Frazier v. Greenberg CA4/1

CourtListener 10731231CalctappNov 5, 2025

Full text

Filed 11/5/25 Frazier v. Greenberg CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for publication or
ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or ordered published for
purposes of rule 8.1115.

COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

PHILLIP FRAZIER, D084791

Plaintiff and Appellant,

v. (Super. Ct. No.
37-2024-00010265-CU-NP-CTL)
HOWARD GREENBERG et al.,

Defendants and Respondents.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Michael T. Smyth, Judge. Affirmed.
Phillip Frazier, in pro. per, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Horton, Oberrecht & Kirkpatrick and Nathaniel J. Michels, for
Defendants and Respondents.
For nonlawyers to represent themselves in any legal proceeding is a
challenge. Judges make every effort to ensure the right of every litigant to be
heard (Cal. Code Jud. Ethics, canon 3(B)(8)), but at the same time they must
apply the law equally to all litigants, regardless of whether those parties are
represented by an attorney or elect to represent themselves. (See Nwosu v.
Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246–1247.) This includes both the
substantive law applicable to the dispute as well as the rules of procedure
that guide its resolution.
In this case, an unlawful detainer (UD) action was filed against
plaintiff Phillip Frazier by his landlord, J Street Inn, L.P. (J Street). J Street
later dismissed the action without prejudice. Believing it had been instituted
without basis and for an improper purpose, Frazier then filed this action for
malicious prosecution against J Street and Howard Greenberg, who Frazier
believed controlled J Street. Defendants responded with a motion to strike
the complaint pursuant to California’s anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil

Procedure section 425.16,1 which gives special protection to certain conduct
“in furtherance of [a] person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
A malicious prosecution action challenges the basis for a litigant’s
previous lawsuit—in this case, defendants’ prior UD action. By definition,
Frazier’s claim arises out of defendants’ right to petition the judicial branch
of government for relief and is subject to the protections of the anti-SLAPP
statute. Here, having established that the statute applied, defendants’

1 All statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure unless
otherwise indicated.
2
motion to strike placed the burden on Frazier to introduce admissible
evidence that, if credited, would be sufficient to sustain a judgment in his
favor. In response, Frazier offered no admissible evidence. The trial court
had no choice but to grant defendants’ motion. For similar reasons, we are
compelled to affirm the judgment.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

In March 2024, Frazier filed a malicious prosecution complaint against
defendants J Street and Greenberg alleging they had brought an unfounded
UD action against him in 2021 attempting to evict him from his home.
Although the details are not completely clear, Frazier apparently believed
that defendants thought he had changed the locks on his unit without their
permission, something he vehemently denied. Defendants responded to the
complaint by filing a special motion to strike under the anti-SLAPP statute.
(§ 425.16.) They asserted that Frazier’s malicious prosecution claim arose
out of constitutionally protected activity—their filing of the UD lawsuit—and
that Frazier could not establish a prima facie basis to prevail.
In response to defendants’ motion, Frazier submitted a “Response
and Opposition and Memorandum of Points and Authorities Opposing

Defendant’s SLAPP Motion to Strike.”2 This memorandum references four
exhibits, which appear to have been attached to a separate “Notice of Filing
of Supplemental Exhibits.” The exhibits included: (1) a one page “pest
control form” purportedly signed by Frazier; (2) a “dog pest article from on-

2 Nearly a month later, Frazier appears to have filed a different two-
page document titled “Opposition to SLAPP Motion” that notified defendants
and the court his opposition to the anti-SLAPP motion was based on the
memorandum of points and authorities, “the Declarations/ Verifications
of Paul Lares, and Iryna Nelipovich [aka Iryna Weisband] [whose
Declarations/Verifications were perjured], and any documentary and/or
oral evidence as may be presented at the time of the hearing of the Motion.”
3
line”; (3) a copy of a verification apparently attached to the UD complaint,
signed by J Street property manager Iryna Nelipovich; and (4) a copy of the
March 10, 2022 minute order reflecting the dismissal of the UD action
without prejudice at J Street’s request. There was no accompanying
declaration to authenticate the exhibits or provide a proper foundation for

their admission.3 Frazier’s argument in opposition to the motion begins
with a six-page statement of facts. It appears to be substantially his version
of what happened leading up to and following the filing of the UD action, but
it is not supported by any declarations signed under penalty of perjury.
Defendants’ reply asserted that because Frazier’s claims “are rooted
and/or arise out of a Malicious Prosecution Cause of Action,” the first step
of the anti-SLAPP analysis was satisfied. As for the second step, defendants
maintained that Frazier had failed to offer any admissible evidence to

support his claims.4
In granting their anti-SLAPP motion, the trial court agreed with
defendants. It concluded that the filing of the UD detainer action was
necessarily protected activity, which shifted the burden to Frazier to produce
evidence that would support a judgment in his favor. The court identified
three elements of a malicious prosecution action, finding that Frazier had

3 Two of the exhibits—the Nelipovich verification and the minute order—
appear to duplicate exhibits that were attached to Frazier’s complaint.
4 It appears Frazier attempted to file a surreply. Under a heading,
“Probability of Prevailing,” he maintained he “has already demonstrated that
he would indeed prevail if a trier of fact [a jury] heard his case. The then
Plaintiff[s] [TP], and now Defendant[s], knowing their case was untenable
and would more than likely lose at trial before a jury, dismissed their case
without prejudice. Not only one, but two attorney[s] the then Defendants
[TD] and now Frazier had to deal with. Frazier’s claim has . . . ‘minimal
merit’ to defeat Defendant[s’] SLAPP motion.”
4
failed to establish a prima facie case as to any of the three. As to the first
element—a favorable termination of the underlying action—the court
explained that a voluntary dismissal would constitute a favorable
termination only if the defendants had conceded Frazier did nothing wrong,
and there was no evidence to that effect. As to the remaining elements—that
the UD action was brought without probable cause and with malice, the court
concluded Frazier had provided no evidentiary support.

DISCUSSION

We begin with some basic principles of appellate review. The trial
court’s decision is presumed correct, and the burden is on the appellant to
affirmatively demonstrate error. (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,
609.) This burden includes several components. Appellants must provide the
reviewing court with a record of the trial court proceedings that contains all
the relevant materials. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971) 3 Cal.3d
875, 881.) Likewise, they must submit a brief summarizing the relevant facts
with citations to the record and pertinent legal authority demonstrating the
claimed error. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C); William
Jefferson & Co., Inc. v. Orange County Assessment Appeals Bd. No. 2 (2014)
228 Cal.App.4th 1, 6, fn. 2; Pringle v. La Chapelle (1999) 73 Cal.App.4th
1000, 1003.) We disregard any facts mentioned in the brief that are not part
of the record. (Pulver v. Avco Financial Services (1986) 182 Cal.App.3d 622,
632.) The brief must also identify each point of argument under a separate
heading, supported by a logical explanation and pertinent authority. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) A failure to do so waives the appellant’s
ability to rely on that argument. (Winslett v. 1811 27th Avenue, LLC (2018)
26 Cal.App.5th 239, 248, fn. 6.)

5
A. Anti-SLAPP Motions Generally

“[T]he anti-SLAPP statute is designed to protect defendants from
meritless lawsuits that might chill the exercise of their rights to speak and
petition on matters of public concern. [Citations.] To that end, the statute
authorizes a special motion to strike a claim ‘arising from any act of that
person in furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the
United States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with
a public issue.’ ” (Wilson v. Cable News Network, Inc. (2019) 7 Cal.5th 871,
883–884.)
“Anti-SLAPP motions are evaluated through a two-step process.
Initially, the moving defendant bears the burden of establishing that the
challenged allegations or claims ‘aris[e] from’ protected activity in which the
defendant has engaged.” (Park v. Board of Trustees of California State
University (2017) 2 Cal.5th 1057, 1061 (Park), quoting § 425.16, subd. (b).)
“[T]he Legislature has defined such protected acts in furtherance of speech
and petition rights to include a specified range of statements, writings, and
conduct in connection with official proceedings and matters of public
interest.” (Park, at p. 1062; see § 425.16, subd. (e).) As relevant here, the
anti-SLAPP statute protects any written or oral statement made “before”
a judicial proceeding or “in connection with an issue under consideration
or review” by a judicial body. (§ 425.16, subd. (e)(1) & (2).)
If a defendant carries its first-step burden, “the plaintiff must then
demonstrate its claims have at least ‘minimal merit.’ ” (Park, supra, 2
Cal.5th at p. 1061.) Importantly, the anti-SLAPP statute does not prohibit
claims against defendants arising from their exercise of protected rights of
petition or speech. “It only provides a procedure for weeding out, at an early
stage, meritless claims arising from protected activity.” (Baral v. Schnitt

6
(2016) 1 Cal.5th 376, 384.) Thus, the second step of the process operates
“as a ‘summary-judgment-like procedure.’ ” (Ibid.) “[T]he plaintiff ‘must
demonstrate that the complaint is both legally sufficient and supported by a
sufficient prima facie showing of facts to sustain a favorable judgment if the
evidence submitted by the plaintiff is credited.’ ” (Wilson v. Parker, Covert &
Chidester (2002) 28 Cal.4th 811, 821.) “If the plaintiff cannot make this
showing, the court will strike the claim.” (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System
(2021) 11 Cal.5th 995, 1009.)

B. Step One: Frazier’s Malicious Prosecution Claim Arises Out
of Constitutionally Protected Activity

It is well settled that by definition, “malicious prosecution causes of
action fall within the purview of the anti-SLAPP statute” (Jarrow Formulas,
Inc. v. LaMarche (2003) 31 Cal.4th 728, 735) because they challenge and
seek to curtail the defendant’s right to petition the court for redress.
Unsurprisingly, the trial court determined that Frazier’s malicious
prosecution lawsuit arose from defendants’ protected activity in filing the
UD action. (See Birkner v. Lam (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 275, 281 [“The
prosecution of an unlawful detainer action indisputably is protected activity
within the meaning of section 425.16”].) Frazier did not attack that finding

in his opening brief.5 His reply brief attempts to do so, but for obvious
reasons of fairness we do not normally consider arguments made for the first

5 Frazier’s trial court papers largely omitted any argument on this point
as well. The only reference to the first step of the anti-SLAPP analysis in his
opposition brief was a heading that read, “The Complaint Does Not Arise Out
of An Act in Furtherance of Defendants[’] Right of Petition or Free Speech in
Connection With a Public Issue and Therefore Defendants[’] Special Motion
to Strike Must Be Denied.” Under the heading was a single sentence: “CCP
425.16 reads in relevant part: ‘To this end, this section shall be construed
broadly’.” Frazier made no effort to explain why his malicious prosecution
claims did not arise out of constitutionally protected activity.
7
time on reply. (West v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th
780, 799.) In any event, Frazier cites no authority to support his assertion
that a malicious prosecution claim is not subject to anti-SLAPP protection.

C. Step Two: Frazier Did Not Establish a Probability of
Succeeding on His Claim

With the burden shifted to him at the second step of the anti-SLAPP
analysis, Frazier was obligated to introduce enough admissible evidence to
support a judgment in his favor. Evidence typically consists of “affidavits,
declarations, and their equivalents.” (Sweetwater Union High School Dist. v.
Gilbane Building Co. (2019) 6 Cal.5th 931, 949.) It is considered “admissible”
if “it is reasonably possible the proffered evidence set out in those statements
will be admissible at trial.” (Ibid.) In other words, the court should consider
the evidence if it appears the plaintiff will be able to lay a proper foundation
after full discovery. (Ibid.)
Here, Frazier failed to satisfy his step-two burden for multiple reasons.
Initially, his brief on appeal presents no coherent description of the relevant
facts accompanied by citations to the record and reasoned argument
explaining why the cited evidence is sufficient to sustain his prima facie
burden. His statement of facts refers to allegations in his complaint and
exhibits attached to it, ignoring the fact that a plaintiff opposing an anti-
SLAPP motion and seeking to establish the merit of the claim “may not rely
solely on its complaint, even if verified.” (San Diegans for Open Government
v. San Diego State University Research Foundation (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 76,

8
95.) “[I]nstead, its proof must be made upon competent admissible

evidence.”6 (Ibid.)
Apart from the inadequacy of the briefing on appeal, Frazier made no
attempt to offer the trial court admissible evidence to support his claim. As
we have noted, the only documents of an evidentiary nature filed by Frazier
are exhibits attached to his complaint and to a “Notice of Filing of
Supplemental Exhibits.” There is no accompanying affidavit or declaration
authenticating the documents or providing a foundation to explain their

origin or relevance.7
Typical is Exhibit 2 to Frazier’s complaint, what appears to be a one-
page handwritten statement signed by J Street’s “maintenance supervisor”
Paul Lares dated November 19, 2021. The statement recites that Lares
went to Unit 426 (Frazier’s apartment) on November 19 with a pest control
technician but was unable to gain access because his key did not work.
Frazier apparently believes that J Street sought to evict him by falsely
asserting he changed the locks on his apartment without permission, but he
failed to provide even a declaration on his own behalf. If, as Frazier asserts,

6 Frazier’s briefing suggests he mistakenly believes that a verified
pleading constitutes admissible evidence for purposes of an anti-SLAPP
motion.
7 The allegedly malicious UD complaint was the subject of a request for
judicial notice filed by defendants. In his purported surreply in the trial
court (ante, at fn. 4), Frazier attempted to address defendants’ argument
that his exhibits lacked foundation and authentication: “Frazier vehemently
disagrees. The Defendants[’] contend that the Verification of Iryna
Nelipovich lacks foundation. The sole purpose of Paul Lares declaration, and
Iryna Nelipovish [sic] Verification, [which were perjured] was to evict Frazier
from his Unit 426. For the Defendants[’] to contend that the aforesaid lacked
foundation and authentication, and not admissible evidence is disingenuous.
The Defendants[’] comes into this Court with ‘Unclean Hands’.”
9
he did not change the locks, it is unclear why the misunderstanding was not
resolved after he received the three-day notice to cure the alleged violation of
the lease. More importantly, perhaps, Frazier offers no evidence to indicate
that any mistakes or errors by J Street were intentional and malicious,

rather than innocent or merely negligent.8
Beyond these deficiencies, Frazier appears to believe his bare assertion
that he has “evidence” entitles him to exercise his constitutional right to a
trial by jury. Indeed, the entirety of the “Argument” section in his opening
brief focuses on his federal and state jury trial rights. Yet California courts
have repeatedly held that requiring plaintiffs in anti-SLAPP cases to
establish a prima facie case in a summary judgment-type preliminary
procedure does not violate the constitutional right to trial by jury. (Rosenthal
v. Great Western Fin. Securities Corp. (1996) 14 Cal.4th 394, 412; Briggs v.
Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19 Cal.4th 1106, 1123; see also
Lafayette Morehouse, Inc. v. Chronicle Publishing Co. (1995) 37 Cal.App.4th
855, 867 [“[P]roperly construed [former] section 425.16, subdivision (b) does
not violate the right to a jury trial”]; Robertson v. Rodriguez (1995) 36
Cal.App.4th 347, 355 [“This test avoids infringing the right to a jury trial”].)
As with a summary judgment motion (see, e.g., Scott v. Farrar (1983) 139

8 Rather than submitting admissible evidence to provide context for
the Lares statement and contradict any factual assertions on which the
UD action was based, Frazier’s brief chooses to cast aspersions: “For the
respondents[’] to assert that the letter/document of Paul Lares [Lares]
is inadmissible evidence is disingenuous and egregious, especially that
the letter/document therein contains information that is deceitful, dishonest,
unconscionable, reprehensible and dangerous and constitutes ‘unclean hands
conduct’. Any reasonable jury at trial after hearing the evidence regarding
the contents contained therein Lares[’s] letter/document, and the subsequent
actions/conduct of Lares will indeed shock the conscious [sic] of a reasonable
mind.”
10
Cal.App.3d 462, 467), an anti-SLAPP motion merely seeks to ascertain
whether the plaintiff has enough evidence to justify a jury trial. (See
generally Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. United States (1902) 187 U.S. 315, 320.)
The trial court properly granted defendants’ anti-SLAPP motion,
striking Frazier’s complaint.

DISPOSITION

The judgment is affirmed. Defendants are entitled to costs on appeal.

DATO, Acting P. J.
WE CONCUR:

DO, J.

RUBIN, J.

11

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

Connect Omnilex to search the legal corpus from your AI assistant.