CourtListener 10715582•People v. Foldgers CA2/8
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Filed 10/31/25 P. v. Foldgers CA2/8
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
DIVISION EIGHT
THE PEOPLE, B339258
Plaintiff and Respondent, (Los Angeles County
Super. Ct. No. XNOMA072186-02)
v.
DELVON FOLDGERS,
Defendant and Appellant.
APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los
Angeles County, Daviann L. Mitchell, Judge. Reversed with
directions.
Keilana Truong, under appointment by the Court of
Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
Attorney General, Scott A. Taryle and David A. Voet, Deputy
Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
——————————
Delvon Foldgers appeals an order partially denying his
request for resentencing pursuant to Penal Code1 section
1172.75. We reverse the order because Foldgers was entitled to
have the court consider his eligibility for relief under Assembly
Bill No. 333.
FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
On October 16, 2018, Foldgers pleaded no contest to assault
with a semiautomatic firearm in violation of section 245,
subdivision (b) and two counts of second degree robbery in
violation of section 211. He also admitted that the assault and
one of the robberies were committed for gang purposes within the
meaning of section 186.22, subdivisions (b)(1)(B), (C) and that he
personally used a firearm in violation of sections 12022.53,
subdivision (b) and 12022.5, subdivision (a). He admitted a prior
“strike” conviction within the meaning of sections 1170.12, 667,
subdivisions (b)–(j) and a prior prison term within the meaning of
section 667.5, subdivision (b).
On October 17, 2018, the trial court sentenced Foldgers to
an aggregate term of 40 years in prison. The sentence included
10-year and 20-month gang enhancements and a one-year prior
prison term enhancement.
In 2022, the California Department of Corrections and
Rehabilitation identified Foldgers as an individual who had been
sentenced to a now-invalid one-year prior prison term
enhancement. On April 12, 2024, Foldgers filed a motion for
recall and modification of sentence. On June 18, 2024, the People
filed opposition to the motion. On June 21, 2024, the trial court
1 Undesignated statutory references are to the Penal Code.
2
struck the one-year prior prison term, acknowledged it had the
discretion to grant a full resentencing, but declined to exercise its
discretion to further reduce Foldgers’s sentence. Foldgers was
resentenced to 39 years. His new sentence still includes the 10-
year and 20-month gang enhancements. Notably neither
Foldgers nor his counsel asked the trial court to determine
whether the gang enhancements were still valid given the
passage of Assembly Bill No. 333. This appeal followed.
DISCUSSION
I. Section 1172.75 Resentencing Renders Foldgers’s
Judgment Non-Final
Foldgers entered the world of non-final judgments when he
was returned to the trial court under section 1172.75 for recall
and resentencing. Section 1172.75 provides that “[a]ny sentence
enhancement that was imposed prior to January 1, 2020,
pursuant to subdivision (b) of Section 667.5, except for any
enhancement imposed for a prior conviction for a sexually violent
offense as defined in subdivision (b) of Section 6600 of the
Welfare and Institution Code is legally invalid.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (a).) The Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation
must notify the trial court of any person serving a prison term
that includes a section 667.5 enhancement. Once the trial court
verifies the current judgment includes the enhancement, “the
court shall recall the sentence and resentence the defendant.”
(§ 1172.75, subd. (c).) When resentencing the defendant, “[t]he
court shall apply the sentencing rules of the Judicial Council and
apply any other changes in law that reduce sentences or provide
for judicial discretion so as to eliminate disparity of sentences
and to promote uniformity of sentencing.” (Id., subd. (d)(2);
3
People v. Saldana (2023) 97 Cal.App.5th 1270, 1276 [section
1172.75 requires a full resentencing, not merely that the trial
court strike the newly “invalid” enhancements].) By the plain
language of the statute, Foldgers was entitled to be considered for
any legislative enactments that might provide for a reduction of
sentence.
II. Assembly Bill No. 333 Applies Retroactively to Non-
Final Judgments.
Case law also entitles Foldgers to a full resentencing with
consideration given to his eligibility for ameliorative legislative
benefits. In the criminal law context, when ameliorative
legislation goes into effect, we generally presume the Legislature
intends the benefits of the new enactment to apply as broadly as
constitutionally permissible to all non-final cases. (In re Estrada
(1965) 63 Cal.2d 740, 745 (Estrada).) For purposes of Estrada,
the test for finality is “whether the criminal prosecution or
proceeding as a whole is complete.” (People v. Esquivel (2021)
11 Cal.5th 671, 679.) The meaning of finality in the Estrada
context is distinct from the issue of whether a judgment is final
for purposes of appealability. (Ibid.)
In People v. Lopez (2025) 17 Cal.5th 388, the Supreme
Court was called upon to determine whether a judgment, or part
of it, becomes final for Estrada purposes based on an appellate
court’s affirmance of a conviction, while sentencing issues remain
pending before the superior court following remand. It held that
a criminal case in which the sentence is not yet final, including
one in which an appellate court has affirmed the conviction and
remanded for reconsideration of sentencing-related issues, is not
final for purpose of Estrada, and the retroactive application of the
4
benefit of supervening ameliorative legislation. (Lopez, at pp.
392–393.)
In 2021, the Legislature passed Assembly Bill No. 333
(2021–2022 Reg. Sess.) (Assembly Bill 333), enacting the STEP
Forward Act of 2021. (Stats. 2021, ch. 699, § 1.) “Assembly Bill
333 made the following changes to the law on gang
enhancements. First, it narrowed the definition of a ‘criminal
street gang’ to require that any gang be an ‘ongoing, organized
association or group of three or more persons.’ (§186.22, subd. (f),
italics added.) Second, whereas section 186.22, former
subdivision (f), requires only that a gang’s members ‘individually
or collectively engage in’ a pattern of criminal activity in order to
constitute a ‘criminal street gang,’ Assembly Bill 333 requires
that any such pattern have been ‘collectively engage[d] in’ by
members of the gang. (§ 186.22, subd. (f), italics added.) Third,
Assembly Bill 333 also narrowed the definition of a ‘pattern of
criminal activity’ by requiring that (l) the last offense used to
show a pattern of criminal gang activity occurred within three
years of the date that the currently charged offense is alleged to
have ben committed; (2) the offenses were committed by two or
more gang ‘members,’ as oppose to just ‘persons’; (3) the offenses
commonly benefitted a criminal street gang; and (4) the offenses
establishing a pattern of gang activity must be ones other than
the currently charged offense. (§ 186.22, subd. (e)(1), (2).)
Fourth, Assembly Bill 333 narrowed what it means for an offense
to have commonly benefitted a street gang, requiring that any
‘common benefit’ be ‘more than reputational.’ (§ 186.22,
subd. (g).)” (People v. Tran (2022) 13 Cal.5th 1169, 1206.)
Assembly Bill 333 took effect on January 1, 2022 and is
considered ameliorative legislation. (Lopez, supra, 17 Cal.5th at
5
p. 397; People v. E.H. (2022) 75 Cal.App.5th 467, 477.) In Lopez
the California Supreme Court held that Assembly Bill 333
applies to cases where a defendant is resentenced pursuant to
section 1172.75, even where there was a negotiated plea
agreement. (Lopez, at p. 400.) Here, both parties agree, as do
we, that Foldgers was entitled to the benefit of Assembly Bill 333
because his judgment was not final when the court engaged in
resentencing pursuant to section 1172.75. They also agree, as do
we, that the trial court should have considered the applicability
of Assembly Bill 333 in the context of Foldgers’s resentencing
under section 1172.75, whether or not his counsel brought the
issue to the attention of the court. By its express language,
section 1172.75 itself puts the onus on the trial court to “apply
any other changes in law that reduce sentences.” (§ 1172.75,
subd. (d)(2).) Assembly Bill 333 is such a law and should have
been addressed by the trial court.2
2 We decline to address Foldgers’s argument that the
prosecution may not withdraw its assent to the plea agreement if
the trial court indicates its intent to further reduce the sentence.
We deem resolution of this question here premature. Our
Supreme Court initially granted review of this same question in
People v. Montgomery but transferred the case back to the court
of appeal in light of passage of Assembly Bill No. 2483 and the
addition of section 1171. (People v. Montgomery (2024)
100 Cal.App.5th 768, review granted May 29, 2024, S284662,
review dism. Dec. 18, 2024; Stats. 2024, ch. 964, § 2, eff. Jan. 1,
2025.) The court of appeal subsequently vacated its decision in
People v. Montgomery, and remanded the matter back to the trial
court for a resentencing hearing complying with section 1172.75,
and noting section 1171 provides, in part, that in postconviction
resentencing hearings, including those under section 1172.75,
trial courts have “jurisdiction to modify every aspect of the
6
DISPOSITION
The order is reversed and the matter is remanded with
directions to the trial court to determine whether the gang
sentencing enhancements meet the requirements of Assembly
Bill 333.
NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
STRATTON, P. J.
We concur:
WILEY, J.
*
RUBIN, J.
defendant’s sentence,” and “[a]ny changes to a sentence shall not
be a basis for a prosecutor or court to rescind a plea agreement.”
(People v. Montgomery (Jan. 14, 2025, A167813) [nonpub. opn.];
§ 1171, subd. (c)(2), (3).)
* Retired Presiding Justice of the California Court of Appeal,
Second District, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article
VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.
7
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