People v. Anderson CA4/1

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Filed 11/4/25 P. v. Anderson CA4/1

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
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COURT OF APPEAL, FOURTH APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION ONE

STATE OF CALIFORNIA

THE PEOPLE, D083976

Plaintiff and Respondent,

v. (Super. Ct. No. SCD298789)

KEITH ANDERSON,

Defendant and Appellant.

APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of San Diego County,
Marian F. Gaston, Judge. Affirmed.
Aude Ruffing and Jill Kent, under appointment by the Court of Appeal,
for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief Assistant
Attorney General, Charles C. Ragland, Steve Oetting and Joshua Trinh,
Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Keith Anderson pleaded guilty to two counts of felony hit and run with
injury, in violation of Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a), and an
unrelated count. The trial court sentenced him to two years formal probation
with various terms and conditions, including victim restitution in an amount
to be determined.
On appeal, Anderson contends the trial court abused its discretion
when it ordered him to pay victim restitution for losses incurred as a result
of the underlying collision, where restitution should have been limited to the
damages caused by his act of fleeing. We find no abuse of discretion and
affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

Anderson was driving down a residential block when he struck two
pedestrians, K.G. and D.C. (collectively, the victims), standing on the driver-
side of their parked vehicle. The collision left both victims with serious
injuries that required extensive surgeries and hospitalization. Parts from
Anderson’s vehicle were recovered at the scene of the accident, and a nearby
residence captured his departure on video. Four days later, an officer found
his car and observed major collision damage, including what appeared to be
flesh and blood on the front hood. A week after the accident, Anderson was
located and arrested.
An amended complaint charged him with two counts of felony hit and
run (Veh. Code, § 20001, subd. (a); counts 1 and 2) for the car accident and a
third unrelated crime. Anderson pleaded guilty to all three counts with an
indication from the court that it would consider all options, including
probation. On the written plea form he admitted that he “drove a vehicle
involved in an accident resulting in injury to two people” and “unlawfully
failed to give my name, address and registration number of the vehicle and

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render assistance to any injured person . . . .” His plea included both an
agreement to pay “full restitution to all victims,” as well as a standard
Harvey waiver allowing the court to “consider [his] prior criminal history and
the entire factual background of the case, including any unfiled, dismissed,
or stricken charges or allegations or cases when granting probation, ordering

restitution or imposing sentence.”1
At the sentencing hearing, defense counsel requested the court grant
Anderson probation. Although both the probation department and the
prosecution recommended a prison term of four years and four months, the
defense highlighted Anderson’s willingness to pay victim restitution as a
significant factor in support of the probation request.
The court ultimately determined this to be the sort of unusual case
where justice would be better served by granting probation. Noting
Anderson’s remorse and willingness to comply with probation, the court also
explained that it could not otherwise secure victim restitution—which it
deemed an important objective of sentencing—unless Anderson could return
to work. It then imposed two years of formal probation, with conditions that
included 225 days in county jail and victim restitution in an amount to be
determined. The judge also elected to strike all fines and fees, pointing to the
payment of restitution as being more important. Neither party objected to
the probation conditions.
Following a series of status hearings, the defense requested a
restitution hearing to determine Anderson’s liability for restitution under
Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a). Both parties submitted briefing
in support of their respective positions on the issue. The prosecution sought
victim restitution in the amounts of $87,852.61 and $78,108.21 for medical

1 See People v. Harvey (1979) 25 Cal.3d 754.
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bills, damaged property, and lost income. In contrast, the defense requested
that the court order no restitution at all.
At the restitution hearing, defense counsel argued that the court could
not order the requested amounts without making findings as to liability,
proximate cause, and contributory negligence, issues that should be resolved
in a civil court. The court disagreed, noting that Anderson’s responsibility for
the accident was apparent from the facts. It went on to award victim
restitution in the amounts requested.

DISCUSSION

Anderson contends the trial court exceeded its authority by holding him
responsible for the accident and ordering restitution for the losses incurred
by the two victims. Focusing on the elements of the hit-and-run offense and
the factual basis for his guilty plea, Anderson argues that he only admitted
liability for fleeing the accident—not the accident itself—and there is no
evidence the victims’ injuries were exacerbated by his fleeing. The People
disagree, claiming the court’s award was permitted by Penal Code section

1203.12 and fully supported by the evidence.3 We agree with the People.

2 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
3 As a preliminary matter, we reject the People’s contention that
Anderson’s appeal should be dismissed because it is really a disguised
challenge to the validity of his plea and he obtained no certificate of probable
cause. (See § 1237.5.) They assert that Anderson is really contesting the
court’s ability to award any restitution in this case, which was something he
agreed to pay as part of his plea bargain. Although it was—or at least should
have been—obvious that the victims’ medical expenses would be the basis for
any restitution claim, Anderson is not disputing the trial court’s conceptual
power to order restitution. Rather, he questions the specific categories of
restitution that are appropriate in this case.
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Our Supreme Court has previously addressed the proper scope of
victim restitution orders for hit-and-run convictions in People v. Carbajal
(1995) 10 Cal.4th 1114 (Carbajal) and People v. Martinez (2017) 2 Cal.5th
1093 (Martinez). Although both cases concerned restitution for damages
caused by underlying car accidents, the court reached two substantially
different conclusions based on the underlying source of the restitution order.
In Carbajal, restitution was ordered as a condition of probation under
section 1203.1. (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1119.) The Supreme Court
explained that “[p]robation is generally reserved for convicted criminals
whose conditional release into society poses minimal risk to public safety and
promotes rehabilitation.” (Id. at p. 1120.) A trial court granting probation
has broad discretion to impose conditions that foster rehabilitation and
protect public safety so long as such conditions serve a purpose specified in
section 1203.1. (Id. at pp. 1120–1121.) Restitution may be ordered for losses
not necessarily caused by the criminal conduct underlying the conviction,
including where the loss was caused by related conduct not resulting in a
conviction and by conduct underlying dismissed, uncharged, and even
acquitted counts. (Id. at p. 1121.) There is no requirement that it be “limited
to the exact amount of the loss in which the defendant is actually found
culpable, nor is there any requirement the order reflect the amount of
damages that might be recoverable in a civil action.” (Ibid.) The Carbajal
court concluded that in a hit-and-run case, a trial court does not abuse its
discretion when it orders the defendant to pay restitution for property
damaged in the underlying accident as a condition of probation. (Id. at
pp. 1124–1125.)
In Martinez, a defendant sentenced to prison was ordered to pay
restitution directly to the victim as required by section 1202.4. (Martinez,

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supra, 2 Cal.5th at pp. 1097–1098.) A court’s ability to order restitution is far
more limited in such circumstances, as section 1202.4 only “authorizes trial
courts to order direct victim restitution for those losses incurred as a result
of the crime of which the defendant was convicted.” (Id. at p. 1101, italics
added.) Martinez held that when a trial court issues a nonprobationary
sentence in a hit-and-run case, it may only order direct victim restitution for
losses incurred as a result of the defendant’s unlawful flight from the scene
of the accident. (Id. at p. 1103.)
Taken together, Carbajal and Martinez indicate that the limitations of
section 1202.4 do not apply to restitution orders where probation is granted.
(People v. Woods (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 1045, 1050.) To be sure, the court in
this case did not explicitly state whether it was imposing restitution under
section 1203.1 or 1202.4. But in referencing its “broad” authority to impose
restitution, it is apparent that restitution was ordered as a condition of
Anderson’s probation under section 1203.1. (See Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th
at p. 1120 [“In granting probation, courts have broad discretion to impose
conditions to foster rehabilitation and to protect public safety”].) Even
assuming the record was ambiguous on this point, we would presume the
trial court knew and applied the law correctly. (See People v. Sangani (1994)
22 Cal.App.4th 1120, 1138; see also People v. Koontzy (2024) 102 Cal.App.5th
268, 276–277, 280 [because restitution for collision damages could not be
imposed under § 1202.4, it was necessarily ordered as a probation condition
under § 1203.1].) Accordingly, it is Carbajal that principally guides our
review.
Anderson first argues that the trial court exceeded its authority by
conducting impermissible factfinding to determine who was at fault for the
accident. By concluding he was responsible for causing the collision with the

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victims and ordering restitution on that basis, Anderson claims the trial
court improperly imposed civil liability for the accident and violated his right
to due process.
Carbajal expressly rejects the notion that restitution as a condition
of probation can only be ordered in amounts that were directly caused by
the defendant’s criminal conduct. (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1122
[§ 1203.1 gives the trial court discretion “to order restitution as a condition of
probation where the victim’s loss was not the result of the crime underlying
the defendant’s conviction”].) Moreover, where relevant factual questions
concerning restitution are not resolved by the defendant’s conviction itself,
nothing precludes the trial court from conducting a hearing and making
additional factual findings that relate to the defendant’s conduct. For
instance, in People v. Lent (1975) 15 Cal.3d 481, the Supreme Court
considered a restitution order that included amounts attributable to a charge
of which the defendant was acquitted. Although “[o]rdinarily” it could not
rely on items of loss related to charges of which the defendant was found
not guilty, in that case restitution was only ordered after the trial judge
conducted a two-day court hearing at which he found that the defendant
perjured himself during his trial and was in fact responsible for the full
amount lost. (Id. at p. 487.) The Supreme Court determined that under
these circumstances, the restitution order was proper. (Ibid.)
The facts of this case fall well within the general rule that permits
the court to order restitution as a condition of probation based on “related
conduct not resulting in a conviction.” (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at
p. 1121.) That is especially true here, where Anderson’s plea agreement
included a Harvey waiver that permitted the court to consider “the entire

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factual background of the case” when it determined restitution.4 The
evidence before the court showed that Anderson suffered from a mental
health crisis impacting his judgment; the victims’ car was legally parked and
no one was inside when the collision happened; and his vehicle was located
shortly after with considerable damage including flesh and blood on the front
hood.
Nor is Anderson correct that his due process rights were violated when
the court made additional factual findings to support the restitution order.
The scope of a defendant’s due process rights at a hearing to determine
restitution is limited—so long as defendants are given notice of the amount
requested and have an opportunity to challenge the amount and present
evidence rebutting their liability, their rights are considered protected.
(People v. Baumann (1985) 176 Cal.App.3d 67, 79–80.) Due process does not
require that the narrow constraints of courtroom evidence rules apply when
determining victim restitution. Instead, sentencing judges have virtually

4 In both the trial court and this court, Anderson emphasizes People v.
Escobar (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1504 (Escobar), a case in which the defendant
was similarly convicted under Vehicle Code section 20001, subdivision (a) and
ordered to pay restitution as a condition of probation. According to Anderson,
Escobar holds “a trial court cannot properly conclude that the defendant owes
money to a third party for other unproved or disproved crimes or conduct.”
(Id. at p. 1511.) Escobar gives no indication that the defendant in that case
executed a Harvey waiver in conjunction with his plea. In any event, Escobar
relied on the reasoning in People v. Richards (1976) 17 Cal.3d 614, 620, but
Richards was both distinguished and disapproved in Carbajal, supra, 10
Cal.4th at page 1126.
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unlimited discretion as to the kind of information they can consider.5 (People
v. Prosser (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 682, 692.) This includes evidence that
would otherwise be inadmissible on the issue of guilt. (Baumann, at p. 81.)
“The standard of proof at a restitution hearing is preponderance of the
evidence, not reasonable doubt.” (Holmberg, supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at
p. 1319.)
Here, Anderson had ample notice of the claimed restitution and was
provided a full opportunity to challenge the order. At sentencing, the court
repeatedly specified it expected restitution to be significant. Multiple
restitution hearings were continued to allow each party additional time to
prepare and review the specific amounts requested. The court ultimately
granted Anderson a full hearing on the issue of restitution to address
whether he could be ordered to pay for damages stemming from the accident.
Finally, the restitution order would have been proper even without a
specific factual finding that Anderson caused the accident. Generally
speaking, we review probation conditions for abuse of discretion and will
only invalidate a condition if, under all the circumstances, it is arbitrary,
capricious, and unreasonable. (People v. Moran (2016) 1 Cal.5th 398, 403.)

5 Anderson cites People v. Holmberg (2011)195 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1320
(Holmberg) for the proposition that the trial court can “only consider hearsay,
including ‘the probation report,’ to inquire about the financial value of the
economic losses.” But Holmberg does not discuss hearsay generally or make
any such categorical assertion; it merely quotes People v. Keichler (2005)
129 Cal.App.4th 1039 at page 1048 for the principle that “ ‘ “a hearing to
establish the amount of restitution does not require the formalities of
other phases of a criminal prosecution. [Citation.] When the probation
report includes information on the amount of the victim’s loss and a
recommendation as to the amount of restitution, the defendant must come
forward with contrary information to challenge that amount.” ’ ” (Holmberg,
supra, 195 Cal.App.4th at p. 1320.)
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A condition of probation will not be deemed invalid unless it has no
relationship to the convicted crime, relates to conduct, which is not in itself
criminal, and requires or forbids conduct not reasonably related to future
criminality. (Lent, supra, 15 Cal.3d at p. 486.) All three prongs must be
satisfied to warrant reversal. (People v. Olguin (2008) 45 Cal.4th 375, 379.)
The restitution order in this case is reasonably related to the convicted
crime. Vehicle Code section 20001 aims to prevent drivers involved in injury-
causing accidents from leaving victims in danger and attempting to avoid
criminal or civil liability for the accident by not identifying themselves.
(Escobar, supra, 235 Cal.App.3d at p. 1510.) Although it is true that no
further physical injuries were caused by Anderson’s failure to identify
himself, by unlawfully fleeing the scene of the collision before it could be
investigated he materially interfered with the victims’ right “to have
responsibility for the accident adjudicated in an orderly way according to
the rules of law.” (Carbajal, supra, 10 Cal.4th at p. 1124.)

DISPOSITION

The restitution order is affirmed.

DATO, J.

WE CONCUR:

O’ROURKE, Acting P. J.

KELETY, J.

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