CourtListener 10715589•Becerra v. Charter Communications CA2/1
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Filed 10/31/25 Becerra v. Charter Communications CA2/1
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION ONE
VICTOR BECERRA, B333509
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. 21STCV14283)
v.
CHARTER COMMUNICATIONS,
INC., et al.,
Defendants and Appellants.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of
Los Angeles County, Gail Killefer, Judge. Affirmed.
Kabat Chapman & Ozmer, Joseph W. Ozmer II, J. Scott
Carr; Latham & Watkins, Roman Martinez and David Steinbach
for Defendants and Appellants.
Law Offices of David R. Denis, David R. Denis and
Armando M. Galvan for Plaintiff and Respondent.
Appellants Charter Communications, Inc., Charter
Communications, LLC, and Charter Communications Holding
Company, LLC (collectively, Charter), moved to compel to
arbitration of respondent Victor Becerra’s lawsuit against Charter.
The court granted the motion. Later, however, the court vacated
its order compelling arbitration based on new Court of Appeal
authority, Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2022) 75
Cal.App.5th 365 (Ramirez I), holding that Charter’s standard
employee arbitration agreement—the same agreement at issue
here—contains unconscionable provisions that cannot be severed.
On appeal, Charter argues the instant agreement contains a
delegation clause that requires an arbitrator to decide all threshold
questions of arbitrability—including whether the agreement is
unconscionable—and thus that the court erred in addressing this
issue and vacating the order compelling arbitration. Because
Charter invited this claimed error by failing to raise the delegation
clause when the court was considering changes to its initial
arbitration order, we decline to reach Charter’s delegation clause
argument on appeal.
Charter argues in the alternative that the court reversibly
erred in concluding Charter’s arbitration agreement contains
unconscionable provisions that cannot be severed. But the
California Supreme Court has since held that all but one of
these provisions is unconscionable. (See Ramirez v. Charter
Communications, Inc. (2024) 16 Cal.5th 478, 495 (Ramirez II).)
And Division Four of this court, on remand from that Supreme
Court decision, has concluded that these provisions cannot be
severed. (See Ramirez v. Charter Communications, Inc. (2025) 108
2
Cal.App.5th 1297, 1305-1307 (Ramirez III).)1 We are bound by the
Supreme Court’s unconscionability analysis and we agree with
Division Four that severance cannot cure the unconscionability the
Supreme Court identified. Accordingly, we affirm.
FACTUAL BACKGROUND
A. The Mutual Arbitration Agreement
Charter hired Becerra in June 2018. As part of Charter’s
online employee onboarding process, Charter presented Becerra
with both a summary and the full contents of a “Mutual
Arbitration Agreement” (the MAA). Becerra checked the box at
the end of the MAA confirming that he had “read, under[stood],
and agree[d] to be legally bound by” the MAA, which he further
understood “require[d] [him] to arbitrate any and all disputes
that arise out of [his] employment, except as expressly provided
otherwise.”2 (Capitalization omitted.)
The MAA provides it “will be governed by the Federal
Arbitration Act [(the FAA)].” It contains a delegation clause
1 The remittitur issued in Ramirez III, supra, 108
Cal.App.5th 1297, on April 29, 2025.
2 The employment application Becerra executed before
Charter hired him also advised Becerra that “[a]ny person
who submits an application for consideration by Charter agrees
to be bound by the terms of [the MAA], where the person and
Charter mutually agree to submit any covered claim, dispute,
or controversy to arbitration. By submitting an application
for consideration you are agreeing to be bound by the [MAA].”
Next to that advisement Becerra selected the answer, “I agree.”
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requiring the parties to arbitrate “all disputes related to the
arbitrability of any claim or controversy.”3
B. Charter’s Motion to Compel Arbitration and
Order Granting It
In 2021, Becerra sued Charter, alleging wrongful
termination and various disability-related claims. Charter
moved to compel arbitration pursuant to the MAA. Charter’s
motion argued, inter alia, that “the parties [had] agreed to
delegate gateway questions to the arbitrator” via the delegation
clause, and thus that “an arbitrator, rather than this court
should determine” any dispute over the arbitrability of Becerra’s
claims. (Capitalization omitted.)
Becerra’s opposition to Charter’s motion did not respond
to Charter’s delegation clause argument or otherwise address
the delegation clause. Instead, Becerra contended that the
entire MAA was unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.
Specifically, Becerra argued provisions regarding statutes
of limitations and attorney fees rendered the entire MAA
unconscionable.
On September 9, 2021, the court granted the motion to
compel arbitration and stayed the case. In its written order,
the court specifically found that “a valid arbitration agreement
exists” and rejected the arguments that there was sufficient
unconscionability for the MAA to be unenforceable. The court
did not address the delegation clause.
3 We address other relevant provisions of the MAA in our
discussion of the parties’ unconscionability arguments below.
4
C. Order Vacating Order Compelling Arbitration
Becerra moved for reconsideration of the September 9,
2021 order compelling arbitration in light of the Court of
Appeal’s February 18, 2022 decision in Ramirez I, supra, 75
Cal.App.5th 365, which held several provisions in the MAA
were unconscionable and not severable. (Id. at pp. 386−387.)
Becerra’s reconsideration motion argued Ramirez was “stare
decisis authority governing and controlling the result in the
present case” (italics omitted), requiring the trial court to vacate
its prior order, find the MAA unenforceable, and deny Charter’s
motion to compel.
On August 16, 2023, the court held a hearing on the
reconsideration motion. Because Becerra filed the motion more
than six months after the statutory deadline (see Code Civ. Proc.,
§ 1008, subd. (a)),4 the court denied it as untimely. The court,
however, in light of Ramirez I and on its own motion, vacated
its prior order compelling arbitration. In an August 31, 2023
minute order so ruling, the court “adopt[ed]” the Ramirez I
decision, identifying the reasoning and holding of the decision
as the sole basis for its ruling. The court did not address the
delegation clause, which neither Ramirez I, nor Becerra’s motion
based thereon, nor Charter’s opposition thereto, had addressed.
DISCUSSION
Charter filed a timely notice of appeal challenging the
August 31, 2023 order vacating the September 9, 2021 order,
which compelled arbitration. Charter argues the delegation
clause is dispositive of the instant appeal and requires reversal.
4 All further statutory references are to the Code of Civil
Procedure.
5
Becerra responds that the order is not appealable and that, in
any case, Charter has forfeited the delegation clause argument.
Charter argues in the alternative that the trial court erred in
both its unconscionability and severance analysis. We conclude
the appeal is properly before this court and affirm.
A. Appealability
Becerra argues that the August 31, 2023 order is
interlocutory and not appealable. (See § 904.1 [addressing
appealability of orders].) But under the California Arbitration
Act, a “party may appeal from an order denying a petition to
compel arbitration. (§ 1294, subd. (a).) When the trial court
vacated its prior order compelling arbitration, it . . . in effect . . .
denied a petition to compel arbitration.” (CPI Builders, Inc. v.
Impco Technologies, Inc. (2001) 94 Cal.App.4th 1167, 1171;
Blake v. Ecker (2001) 93 Cal.App.4th 728, 739 [section 1008,
subdivision (c) order reconsidering an earlier order compelling
arbitration “decide[s] [a] defendant[’s] motion to compel
arbitration”].) Indeed, Becerra’s own reconsideration motion
asked the trial court to “deny[ ] [Charter’s] motion to compel
arbitration.” (Capitalization omitted.) (See § 1008, subd. (c)
[trial court may “reconsider a prior order it entered . . . on its
own motion and enter a different order,” italics added].) The
August 31, 2023 order is thus appealable.
Becerra next argues that “the notice of appeal was defective
because neither [Charter] nor [Charter]’s attorney of record at
the time . . . signed the notice; no notice of association of attorney
or substitution was ever filed to formally make the [signing]
law firm ‘of record.’ ” But the only authority Becerra cites
for this argument is California Rules of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1),
which imposes no requirement that an appellant or his “attorney
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of record” sign a notice of appeal. Other subsections of rule 8.100
refer to a party’s “attorney of record” (see Cal. Rules of Court,
rule 8.100(e)(1) & (e)(2)(A)), but rule 8.100(a)(1) governing
the signatures required on a notice of appeal does not. Rather,
that rule provides in full: “To appeal from a superior court
judgment or an appealable order of a superior court, other
than in a limited civil case, an appellant must serve and file
a notice of appeal in that superior court. The appellant or
the appellant’s attorney must sign the notice.” (Cal. Rules of
Court, rule 8.100(a)(1).) Here, the notice of appeal was signed by
“[a]ttorneys for [Charter]” in conformance with California Rules
of Court, rule 8.100(a)(1).
Becerra’s arguments regarding appealability thus fail.
B. Delegation Clause
Becerra argues that Charter has forfeited any argument
based on the delegation clause, because Charter did not raise
such an argument in response to either Becerra’s motion for
reconsideration or the court’s sua sponte vacatur of the order
compelling arbitration. Charter counters that it timely raised
the delegation clause as a basis for compelling arbitration in its
initial motion to compel arbitration, and that this was sufficient
to preserve the argument for appeal. We disagree.
When initially granting Charter’s motion to compel
arbitration, the court did not rely on the delegation clause.
Rather, it assessed the enforceability of the MAA as a whole and
thereby implicitly rejected the argument that the clause requires
an arbitrator to decide enforceability. Charter nevertheless
had received the relief it was seeking—an order compelling
arbitration—and thus understandably did not object. But when
Becerra later asked the court to reconsider the enforceability of
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the MAA, and when the court chose to do so on its own motion,
Charter did not argue that, under the delegation clause, MAA
enforceability questions are for the arbitrator, not the court.
To the contrary, Charter encouraged the court to reject
Becerra’s unconscionability arguments and conclude the MAA
is enforceable—something Charter had previously argued the
court could not do because of the delegation clause. By not only
failing to raise the delegation clause in connection with these
subsequent motions, but also taking positions inconsistent with
the delegation clause argument previously raised and implicitly
rejected by the court, Charter has at the very least invited
the error of which it now complains. (See Mary M. v. City of
Los Angeles (1991) 54 Cal.3d 202, 212 [“[u]nder the doctrine
of invited error, when a party by its own conduct induces
the commission of error, it may not claim on appeal that the
judgment should be reversed because of that error”]; Norgart v.
Upjohn Co. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 383, 403.) We therefore agree with
Becerra that we should not consider Charter’s delegation clause
argument.5
C. Unconscionability and Severance
Charter challenges the court’s conclusion that the MAA
contains multiple unconscionable provisions. But the California
Supreme Court in Ramirez II has since reached the same
conclusion regarding all but one of the MAA provisions the
trial court here identified. (Ramirez II, supra, 16 Cal.5th
at pp. 495-512.) The trial court thus did not err in concluding
5 Further, there is no reason to believe that an arbitrator
would reach a different result regarding unconscionability than
did the trial court. (See Discussion part C, post.)
8
the MAA contains the following three unconscionable provisions
Ramirez II identifies:
First, under the MAA’s definitions of excluded and
included claims, “a wide range of statutory and policy-based
claims that would typically be initiated by an employee are
directed into arbitration” but “only a small subset of claims
that would typically be initiated by Charter are similarly
directed [the arbitration] . . . [and the MAA] specifically excludes
claims related to intellectual property rights and severance
or noncompete agreements, claims for equitable relief related
to unfair competition or the disclosure of trade secrets or
confidential information, and claims for theft or embezzlement.”
(Ramirez II, supra, 16 Cal.5th at p. 498.) Ramirez II held “th[is]
lack of mutuality in the [MAA’s] covered and excluded claims
clauses was substantively unconscionable” (id. at p. 495) in
the absence of “a justification grounded in something other than
the employer’s desire to maximize its advantage based on the
perceived superiority of the judicial forum.”6 (Ramirez II, supra,
6 Charter implies that we may reach a different
result regarding the included and excluded claims provision
because Ramirez II acknowledged that it would not have
been unconscionable, had Charter established a legitimate
business justification for the provision’s lack of mutuality.
(See Ramirez II, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 499-500.) Although
“a contract can provide a ‘margin of safety’ that provides the
party with superior bargaining strength a type of extra protection
for which it has a legitimate commercial need without being
unconscionable [citation], . . . unless the ‘business realities’ that
create the special need for such an advantage are explained in
the contract itself, which is not the case here, it must be factually
established.” (Stirlen v. Supercuts, Inc. (1997) 51 Cal.App.4th
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16 Cal.5th at p. 496.) Second, the MAA “limits the time for filing
an arbitration claim” (id. at p. 491) in a manner that “ ‘cuts
the period that would otherwise apply to file a [California Fair
Employment and Housing Act (Gov. Code, § 12940 et seq.)
(FEHA)] action in court by as much as two years[ ]’ . . . [and]
raise[s] the possibility that [an employee] would ‘be compelled
to arbitrate before [the Department of Fair Employment and
Housing] has completed its investigation and issued a “right-to-
sue” letter.’ ” (Id. at p. 501.) Third, the MAA addresses “the
allocation of arbitral costs, fees, and expenses” (id. at p. 491) in a
manner that “violate[s] the dictates of FEHA and Armendariz [v.
Foundation Health Psychcare Services, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 83]”
in that it “unambiguously requires an award of attorney fees [to
the opposing party], even if the moving party is a defendant in a
FEHA action and the arbitrator has made no finding of frivolity,
groundlessness, or continued litigation.” (Ramirez II, supra, at
p. 508.) It thus “creates a potential obligation to pay costs only in
an arbitral setting . . . undermin[ing] the public policy embodied
in FEHA’s asymmetric [fee] rule.” (Ibid.)
Ramirez II did not decide whether to sever these
unconscionable provisions from the MAA, but rather set forth
the proper framework for analyzing severance and instructed
the Court of Appeal to apply that framework following
1519, 1536.) Charter did not present evidence establishing
such business realities, despite having an opportunity to do
so in opposing Becerra’s motion for reconsideration. Charter’s
proffered justifications for the lack of mutuality on appeal are
thus insufficient for us to distinguish the Supreme Court’s
analysis of the excluded and included claims provision in
Ramirez II.
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remand. (See Ramirez II, supra, 16 Cal.5th at pp. 517-518.) In
Ramirez III, Division Four applied this framework and concluded
that the provisions were not severable. (Ramirez III, supra,
108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1300.) We agree with Ramirez III ’s
analysis that the unconscionable provisions are not severable
because they (1) are not collateral to the MAA’s main purpose
of “subject[ing] the employee to arbitration ‘ “as a means of
maximizing employer advantage” ’ ” and (2) cannot be severed
without further reforming or augmenting the MAA. (Id. at
pp. 1305-1307.)
Division Four went on to note that “[i]n any event, even
if we agreed with Charter that the unconscionable provisions
are collateral to the contract’s main purpose and it is possible to
sever those provisions, severance is still not warranted because
‘enforcing the balance of the contract would [not] be in the
interests of justice.’ ” (Ramirez III, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at
p. 1306.) We do not view this additional conclusion as necessary
to the core holding of Ramirez III. Nor do we view the
“interests of justice” concept as an independent basis for
declining to sever a term under Ramirez II.7 But we need not
agree with Ramirez III ’s alternative reasoning in this regard
in order to agree with the decision’s core analysis and holding
7 Charter argues on appeal that the Federal Arbitration
Act preempts the “interests of justice” aspect of the Ramirez II
severance framework. Because we do not rely on this concept,
we need not and do not address Charter’s argument.
11
that the MAA’s unconscionable provisions are not severable. 8
(Ramirez III, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1305-1307.)
Charter argues the court necessarily abused its discretion
because it applied the incorrect severance framework—that
is, because the court did not apply the Ramirez II severance
analysis, which the California Supreme Court had not yet
created. But here, based on Ramirez III ’s analysis of the
same MAA provisions under the correct and current severance
framework, we may conclude the trial court reached the correct
result, albeit for different reasons.
Finally, in arguing we should reach a different conclusion
regarding the MAA than did the California Supreme Court
and Division Four, Charter notes that Becerra did not initially
challenge some of the provisions Ramirez II held to be
unconscionable, but instead raised these arguments for the
first time in his motion for reconsideration. Charter argues that
we therefore must limit our unconscionability and severance
analysis to the provisions Becerra challenged at the outset of
the proceedings, and that this would lead to a different result
8 Division Four also rejected a request by Charter to
remand the severance issue to the trial court. (Ramirez III,
supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at p. 1305.) In so doing, the Court of
Appeal noted the Supreme Court could have, but did not,
instruct that the trial court should decide severance under
the new framework. (Ibid.) Although this reasoning does not
directly apply here, it is instructive that the Supreme Court
did not consider it necessary for the trial court to apply the new
severance framework in the first instance. In any event, even
if we were to remand to the trial court, it would be bound to
follow Ramirez III ’s holding on the severability of these MAA
provisions.
12
regarding severance than Ramirez III reaches. But we are not
reviewing an order granting that reconsideration motion; we are
reviewing one in which the court acted on its own motion and
reconsidered its prior ruling. Thus, the court, not Becerra,
determined the scope of what it was addressing. Becerra’s
decisions on when to challenge what provisions in the MAA
do not affect the court’s inherent authority to address all
provisions the court viewed as unconscionable. (See Le Francois
v. Goel (2005) 35 Cal.4th 1094, 1108 [“[i]f a court believes one
of its prior interim orders was erroneous, it should be able to
correct that error no matter how it came to acquire that belief”].)
Moreover, Charter had the opportunity to (and did) brief
the unconscionability of the larger group of provisions in its
opposition to Becerra’s motion for reconsideration.
We therefore hold the trial court here did not abuse
its discretion in declining to sever the same unconscionable
provisions at issue in Ramirez III.
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DISPOSITION
The court’s August 31, 2023 order is affirmed. The parties
shall bear their own costs on appeal.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
ROTHSCHILD, P. J.
We concur:
BENDIX, J.
WEINGART, J.
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