. attempted to show section 366.26,
subdivision (c)(1)(B)(v)’s sibling relationship exception applied.
The record showed I.M. and S.C. had lived in the same
home for approximately two and a half years—roughly the first
half of I.M.’s life. For the two years preceding the hearing, I.M.
had been placed out of their home. This suited S.C. She reported
being “happy and prefer[ring] to be alone with Mother.”
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Though Mother visited I.M. consistently, S.C. joined those
visits only sporadically. This was by choice. S.C. “expressed a
preference to remain at home, as she ha[d] become comfortable
and . . . adjust[ed] to spending time alone. She ha[d] little interest
in attending the visits with her mother.”
Also, the weekend visits which did not conflict with S.C.’s
school—usually Saturday or Sunday at 11:00 a.m.—were too
early for S.C.’s taste. She said she would be willing to join “if they
could be scheduled for a later time like around the afternoon,”
but they remained scheduled for the morning. S.C. also declined
to join at least one visit in November 2024 because she said it
was too cold.
In total, during the two years I.M. was in out-of-home
placement, S.C. attended only three visits with him.
Mother testified about these visits and the bond between
S.C. and I.M. more broadly. Mother said they each appeared
“[v]ery happy” when they saw each other. They would “[p]lay
with the ball, run around”; and at the last visit S.C. attended
they “brought some bubbles, so [I.M.] was chasing the bubbles
with [S.C.].” Mother viewed I.M. as “very close with [S.C.]” and
recalled them “sitting together, reading a book, playing whatever
it is.” But there is also evidence Mother was trying to engineer a
meaningful relationship between I.M. and S.C. that did not exist.
S.C. reported Mother had told her I.M. asked “ ‘where is sis?’ ” at
one of the visits S.C. missed. But he could not have said this. At
the hearing, Mother admitted she never heard I.M. make a
sentence three, or even two, words long.
With this evidence before it, the juvenile court found the
sibling relationship exception inapplicable and terminated
Mother’s parental rights to I.M. In doing so, it expressed
“concerns about Mother’s credibility.”
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S.C. timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
I. Applicable Law and Standard of Review
At a hearing under section 366.26, the juvenile court must
select and implement a permanent plan intended to provide the
dependent child a “stable, permanent” home. (Id., subd. (b).)
Where there is no probability of reunification with a parent,
adoption is the preferred permanent plan. (Id., subd. (b)(1).) For
the court to select adoption as the permanent plan, it must find,
by clear and convincing evidence, that the child is likely to be
adopted if parental rights are terminated. (Id., subd. (c)(1).)
Then, in the absence of evidence that a relative guardianship
should be considered, or that the termination of parental rights
would be detrimental to the child under one of the enumerated
exceptions, the court “shall terminate parental rights.” (Id.,
subd. (c)(1)(B)(i)–(vi).) These “ ‘statutory exceptions merely
permit the court, in exceptional circumstances [citation], to
choose an option other than the norm, which remains adoption.’ ”
(In re Caden C. (2021) 11 Cal.5th 614, 631.)
One such exception is the “sibling relationship” exception.
(§ 366.26, subd. (c)(1)(B)(v).) It applies where “[t]here would be
substantial interference with a child’s sibling relationship, taking
into consideration the nature and extent of the relationship,
including, but not limited to, whether the child was raised with a
sibling in the same home, whether the child shared significant
common experiences or has existing close and strong bonds with
a sibling, and whether ongoing contact is in the child’s best
interest, including the child’s long-term emotional interest, as
compared to the benefit of legal permanence through adoption.”
(Ibid.) “The sibling bond exception is evaluated from the
perspective of the child who is being considered for adoption, not
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the perspective of that child’s siblings.” (In re D.O. (2016)
247 Cal.App.4th 166, 174.)
The legislator who drafted the sibling relationship
exception “anticipated that ‘use of the . . . exception “w[ould]
likely be rare,” ’ meaning ‘that the child’s relationship with his or
her siblings would rarely be sufficiently strong to outweigh the
benefits of adoption.’ ” (In re Daisy D. (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 287,
293.) Accordingly, there is a “heavy burden” on the party
opposing adoption under the exception. (In re Daniel H. (2002)
99 Cal.App.4th 804, 813.) That burden is greater still “when the
proceedings concern young children whose needs for a competent,
caring and stable parent are paramount.” (In re Valerie A. (2007)
152 Cal.App.4th 987, 1014.)
“To show a substantial interference with a sibling
relationship the [proponent] must show the existence of a
significant sibling relationship, the severance of which would be
detrimental to the child.” (In re L.Y.L. (2002) 101 Cal.App.4th
942, 952.) If the court determines termination of parental rights
will substantially interfere with the sibling relationship, it must
then “weigh the child’s best interest in continuing that sibling
relationship against the benefit the child would receive by the
permanency of adoption.” (Ibid.)
“We apply the substantial evidence standard of review to
review the [juvenile] court’s factual findings regarding the
applicability of the sibling relationship exception, ‘and the abuse
of discretion standard to the court’s weighing of competing
interests.’ ” (In re Isaiah S. (2016) 5 Cal.App.5th 428, 438.)
II. Application
First, S.C. fails to acknowledge the standard of review at
all. Her argument proceeds as if our review were independent. It
is not, and S.C.’s failure to so much as acknowledge the standard
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of review, much less argue error through the proper lens, may
properly be viewed as a concession of the lack of merit to her
appeal. (Sonic Manufacturing Technologies, Inc. v. AAE Systems,
Inc. (2011) 196 Cal.App.4th 456, 465.)
In any event, there is no error. The trial court found there
“is simply no sibling . . . bond []here to protect.” Because she bore
the burden of proof in the juvenile court, S.C. can show error in
this finding only if she demonstrates the evidence compelled a
finding in her favor as a matter of law. (See In re I.W. (2009)
180 Cal.App.4th 1517, 1528, overruled on other grounds by
Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.) She
fails to do so.
The only evidence supporting the existence of a significant
sibling relationship came by way of Mother’s testimony. The
juvenile court did not find Mother credible. We will not second-
guess that determination. (See In re Cole Y. (2015)
233 Cal.App.4th 1444, 1453 [credibility determinations are the
province of the juvenile court].)
Moreover, even if the burden of proof before the juvenile
court had been on DCFS or I.M., there was substantial evidence
to support the court’s conclusion. S.C. was not interested in
visiting I.M., barely ever did, and was content not having him in
the home she shared with Mother. This is not the “rare” or
“exceptional” case where the relationship was so strong that it
would outweigh the benefits of adoption. (See In re Daisy D.,
supra, 144 Cal.App.4th at p. 293; In re Caden C., supra,
11 Cal.5th at p. 631.)
In her briefing, S.C. refers to section 16002 and faults
DCFS for not addressing it. But S.C. claims no violation of the
portion of section 16002 that sets forth the steps an agency
should take to facilitate sibling contact in the context of adoptions
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involving siblings. (§ 16002, subd. (e).) Instead, she argues
section 16002 contains an expression of legislative intent about
the relationship between siblings that the juvenile court failed to
honor in ordering Mother’s parental rights terminated. For the
reasons already stated, the juvenile court made a finding
sufficient to reject the sibling relationship exception and did not
err in doing so.
DISPOSITION
The juvenile court’s order is affirmed.
RICHARDSON, J.
WE CONCUR:
LUI, P. J.
SIGGINS, J.
Retired Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeal, First
Appellate District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to
article VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
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