Sahar v. Miller CA1/3

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Filed 11/3/25 Sahar v. Miller CA1/3
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions not certified for
publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion has not been certified for publication or
ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA

FIRST APPELLATE DISTRICT

DIVISION THREE

JOSEPH SAHAR et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
A167830
v.
RAYMOND MILLER et al., (Contra Costa County
Super. Ct. No. C22-00737)
Defendants and Respondents.

Joseph Sahar, Nathan Sahar, and Michele Sahar (jointly, plaintiffs)
voluntarily dismissed their complaint after Raymond Miller filed a special
motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute, Code of Civil Procedure
section 425.161 (anti-SLAPP motion). Following the dismissal, Miller moved
for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the same statute. The trial court
granted the motion.
Plaintiffs appeal from that order, arguing the trial court erred by
permitting Miller to seek fees in what they characterize as a “closed action.”
They further contend the record establishes they would have prevailed on the
merits of their prior claims. We are not persuaded and affirm the trial court’s
order.

1 All undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil

Procedure.

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BACKGROUND
On March 23, 2022, plaintiffs placed into the Wakefield Taylor
Courthouse drop box a complaint against Miller and his client, Said Shefayee
(March complaint). That complaint arose from a prior case (Shefayee Jr. v.
Sahar et al., Super. Ct. Contra Costa County, 2018, No. C18-01416) in which
Miller represented Shefayee in claims alleging unpaid wages, unpaid
overtime, and other Labor Code violations. The March complaint alleged
causes of action for (1) malicious prosecution, (2) abuse of process, (3)
negligent infliction of emotional distress, (4) intentional infliction of
emotional distress and (5) declaratory relief.
On April 18, 2022, plaintiffs filed a duplicative complaint (April
complaint), explaining they were uncertain whether the March complaint had
been accepted by the court. After serving the April complaint on Miller and
Shefayee, plaintiffs received file-stamped copies of the March complaint but
did not serve it at that time.
On June 7, 2022, Miller responded to the April complaint by filing an
anti-SLAPP motion. Miller argued that the filing of a lawsuit constituted an
act in furtherance of the constitutional right to petition, a protected activity
under the statute. He further contended the prior action had not terminated
in plaintiffs’ favor, probable cause existed as demonstrated by the trial court’s
denial of plaintiffs’ summary judgment motion in that action, and the
litigation privilege barred all claims because they arose from his conduct in
filing and maintaining the prior lawsuit.
Plaintiffs did not oppose the anti-SLAPP motion. Instead, on July 12,
2022, they voluntarily dismissed the action without prejudice. In August
2022, plaintiffs amended the March complaint, then served that amended
pleading on Miller in October.

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Following entry of the dismissal of the April complaint, Miller filed a
motion for attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to section 425.16. He argued
(1) the anti-SLAPP statute mandates an award of attorney’s fees to
prevailing defendants, (2) he is presumptively the prevailing party because
plaintiffs dismissed the complaint in response to the anti-SLAPP motion, and
(3) plaintiffs failed to rebut that presumption.
Plaintiffs opposed the motion, asserting Miller had not demonstrated
any entitlement to fees apart from claiming he was the prevailing party.
They further contended the motion lacked relevant factual background, relied
on conclusory allegations, and cited no legal authority establishing Miller as
a prevailing party.
The trial court granted Miller’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs. In
so doing, the court found all the claims against Miller arose from protected
activity—namely, his filing and prosecution of the prior lawsuit. The court
also found plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a probability of prevailing under
the anti-SLAPP statute’s second prong as—apart from the malicious
prosecution claim—their claims were based on communications made in a
judicial proceeding and thus barred by the litigation privilege. In addition,
the court found probable cause existed for the prior action because plaintiffs’
motion for summary judgment was denied on all but one claim.
Accordingly, the court determined Miller was the prevailing party
under section 425.16 and awarded $13,555 in attorney’s fees and costs.
Plaintiffs timely appealed.
DISCUSSION
Plaintiffs raise two arguments on appeal. First, they assert the court
could not consider the motion for attorney’s fees after they dismissed the
action. Second, they contend the court erred in granting fees because they

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would have prevailed on the merits of the prior action had the case not been
dismissed. We disagree.
I. Special Motions To Strike
A SLAPP suit is one in which a plaintiff “seeks to chill or punish a
party’s exercise of constitutional rights to free speech and to petition the
government for redress of grievances.” (Rusheen v. Cohen (2006) 37 Cal.4th
1048, 1055 (Rusheen).) SLAPP suits may be disposed of summarily by a
special motion to strike under section 425.16, which is “a procedure where
the trial court evaluates the merits of the lawsuit using a summary-
judgment-like procedure at an early stage of the litigation.” (Varian Medical
Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35 Cal.4th 180, 192.) The statute provides: “A
cause of action against a person arising from any act of that person in
furtherance of the person’s right of petition or free speech under the United
States Constitution or the California Constitution in connection with a public
issue shall be subject to a special motion to strike, unless the court
determines that the plaintiff has established that there is a probability that
the plaintiff will prevail on the claim.” (§ 425.16, subd. (b)(1).)
Subdivision (e)(2) of section 425.16 identifies a general category of
protected activities of petition or free speech, namely, “any written or oral
statement or writing made in connection with an issue under consideration or
review by a legislative, executive, or judicial body, or any other official
proceeding authorized by law.”
While not all attorney conduct undertaken in connection with litigation
is protected by section 425.16, courts “have adopted ‘a fairly expansive view
of what constitutes litigation-related activities.’ ” (Optional Capital, Inc. v.
Akin Gump Strauss, Hauer & Feld LLP (2017) 18 Cal.App.5th 95, 113.) And,
generally, courts have held “ ‘[t]he filing of lawsuits is an aspect of the First

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Amendment right of petition’ [citation], and thus is a protected activity under
the anti-SLAPP statute.” (Sheley v. Harrop (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 1147, 1165–
1166; Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1056 [acts in furtherance of the right
of petition include “communicative conduct such as the filing, funding, and
prosecution of a civil action.”].)
II. Impact of Dismissal
Plaintiffs argue that their voluntary dismissal of the April complaint
rendered the case closed and left the court without authority to consider any
subsequent filings, including Miller’s motion for attorney’s fees and costs.
Relevant authority holds otherwise.
As a threshold matter, plaintiffs cite no authority supporting their
position. “Appellate briefs must provide argument and legal authority for the
positions taken. ‘When an appellant fails to raise a point, or asserts it but
fails to support it with reasoned argument and citations to authority, we
treat the point as waived.’ ” (Nelson v. Avondale Homeowners Assn. (2009)
172 Cal.App.4th 857, 862.) Plaintiffs’ failure to present supporting authority
or meaningful analysis forfeits their claim that dismissal precluded the trial
court from considering Miller’s fee motion.
Even if we were to reach the merits, plaintiffs’ argument fails. Section
425.16, subdivision (c)(1) provides that “a prevailing defendant on a special
motion to strike shall be entitled to recover that defendant’s attorney’s fees
and costs.” Consistent with that mandate, courts have held that when a
plaintiff voluntarily dismisses an action while an anti-SLAPP motion is
pending, the trial court loses jurisdiction to decide the merits of the motion
but retains limited jurisdiction to award attorney’s fees and costs. (Law
Offices of Andrew L. Ellis v. Yang (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 869, 879; Sylmar
Air Conditioning v. Pueblo Contracting Services, Inc. (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th

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1049, 1054 [“It is settled that a plaintiff may not avoid liability for attorney
fees and costs by voluntarily dismissing a cause of action to which a SLAPP
motion is directed.” (Italics omitted.)].) This rule preserves the statute’s
deterrent purpose by preventing plaintiffs from avoiding fee liability through
strategic or last-minute dismissals. (Ross v. Seyfarth Shaw LLP (2023) 96
Cal.App.5th 722, 733 (Ross).) Accordingly, the court acted within its
jurisdiction in considering and granting Miller’s motion for attorney’s fees
and costs.
III. Prevailing Party
Not every defendant who obtains some relief on a special motion to
strike is a “ ‘prevailing defendant’ ” entitled to attorney’s fees and costs under
the anti-SLAPP statute. (Ross, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at p. 732.) Courts
have developed two distinct frameworks for determining whether a
preadjudication dismissal renders a defendant the “prevailing party” for
purposes of section 425.16, subdivision (c)(1).
In Coltrain v. Shewalter (1998) 66 Cal.App.4th 94 (Coltrain), the
Fourth District Court of Appeal held that an award of attorney’s fees
following a voluntary dismissal is discretionary and turns on whether the
moving party “realized its objectives in the litigation.” (Id. at p. 107.) A
voluntary dismissal creates a rebuttable presumption that the defendant
prevailed, but the plaintiff may overcome that presumption by showing the
dismissal occurred for reasons unrelated to the probability of success on the
merits—such as through a settlement, because the defendant was insolvent,
or for other extrinsic reasons. (Ibid.; see also Ross, supra, 96 Cal.App.5th at
p. 733.) Under Coltrain, courts need not assess the merits of the anti-SLAPP
motion to determine prevailing party status. (Ross, at p. 733; Coltrain, at
p. 107.)

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The Second District Court of Appeal adopted a different approach in
Liu v. Moore (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 745 (Liu). Liu directs courts to consider
the merits of the filed anti-SLAPP motion and determine prevailing party
status based on whether the motion would have been successful had it been
adjudicated. (Id. at p. 752.) This approach ensures fee awards align with the
substantive purpose of section 425.16—to deter meritless claims targeting
protected activity. (See Liu, at p. 752; Tourgeman v. Nelson & Kennard
(2014) 222 Cal.App.4th 1447, 1457.)
We find the reasoning in Liu persuasive and consistent with the
statute’s objectives. As the trial court did here, we evaluate whether the
anti-SLAPP motion would have succeeded on the merits in determining
whether a fee award was appropriate. Our review is de novo. (Grewal v.
Jammu (2011) 191 Cal.App.4th 977, 988.)
A. Protected Activity
An anti-SLAPP motion proceeds in two distinct steps. First, the
moving defendant must establish that the challenged claim arises from
protected activity. (Bonni v. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,
1009.) Second, if that burden is met, the plaintiff must show its claim has
“ ‘at least “minimal merit.” ’ ” (Ibid.) The court will strike the claim if the
plaintiff fails to make this showing. (Ibid.)
Plaintiffs acknowledge “ ‘[a] malicious prosecution action arises from
protected activity under the anti-SLAPP statute,’ ” and the “sole basis” for
Miller’s motion was his assertion that filing a lawsuit constituted protected
activity. They do not dispute this prong; instead, plaintiffs focus their
challenge on the second prong of the analysis, i.e., plaintiffs demonstrated a
likelihood of prevailing on the merits.

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B. Likelihood of Success on Merits
To prevail on the second prong, plaintiffs were required to make a
prima facie showing that they could succeed on the merits of their claims.
While a plaintiff’s burden may not be high, he or she must demonstrate that
the claim is legally sufficient. (Navellier v. Sletten (2002) 29 Cal.4th 82, 93.)
And a plaintiff must show that the claim is supported by “ ‘competent and
admissible evidence.’ ” (Hecimovich v. Encinal School Parent Teacher
Organization (2012) 203 Cal.App.4th 450, 469; Baral v. Schnitt (2016) 1
Cal.5th 376, 396 [plaintiff must show that its claims are “legally sufficient
and factually substantiated,” and the court must determine whether this
“showing, if accepted by the trier of fact, would be sufficient to sustain a
favorable judgment”].)
1. Malicious Prosecution
To prevail on a claim for malicious prosecution, a plaintiff must plead
and prove three elements: (1) the defendant initiated a prior action that was
terminated in the plaintiff’s favor; (2) the prior action lacked probable cause;
and (3) the action was initiated with malice. (Citi–Wide Preferred Couriers,
Inc. v. Golden Eagle Ins. Corp. (2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 906, 911.) As relevant
here, plaintiffs contend they established a lack of probable cause. We
disagree.
The existence of probable cause is a question of law, determined
objectively, asking whether any reasonable attorney would agree the prior
action was completely without merit. (Kinsella v. Kinsella (2020) 45
Cal.App.5th 442, 455 (Kinsella).) A plaintiff is without probable cause for his
or her action if it is based upon facts the plaintiff has no reasonable basis to
believe are true, or based upon a legal theory that is untenable under the
facts known to the plaintiff. (Ibid.)

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Here, the trial court found probable cause existed to defeat the
malicious prosecution claim because plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment
and summary adjudication of multiple claims in the prior action was denied.2
That determination is dispositive. “California courts have long held that
victory in the trial court, even if reversed on appeal, conclusively establishes
the requisite probable cause to have brought the prior action.” (Kinsella,
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 455.) And denial of a summary judgment motion
in the prior action establishes that the claims were not completely
unmeritorious. (Ibid.; Hutton v. Hafif (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 527, 550.)
Plaintiffs do not dispute that their summary judgment motion was
denied. Instead, they argue the lawsuit lacked probable cause because:
(1) the prior complaint filed by Miller was unverified and lacked exhibits;
(2) Miller’s client, Shefayee, did not produce any employment-related
documents; and (3) Shefayee failed to pursue discovery or otherwise
prosecute the action. These assertions, however, do not address the central
fact that Miller successfully defeated their summary judgment motion—an
outcome that independently confirms the existence of probable cause.
Because the trial court’s ruling demonstrates the prior claims could not
have been “ ‘ “ ‘totally and completely without merit,’ ” ’ ” plaintiffs have not
shown a likelihood of success on their malicious prosecution claim. (Kinsella,
supra, 45 Cal.App.5th at p. 455.)
2. Abuse of Process
To prevail on a claim for abuse of process, a plaintiff must show the
defendant (1) acted with an ulterior motive in using the legal process, and

2 While the court granted summary adjudication as to plaintiff Michele

Sahar’s fraudulent transfer cause of action, appellants do not address that
particular claim on appeal and thus that portion of the ruling is not relevant
to this analysis.

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(2) committed a willful act in the use of that process that was improper in the
regular course of the proceedings. (Rusheen, supra, 37 Cal.4th at p. 1057.)
Plaintiffs contend Miller misused discovery in the prior lawsuit for
“ ‘judgment enforcement’ ” and to “intimidate, harass and cause mental
anguish and distress.”
This argument overlooks the trial court’s finding that the litigation
privilege applies and bars the claim. The litigation privilege, codified in Civil
Code section 47, provides that any “publication or broadcast” made in the
course of any “judicial proceeding” is privileged, subject to certain exceptions
not relevant here. (Civ. Code, § 47, subd. (b)(1).) The privilege functions as
an absolute bar to all tort claims—other than malicious prosecution—that are
based on communications made in or related to judicial proceedings. (JSJ
Limited Partnership v. Mehrban (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 1512, 1522.) The
privilege therefore serves as a substantive defense that plaintiffs must
overcome to demonstrate a probability of prevailing. (Ibid.)
Nothing in the record suggests the privilege is inapplicable. To the
contrary, plaintiffs’ claim arises entirely from Miller’s conduct in prosecuting
the prior lawsuit—specifically, his use of discovery tools during litigation.
Such conduct falls squarely within the scope of the litigation privilege, which
“ ‘forecloses the pursuit of’ the abuse of process cause of action” based on acts
undertaken in the course of judicial proceedings. (JSJ Limited Partnership v.
Mehrban, supra, 205 Cal.App.4th at p. 1523.)
Accordingly, the trial court correctly concluded that the litigation
privilege precludes plaintiffs’ abuse of process claim, and plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate a probability of success on the merits.

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3. Remaining Arguments
Plaintiffs make no effort to argue that they demonstrated a likelihood
of success as to any other claims. Instead, they conclusively assert: “Based on
all of the content alleged herein and in the pleadings, the Appellants believe
and assert that they were likely to prevail on the merits of those causes of
action at this stage.” As explained above, points not supported by “ ‘reasoned
argument and citations to authority’ ” are waived. (Nelson v. Avondale
Homeowners Assn., supra, 172 Cal.App.4th at p. 862.)
And finally, plaintiffs assert the amount of attorney’s fees awarded was
excessive for the first time in their reply brief. “ ‘[A]rguments raised for the
first time in a reply will not be considered.’ ” (Sandhu v. Board of
Administration etc. (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 1048, 1080.)
DISPOSITION
The order is affirmed. Miller may recover his costs on appeal. (Cal.
Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)

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PETROU, J.

WE CONCUR:

TUCHER, P. J.

FUJISAKI, J.

A167830 / Sahar v. Miller

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